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Preface
Economic history and development economics are both interested in the develop-
ment of economy from poor agrarian society to emerging state through agricultural
development and industrialization. While historical studies are concerned with the
long-term development of specific countries, regions, and the world, development
studies are mainly interested in the short-term development of low-income and
middle-income economies across the world. The former generally adopt descriptive
and interpretative approach because detailed statistical data suitable for econometric
analyses are usually unavailable, whereas the latter often use econometric tech-
niques based on survey data which are available only for a short period of time in
certain locations. Yet, it is clear that the issues addressed by these two strands of
economics discipline are no different and that the two types of analyses are highly
complementary. Nonetheless, economic historians and development economists
have seldom collaborated in the past. This study is a unique attempt to synthesize
studies of economic histories and development economics.
Authors of this volume strongly believe that in order to grasp the evolutionary
process of economic development towards the emerging state, which is the main
theme of the entire project leading to four volumes including this one, a synthesis of
historical and development studies is indispensable. Why did Meiji Japan succeed
in economic development through fairly rapid industrialization to become an
emerging state, while India and China followed different paths of economic
development and took longer to emerge as powerful emerging states? What was the
role of agriculture in the development of prewar Japanese economy as well as
high-performing Asian countries in the postwar period? Why has sub-Saharan
Africa (SSA) largely failed in both agricultural development and industrialization
so far? What are the lessons to be learned from the Asian experiences for the future
development path of SSA towards the emerging state? Considering that interna-
tional trade was surprisingly active in the economic history of East, Southeast, and
South Asia, it is highly relevant for this volume to inquire exactly how and why
local, regional, and long-distance trade played such crucial roles in the historical
development of Asian economies, while it did much less in the recent development
of the economies of SSA. These are the questions that authors of this book
v
collectively address. Some chapters were written by economic historians while
others by development economists. All of them collaborated through repeated
workshops in the course of preparing this volume for the last 5 years. We believe
that the questions raised above are pertinent for proper understanding of the issue of
emerging economy and state.
A large number of people have contributed to the preparation of this book. In
particular, we would like to thank Gareth Austin, Chris Baker, Linda Grove, Tetsuji
Okazaki, Tirthankar Roy, Osamu Saito, Takashi Shiraishi, Tetsushi Sonobe, Keiichi
Tsunekawa, and Bin Wong for useful comments during the workshops and on the
earlier versions of various chapters. We are also grateful to GRIPS staff, Yu Ito,
Eriko Kimura, and Yasuko Takano for their dedicated assistance for organizing the
seminars and workshops, and to Fumiyo Aburatani, Yumiko Iwasaki, and Aya
Yamamoto for editorial assistance.
Funding for our project leading to this book publication was provided by Japan
Society for Promotion of Science (JSPS) KAKENHI Grant numbers 25101001,
25101002, 25101003, and 15K2178. We highly appreciate the financial support of
JSPS.
Kobe, Japan Keijiro Otsuka
Kyoto, Japan Kaoru Sugihara
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Chapter 1
Multiple Paths to Industrialization:




This volume addresses the issue of how a country, which was incorporated into
the world economy as a periphery, could create a path of economic development
and industrialization as the ‘emerging state’ in Asia and Africa. We offer historical
and contemporary case studies of development paths, as well as the international
background under which a transition to the emerging state was successfully made,
delayed or failed.
In this chapter I describe how diverse paths of economic development emerged
in various regions of the world, and show that interactions of such ‘multiple paths’,
rather than the diffusion of modern technology and institutions fromWestern Europe
to the rest of the world, determined the timing and pace of global industrialization
over the last two centuries. The industrial revolution in England, which began in the
late eighteenth century, was first transmitted to Continental Europe, the United States
and Japan in the ‘long’ nineteenth century. During the period of interwar instability
and after World War II, a variety of state-led industrialization programs, including
socialist models, were implemented, which had varying degrees of success. The
diffusion of industrialization has been often interpreted along the Gerschenkronean
framework of ‘advantage of backwardness’ and late development (Gerschenkron
1962; Austin 2013, 288–90). In a broad sense, any state engaged in ‘catching-up’
industrialization qualifies the emerging state. Thus the first type of the emerging state
exploits its respective factor endowment advantages in relation to the more advanced
countries. If an Asian country such as Japan is labour abundant and capital scarce,
she might focus on the development of labour-intensive industries, in addition to
fostering capital-intensive ones for political and military reasons.
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Meanwhile, as early development economists such as W. A. Lewis pointed out,
many countries of Asia and Africa under colonial rule or domination were not given
the chance to industrialize, either because industrializedWest sought an international
divisionof labourwhere the latter specialized inmanufacturedgoodswhile the former
was encouraged to specialize in primary products, or, perhaps more fundamentally,
because resource and environmental constraints in Asia and Africa, especially their
tropical parts, made it difficult for their people to raise agricultural productivity, thus
depressing the chance to increase the real wage and the opportunity to train labour
(Lewis 1954, 1970).
Another, somewhat related line of development was the state-led, import-
substitution industrialization strategy, pursued in India and China among others,
which aimed at political and economic independence at the cost of seeking gains
from international trade and technological transfer from advanced countries, espe-
cially the United States. The idea of ‘import-substitution’ was widely shared among
the leaders of newly independent states, crossing over the political division between
non-allied and socialist countries, which reflected their experiences as a ‘periphery’
and the impact of ‘forced’ free trade. In general, this form of ‘third world industrial-
ization’ and ‘state-led development’ did not successfully close the gap between the
‘North’ and the ‘South’ in terms of per capita GDP or living standards. Nor was it
often associated with democracy. But in all cases the state played a powerful role
in determining the type of industrialization with varied implications for economic
growth and living standards. Industrialization of China in the Mao period, in spite of
its stormy politics, left a particularly lasting impression for the study of the role of
the state in economic development, not least because it contributed to the improve-
ment of health and education of a very large number of people. Thus the second
type of the emerging state as a driver of industrialization came out of the ideology
of politico-economic independence and import-substitution, rather than as a result
of the exploitation of factor endowment advantages.
A major change came from the western rim of the Pacific in the post-war period.
In contrast to Japan’s late development since theMeiji period, which we term labour-
intensive industrialization and categorize as the first type of the emerging state, the
Japanese high economic growth in the 1950s and the 1960s resulted in a rapid con-
vergence of per capita GDP to advanced western countries. This could be seen as an
extensionof pre-war labour-intensive industrialization to a large extent in that its com-
parative advantage remained firmly in relatively cheap, competitive labour. Newly
Industrializing Economies (NIEs) and some Southeast Asian countries adopted the
strategy of export-oriented industrialization also by taking advantage of cheap, com-
petitive labour and by meeting the demand from the mass-consumer markets of
advanced countries (Sugihara 2013). Then, some states, such as Japan, South Korea
and Taiwan, also began to take on the task of creating competitive capital- and
resource-intensive industries, and successfully pursued them. This is ‘developmen-
talism’, which relies the legitimacy of its existence on growth, willing to go beyond
the simple pursuit for exploiting its factor endowment advantages. The state could
exercise power to promote industrial technology, build infrastructure and mobilize
human and natural resources by prioritizing growth over democracy, equality and
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environmental concerns.1 The ‘developmental state’ with commitment to interna-
tional trade and growth ideology thus constitutes the third type of the emerging state.
It is worth noting that this regional development occurred when mainland China and
India were largely outside the orbit of the international economy.
Set against the high economic growth at the western rim of the Pacific, China and
India made policy changes around 1979 and 1991 respectively, to re-enter the inter-
national economy. There too a fusion between capital-intensive and labour-intensive
paths took place, that is, emphasis on capital-intensive, heavy industries (represented
by steel and machinery sectors) was eventually replaced by or absorbed into the
industrialization strategy with attention to a greater range of industries, including
those which were more employment-generating and human-capital-intensive. Thus
the growth of the Asia-Pacific economy and regional integration accelerated, and
led global industrialization. By the end of the twentieth century the majority of
world population lived in industrialized or rapidly industrializing countries, espe-
cially in Asia. It is now spreading to the rest of the world. Some emerging economies
have built their economy on resource exports and trade, while some states lack the
experience of centralized administration. But global industrialization emerged as a
formidable force, both as an economic competition and as an ideology, regardless of
the preparedness of each developing country. It is this global process of transition
that provides the economic context of the rise of emerging states today.
Is there any theory that can explain the timing, pace and underlying causes of
this process? This chapter suggests that the key to answering this question lies in the
examination of the ways in which regional trade, long distance trade and technol-
ogy transfer successively released local and regional resource constraints in various
parts of the world. Local and regional resource constraints, such as shortage of land,
scarcity of water and the lack of access to biomass energy, would reduce the chance
for securing food and other necessities, hence a sustainable path of economic devel-
opment. Intercontinental trade may provide export outlets, while advanced countries
could provide technology, capital and human resources, to build an infrastructure
and offer advice on policy. From the point of view of a developing country, however,
imported resources had to find matching local ones to make economic sense. Earn-
ings from primary exports had to be translated into securing livelihood goods, which
normally meant securing supplies locally or through regional trade. Intra-regional
trade couldmitigate local resource constraints at a criticalmoment (think of famines).
Likewise, modern technology and institutions had to be adapted to the local context
of production and consumption. Machinery and means of transport had to adapt to
local factor endowment conditions and the effective use of traditional technology and
resources (When necessary, the material for the frame of the power-loom, made by
steel, temporarilywent back towood,whilemodern factories and railways resorted to
the use of timber, instead of coal, for fuel). Above all, the industrialization drive had
to be supported by (thus ‘embedded’ in) the agricultural economy and population;
There technology and institutions would change only very slowly. It is the nature and
1For discussion on the effects of developmentalism and the developmental state on the environment,
see Sugihara (2017).
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mechanism of these ‘multiple paths’ to industrialization and the role various kinds
of emerging states played in them that need to be understood.
In the next section we describe the emergence of a three-tier international division
of labour where capital-intensive industrialization, labour-intensive industrialization
and exports of primary products characterized each region, mainly referring to the
period up to World War II. In the third section we focus on the growth of intra-Asian
trade, to show local and regional agencies for the growth of world economy and trade.
It contributed to labour-intensive industrialization, as well as the growth of the export
economy of primary products. The fourth section extends the discussion from the
pre-war to the post-war period, and comments on the industrialization experiences of
EastAsia, and SoutheastAsia, from the perspective of the region’s respective position
in the world economy. The final section discusses the role of the emerging state in
relation to industrialization and economic development of Sub-Saharan Africa.
1.2 Emergence of a Three-Tier International Division
of Labour
1.2.1 The Beginning
Before 1800, most local agricultural societies in Asia and Europe developed a system
of production and reproduction by accepting local resource constraints, imposed
by nature. Reflecting a large ‘population-carrying capacity’ of monsoon Asia (see
Sugihara 2017), 66% of world population is thought to have lived in Asia, and
22% in Europe in 1820 (Maddison 2009). The fate of many societies was only
partially altered or complemented by regional or intercontinental trade, although
some societies were affected by the more drastic interventions such as epidemics
and violence. In Asia the arrival of knowledge from outside was often not taken
advantage of, unless enlightened rulers made it compatible with the technologies
and institutions governing local and regional systems. Thus the Malthusian logic
prevailed, even in the early modern period when a gradual but sustained expansion
of the market occurred in several core regions of the world (Richards 2003). The
balance between population and food had to be retained in the long run.
In what ways was this Malthusian trap overcome? In the “European miracle” nar-
rative, technological breakthroughs during the period from the scientific revolution
to the industrial revolution have been highlighted, and accompanying institutional
developments, especially emergence of the nation state and the regime of private
property rights, have been identified as essential conditions for industrialization and
economic growth (Jones 1981). Once agricultural productivity rose and coal became
available in some places, major resource constraints such as shortage of land and dan-
ger of deforestation began to be significantly eased. Cheap coal helped the diffusion
of steam engines inmodern factories and transport sectors. Overseas expansion aided
by the development of navigation andmilitary technologies also helped ease regional
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resource constraints, through the imports of rawmaterials and food. Pomeranz called
such a resource bonanza ‘coal and North America’ (Pomeranz 2000). By the early
nineteenth century the environmental conditions of Western Europe largely ceased
to constrain economic growth. By the second half of the nineteenth century intercon-
tinental trade centering on the Atlantic but also involving Asia grew, and formed an
international division of labour whereWestern Europe exported manufactured goods
to, and imported primary products from, the rest of the world.
However, this was a solution specific to Western Europe. The ways in which
resource constraints were eased in the subsequent process of global industrialization
differed region by region (Sugihara 2015a). The level of constraints in the United
States and other regions of recent European settlement (such as Canada, Australia
and New Zealand) was much lower than that inWestern Europe in some crucial mea-
sures (such as land and biomass stock), making room for them, especially the United
States, to pursue an even more capital- and resource-intensive path than countries in
WesternEurope. InEastAsia,meanwhile, landwasmuchmore scarce relative to pop-
ulation, and people were fed, clothed and organized quite differently, mainly through
rice farming and associated proto-industry and social institutions. It created the more
labour-intensive and eventually resource-saving path (for the socio-ecological foun-
dations for this path, see Oshima 1987). In other words, neither the United States
nor East Asia followed the pathWestern Europe had created. The critical importance
of the availability of water, and the frequency of epidemics and natural disasters,
especially in the tropical parts of Asia, Africa and Latin America, further signaled
the difference of resource endowments of various regions of the world, hence the
impossibility of conceptualizing the relationship between industrialization and the
environment on the basis of the experience of Western Europe.
1.2.2 The Western Supremacy and Reorganization of Asian
Industries
Between 1750 and 1840 an overwhelming proportion of world industrial produc-
tion, mostly un-mechanized, was located in Asia, especially in China and India (see
Fig. 1.1). Even in 1840 the impact ofmechanized industrieswas limited. In industrial-
izing Europe a half of textile production was still un-mechanized. By 1910 the world
market of textiles was dominated by the modern English cotton textile industry. The
decline of traditional industries, especially cotton textile industry in India (and to a
lesser extent China), was a serious global event that involved a loss of employment
on an unprecedented scale (Bagchi 1976; Roy 2005: 106–15). Asia’s share in world
GDP declined from 60% in 1820 to 25% in 1913, while that of Western Europe rose
from 20 to 31%, and North America from 2 to 20% in these years (Maddison 2009).
This mainly reflected the widening gap in real wages between Asia and the West,
although the growth of GDP in North America reflected the rapid growth of migrant
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Fig. 1.1 Geographical composition of world industrial production, 1750–1913. Source and Note
Bairoch (1982: 292). In Bairoch’s overall data Japan is included in ‘developed countries’, but I
reclassified her under ‘developing countries’, as this Figure refers to the period up to 1913
of tea, rice, sugar, tin, rubber, raw cotton, raw silk, raw jute and wheat. Thus an
international division of labour emerged between industrialized West as exporters of
manufactured goods, and Asia as exporters of primary products. The environmen-
tal implication of this division of labour was the transfer of (mainly land-derived)
natural resources from the latter to the former, in exchange for the improvement of
transport, urbanization and mass-produced consumer goods. Industrialization in this
context has typically been portrayed as an agent of both resource exploitation and
the diffusion of modern science and technology.
However, Asia’s response to Western impact also contained another feature,
namely labour-intensive industrialization. Asia was not just de-industrialized but
was reorganized into a new form of industrialization. Thus there were two differ-
ent routes of diffusion of industrialization, the capital-intensive route originating in
the West, and the labour-intensive one originating in the East. In addition, the latter
tended to be less resource-intensive than the former. I describe below the emergence
of a three-tier international division of labour between capital-intensive manufac-
tured goods, labour-intensive manufactured goods and primary products, and an
increasingly uneven global resource allocation in favour of Europe and regions of
recent European settlement, in the period from the nineteenth century to the 1930s. I
also suggest that this three-tier structure was developed into the main pattern of the
international division of labour by the end of the twentieth century.
First, the growth of theAtlantic economy represents themain global route to indus-
trialization in terms of leading technological and institutional developments. Coun-
tries in Continental Europe and the regions of recent European settlement achieved
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industrialization by learning new technology and/or by importing capital, labour
and machinery with their export earnings. In the New World, the integration of vast
natural resources into the international economy served as the engine of economic
growth. Labour was scarce and land and other resources were abundant, and the
difference in factor endowments between the old and the new worlds induced a
growth of trade, migration and investment. In the nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries, the growth of the Atlantic economy was prominent in intercontinental
trade. An implication of this development was that the regions of recent European
settlement had a better incentive than Britain to raise labour productivity, using abun-
dant natural resources and employing imported capital. The movement towards the
development of labour-saving, capital-intensive and resource-intensive technology
was most clearly observed in the United States (for the significance of different fac-
tor endowments behind different institutions within the Americas, see Engerman and
Sokoloff 2011). The need to save skilled labour led to standardization of industrial
production such as the use of transferable parts, which in turn facilitated the transfer
of technology across industries and the development of mass production, as well as
‘deskilling’ of labour. Industrialization became associated with the exploitation of
economies of scale.
The American frontier was exhausted around 1890, and by the early 1920s migra-
tion from Europe ceased to be encouraged. But American technology continued to
lead the world, by raising labour productivity through automation, the introduction
of more systematic labour management and mass marketing. Looking back from the
twenty-first century, the British industrial revolution only began to show the explo-
sive power of labour-saving technology through the use of coal and steam engines,
and merely paved the way for a fuller replacement of skilled labour by capital and
technology. Therefore, although the conditions for the industrial revolution may
have been laid in Europe, the ‘Western path’, with emphasis on capital-intensive and
resource-intensive technology, arguably only became fully established as a result of
the growth of the Atlantic economy.
As far as the direction of technology and institutions is concerned, the Soviet
model of ‘big push’ resembled the American one, in so far as it was capital- and
resource-intensive. In this model emphasis on heavy and chemical industries, and
on high-technology sectors backed by the state, was quite explicit. Although some
aspects of these industrialization strategies were successful (see Allen 2005), many
socialist economies eventually failed to foster internationally competitive industries.
Second, a different model developed in Asia. Although earlier efforts tended to
attempt at a direct transfer of Western technology and institutions, the Japanese gov-
ernment by the 1880s had developed an industrialisation strategy quite distinct from
such attempts. Recognizing that both land and capital were scarce, while labour was
abundant and of relatively good quality, the new strategy was to encourage active use
of the tradition of labour-intensive technology, modernisation of traditional indus-
try, and conscious adaptation of Western technology to different conditions of factor
endowment. The path Japan developed can be termed ‘labour-intensive industrialisa-
tion’, as it absorbed and utilised labour more fully and depended less on the replace-
ment of labour by machinery and capital than the Western path. Some traditional
8 K. Sugihara
industries not only survived but developed. For example, hand-weaving industry
sustained a large employment with the use of machine-made yarn, contributing to
the development of a market for mass consumer goods by combining the efficiency
of machine made intermediate goods with traditional clothing patterns.
The comparative advantage of labour-intensive industries in Asia was reinforced
by the divergence through the growth of real wage gap between the Atlantic high-
wage economy and the non-European low-wage economies. The persistence of this
gap was partly helped by migration laws in the United States and other regions of
recent European settlement. A largely unintended consequence of this was that it
progressively became easier for Japan, the first industrial nation in Asia, to compete
withWestern manufacturers in the international market of labour-intensive manufac-
tured goods where wage differences mattered. The difference between the structure
of consumption in Asia and the West was another important factor that made it pos-
sible for Asia to industrialise itself. Thus industries of Asia and Europe developed,
each with separate niches.
Under the imposition of the free trade regime, labour-intensive industrialization
constituted the core of Asia’s development path, and the expansion of its trade served
as an engine of regional industrialization. The rate of growth of intra-Asian trade
between 1880 and 1938 was faster than that of Asia’s trade with the West or world
trade, as the division of labour between agriculture and industry grew at local and
regional levels, and merchant networks exploited slight differences in price and
quality of commodities, includingmanufactured goods. Thus, like the Japanese hand-
weavers mentioned above, Chinese hand-weavers used Indian, and later Japanese,
machine-made yarn before themodernChinese spinning industry provided it to them.
A substantial proportion of Japanese yarn by this time was made from Indian raw
cotton. Thus there developed a competitive international commodity chain within
Asia (Sugihara 1996, 2005a). Since most of Asia were labour abundant, successful
industrializers needed to possess a pool of competitive labour, that is, cheap labour
relative to efficiency. The effort to improve the quality of labour was an important
feature of Japan’s industrialization,while intra-Asian trade, led byChinese and Indian
merchant networks, was a main mechanism through whichmassive employment was
maintained and the quality of labour was tested at each point of labour absorption.
An important consequence of the emergence of the three-tier international divi-
sion of labour was that both capital-intensive industrialization and labour-intensive
industrialization needed the supplier of primary products. There was a transfer of
natural resources from primary producers to industrial countries, especially to those
pursuing capital- and resource-intensive industrialization. But those pursuing labour-
intensive industrialization also exploited natural resources from other parts of Asia
and beyond. As we will see in Sect. 1.5, the rapid development of economic relation-
ships between growth Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa suggests that Asia, along with
the West, acts as a major importer of natural resources, while retaining a competitive
position in the international market of labour-intensive manufactures at the same
time.
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1.3 Intra-regional Trade as an Agent of Economic
Development
1.3.1 Integration of Asia and Africa into the World Economy
Figure 1.2 shows that intercontinental trade in 1840 was centred onWestern Europe,
while there were very large regional trading zones both in Europe and Asia. One of
the reasonswhymyfigures on intra-Asian trade (especially roughfigures) are so large
is that I have included all intra-Asian trade, regardless of whether they are indige-
nous commodities, imported foreign goods or commercial crops for export. Thus, if
English textiles were brought to Bombay or Singapore, and then were redistributed
by Indian or Chinese merchants within India or Southeast Asia, we would count
the latter transaction as intra-Asian trade. Unless English textiles were consumed
within Bombay or Singapore, therefore, most imported goods would be counted as
regional trade as well. This is appropriate in my view, as most of the time English
or European traders were unable to penetrate into the interior or smaller markets of
Asia, and were dependent on the initiatives of Asian merchants for the maintenance
of their intercontinental trade. The same points can be made with regard to much of
Asia’s exports to the West. Peasant producers in the hinterland were most likely to
deal with local or regional Asian merchants, who would in turn sell their produce to
Western merchants at large ports. Behind the strength of Asian merchants were their
extensive local and regional networks, which were developed with the use of their
languages and under the influence of their cultures and social institutions. A large
difference in the two figures for intra-Asian trade in Figs. 1.2, mainly comes from
the inclusion of local trade relating to long-distance trade, and definition of territorial
units. The units in Asia at this point was larger than anywhere else in the world.
By 1910 the structure of world trade became much more multilateral (Fig. 1.3).
The United States became an important participant, while many primary producers
in Latin America, parts of Asia (such as Middle East) and Africa were integrated
into the trade structure as a satellite of the metropolitan economy. But this well-
known multilateral pattern of trade settlement, illustrated by S. B. Saul referring to
the centrality of the U.K. (Saul 1960), also grossly underrepresents the depth of intra-
Asian trade, hence the importance of intra-regional trade for world trade. Intra-Asian
trade is shown to have been 432 million pounds in Fig. 1.3, which corresponds to the
smaller figure of 42 million in 1840 in Fig. 1.2. If the growth of intra-Asian trade at
the unrecorded level was roughly at the same pace as that of the recorded one, the
real amount of intra-Asian trade in 1910 must have been much larger. We will show

























Fig. 1.2 Structure ofworld trade, 1840. Sources and NotesSugihara (2015c, 29). Trade data include
original estimates. Figures for each region are intra-regional trade. Those in brackets are very rough






























Fig. 1.3 Structure of world trade, 1910. Sources and Notes Sugihara (2015c, 33). Trade data are
original estimates. Figures for each region are intra-regional trade. Those in brackets are very rough
estimates. The size of the circle expresses the relative proportion of each region in world GDP
(Maddison 2009)
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1.3.2 Local and Regional Trade in British India2
In order to show the magnitude of local and regional trade, it is useful to look at
British India, a region with a massive amount of trade-related statistics. Here we
show some examples of different types of statistics such as coasting trade, rail-
and river-borne and road-borne trade, in addition to foreign trade. Figure 1.4 shows
the magnitude of rail- and river-borne trade of India (largely British India except
Burma, but includes many princely states) in 1888. By then large port cities such
as Calcutta, Bombay and Madras (and its surrounding ports) became regional hubs
of Bengal, Bombay and Madras Presidencies respectively, and rail- and river-borne,
coasting and road networks were developed to link them to hinterlands, often beyond
each presidency. Manufactured goods such as British cotton textiles were carried
inland, and in turn primary products were brought to port cities (for details, see
Sugihara 2015b). According to the traditional interpretation, this was an attempt
to build a transport infrastructure through a combination of British investment in
Indian railways and promotion of long-distance trade. The British government of
India discouraged the development of Indian industries through tariff and exchange
rate policies and preferential imports of British textile machinery and railway-related
goods.
While such an account highlights an important aspect of development under
colonial rule, a closer look at regional statistics indicates a more complex picture.
Figure 1.5 compares foreign trade, coasting trade, rail-borne trade, river-borne trade
and road-borne trade of Calcutta and its environs around 1877. According to Report
on the Administration of Bengal, the source of Fig. 1.5, foreign trade amounted to
500 million rupees, while 330 million rupees of commodities were carried by rail,
40 million by steam boats, 20 million by road (captured at a small number of ‘cor-
dons’), and 190 million by ‘country boats’. The traditional understanding of the role
of the large port cities such as Calcutta was to import manufactured goods from
abroad and distribute them to districts of Bengal and other parts of North India,
and to export primary products collected from inland areas. Indeed cotton textiles,
liquors and wines, and iron imported from Britain were transported by rail to other
districts, while indigo, rice, linseed, wheat and raw jute were carried, mainly by rail,
from Bengal, North Western Provinces and Oudh, Bihar and Punjab to Calcutta, and
parts or most of them were exported. Tea was carried by steam boats from Assam to
Calcutta, most of which were exported to Europe and the United States.
At the same time, those who operated in the central markets of the economy of
Calcutta and its environs were mainly Indian and India-based merchants. For them
Calcutta was also a place of exchange of domestic goods, with the combined use of
four vastly different types of transport, railways and steam boats on the one hand, and
traditional road transport and country boats on the other. From this perspective, the
combined statistics reveal that the greater part of imports of rice, raw jute, linseed
and grams and pulse were actually imported by country boats rather than by rail.
The greater part of both salt and rice trade (imports and exports) was conducted by



















Fig. 1.4 Rail- and river-borne trade in India, 1888. Source and Notes Rail- and River-borne Trade,
1888/89–1892/93. Figures are sums of exports and imports. Thin arrows represent a million rupees
and above, while thick arrow 10 million and above
country boats and road transport. In this particular year a large amount of rice and
other commodities were sent to Madras under the famine. In normal years, however,
a very large proportion of grains and salt that came into the city must have consumed
there. Given the recording of road-borne trade was limited and a large proportion of
imports to the city was consumed within, it is reasonable to assume that about a half
of the commodity flows in the city economy were unrelated to foreign trade.
By the end of World War I it became the norm that the majority of rail-borne
trade was more closely related to the domestic market than to foreign trade. A large
part of this change came from the expansion of commodity chains driven by the
growth of modern industries, such as the Bombay-driven flows of raw cotton to cot-
ton piece goods and the Bengal-driven flows for raw jute to jute bags. At the same
time, domestic markets of major grains such as rice and wheat emerged, and they
were accompanied by a wide circulation of traditional spices and daily necessities.
Materials for the construction and maintenance of railways, roads and urban infras-
tructure were also among the major items of domestic trade (Sugihara 2002, 2015b).
An important feature is that railways and steam boats did not simply replace the
more traditional road- and river-borne trade, but the former often activated the latter.
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Fig. 1.5 Trade of Calcutta and its environs, 1877/78. Source Report on the Administration of
Bengal (1877/78)
The growth of the domestic market was not confined to the urban centers such as
Calcutta, as shown above. Construction of a railway station in the relatively remote
part of inland areas, for example, often led to the construction of feeder roads from
the station, and they were then often linked to traditional road networks (for Bombay
presidency see Sugihara 2015b). The transport infrastructure of British India thus
served, albeit in a largely unintended fashion, for the growth of the domestic market
and labour-intensive industrialization.
After independence, the British-driven development of modern infrastructure was
eventually transferred to serve for the domestic market, consisting of diverse local
and regional merchant networks and new nation-wide networks, largely unrelated to
imports and exports. Although replacement investment in railways was insufficient
towards the end of the colonial period, and the independent government had to bear
rather heavy costs from the beginning, the railway networks nevertheless acted as a
backbone of capital-intensive industrialization. At the same time, it acted as a vehicle
of the distribution of food and clothing and other necessities, whichwere increasingly
standardized and modernized. The admittedly slow development of mass consumer
culture emerged, largely as a result of activities of domestic merchants rather than
with the aid of the state.
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1.3.3 Indian Ocean Trade
The scale of local and regional trade in India was already quite large by the time of
the development of the territorial rule by the English East India Company. Even in
Bengal where long-distance trade grew fast from the end of the eighteenth century,
the sum of Calcutta’s intra-Asian trade, trade with other parts of India, and trade
within the Bengal Presidency in 1811 was still greater than Calcutta’s long-distance
trade. Local and regional trade was much greater than long-distance trade in Bombay
and Madras for that year (Sugihara 2009).
This picture changes dramatically by 1840.These three port cities greatly strength-
ened links with Britain. A large part of traditional Indian Ocean trade declined, while
Europeanmanufactures penetrated into the domesticmarket. Even so, the distribution
of European goods and the transport of primary products to port cities were largely
conducted by Indian and India-based merchants. For example, sea-borne trade statis-
tics of the city of Bombay records a large increase of both foreign trade and coasting
trade. Most of raw cotton was imported to the city of Bombay from other ports of
Bombay Presidency before being exported mostly to Britain (Bombay Presidency
Report of the Commerce of Bombay; Bombay Trade and Navigation Annual State-
ments). This means that even the most typical ‘long-distance trade’ was not under
the full control of Britain, but was dependent on the traditional trade networks. For
local merchants this was a new business. Available statistics alone does not tell us a
clear overall decline of local and regional networks.
Did regional trade really decline in themid-nineteenth century onwards? It is clear
that there was a strong and sustained surge of long-distance trade of British India
after the 1860s, led by the sudden increase of raw cotton from Bombay in the 1860s
(against the ‘cotton famine’) and the opening of the Suez Canal. On the other hand, a
sharp decline of coasting trade only reflects the change of the recording methods of
trade statistics (intra-Presidency trade statistics largely disappear from the Bombay
Presidency data, for example). In reality, the establishment of the Suez Canal route
led to the reorganization of both India’s domestic trade and the Indian Ocean trade,
involving Southeast Asia, East Asia, the Middle East, East Africa and South Africa.
The rate of growth differed region by region and was not as rapid as long-distance
trade, but an increase of the absolute amount of regional trade seems clear.
Figure 1.6 shows the composition of geographical distribution of trade of each
country or region of the Indian Ocean and East Asia in 1910. The numbers refer
to the proportion of exports to Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa to the total amount
of exports. The statistics come from the presidency data of British India and the
British parliamentary papers. I have included the amount of coasting trade for British
India trade statistics in this calculation, on the ground that they are trades between
different regional economies, and are closer to other components of intra-Asian trade
(such as the trade between the Straits Settlements and Siam). The Figure however
excludes all land trade (and, for that matter, all domestic trade in China), so it grossly
underestimates the magnitude of local and regional trade. Nevertheless, it is clear
that many major ports were oriented towards regional trade rather than long-distance
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Fig. 1.6 Long distance trade and regional trade, 1910. Sources and Notes Sugihara (2013). Circles
show major trading countries and regions. Figures indicated within the circle shows the value of
exports to Asian and African regions over that of total exports. Figures for the Presidencies and
the Provinces of India and Aden are derived from the references originally used in Sugihara (1996)
(186) and Sugihara (2002) (28). Figures refer to sea-borne trade only. As coastal trade in British
India is included here, the ratio of intra-regional trade is greater than the usual calculation made
from the geographical composition of foreign trade. Figures for Hong Kong was estimated from
those in 1913. See Sugihara (1996) (107)
trade, and that intra-Asian trade constituted an essential part of Asian trade, together
with Asia’s trade with the West (for other periods, see Sugihara 1996, 2005a). The
regional trade was primarily conducted by merchant networks based in Asia and
Africa (including some non-Asian traders based in the region).
Let us first briefly describe the nature of trade of the IndianOcean. First, it changed
from traditional commodity flows to themore ‘industrialization-driven trade’, that is,
it increasingly included the exports of Bombay cotton cloth and other manufactured
goods to other parts of Asia and imports of primary products such as rice and sugar
from there for urban and rural consumption, arising from a marginal rise in the
purchasing power of local population (Sugihara 1996, Chap. 6).
Second, over 30 million people migrated from India from 1834 to 1930, mainly
to Ceylon, Burma and Malaya to seek employment in plantations and mines and in
commercial agriculture. There was also a long-distance migration within India to
work for plantations and mines. Most of these people stayed in host locations from
a few months to three years, and returned home. Their income benefitted the home
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village, sometimes resulting in the improvement of the farmers’ status through the
purchase of cattle or land (Yanagisawa 1996). A large amount of intra-Asian trade in
this period is related to such temporarymigration, consisting of food and other neces-
sities the migrants used. Indian merchant networks (and sometimes moneylenders as
well) followed the migration. Indian migrants were also seen in East Africa, South
Africa and the Caribbean, but an overwhelming proportion of themmoved within the
British Empire. Migration to regions of recent settlement (such as Canada, Australia
and New Zealand) where high wages were on offer was extremely limited (Sugihara
1996, Chap. 9, 1999).
Third, activities of merchant networks based in India expanded to Southeast and
East Asia.With the opening of ports to foreign trade in East Asia, Sassoons, for exam-
ple, extended their networks to China and Japan, to deal with opium and other Asian
produce. Given the significance of India’s cotton yarn in the 1870s to the 1890s, India
clearly acted as an exporter of manufactured goods to East Asia at this stage. How-
ever, Indian merchant networks soon faced a competition from Chinese networks.
Also, with the more successful industrialization of Japan, India-based merchants
increasingly handled imports of Japanese manufactured goods and exports of pri-
mary products. Japan’s labour-intensive industries were competitive in the relatively
cheap range of cotton textiles and sundries, and penetrated into diverse consumer
markets of the Indian Ocean. Japanese goods were often interpreted in local cultural
contexts (for example, Japanese matches were sold in Chinese or Indian labels),
and in some areas import substitution of Japanese manufactured goods took place
(Sugihara 1996, Chaps. 1 and 2; Oishi 2015).
The Indian Ocean trade as an arena possessed a high level of merchant abilities
of organizing trade and production. Merchant networks did not necessarily bring
major innovation in production, but were capable of organizing production networks
and easing local resource constraints. Thus they connected cotton producing areas
to modern spinning to hand-weaving, and created commodity chains. They also
created networks of grain trade, easing local food shortages and enabling peasants
to specialize in commercial production. In addition to Hindu and Muslim people,
Parsis, a Zoroastrian community, and Jewish merchants originally from Baghdad
were among those who exploited cultural and ecological diversities in their own
ways. Their presence reinforced the diverse nature of Indian Ocean trade, and helped
make changes in commodity production and consumption compatible with religious
and linguistic characteristics.
To put this into the longer term perspective, early modern South Asia was at the
center of a large regional trading world (Chaudhuri 1985). The South Asian path of
economic development was capable of coexisting with long-distance trade, a quality
absent in the European path of economic development which pursued its own long-
distance trade and territorial expansion, and in the East Asian path which severely
restricted it. The Indian Ocean was the only large trading area that embraced regional
and global commodity flows in this period. The British rulers took advantage of this
quality for the economic integration of both the subcontinent and the Indian Ocean.
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1.3.4 The Wider Contexts
Figure 1.6 also charts East Asian countries and ports to show the relative significance
of Intra-Asian trade in 1910. As indicated above, the numbers refer to the proportion
of exports to Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa to the total amount of exports. At this
point the bulk of trade for East Asian ports was with East Asian and Southeast Asian
ports, with some crucial links with Indian ports.
We have already referred to intra-Asian cotton trade in relation to labour-intensive
industrialization in Sect. 1.2. In addition, Japan imported rice and sugar from South-
east Asia before Korea and Taiwan under Japanese rule became providers of these
items. By the interwar period the Chinese position shifted from an importer of cotton
yarn from India and Japan to exporters of a small amount of cotton cloth to Southeast
Asia, reflecting import-substitution industrialization. Perhaps more important was a
large amount of remittances of overseas Chinese from Southeast Asia. Between 1891
and 1938 at least 14 million people migrated to Southeast Asia, mostly for a short
period. Unlike Indian counterparts, it was relatively easy to move from labourers
to merchants, and within merchant communities from small shop keepers to whole-
salers to foreign traders. Dialect-based groups constituted powerful migration net-
works across Southern China and Southeast Asia, to freely move labourers around,
often via Hong Kong and Singapore (Sugihara 2005b).
Hong Kong and Singapore also played as a hub of intra-Asian trade, linking
it to both long-distance trade and intra-Southeast-Asian trade. Three chapters of
this volume discuss aspects of the path dependency of Southeast Asia as a pivotal
region of Asia’s trade. It not only acted as a region of active trading at all levels, but
played a vital role in linking economies surrounding the Indian Ocean and countries
under the tributary trade system in East Asia. In early modern Asia, China and
India fed the bulk of population, while first serious European contacts with East
Asia were likely to be made in or through Southeast Asia. In Chap. 3 Shimada
outlines Southeast Asia’s long-term path of economic development, and argues for
the fundamental importance of intra-Asian trade in shaping it. InChap. 4Ota captures
the persistence and development of ‘China-oriented trade’ from the eighteenth to the
nineteenth century, and describes the changing relationships between trade and the
state. Commerce was often as important as production for state formation. At one
point, part of the state functions was performed by commercial groups and their
military wings. Examination of the distinct trajectory of trade-sensitive regional
governance goes a longway towards explaining how it was possible for agriculturally
fragile and environmentally and politically unstable parts of maritime Asia to handle
an intra-regional trade of this magnitude. In Chap. 5 Kobayashi describes the growth
of Singapore by examining the period from the early nineteenth to the early twentieth
century, and locates it in the context of the region’s path of economic development.
TheWestern impact, colonialismandglobalizationdidnot destroy the long-termpath.
Development of Singapore as a trading and information hub shows that an originally
colonial port city exhibited an extraordinary capacity to embrace environmental,
technological and institutional diversities within the region.
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By the end of the nineteenth century Southeast Asia’s imports of Indian textiles
became small, and gradually shifted towards a higher value added range. By contrast
exports of lower value added range of Indian cloth to East Africa remained important,
and competed with European textiles to some extent. In other words, intra-regional
trade sought complementarity with long-distance trade, and expanded its geographi-
cal scope by connecting to new markets on the one hand, and by upgrading the range
of manufactured goods on the other.
Finally, intra-East-Asian trade grew very fast after WorldWar I, mainly as a result
of the growth of trade of Korea and Taiwan with Japan. By the late 1930s intra-yen-
bloc trade numerically dominated intra-Asian trade. The composition of this trade
also changed to include exports of machinery, reflecting industrialization in Korea
(Hori 2009). While these developments are important for the economic development
of Korea and Taiwan under colonial rule, their trade was severely confined to trade
with Japan. The Japanese strategy for trade expansion in Asia increasingly sought
autarchy, ignoring the position of Asia inworld trade. For example, the bulk of rubber
exports from Malaya to the United States and Europe could not possibly have been
absorbed within the imagined Japanese ‘co-prosperity sphere’. Neither would Japan
have survived without the imports of oil and minerals, as well as raw cotton, from
outside the Japanese sphere of influence. In these respects the mechanism of pre-war
intra-Asian trade was destroyed as a result of Japanese aggression. A post-war order
was built on the new trend of decolonization and the Cold War divide, as well as the
experiences of the war-time controlled economy.
1.4 Paths to Industrialization
1.4.1 Regional Industrialization
The previous section addressed the question of why the growth of intra-Asian trade
was important for the emergence of the international division of labour, including
labour-intensive industrialization. To recapture, the world economy in the long nine-
teenth century was not entirely generated by the dynamics of Atlantic economy,
nor was it ‘bipolarised’ by the development of the ‘enclave economies’. Looking
at the period from 1820 to 1950 as a whole, the intra-regional trading sphere of
Asia showed a common tendency to expand by commercializing its agriculture and
reorganizing its traditional industries, and by linking modern manufacturing to this
expansion, which resulted in the evolution of the system comprising the division
of labour between agriculture and industry within the region. The period saw that
Western powers (and regions of recent settlement) and Asia (and the tropical regions
to which Asian workers emigrated) simultaneously developed high-wage and low-
wage economies (see Lewis 1978: especially 194–224 for a similar formulation; for
criticism see Sugihara 2013: 21, 22, 27). The former used more resources, while the
latter fed more people. Uneven allocation of resources underpinned two different
1 Multiple Paths to Industrialization: A Global Context … 19
paths to industrialization. Together, they fuelled and sustained the expansion of the
world economy.
During the interwar period labour-intensive industrialization was more systemati-
cally extended from Japan to China andKorea, with state and colonial reinforcement,
and the ‘flying geese pattern of economic development’ (Akamatsu 1962) emerged
between Japan and China (see Abe 2005). By 1938 intra-Asian trade, by then dom-
inated by the Yen bloc, was the second largest area of intra-regional trade, next
to intra-European trade, consisting of 9% of world trade at the level of recorded
statistics.
After a heavy intervention of the emergence, development and abrupt collapse of
the Yen bloc in the 1930s and the first half of the 1940s, intra-Asian trade recovered
fast among a smaller number of countries. By 1950, India, China, many Southeast
Asian countries, and North Korea withdrew from the regime of free trade, while
the countries along the western Pacific coast (Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Hong
Kong and Malaya-Singapore among others) were integrated into the U.S.-led world
economy.
Table 1.1 summarizes the growth of Asia’s trade and intra-Asian trade in relation
to world trade. In the early post-war period, the share of the U.S. (and other Western
countries) in Asia’s trade was large, and its influence was dominant. However, the
U.S. share rapidly declined, and was replaced by the growth of regionally-driven
trade. In 1965 the share of ten major Asian countries in world exports was 14%, but
this share increased to 23% in 2000, and to 31% in 2015. More important, the share
of intra-Asian trade in Asia ten’s exports increased from 35% in 1965 to 51% in
2000, and to 70% in 2015, a figure comparable to intra-E.U. trade.
The post-war diffusion of industrialization, beginning in Japan and spreading
to other Asian countries, followed the same interactive path between intra-regional
trade and industrialization as in the prewar years, first among a small number of
countries under the regime of free trade, and gradually embracing others. For exam-
ple, think of the ‘Asian textile complex’ in the 1970s, in which Japan produced rayon
yarn, Taiwan wove rayon cloth, and Hong Kong made the cloth into an apparel and
exported the apparel to the United States (Arpan et al. 1984: 112–7, 136–49, 159).
New intermediate goods included cheap plastics, man-made fibres, machine parts,
and eventually IC chips. As in the pre-war period, we do not see such a dynamic rela-
tionship between regions in Africa, Middle East or Latin America. South Africa and
Brazil proceeded with industrialization without accompanying regional integration.
It is only in Asia that economic nationalism has embraced regional integration.
Generally speaking, therefore, the labour-intensive path of economic development
was suited to Asia’s factor endowment in relation to the rest of the world. In practice,
each industrialization was country-specific (or rather the modern nation state was
often created to realize industrialization and modernization). This volume offers
three chapters on industrialization experiences of Japan, China and India.
Themost obvious country that benefitted fromboth transfer ofWestern technology
and institutions, and availability of a very largemarket for cheapmanufactured goods
in Asia was Japan. In Chap. 6 Tanimoto discusses the nature of Japan’s pre-war
industrialization, in which to locate labour-intensive industrialization, with special
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Table 1.1 Growth of intra-Asian trade, 1950–2014 (in billion US dollars)
(1) World exports total (2) Asia exports total (3) Intra-Asian trade
total
(3)/(2)%
1950 58.0 (100.0) 10.7 (18.4) 2.9 (5.0) 27.1
1955 93.9 (100.0) 13.4 (14.3) 4.0 (4.3) 29.9
1960 128.9 (100.0) 18.3 (14.2) 5.9 (4.6) 32.2
1965 188.2 (100.0) 25.7 (13.7) 9.1 (4.8) 35.4
1970 320.7 (100.0) 44.4 (13.8) 15.6 (4.9) 35.1
1975 887.4 (100.0) 143.4 (16.2) 49.8 (5.6) 34.7
1980 2018.1 (100.0) 332.6 (16.5) 135.9 (6.7) 40.9
1985 1987.0 (100.0) 424.2 (21.3) 167.7 (8.4) 39.5
1990 3601.2 (100.0) 805.4 (22.4) 357.3 (9.9) 44.4
1995 5325.1 (100.0) 1460.6 (27.4) 764.8 (14.4) 52.4
2000 6385.6 (100.0) 1456.8 (22.8) 738.9 (11.6) 50.7
2005 10369.0 (100.0) 2285.5 (22.0) 1330.0 (12.8) 58.2
2010 14937.3 (100.0) 4495.3 (30.1) 3073.9 (20.6) 68.4
2014 18442.9 (100.0) 5603.2 (30.4) 3905.9 (21.2) 69.7
Sources and Notes Takanaka (2000). For figure from 2000 onwards, IMF, Direction of Trade Statis-
tics Yearbook. The former work is based on UN commodity trade statistics, which is slightly wider
in the scope of coverage than the IMF data, but the differences are small. Intra-Asian trade total
refers to the value of exports from ten Asian countries (Japan, four NIEs, four ASEAN countries
and China) and their imports from the smaller Asian countries (adjusted by FOB-CIF conversion)
reference to urban small-scale manufacturing industry. While the bulk of cotton
textiles and sundries were indeed exported to Asia, the examples Tanimoto offers
here include the growth of production of ‘new’ commodities, such as toys, that were
mainly exported to Europe and the United States. He further links this development
to the emergence of yet another generation of small-scale manufacturing in the post-
war period. Tanimoto’s account is an important reminder of the potential of labour-
intensive industries and their contributions to global industrialization.
Figure 1.7 shows that Japan adopted a policy of selective protectionism, that is,
setting up tariff barriers only against imports directly competing with the domestic
industry attempting import-substitution but pursuing the benefit of free trade, as a
result of which her overall tariff rate stayed relatively low, while China and India
raised tariff rates during the interwar period, partly for revenue purposes but also
to more comprehensively protect domestic industries. Japan’s dependence for the
imports of raw materials was much greater than that of the other two countries.
In Chap. 7 Kubo discusses the historical processes of China’s industrialization
with reference to different types of states and economic policies in the twentieth
century. Originally integrated into the international economy from the 1840s, mainly
as exporters of tea, raw silk and other primary products, China eventually established
a modern state in the 1920s and the 1930s, capable of demanding tariff autonomy
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Fig. 1.7 Import tariff rates in India, China and Japan, 1864–1940. Notes and Sources India: Sug-
ihara (2002, 30–31), China: Hsiao (1974, 22–24, 132–33), Japan: Okurasho (1948). Rates refer
to the share of total import revenue divided by total value of imports. The Japanese data exclude
colonial imports after 1919
and negotiating the currency reform under the Nationalist government. The selective
tariff protection adopted in this period can be interpreted as an import-substitution
industrialization strategy under the regime of free trade (Kubo 2005). However, Kubo
then turns to the various regimes emerging under thewar-time conditions, inwhich he
skillfully describes the economic policies ofManchuria, the Nationalist government,
the communist regime etc., and their changing relationships. He emphasizes that
elements of ‘planned economy’ were variously experimented in this period, which
formed the basis for the economic policy of communist China during theMao period.
For Kubo, industrialization of Chinawas best characterized as a parallel development
of capital-intensive and labour-intensive industries. The nature of the state in the
planning economy period is distinct in the sense that it aimed at the strengthening
of political and economic power of the country rather than following the signals of
comparative advantage of each industry in international market place. Even so, after
the policy reform China was able to take advantage of its comparative advantage to
export labour-intensive products in massive quantities. There are similarities and a
degree of continuities between the pre-war path and post-reform path (see Pomeranz
2013).
Although the first modern cotton industry in Asia took root in Bombay in the
1850s, labour-intensive industrialization was less successful in colonial India than
in Japan and perhaps China. In Chap. 8 Nomura compares factor endowments of
labour and capital between India and Japan, to show that labour abundant and capital
scarce conditions, which prompted Japan to proceed with labour-intensive industri-
alization, were not present in India as clearly as in Japan. The laissez-faire economic
policy, including free trade, is not in themselves a sufficient condition for stagnant
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industrialization, although it may have affected the potentiality of industrialization
through the fiscal stringency of the British government of India, leading to the lack
of encouragement of education, for example. It also argues that other factors such
as the slow technological transfer arising from the nature of Indian organization and
management must be taken into account.
In independent India, import-substitution industrialization strategy made it dif-
ficult to pursue labour-intensive industrialization, in spite of the fact that it had
long historical roots (Roy 2005, Chap. 6). There was the heritage of the nationalist
movement, which advocated the protection and development of traditional cottage
industries, including economically inefficient sectors like khadi and handloom seg-
ments. Partly inheriting the Gandhian tradition and partly in a more explicit effort to
create employment, these sectors had been isolated from international competition.
Meanwhile, the government protected the large-scale modern cotton textile industry,
which in turn provided the traditional weaving industries with cheap machine-made
yarn. Labour in the organized sector was legally protected, whichmade it difficult for
any factory to lay off its workers. Furthermore, because of the virtual prohibition of
the imports of textile machinery and the installation of new machinery in the factory,
there was little chance of raising productivity or improving the quality of yarn. As a
result, the Indian cotton textile industry went through a long period of isolation from
the rapid technological advance in Asian countries, led by Japan. More generally,
the ideology for the political and economic autonomy remained powerful in India.
In India several attempts were made to liberalize the economy after 1965 without
much success. The policy shift of 1991 realized a degree of liberalization of trade
and capital flows, and was a step towards deregulation, but it did not represent a
major ideological change in economic policy among the Indian elites. In particular,
the rate of increase in the expenditure on education and welfare for the ordinary
people, relative to that for elites, has been slow. Yet a high level of capability based
on primary and secondary education (the literacy rate remains a major problem) and
hygiene (especially low infant mortality) is clearly a necessary, though not sufficient,
condition for economic development. In this respect the Chinese achievement during
the pre-reform period (1949–1979) was far more impressive (Dreze and Sen 1995,
1997).
Nevertheless, the economic reforms of 1991 sharply corrected India’s bias towards
strong economic ties with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. Export
growth in the 1990s mainly came from labour-intensive industrial goods, includ-
ing woven cloth, knitwear, garments, leather, machine components and software.
Primarily through exports of textiles and apparel, India became progressively inte-
grated into the international economy during the 1990s (Sugihara 2001). By 2000
India was trading more with the Asia-Pacific countries than with Western Europe,
the Middle East, the former socialist countries and Africa combined.
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1.4.2 The Resource Nexus
From the perspective of spatial resource allocation, particularly important was the
expansion of the scope of competitive modern industries in Japan: Prewar industri-
alization was largely based on light industries (for textiles and sundries) and was
labour-intensive, while the post-war path included heavy and chemical industries
(for steel, machinery and petrochemical products), which were usually more capital-
and resource-intensive. Imports of fossil fuels, including oil, and raw materials from
all over the world became essential to the economic growth of Asia. Thus, during
the period of high-speed growth, geography, human habitat and resource use were
redefined and relocated to accommodate them. A number of industrial complex were
created, typically along the Pacific coast, with transport connections to major urban
centers. The spatial allocation of human and natural resources was now driven by
the need to secure access to industrial imports, as well as by the availability of land,
capital and labour. A large proportion of population moved to cities, or a large part
of rural areas became administratively ‘urban’, to develop the mass domestic con-
sumer market. In prewar Japan rural industrialization remained important, especially
in labour-intensive industries, while agriculture provided industry with labour force,
purchasing power and food and raw materials. Traditional considerations for indus-
trial locations included local employment with relatively low wages (e.g. female
by employment in the peasant household economy), and supply of water, food and
energy (both biomass and electricity). All of these functions had to be retained
under the industrial-complex-driven national land development policy, and the value
of natural resources (e.g. land, forest, water) reassessed under the new light, not
least because sections of new industries needed to use lots of water, while others
needed clean air. In fact most heavy and chemical industries, which depended on
the imports of raw materials and energy for their production, simultaneously needed
some non-tradable resources (e.g. land and water), competing for their procurement
with traditional users.
Urbanization also changed the traditional resource endowment regime, which
dominated the pre-fossil-fuel economy. This first happened in Japan (In 1945 the
rate of urbanization in Japan and other parts of Asia was significantly lower than in
industrial countries in the West. See Sugihara 2003, 111–2). Urban space not only
combined basic livelihood needs such as water, food and electricity with employ-
ment in manufacturing, distribution and services, but added new demands such as
education, health and leisure, as well as the urban transportation system. The ‘civil’
living space, that is, free from air pollution and congestion, became a target for local
government and citizensmovement. Capital- and resource-intensive industries began
to be pushed out from urban and suburban landscapes, and were increasingly relo-
cated to rural areas (Kobori 2017). Tokyo grew into the first mega-city, while Osaka
and other major cities followed. The rate of growth of cities was very rapid. The
critical aspects of this development lay in the perceived combination of industrial
development and the securement of civil and environmentally acceptable living space
through the negotiation between national land development plans, local government
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initiatives and the citizens movement. The general direction of the political process
was to enable heavy and chemical industrialization to take root, without entirely
losing rural landscapes and civil living spaces in urban settings.
Overall, however, the driving force behind the reorganization of economy and
ecology was ‘developmentalism’ behind the central government policy. The concur-
rent growth of cities and the industrial complex created an ‘urban-industrial nexus’
where various tradable and non-tradable resources were identified as a set of ‘fac-
tor endowments’ necessary for creating an international ‘comparative advantage’ of
manufacturing industry. Labour-intensive manufacturing in urban areas was embed-
ded in the newly created ‘resource nexus’, with intensive use of space, and retained
its strength, along with capital- and resource-intensive industries in the industrial
complex (see Sugihara 2019a).
1.4.3 Structural Transformation in Southeast Asia
Southeast Asia as a region experienced perhaps the fastest structural transformation
in global history from the export economies of primary products to industrialized
countries. In 1950 four countries of Southeast Asia (Indonesia, Philippines,Malaysia
and Thailand; hereafter ASEAN 4) and Singapore (territorial changes were adjusted
wherever possible) were all exporters of primary products par excellence. By the end
of the twentieth century they became exporters of labour-intensive manufactured
goods and importers of capital-intensive manufactured goods. Following the lead
of South Korea and Taiwan, a rapid shift took place in the 1970s and the 1980s.
Figures 1.8 and 1.9 suggest a fundamental change in the five countries’ position in
the international economy.
There are at least three reasons why Southeast Asia managed to transform itself so
quickly. First, the region successively found the market for their products in the post-
war period, first by exporting primary products to the expanding American market,
then by participating in the commodity chain of labour-intensivemanufactured goods
initiated by Japanese, American and other foreign companies, and finally exporting
competitive labour-intensive manufactured goods by themselves or in corporation
withmultinational companies.After the secondhalf of the 1960s, itwas able to benefit
from foreign investment and, through it, the transfer of technological and managerial
knowledge for industrial development. Although the region suffered many wars and
conflicts, and many other Southeast Asian countries were left out from this dynamics
for a long time, ASEAN slowly expanded its membership and steadily increased its
economic influences.
Second, against the background of population growth, there was a growth of
labour-intensive industries, which absorbed labour. In 1974 Indonesia, for example,
had manufacturing employment of around four million, mostly in very small estab-
lishments in rural areas engaging in food processing and other traditional industries
(van der Eng 2013). This was too big a sector for the capital-intensive manufacturing
sector to absorb. In 1970 Harry Oshima argued for a systematic effort to make these
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small industries internationally competitive, with a fuller and the more efficient use
of labour, training of skilled labour, better marketing and the more detailed govern-
ment support for information gathering and export promotion (Oshima 1970). This
was a strategy close to the East Asian (especially Japanese) path, signalling a clear
departure from the heavy industry orientation the earlier orthodoxy had advocated.
On the one hand, labour, both rural and urban, was absorbed into sweat shops and
modern factories as unskilled labour, with low wages and harsh working conditions.
The society became unequal in many ways. At the same time, ethnic and institutional
barriers to social mobility became less serious, and increasingly large numbers of
primary and secondary school graduates with better health became available. And
the quality of workforce gradually improved. This was a major reason why the pace
of industrialization of ASEAN 4 accelerated by the 1980s, overtaking early indus-
trializers such as India.
Third, it was on this basis that export-oriented industrialization strategy diffused
rapidly. In many respects the strategy looked ‘shallow’; It was externally induced
(often with export processing zones and other government measures to promote
investment of multinational companies); The sequential upgrading of an industrial
structure, typically seen in earlier industrializations from light industry to heavy
industry with all ‘basic’ industries and complicated linkages, was missing; The land
reform was incomplete, and rural inequality remained a macroeconomic issue. But
it was not a shallow kind of industrialization, in the sense that it was supported by
competitive labour (cheap labour able to produce goods in a competitive market).
It was natural that countries of NIEs and ASEAN 4 with smaller population were
keener on export-orientation than the United States or Japan (both with a low ratio
of trade to GDP). The growth of a relatively homogenous market for cheap, labour-
intensive manufactured goods across East and Southeast Asia, as well as the lower
end of the American market, made a regional industrialization possible.
The core ideology behind this process was ‘developmentalism’ which was cre-
ated to pool all the resources for economic development (Suehiro 1998). It advocated
both regional and international economic cooperation through trade, capital flows and
technological transfer in strongest terms. Part of this idea came from Japan and dif-
fused to NIEs to ASEAN countries, and, helped by Australians, took the form of
‘open nationalism’ (Garnout and Drysdale 1994). It argued for a free trade within
the region, but without discriminating against outsiders. Southeast Asia played a key
role in the diffusion of this principle. And its economic success, linking intra-Asian
dynamism to world trade, was eventually to help China and India to change course.
Developmentalism was distinct from both the principle of unfettered free trade with-
out national and regional considerations, and socialism with emphasis on planning
and autonomy. Although its practice suffered from authoritarian rule and the Cold
War divide, it was committed to raising living standards for the ordinary people, and
survived the criticisms of liberal democracy and ‘market fundamentalism’. Develop-
mentalism was not only the guiding principle of the developmental state. It largely
created a regional order.
1 Multiple Paths to Industrialization: A Global Context … 27
1.5 Paths to the Emerging State
1.5.1 A Summary
The notions of multiple development paths and the emerging state in the periphery
do not come directly from the Eurocentric perspective of the diffusion of industrial-
ization or civilizing missions of imperialism. The terms adopted here do not assume
a country-based linear stage theory, in which a nation such as England and Japan
would make a transition from feudalism to capitalism or from pre-industrial to an
industrial nation. In Asia and Africa the development path of each country was often
non-linear, with plenty of disturbances from colonialism, famines and epidemics
and environmental degradations, and its pace was largely determined by their own
socio-cultural preferences (or reservations) for economic development. While all
countries have been affected by the forces of global industrialization and economic
development in one way or another, we note that the path each country followed was
diverse, non-linear and more locally and regionally rooted than standard economic
history and development economics had allowed for.
This chapter mainly discussed the trade and industrialization components of this
view, largely leaving the issues relating to agriculture to Chap. 2. Its aim was to
identify relevant historical contexts, that is, the ‘initial conditions’ and internal and
external forces which governed the path, and to understand what current developing
countries with low-income economies require for their transition to the emerging
state. We suggested that local and regional trade fed employment in agriculture
and industry, hence population-carrying capacity, by mitigating local resource con-
straints. Given the nature of constraints, long-distance trade is not always a solution.
We end our discussion with a brief observation on Sub-Saharan Africa, to suggest
that the emerging state should implement a development plan to promote local and
intra-regional trade, to more systematically link resource exports to an increase of
agricultural and industrial production and employment.
1.5.2 Intra-regional Trade of Sub-Saharan Africa
Historically, Sub-Saharan Africa actively engaged with local, regional and long dis-
tance (intercontinental) trade. After the decline of slave trade and the rise of ‘legiti-
mate commerce’ in the nineteenth century, the region began to export primary prod-
ucts to Europe and other places. With the integration of local and regional economies
into world trade, the former responded to the trade opportunities created within the
region.
However, at the level recorded as foreign trade statistics, intra-regional trade
declined sharply after the First World War, never to be recovered till the end of the
twentieth century.
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Table 1.2 shows the growth of trade and the proportion of intra-regional trade in
Sub-SaharanAfrica for a period similar to Table 1.1.3 The proportion of Sub-Saharan
Africa in world trade has always been small, and most of exports went outside the
region, especially to advanced industrial countries. Europe remained the major trad-
ing partner throughout the second half of the twentieth century. More important,
Sub-Saharan Africa as a whole has always acted as a primary producer exchang-
ing the regional natural resources for manufactured goods and services, in spite of
industrialization of some countries such as South Africa. Main export commodities
changed over time, but the tendency for each country to rely on a single commodity
such as oil persisted. The export diversification index has not improved much. Each
economy remained a satellite linked to the metropolis.
A closer look at the Table suggests that the proportion of intra-regional trade
began with 11% in 1950, and then went down because Rhodesia’s trade statistics
became unavailable (trade actually collapsed too), but the statistical collection was
restored since around 1965, and the coverage of countriesweremore or less stabilized
since. The Table clearly shows a surge of the amount of intra-regional trade, but the
more important comparative observation is that the level of intra-regional trade had











(3) SSA exports to
SSA
(3)/(2)
1950 47.63 (100.00) 13 2.16 (4.53) 0.24 (0.50) 11.12
1955 82.41 (100.00) 13 2.69 (3.27) 0.10 (0.12) 3.75
1960 105.98 (100.00) 24 3.14 (2.97) 0.12 (0.11) 3.75
1965 159.92 (100.00) 36 6.86 (4.29) 0.64 (0.40) 9.38
1970 281.56 (100.00) 43 10.24 (3.64) 0.97 (0.34) 9.44
1975 771.15 (100.00) 42 26.15 (3.39) 1.56 (0.20) 5.98
1980 1,830.87 (100.00) 43 43.73 (2.39) 2.83 (0.15) 6.47
1985 1,872.67 (100.00) 44 47.94 (2.56) 2.60 (0.14) 5.42
1990 3,375.34 (100.00) 44 61.68 (1.83) 4.82 (0.14) 7.82
1995 5,070.79 (100.00) 44 68.56 (1.35) 8.11 (0.16) 11.83
2000 6,412.83 (100.00) 45 92.09 (1.44) 12.07 (0.19) 13.10
2005 10,398.42 (100.00) 45 184.15 (1.77) 23.68 (0.23) 12.86
2010 15,133.15 (100.00) 45 331.45 (2.19) 60.19 (0.40) 18.16
2015 16,386.42 (100.00) 46 295.29 (1.80) 63.60 (0.39) 21.54
Source IMF, IMF Data, Access to Macroeconomic and Financial Data, Direction of Trade Statistics
http://data.imf.org/?sk=9D6028D4-F14A-464C-A2F2-59B2CD424B85&sId=1409151240976
3The sources of the two tables, both originally from IMF, slightly differ, and so does the amount of
world trade, but they do not affect main observations here.
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remained low. The crucial issue is not somuch import-substitution of a single country
as its lack on a regional scale.
Figures 1.10 and 1.11 show the geographical distribution of Sub-Saharan Africa’s
exports and imports respectively from 1990 to 2017. Between 2000 and 2105 the
main trading partners changed from Europe and the United State to emerging and
developing countries, including China and India. But there was little change in the
components of exports, which were concentrated on a few commodities, especially
oil and mineral resources, without much processing before exports. Imports, on
the other hand, consisted of goods for infrastructure building and consumer goods.
There was little progress on the exports of labour-intensive manufactured goods and
processed food-stuffs from the region.
In fact, African Economic Outlook argues, there is a huge potential for the devel-
opment of labour-intensive manufacturing exports within the region. ‘Trade between
African countries has the greatest potential for building sustainable economic devel-
opment’ (AfDB/OECD/UNDP 2017, 82). At the moment, however, most of the
labour-intensive manufactured goods and processed food-stuffs which could be pro-
vided within the region are imported from emerging economies, especially from
China and other Asian countries. In fact, amongst the surge of the proportion of
intra-African trade in total African exports between 2005 and 2015, the proportion
of intra-African trade in manufactured goods in total African manufacturing exports
declined from18 to 15% (ibid, 83–84. Figures refer toAfrica rather than Sub-Saharan
Africa). ‘Transportation and communication infrastructure for intra-African trade is
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Fig. 1.11 Geographical composition of imports from Sub-Saharan Africa, 1990-2017. Source As
per Table 1.2
mines the impacts of regional integration and development’ (ibid. 89). In any case,
‘Africa’s imports of heavy machinery and transport equipment are among the lowest
in the world’ (ibid. 80). ‘Light manufacturing could help Africa reduce its imports
from outside the continent and increase intra-African trade with countries that have
agricultural production and processing capacity’ (ibid, 78).
Chapter 9 endorses the view that much of Africa’s growth of GDP and employ-
ment in the recent period came from the service sector and improved agricultural
productivity (reflecting the declining share of agricultural employment), and argues
the need for the development of the labour-intensive sector and industrial policy to
effect it. Perhaps we should go back to the pre-war intra-Asian trade to find a paral-
lel situation in Southeast Asia, where a combination of merchant networks, trading
and information hubs and trade-sensitive regional governance offered critical ‘initial
conditions’ for structural transformation.
References
Abe, T. (2005). The Chinese market for Japanese cotton textile goods, 1914–30. In K. Sugihara
(Ed.), Japan, China and the growth of the Asian International Economy, 1850–1949 (pp. 49–100).
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
AfDB/OECD/UNDP. (2017). Trade policies and regional integration inAfrica. InAfrican Economic
Outlook 2017: Entrepreneurship and Industrialisation. Paris: OECD Publishing.
1 Multiple Paths to Industrialization: A Global Context … 31
Akamatsu, K. (1962). A historical pattern of economic growth in developing countries. Developing
Economies, Preliminary Issue, 3–25.
Allen, R. C. (2005). Farm to factory: A reinterpretation of the Soviet Industrial Revolution. Prince-
ton: Princeton University Press.
Arpan, J. S., Barry, M., & Van Tho, T. (1984). The textile complex in the Asia-Pacific region: The
patterns and textures of competition and the shape of things to come. Research in International
Business and Finance, 4-B, 101–164.
Austin, G. (2013). Labour-intensive industrialization and global economic development: Reflec-
tions. In G. Austin & K. Sugihara (Eds.), Labour-intensive industrialization in global history
(pp. 280–302). London: Routledge.
Bagchi, A. K. (1976). Deindustrialization in India in the nineteenth century: Some theoretical
implications. Journal of Development Studies, 12(2), 135–164.
Bairoch, P. (1982). International industrialization levels from 1750 to 1980. Journal of Economic
History, 11(2), 269–333.
Bombay Presidency Report of the Commerce of Bombay, Bombay.
Bombay Trade and Navigation Annual Statements, Bombay.
Chaudhuri, K. N. (1985). Trade and civilisation in the Indian Ocean: An economic history from the
rise of Islam to 1750. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Dreze, J., & Sen, A. (1995). India: Economic development and social opportunity. Delhi: Oxford
University Press.
Dreze, J., & Sen, A. (1997). Indian development: Selected regional perspectives. Delhi: Oxford
University Press.
Engerman, S. L., & Sokoloff, K. L. (2011). Economic development in the Americas since 1500:
Endowments and institutions. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Garnout, R.,&Drysdale, P. (1994).Asia Pacific regionalism:The issues. InR.Garnout&P.Drysdale
(Eds.), Asia Pacific regionalism: Readings in international economic relations (pp. 1–7). Pymble,
Australia: Harper Educational.
Gerschenkron, A. (1962). Economic backwardness in historical perspective: A book of essays.
Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
Hori, K. (2009). Higashi-Ajia Shihonshugishi-ron 1 (Treatise on the history of East Asian Capital-
ism, Part 1). Kyoto: Mienruva Shobo.
Hsiao, L. (1974). China’s foreign trade statistics, 1864–1949. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press.
India Annual Rail- and River-borne Trade Returns, 1888/89–1892/93, Calcutta.
International Monetary Fund (IMF) (various years), Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook.
International Monetary Fund (IMF), Direction of Trade Statistics. http://data.imf.org/?sk=
9D6028D4-F14A-464C-A2F2-59B2CD424B85&sId=1409151240976. Accessed August 24,
2018.
Jones, E. L. (1981). The European miracle: Environments, economies and geopolitics in the history
of Europe and Asia. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Kobori, S. (2017). Rinkai kaihatsu, kogai taisaku, shizen hogo: Kodo seicho-ki Yokohama no
kankyoshi (Seafront development, anti-pollution policy and nature conservation: An environ-
mental history of Yokohama in the period of high-speed growth). In S. Shoji (Ed.), Sengo Nihon
no Kaihatsu to Minshushugi: Chiiki ni Miru Sokoku (Development and democracy of Japan in
the post war era: The conflicts seen from the region) (pp. 71–104). Kyoto: Showado.
Kubo, T. (2005). The tariff policy of the nationalist government, 1926–36: A historical assessment.
InK.Sugihara (Ed.), Japan, China and the growth of the Asian International Economy, 1850–1949
(pp. 145–176). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Lewis, W. A. (1954). The economic development with unlimited supplies of labour. Manchester
School of Economic and Social Studies, 22(2), 139–191.
Lewis, W. A. (Ed.). (1970). Tropical development, 1880–1913: Studies in economic progress.
Evanston: Northwestern University Press.
Lewis, W. A. (1978). Growth and fluctuations, 1870–1913. London: George Allen and Unwin.
32 K. Sugihara
Maddison, A. (2009). Statistics on world population, GDP and per capita GDP, 1-2008 AD. http://
www.ggdc.net/maddison/.
Oishi, T. (2015). Kan-indoyo sekai to indojin shonin, kigyoka no nettowaku: Shokuminchi-ki ni
okeru fukugosei, tayosei (The world of Indian Ocean Rim and Indian merchant-entrepreneur net-
works: Plurality and diversity in the colonial period). In A. Tanabe, K. Sugihara, & K. Wakimura
(Eds.), Shirizu Gendai Indo 1: Tayosei Shakai no Chosen (Challenges for a diversity-driven
society: Contemporary India Series 1) (pp. 169–196). Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai.
Okurasho Shuzeikyoku [Japanese Ministry of Finance Government Bureau of Taxation]. (1948).
Dai-15-kai Kokkai Kanzei Sankosho (Reference material on customs tariff for the 15th Parlia-
ment). Tokyo: Okurasho.
Oshima, H. (1970). The role of small industries in the acceleration of Asian growth. In Economic
Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE), Small industry bulletin for Asia and the Far
East (Vol. 7, pp. 134–136). New York: U. N.
Oshima, H. (1987). Economic development in Monsoon Asia: A comparative study. Tokyo: Uni-
versity of Tokyo Press.
Pomeranz, K. (2000). The great divergence: China, Europe, and the making of the modern world
economy. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Pomeranz, K. (2013). Labour-intensive industrialization in the rural Yangzi Delta: Late imperial
patterns and their modern fates. In G. Austin & K. Sugihara (Eds.), Labour-intensive industrial-
ization in global history (pp. 122–143). London: Routledge.
Report on the Administration of Bengal, 1877/78, Calcutta.
Richards, J. (2003). The unending frontier: An environmental history of the early modern world.
Berkeley: University of California Press.
Roy, T. (2005). Rethinking economic change in India: Labour and livelihood. London: Routledge.
Saul, S. B. (1960). Studies in British overseas trade, 1870–1914. Liverpool: Liverpool University
Press.
Suehiro, K. (1998). Hatten tojokoku no kaihatsu-shugi (Developmentalism in developing countries).
In Tokyo Daigaku Shakai Kagaku Kenkyusho (Ed.), 20-seiki Sekai Shisutemu 4: Kaihatsu-shugi
(The World System of the twentieth century 4: Developmentalism) (pp. 13–46). Tokyo: Tokyo
Daigaku Shuppankai.
Sugihara, K. (1996). Ajia-kan Boeki no Keisei to Kozo (Patterns and development of intra-Asian
trade). Kyoto: Mineruva Shobo.
Sugihara, K. (1999). Kindai sekai shisutemu to ningen no ido (Themodern world system and human
migration). In Iwanami Koza Sekai Rekishi 19: Chiiki o Musubu Dainamizumu (Iwanami lectures
of the World History 19: Dynamic forces that connect regions) (pp. 3–64). Tokyo: Iwanamai
Shoten.
Sugihara, K. (2001). India and the rise of the Asia-Pacific economy, c. 1947–1997. In N. Kondo
(Ed.), The ‘Nation-State’ and Transnational Forces in South Asia. Research project ‘Institutions,
Networks and Forces of Change in Contemporary South Asia’ (pp. 43–67), Tokyo, March 2001,
Conference Proceedings.
Sugihara, K. (2002). Indo kindaishi ni okeru enkakuchi boeki to chiiki koeki, 1868-1938-nen (The
long-distance trade and regional trade in modern Indian history, 1868–1938). Toyo Bunka, 82,
1–46.
Sugihara, K. (2003). The East Asian path of economic development: A long-term perspective. In
G. Arrighi, T. Hamashita, &M. Selden (Eds.), The resurgence of East Asia: 500, 150 and 50 year
perspectives (pp. 78–123). London: Routledge.
Sugihara, K. (2005a). An introduction. In K. Sugihara (Ed.), Japan, China and the growth of the
Asian International Economy, 1850–1949 (pp. 1–19). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Sugihara, K. (2005b). Patterns of Chinese emigration to Southeast Asia, 1869–1939. In K. Sug-
ihara (Ed.), Japan, China and the growth of the Asian International Economy, 1850–1949
(pp. 244–274). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Sugihara, K. (2009). The resurgence of intra-Asian trade, 1800–1850. In G. Riello & T. Roy (Eds.),
How India clothed the world: The world of South Asian textiles (pp. 1500–1850). Leiden: Brill.
1 Multiple Paths to Industrialization: A Global Context … 33
Sugihara, K. (2013). Labour-intensive industrialization in global history: An interpretation of East
Asian experiences. In G. Austin & K. Sugihara (Eds.), Labour-intensive industrialization in
global history (pp. 20–64). London: Routledge.
Sugihara, K. (2015a). Global industrialization: A multipolar perspective. In J. R. McNeill & K.
Pomeranz (Eds.), Cambridge world history. Volume 8: Production, connection and destruction,
1750-Present (1, pp. 106–35). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Sugihara, K. (2015b). Shokuminchiki ni okeru kokunai shijo no keisei (Formation of a domestic
market in the colonial period). In A. Tanabe, K. Sugihara & K. Wakimura (Eds.), Shirizu Gendai
Indo 1: Tayosei Shakai no Chosen (Challenges for a diversity-driven society: Contemporary India
Series 1) (pp. 197–221). Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai.
Sugihara, K. (2015c). Asia in the growth of world trade: A re-interpretation of the ‘long nineteenth
century’. In U. Bosma & A. Webster (Eds.), Commodities, ports and Asian maritime trade c.
1750–1950 (pp. 17–58). Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
Sugihara, K. (2017). Monsoon Asia, intra-regional trade and fossil-fuel-driven industrialization. In
G. Austin (Ed.), Economic development and environmental history in the anthropocene: Perspec-
tives on Asia and Africa (pp. 119–144). London: Bloomsbury Academic.
Sugihara. K. (2019a). Varieties of industrialization: An Asian regional perspective. In G. Riello &
T. Roy (Eds.), Global economic history (pp. 195–214). London: Bloomsbury Academic.
Sugihara, K. (2019b). Guro-baru hisutori no nakano minami ajia (South Asia in global history). In
N. Nagasaki (Ed.), Taikei Minami Ajia-shi 4: Kingendai (Outline of South Asian history 4: The
modern and contemporary period). Tokyo: Yamakawa Shuppansha.
Takanaka, K. (2000). Higashi-ajia Choki Keizai Tokei 9: Gaikoku Boeki to Keizai Hatten (Long-
term economic statistics of East Asia. Volume 9: Foreign trade and economic development).
Tokyo: Keiso Shobo.
van der Eng, P. (2013). Government promotion of labour-intensive industrialization in Indonesia,
1930–1975. In G. Austin & K. Sugihara (Eds.), Labour-intensive industrialization in global
history (pp. 176–200). London: Routledge.
Yanagisawa, H. (1996). A century of change: Caste and irrigated lands in Tamilnadu, 1860s–1970s.
New Delhi: Manohar.
Open Access This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-
NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-
nc-nd/4.0/), which permits any noncommercial use, sharing, distribution and reproduction in any
medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source,
provide a link to the Creative Commons licence and indicate if you modified the licensed material.
You do not have permission under this licence to share adapted material derived from this chapter
or parts of it.
The images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the chapter’s Creative
Commons licence, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not
included in the chapter’s Creative Commons licence and your intended use is not permitted by
statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from
the copyright holder.
Chapter 2
Technology Transfer and Agricultural
Development: A Comparative Study
of Asia and Africa
Keijiro Otsuka
2.1 Introduction
Afewcenturies ago,Malthus predicted that faminewill inevitably take place because,
while the population grows exponentially, food production increases only arithmeti-
cally. Following the Malthusian argument, the Club of Rome predicted in the early
1970s that famine cannot be avoided in tropical Asia (Meadows et al. 1972).
1
How-
ever, serious famine has never taken place in this region for the past half century
and, hence, Malthus’ prediction may appear questionable. However, by reviewing
the history of growth of population and food production, his prediction turns out to
be almost correct (Otsuka 2013). What he failed to predict was the technological
change induced by population pressure (Hayami and Ruttan 1985), which resulted
in the rapid growth of food production, thereby restoring or more than restoring the
balance between population and food production. In other words, the fear of Malthu-
sian hardship, or severe food insecurity, begot efforts to overcome it by means of
technological changes based on international technology transfer.
Indeed, the Green Revolution for rice as well as wheat, defined as the development
and diffusion of high-yielding varieties, took place in tropical Asia in the 1970s
and 1980s, when the population pressure on the limited land became severe enough
(David and Otsuka 1994). However, the Green Revolution for major grains has failed
to hitherto take place in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), although current population
pressure is as severe as in tropical Asia in the 1960s (Otsuka and Larson 2013, 2016).
Unless a sufficient food supply is secured, the economy can unlikely evolve from a
poor agrarian state to an emerging state with decent development of manufacturing
industries and service sectors. Indeed, as agriculture is a dominant industry at the early
1Tropical Asia refers to Southeast and South Asia.
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stages of economic development, its progress is a prerequisite for overall economic
development.
The first major issue to be addressed in this chapter is identifying the conditions
under which the Green Revolution successfully took place in Asia. For this purpose,
I review the historical experiences of the prototype Green Revolutions in rice produc-
tion in prewar Japan, Taiwan, and Korea, and tropical Asia in the 1970s and 1980s.
I find that a major determinant of the Green Revolution was technology transfer.
Indeed, Hayami and Godo (2005) argue, among others,2 that the essence of the Asian
GreenRevolution in ricewas the transfer of intensive rice farming systems fromJapan
to tropical Asia, which is characterized by the adoption of fertilizer-responsive high-
yielding varieties, intensive use of commercial fertilizer, and application of improved
management practices. While it is understandable that the transfer of technologies
from a temperate zone, such as Japan, to tropical Asia would have been difficult
because of the substantial climate differences, it is not easily understandable why
it is so difficult to transfer technology from one tropical zone to another (i.e., from
tropical Asia to SSA). An exploration into the causes for the failure of the Green
Revolution in SSA is the second major issue to be addressed in this chapter.
However, agricultural development alone is not sufficient for the economy to
evolve froman agrarian to an emerging state, as there are strong relationships between
agricultural development and that of nonfarm sectors (e.g., supply of food and pro-
cessing materials and labor from agriculture and demand for products and services
provided by nonfarm sectors in rural areas). Therefore, to identify the significance of
agricultural development, this chapter identified paths to the emerging state based on
the analysis in this chapter and the companion studies on agricultural development
and policies reported in Chaps. 10–12, as well as the industrial development policies
in SSA discussed in Chap. 9.
Theorganizationof this chapter is as follows.WhileSect. 2.2 reviews theprototype
Green Revolutions in rice farming in prewar Japan, Taiwan, and Korea, Sect. 2.3
assesses the Green Revolution in rice farming in Southeast and South Asia in the
1970s and 1980s. Section 2.4 examines the possibility of a Green Revolution in SSA,
focusing on its constraints on this continent. Finally, Sect. 2.5 discusses the role of
agricultural development in steering the economy towards an emerging state.
2.2 Prototype Green Revolutions in Prewar Japan, Taiwan,
and Korea
There was a race between population growth and expansion of food production
during the Meiji era (1868–1912) in Japan, principally because the country is char-
acterized by meagre endowments of cultivable land relative to its population. In fact,
the average farm size was merely one hectare. However, as shown in Fig. 2.1, grain
2Both agricultural economists (e.g.,Dalrymple (1986) andHsieh andRuttan (1967)) and agricultural
scientists (e.g., Tanaka (2012) and Tanaka and Imai (2006)) express similar views.
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Fig. 2.1 Changes in grain production, cultivation area, population, and grain yield in Prewar Japan
(Index: 1880100). Source Umemura et al. (1966)
production increased rapidly from 1880 to roughly 1915 due to the sustained increase
in grain yield per hectare, although cultivation area increased slowly throughout the
prewar period due to the limited availability of unused land. Suddenly, grain pro-
duction and yield stopped increasing around 1915 and grain production per capita
continued to decline thereafter, as population growth surpassed that of food pro-
duction. Nonetheless, this increasing “food deficiency” did not induce grain yield
growth in the subsequent prewar period in Japan. As a result, rice price increased,
and the rice riot occurred in 1918, in which people violently attacked rice dealers
who were suspected to control rice markets and increase rice prices. Since rice is a
so-called wage good or the good on which urban households spend large proportions
of their income, increases in its price tend to trigger not only social instability but also
increase in wage cost, which is in turn detrimental to the development of industries
and other nonfarm sectors.
Grain production and yield increased rapidly in the Meiji era primarily because
of the rapidly increasing rice yield (see Fig. 2.2).3 According to Hayami and Godo
(2005, p. 99), “[c]rop varieties similar to those of modern varieties were selected
through trial and error by experienced farmers” before and during the Meiji era.
While modern varieties (MVs) developed for tropical Asia since the late 1960s are
semi-dwarf, possessing short stems, the improved varieties developed in Japan during
3Note that rice yield is measured as tons of brown rice per hectare in Fig. 2.1. On the other hand,
in developing countries, it is measured in terms of tons of paddy rice. Since paddy is roughly 20%
heavier than brown rice, rice yield in Japan at the beginning ofMeiji era was estimated to be roughly
2.4 tons per hectare in terms of paddy.
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Fig. 2.2 Changes in rice
yield per hectare in Prewar




and Godo 2005, p. 101)
the Meiji period were not necessarily semi-dwarf.4 Similar to MVs, those improved
rice varieties in Japan were resistant against lodging, so that a heavier application
of fertilizers leads to higher yield. Such fertilizer-responsive varieties were initially
selected in the western region and their diffusion boosted registered yield growth
from 1895 to 1910. Such superior varieties in the western region served as parental
varieties to developing improved varieties suitable for the ecologies of the east-
ern region by leading farmers and experiment-station workers. Consequently, yield
growth took place five to ten years later in this region. However, once new varieties
were completely diffused, yield became stagnant throughout Japan by themid-1910s.
Facing the risk of high rice prices and drain on scarce foreign exchange by large-
scale rice imports, the Japanese government decided to increase rice production and
imports from the overseas territories of Korea and Taiwan. Further, the government
actively invested in irrigation and water control and in research and extension to
develop and diffuse high-yielding Japanese varieties adapted to the local ecologies
of Korea and Taiwan and transfer improved agronomic practices (Hayami and Ruttan
1985). As a result, fertilizer-responsive, high-yielding ponlai varieties were devel-
oped in Taiwan, which were cross-bred between Japonica and Indica rice varieties
and also between improved Japonica varieties. Tanaka and Imai state (2006) that
the expansion of rice production in Taiwan was made possible by the transfer of
4However, Dalrymple (1986) points out that the first efforts to develop semi-dwarf rice varieties
occurred in Japan in the late 19th century, leading to the development of an improved variety called
Shinriki.
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the Japanese farming system, based on improved seeds, application of fertilizer, and
irrigation. Hayami and Ruttan (1985) conclude that “the economic implication of the
ponlai varieties for Taiwan in the 1920s were essentially equivalent to those of the
modern rice varieties in the tropics today.”5 Similarly, Hsieh and Ruttan (1967) argue
that new rice varieties now being developed in tropical Asia in the 1960s resemble, in
terms of fertilizer responsiveness and yield potential, the ponlai varieties introduced
to Taiwan in the mid-1920s.
As per Fig. 2.2, rice yield increased slowly during the 1910s and dramatically in
the 1920s in Taiwan. This coincides with the development of ponlai varieties, the
first one being Taiching 65, developed in 1924 from a cross of two Japanese varieties
(Tanaka 2012). Rice production in Korea was less successful than in Taiwan because
of the lower levels of irrigation and water control, but rice yield in this country
nonetheless accelerated in the 1930s.6 Theyield growth in bothTaiwan andKoreawas
obviously the result of technology transfer from Japan, where adaptive agricultural
research, irrigation investment, and technological extension played critical roles. A
stable supply of rice to Japan from Taiwan and Korea undoubtedly contributed to
rice price stability and increased its availability in Japan, thereby contributing to the
sustainable growth of nonfarm sectors in prewar Japan.
2.3 Green Revolution in Tropical Asia
Not only the Club of Rome (Meadows et al. 1972) but also the majority of those
interested in the development of agriculture in tropical Asia were worried about the
future balance between rice supply and demand in the 1960s and early 1970s in this
region, because population was increasing, rice yield had stagnated, and uncultivated
land had been largely exhausted (Barker and Herdt 1985). As is shown in Fig. 2.3,
population grew in parallel with grain production in the 1960s in Tropical Asia.
However, grain production fluctuated widely, which means that food shortages took
place occasionally during poor crop years (e.g., in 1965–1966 in West Bengal).
Without exaggeration, it can be argued that tropical Asia was on the verge of famine
due to increasing population pressure, as predicted by Malthus.
As per Fig. 2.3, grain production began increasing since the mid-1960s and its
growth rate accelerated in the 1970s and 1980s, thereby surpassing the population
growth by awidemargin. Grain production increased not because of the expansion of
land area, but largely because of yield growth. This is a result of theGreenRevolution,
primarily for rice but also for wheat in tropical Asia.
For rice, the first semi-dwarf, fertilizer-responsive, high-yielding MV, IR8, was
released in 1966 by the International Rice Research Institute (IRRI) in the Philip-
pines, which was established in 1960 by support of the Rockefeller and Ford Founda-
5Dalrymple (1986) points out that early ponlai varieties were not semi-dwarfs.
6It is also worth noting that rice yield in Japan began increasing in the 1930s due to the lagged
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Fig. 2.3 Changes in grain production, harvested area, population, and grain yield in tropical Asia
(Index: 1961100). Source FAOSTAT (2016)
tions.7 IR8 was the result of a cross between Peta, a tall variety from Indonesia, and
Dee-Geowoo-Gen, a semi-dwarf variety from Taiwan. Although the contribution of
Japanese scientists to the development of Dee-Geowoo-Gen in Taiwan is not clear,
the basic idea of Green Revolution is obviously the same as the growth of rice yield
based on the development of high-yielding varieties in Japan during the Meiji era.
Indeed, Hayami and Godo (2005, p. 97) point out that “IR8 was modeled after the
high-yielding Japanese varieties.”8
The rice yield in Southeast Asia began increasing since 1966 and accelerated since
the mid-1970s (Fig. 2.4). This is because IR8 and other early IRRI varieties were
potentially high-yielding under favorable production environments but susceptible to
pests and diseases, withmajor yield gains being achieved only after pest- and disease-
resistant varieties were developed in the mid-1970s (David and Otsuka 1994). As a
result, paddy yields in Southeast Asia were only half of those in Northeast Asia in
the 1960s but increased to about two-thirds by the 2010s.9
It is remarkable that rice yield in South Asia began growing with a time lag of
five to ten years compared with Southeast Asia. This is important because rice MVs
were highly transferable from Southeast Asia to South Asia, not to mention from one
7For rice plant to be fertilizer responsive, it is desirable to be short and their stem thick. If the plant
is fertilizer responsive, it is also high-yielding. Improved varieties used to be called “high-yielding
varieties,” but since they are not high-yielding in areas subject to drought and floods, they are now
more commonly called “modern varieties”.
8Japanese agricultural scientists made significant contributions to the development of IR8. IRRI
also learned rice science from Japan by translating articles and books about rice from Japanese into
English.
9Northeast Asia refers to Taiwan, South Korea, and Japan.
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Fig. 2.4 Changes in rice yield in Northeast, Southeast, and South Asia. Source FAOSTAT (2016)
country to another within Southeast Asia.10 In fact, IR8 and related varieties were
widely grown in India andBangladesh, although these varietieswere later replaced by
newer ones, generated by cross-breeding between IRRI and local traditional varieties
(Janaiah et al. 2005). Rice yield in South Asia has been lower than in Southeast Asia,
primarily because of lower availability of irrigation in the former, which indicates
the decisive importance of irrigation for high rice yields (see Chap. 12).
In this way, rice production technology in tropical Asia improved, which led to
sustainable growth in rice production. The upper panel of Fig. 2.5 shows that global
rice production continued to increase over the past several decades. Since more than
90 percent of rice is produced in Asia, the rice Green Revolution significantly con-
tributed to increasing rice production globally. In other words, technology transfer
from Japan to Taiwan and further from Taiwan to tropical Asia resulted in a signifi-
cant growth in rice production (Tanaka 2012). As a result, real rice prices continued
to decline due to increasing rice production, coupledwith price- and income-inelastic
demand for rice, until the “food crisis” in 2008. The real rice price around 2000 was
merely one-third of the level around 1970. This sharp reduction in real rice prices
indicated that the major beneficiaries of the Green Revolution were rice consumers,
including urban workers, whereas rice farmers who failed to adopt improved tech-
nology due to unfavorable production environments lost because of lower rice prices
(David andOtsuka 1994). On the other hand, rice farmers who adopted improved rice
technologies received benefit from enhanced production efficiency but still suffered
10For example, IRRI varieties were widely diffused not only in the Philippines, but also in Indonesia






































































































































Fig. 2.5 World production and real prices for rice and maize, 1961–2016. Source United States
Department of Agriculture database
from price reductions,11 with the net effect more likely to be rather negative because
of the sharp rice price reduction. The lower panel of Fig. 2.5 indicates that not only
the real price of rice but also that of maize had been declining from the 1960s to the
middle of the first decade of this century, because of the increasing maize yield and
production.12
11Although there are no official statistics on the adoption rates of MVs in tropical Asia, they are
likely to be between 75 and 80% as of now.
12Grain prices fluctuated widely around 1974 and 2008, partly because of the slight shortfall in
production, but more importantly because of excessive speculation.
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Although there is no direct evidence that the Green Revolution in tropical Asia
contributed to building emerging states in this region, it would not be unrealistic to
argue that a sufficient supply of such an important staple crop as rice contributed
significantly to the stability of Asian societies by improving the well-being of rice
consumerswithout excessively sacrificing thewelfare ofmost rice farmers. Since rice
is a wage good, the reduction in rice prices must have stimulated the development of
industries and other nonfarm sectors by reducing the cost of living for urban workers.
If there had been no Green Revolution, people in tropical Asia would have been
adversely affected by the high rice prices, persistent food insecurity, and occasional
famines in theworst-case scenario and the import of expensive grains from elsewhere
in the world in the best-case scenario.
2.4 Possibility of a Green Revolution in SSA
Boserup (1965) argues that population pressure on limited land areas stimulates
the spontaneous adoption of land-saving and labor-using production methods by
farmers,which leads to an increase in crop yield.However, this view is not necessarily
consistent with the reviewed historical experience. Even when population pressure
increased in prewar Japan, rice yield did not increase without technological changes.
Similarly, rice yield increased significantly in tropical Asia only after MVs were
developed. Hayami and Ruttan (1985) argue that population pressure induces not
only technological innovations but also institutional innovations, which supports the
development and diffusion of innovations. As such, theAsian experience seemsmore
consistent with this latter view than the Boserupian one.
Although there are a few land abundant countries in SSA, the ratio of arable land
to rural population, on average, has been steadily declining (see Fig. 2.6). As a result,
the land-population ratio in SSA now is similar to that in tropical Asia on the eve of
the Green Revolution. However, since rainfall is lower in SSA, the quality-adjusted
land-population ratio could be much lower than face value in SSA. Therefore, if
the Hayami-Ruttan (1985) posited innovation hypothesis is relevant, it might be
opportune for SSA to launch the Green Revolution.
From the trends of grain production,13 cultivation area, population, and grain yield
in SSA, it is clear that while population has been growing continuously, the growth
of grain production was much slower from 1961 to around 2000 (Fig. 2.7). This is
similar to or worse than the situation in tropical Asia in the 1960s (see Fig. 2.3).
The imbalance between the growth of population and grain production contributes
to the food insecurity in SSA, particularly around the turn of the century, when the
gap between the trends of population and grain production growth was maximum.
However, it is remarkable that grain production growth became faster than population
growth over the past one and a half decades. Grain production increased not only
13Grain includes maize, sorghum millet, rice, and wheat, and production is the total quantity of the
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Fig. 2.7 Changes in grain production, harvested area, population, and grain yield in SSA (Index:
1961100). Source FAOSTAT (2016)
because of the increase in cultivated area, but more importantly because of the rapid
yield growth.
Such yield growth seems consistent with the arguments of Boserup (1965) and
Hayami and Ruttan (1985). The question is whether it can be interpreted as an
indicator of a nascent African Green Revolution. For this purpose, it is instructive to
compare the yields of individual crops in SSA with those in India, a beneficiary of

























Fig. 2.8 Changes in aggregate harvested area in SSA by major crop. Source FAOSTAT (2016)
the Green Revolution in rice and wheat, whose agro-climate is relatively similar to
that in SSA among the Asian countries.14
Before comparing the trends of individual grain yields, it would be useful to exam-
ine the relative importance of different grains in terms of harvested area (Fig. 2.8).
Maize is by far the most important grain in SSA, whose harvested area has been
expanding rapidly. Sorghum and millet are less and roughly equally important com-
pared to maize, but their harvested areas have been declining in tandem during the
past decade. Since their yields are comparatively low and stagnant,15 harvested areas
would have been replaced bymaize areas. Rice harvested area has beenmuch smaller,
but it is steadily increasing primarily due to the conversion of uncultivated marshy
land to lowland paddy fields. The importance of wheat is much lower, and its area has
been largely constant because it can be grown only in cool climates, found primarily
in South Africa and the highlands of eastern Africa. In the following, I focus on the
analysis of rice and maize yields in SSA compared to those in India because these
crops are more promising than other grains.
There are several important observations derived from the comparison of average
rice yields in SSA with the yields of top and bottom 10 countries within SSA plus
14The major conclusions remain the same qualitatively, even if average yield in tropical Asia was
used.
15Although not shown here, the yields of sorghum and millet are not only low and stagnant in both
SSA and Asia but also similar between the two, indicating the Green Revolution of these crops did
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Fig. 2.9 Changes in average rice yield in SSA, top 10 and bottom 10 countries, and India. Source
FAOSTAT (2016)
India (Fig. 2.9).16 First, the average yield gap between SSA and India was small
in the 1960s, refuting the often-held view that crop yield is higher in Asia due
to more favorable climates. According to Nakano and Otsuka (2011), paddy yield
was 3 tons per hectare in the Doho Irrigation Scheme in Uganda, even though no
chemical fertilizers were applied, and double cropping had been practiced for more
than two decades. Nakano et al. (2018a) report that rice yield is as high as 5 tons
per hectare even in rainfed conditions in Kilombero Valley in Tanzania if proper
cultivation practices are applied. These findings indicate that both agro-climate and
soil conditions are favorable for lowland rice production, at least in some areas
of Uganda and Tanzania. Although I cannot generalize these findings to the entire
SSA, the literature review by Balasubramanian et al. (2007) concludes that rice yield
potential in SSA is high. Furthermore, according to my own field observations, many
rainfed paddy fields are located in valley bottoms in SSA, which are moist and fertile
and, hence, favorable for rice production.
Second, rice yield began increasing in India by the late 1960s, although the
improved rice varieties adopted in India at that time had been developed in the
Philippines, such as IR8. Therefore, the early takeoff of rice yields in India sug-
gests a high transferability of improved modern rice varieties from Southeast Asia
to South Asia. Additionally, irrigation investments were induced in Asia, as the rate
of return on such investments increased with the introduction of MVs (Hayami and
16Rice includes both lowland and upland rice, the latter accounting for nearly 40% of the total rice
area. While the yield of upland rice is generally low, new upland varieties, called NERICA, are high
yielding in some areas in SSA (e.g., Uganda; Kijima et al. 2011).
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Kikuchi 1978). Chapter 10 reports that the irrigation ratio in Asia increased from
20% in 1965 to 45% in 2015 (see Fig. 10.3). According to my own observations,
IRRI varieties and their offspring are widely grown in irrigation schemes across the
continent, which also indicates the high transferability of Asian MVs to SSA. Third,
the difference in yield between average and top 10 countries is large,17 which implies
paddy yield is considerably higher in the advanced regions in SSA. Indeed, the yield
gap between the top 10 countries and India was relatively small, which strongly
suggests that improved rice production systems have been successfully adopted at
least in advanced areas in SSA. In fact, rice yields are higher than 5 tons per hectare
in several irrigated areas in SSA, where MVs and improved management practices
were adopted (Otsuka and Larson 2016), and also far higher than average rice yields
in tropical Asia (see Fig. 2.4).
Rice yield is significantly higher under irrigated than rainfed conditions in Asia
(e.g., David and Otsuka 1994; Otsuka and Hayami 1994) because of the decisive
impact of irrigation on rice yield (see Chap. 12). Njeru et al. (2016) point out,
based on case-study evidence, that as far as irrigated areas are concerned, there is
no significant difference in the relationship between fertilizer application and yield
per hectare between tropical Asia and SSA. This suggests that the properties of
yield functions are similar between tropical Asia and SSA. However, the fertilizer
application per hectare tends to be lower in SSA because real fertilizer priced tend
to be higher. Although the irrigated area accounts for only 15% of the paddy area
in SSA (Balasubramanian et al. 2007), Asian rice Green Revolution technologies
function well in irrigated rice areas in SSA. Indeed, roughly 50% of paddy areas in
the top 10 countries in SSA are irrigated.
Finally, average rice yield began increasing around 2005, which may indicate that
the rice sector in SSA is currently transitioning to the Green Revolution. Indeed,
adaptive crop breeding research developed a large number of improved rice varieties
in SSA (Yamano et al. 2016).
For comparative purposes, Fig. 2.10 shows the yield trend of maize in SSA and
India. First, similar to the case of rice, the yield gap between SSA and India was
negligible in the 1960s and 1970s, which indicates either the difference in agro-
climate between SSA and India is not a decisive determinant of maize yield or agro-
climatic differences are small. Second, the maize yield in India began increasing in
the mid-1980s due to the Green Revolution, resulting in a yield gap of roughly 1
ton per hectare between SSA and India in recent years. However, this gap is much
smaller than for rice, where the yield gap amounts to two tons per hectare. Since
improved maize varieties are highly location specific (Smale et al. 2013), improving
the maize yield in SSA seems more difficult than for rice. Third, the difference in
yield between the average and top 10 countries in SSA is relatively small,18 which
indicates themaize yield is low even in themost advanced regions in SSA. Therefore,
17Note that, although yield in the bottom 10 countries is very low, their harvested areas are relatively
small, so that average yield is not significantly affected by the overly low yield.
18Note that, although yield in the bottom 10 countries is very low, harvested areas are small so that
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Fig. 2.10 Changes in average maize yields in SSA, top 10 and bottom 10 countries, and India.
Source FAOSTAT (2015)
it seems safe to conclude that the maize Green Revolution did not take place on a
large scale anywhere in SSA. The lack of adaptive research is likely to be one of
the causes for the delay of an African maize Green Revolution. Fourth, similar to
the case of rice, the maize yield in SSA began increasing around 2005, which may
reflect the increasing adoption of new technologies, possibly leading to amaizeGreen
Revolution in SSA. According to the review of literature onmaize production in SSA
by Otsuka and Muraoka (2017), the adoption of high-yielding hybrid seeds, use of
chemical fertilizer as well as manure and compost, and application of inter-cropping
with leguminous crops which have the capacity to fix nitrogen have been gradually
increasing in SSA. Furthermore, responding to population pressure, markets have
been developing and improved soil management technologies adopted in East Africa
(Yamano et al. 2011).
The critical question is whether a full-fledged Green Revolution can take place in
SSA and a related question is what its constraints are on this continent. According
to Otsuka and Larson (2013, 2016), rice is the most promising crop in SSA, primar-
ily because of the high transferability of the Asian Green Revolution technology.
This view is consistent with the transfer history of rice technology from Japan to
Taiwan, and further to the Philippines and South Asia. A major constraint of the
Green Revolution in SSA is low grain prices (see Fig. 2.5), which would discourage
farmers’ incentives to adopt new technologies and those of researchers to develop
them. Declining and small farm size in SSA is not a major concern, because an
inverse relationship between farm size and productivity is widely observed in SSA
(Larson et al. 2014), indicating that small farms relying on family labor are more
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productive than large farms relying on hired labor. Therefore, the Green Revolution
is compatible with smallholder agriculture in SSA (Larson et al. 2016), as was the
case in tropical Asia.
In my view, another and more serious constraint is the lack of recognition that
the Green Revolution technology is “management intensive.” The Green Revolution
is alternatively called the “seed-fertilize” revolution in the literature (Johnston and
Cownie 1969), which indicates that if improved fertilizer-responsive seeds and chem-
ical fertilizers are adopted, it will take place. However, I believe this is incorrect as not
only improved seeds and fertilizers, but also improved management practices, such
as seed selection, bunding, leveling, transplanting in row, and weeding are critically
important to improving rice yields. This has been proven by assessing the impact of
improved management training on rice yield, income, and profit per hectare under
both irrigated and rainfed conditions in SSA (deGraft-Johnson et al. 2014; Kijima
et al. 2012; Nakano et al. 2018b; Otsuka and Larson 2016; Takahashi et al. 2018).
Rice yield seems to increase by 25–50% if proper management practices are adopted,
even if improved seeds and chemical fertilizers are not used. The importance of these
improved management practices would not have been emphasized in tropical Asia
in the 1960s and 1970s partly because it was considered “trivially” true and also
because basic management practices had been adopted in Asia due primarily to its
long tradition of rice farming.19 The lack of recognition that that Green Revolution
is management intensive leads to a lack of effective extension systems.20 Conse-
quently, the Green Revolution will not take place widely in SSA, unless and until
proper extension systems are built. The failure to accomplish the Green Revolution
will delay the evolution of African countries towards an emerging state, as discussed
in the next section.
2.5 Agricultural Development and Paths to an Emerging
State
Following de Janvry and Sadoulet (2002), Otsuka et al. (2009), and Estudillo and
Otsuka (2016), Fig. 2.11 illustrates how technological innovations in agriculture and
irrigation investment, which lead to the Green Revolution, affect rural household
income directly by increasing the efficiency and profitability of farming and indi-
rectly through the growth linkage effects on nonfarm sectors and changes in the
prices of agricultural products.21 The growth linkage effects of the Green Revolution
19I obtained this information from the former assistant of IRRI, Violy Cordova, who had worked
for IRRI since 1970, Dr. Chukichi Kaneda who worked for IRRI in the early 1970s, and Professor
Koji Tanaka of Kyoto University who has researched the history of the development of rice faming
in Asia.
20This is true not only for rice but also for maize (Otsuka and Muraoka 2017).
21For simplicity, Fig. 2.11 does not consider the consumption linkage effect of agricultural innova-
tions on nonfarm sectors, which arises from increases in farm household income. Additionally, the
possible effect of human capital on the introduction of new technologies is ignored.
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Fig. 2.11 Linkages between agricultural development and industrialization
on the development of nonfarm sectors arise from increased demand for chemical
fertilizers and other purchased inputs and from an increased supply of farm products
for processing activities. While rigorous estimations of the growth linkage effect are
scant, Christiaensen et al. (2011) demonstrate that agricultural growth leads to the
growth of the nonfarm economy by employing cross-country regressions. Because
of the weak evidence, a dotted line is used for connecting agricultural technology and
irrigation with industrial development. The reduction in food prices due to the Green
Revolution has negative effects on farm household incomes and also provides nega-
tive incentives to generate new agricultural technologies and invest in irrigation. At
the same time, lower food price will stimulate industrial development and the devel-
opment of other nonfarm sectors by reducing the cost of living for urban workers.
Another major factor that affects the income of rural households and development of
nonfarm sectors is human capital. Schooling, a major component of human capital
along with health, is known to affect farming efficiency (e.g., Foster and Rosen-
zweig 1996) and have a positive effect on the choice of nonfarm jobs and income
(e.g., Jolliffe 2004;Matsumoto et al. 2006; Nakajima et al. 2018). An important point
is that educational investment is strongly affected by the income of rural households
(Estudillo and Otsuka 2016; Otsuka et al. 2009). An educated rural labor force tends
to choose nonfarm jobs and thereby further contributes to its development.
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In short, the Green Revolution aids the development of industries and other non-
farm sectors by supplying wage goods and an educated labor force to the extent that
the Green Revolution increases the income of rural households and, consequently,
stimulates educational investment. The failure of the Green Revolution in SSA may
well be one of themajor causes for the failure of industrial development and the weak
effects of labor allocation from agriculture to other sectors on the labor productivity
of African economies, as reported in Chap. 9.
Here, a critical question is the role of the state in promoting the Green Revolu-
tion. Since improved varieties are public goods, particularly when they can be repro-
duced by farmers, the government must play a major role in agricultural research.22
Knowledge of improved agronomic practices can thus be shared among farmers in
the locality and, hence, it is a local public good. Therefore, the government must take
responsibility for agricultural extension. Furthermore, irrigation water is a common
pool resource and, thus, themarket fails to build irrigation facilities and allocatewater
efficiently (see Chap. 12 for details). Here too, the state must play a leading role.
Therefore, whether the agrarian economy successfully evolves towards an emerging
state critically hinges on the government’s agricultural policy.
It is noteworthy that the income of a rural household is the major determinant
of its investment in human capital (Otsuka et al. 2009). If a Green Revolution takes
place, thereby improving farm income and stimulating the development of nonfarm
sectors, there can be a virtuous circle of income growth, increased investment in
human capital, and the subsequent development of farm and nonfarm sectors. The
effects of the Green Revolution and human capital, as well as those of nonfarm sector
development on farm household income in Asia and Africa are analyzed in depth in
Chap. 10, using primary data.
Chapters 6–8 focus on industrialization in Asia, whereas Chap. 9 examines how
industrialization can be promoted by policy means in SSA. A common finding is the
importance of labor-intensive industrialization, particularly during the early stages of
economic development. Although agricultural development can contribute to indus-
trialization by supplying an educated labor force and cheap foods, its contribution is
often curtailed by insufficient and inefficient extension systems, as pointed out in this
chapter, and inappropriate irrigation policies, which will be discussed in Chap. 12.
Particularly, the efficient management of ground water is extremely difficult because
of the free access to this source of irrigation water. Practically, the most effective
system is community irrigation because people know each other very well within a
community and punishment on deviating behavior from the communal agreement
is feasible and possibly severe. Chapter 12, which concerns irrigation management,
demonstrates that insufficient or improper recognition of the importance of com-
munity irrigation systems by the government leads to mismanagement of irrigation
water, which in turn, deters agricultural development.
22To the extent that improved varieties can be diffused across country borders, they are “glob-
al” or “regional” public goods. That is why international organizations, such as IRRI, undertake
agricultural research.
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The Green Revolution in Asia contributed to a reduction in grain prices, which
must have reduced farm household income directly. Indirectly, lower food prices
stimulate the development of nonfarm sectors, which creates nonfarm job opportu-
nities for rural households. Furthermore, the governments of developing countries
tend to “exploit” agriculture by intentionally reducing product prices and increasing
input prices (e.g., by imposing export tax on agricultural products and import tar-
iffs on imported agricultural inputs). Such policies reduce the incentives to realize a
Green Revolution. On the other hand, to reduce the income gap between farm and
nonfarm sectors, the governments of developed countries tend to “protect” agricul-
ture by price support, input subsidies, and import restrictions. Such policies stimu-
late domestic production in developed countries excessively and reduce agricultural
product prices internationally, thereby discouraging the agricultural development in
developing countries. Chapter 11 examines whether the “development paradox” of
exploiting agriculture in developing countries applies to Africa.
To sum up, based on the analysis of the evolutionary process of the Green Revolu-
tion in this chapter, Chaps. 10–12 attempt to identify the determinants of agricultural
development, which will eventually contribute to guiding developing economies
towards an emerging state.
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Chapter 3
Southeast Asia and International Trade:




International trade has been an essential element of the long-term economic devel-
opment of Southeast Asia. Involvement in international trade has laid crucial foun-
dations for the present-day economic growth of this region since the fourth quarter
of the twentieth century.
This chapter aims to provide a general overview of the relations between interna-
tional trade and the economy of Southeast Asia from a long-term perspective. First, a
short description is supplied about the relationships between natural endowments and
international trade of Southeast Asia before the European arrival. The second section
is devoted to an analysis of international trade of Southeast Asia from the beginning
of the sixteenth century to the middle of the second half of the nineteenth century.
This is then followed by a case study of Batavia’s trade. The third section focuses on
the economic influences of international trade on the Southeast Asian economy and
society, including the change in the patterns of production, during the same period.
The forth section returns to a survey of trade, to extend it to the high colonial period
and its aftermath roughly to 1975, identifying several characteristics of the modern
Southeast Asian economy along the way. Finally, the last section touches on the
most recent period of industrialization, to show that the historically specific path
laid by international trade has been critically important for the understanding of the
long-term economic development of Southeast Asia.
Figure 3.1 is an illustration of the structure of this chapter. It was drawn to sug-
gest that, if we take a few centuries together, there was normally an intermediate
level of trade, which might be called intra-Asian trade, that often linked and orga-
nized other levels of trade. Intra-Asian trade is distinguished from both global long-
distance trade, usually with Europe and the Americas, and local trade, including
R. Shimada (B)
Graduate School of Humanities and Sociology, The University of Tokyo, Tokyo, Japan
e-mail: r_shimada@nifty.com
© The Author(s) 2019
K. Otsuka and K. Sugihara (eds.), Paths to the Emerging State in Asia and Africa,




























I. Pre Columbian Exchange Period:
Before 1500
II. Early Modern Period:
1500–1870












- Opening of Suez Canal (1869) and 
emergence of steamed vessels
- New institutional frameworks
- Increase in Chinese immigration
- Decolonization
- Indianization
- Envoys by Zheng He
- Emergence of port polity
- Expansion of overseas market
- New pattern of production
- Chinese immigration and multi-
ethnic society




Fig. 3.1 International trade and socio-economic changes in Southeast Asia
intra-Southeast Asian trade. The implication of this formulation is that economy and
society of the region have been developed by constant absorption of both Western
and Asian civilizations through international trade and migration. Intra-Asian trade
was the most significant driver of change of the Southeast Asian economy, although
long-distance trade was the most important in the high colonial period. This chapter
aims to examine the relationships of international trade and socio-economic changes
of SoutheastAsia, especially until themid-twentieth century, along the line suggested
by this figure.
In this chapter the ‘early modern period’ is defined in accordance with the peri-
odization made from a perspective of global history rather than that of Southeast
Asian history. It runs from the late fifteenth century, when Christopher Columbus
“discovered” the Americas and the global economy became truly connected, to the
middle of the second half of the nineteenth century, when steam vessels became dom-
inant in place of sailing ships and global network of telegrams was created. Readers
are reminded that this periodization does not follow the usual periodization in the
historiography of Southeast Asia, where, for example, the early modern period is
defined as from 1400 to 1830 by Barbara Watson Andaya and Leonard Y. Andaya
(Andaya and Andaya 2015).
3.2 Southeast Asia Before the European Arrival
Reflecting the natural conditions of the tropics, the Southeast Asian economy expe-
rienced a path of economic development that is different from those in the temperate
zone. Due to the high temperature and humidity in Southeast Asia, people were ini-
tially inclined to live in mountainous areas rather than in delta areas. In general, delta
areas were an unfavorable place for people to live, because of the humidity and the
high possibility of floods and the outbreak of infectious diseases such as malaria and
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dysentery. The difficulty of controlling large volumes of water was another reason
for people’s unwillingness to live in the delta. Thus most people lived in the cool and
dry mountainous areas, and therefore did not utilize the delta areas by the seaside,
an environment potentially richly endowed. For these reasons, Southeast Asia was
comparatively sparsely populated during the pre-early modern period.
A major motivation for developing delta areas was to respond to the rise of prof-
itable international maritime trade. High overseas demands for products supplied
from the hinterland as well as large profits from transit trade inspired people to
move and settle in lower areas from their mountainous dwellings. In this way, port
cities such as Gresik in Java, Palembang in Sumatra and Ayutthaya in Thailand
were established to facilitate maritime trade. These port cities were transport hubs
where products from inlandwere gathered for export and overseas commodities were
imported for distribution into the hinterland.Moreover, strong political regimes were
often formed in such port cities. These political regimes are now called port-polity
(Kathirithamby-Wells and Villiers 1990). In fact, Palembang and Ayutthaya are good
examples of this, even though these ports were located far from the sea. These two
cities were established at the point just between the plateau and the delta areas, which
indicates that it was difficult to develop the delta areas at this time.
Historically, Southeast Asia engaged in two types of maritime trade. The first was
intra-Asian trade. This type of trade has a very long history, spanning more than
two thousand years. Geographically, it was of a very large scale. Since Southeast
Asia is located between China and India, both of which had been powerful economic
forces, Southeast Asia’s trade developed along with the development of maritime
trade of these Asian economic powers. Contacts with the Indian subcontinent had
been significant over a longer period of time, as is reflected in India’s strong cultural
influence over Southeast Asia, which continues to this day. In addition, present-
day Southeast Asia has Persian and Arabian imprints through the presence of the
West Asian merchants who came to the region via maritime routes (Hall 2011). The
kingdom of Champa is a good example to reveal the strong economic and cultural
connections with China, India, and even West Asia. This kingdom, located in what
is now mid-Vietnam, first had strong links with China around the third century, and
sent tributary missions there. However, Champa began to be influenced by India and
acceptedHindu culture, before the spread of Islamic influence began in the fourteenth
century (Hardy et al. 2009).
Needless to say, Chinese influence has been as strong as Indian influence in South-
east Asia. The naval expeditions of Ming China between 1405 and 1433 directed by
Zheng He, whowas aMuslim Chinese admiral, and the tributary trade betweenMing
China and Southeast Asian states marked a climax of the intra-Asian trade before the
European entry into Southeast Asia. The Ming imperial court sent large fleets seven
times. The fleets visited Southeast Asia as well as Sri Lanka, the Indian subcontinent,
the Arabian Peninsula, and East Africa. Due to the arrival of powerful fleets directed
by Zheng He, Southeast Asian states in particular came under the strong political
influence of Ming China. They sent to tributary missions to China and conducted
maritime trade under the control of the Ming dynasty within the framework of the
tributary system (Liu et al. 2014).
58 R. Shimada
The second type of maritime trade was a regional trade within Southeast Asia.
Along with the development of intra-Asian trade, intra-regional maritime trade also
began to grow. Not only coastal trade such as that in Java and Vietnam, but also a
fairly long-distance trade was developed within Southeast Asia. The combination of
intra-Asian trade with India and China and regional trade created a path of economic
development based on international maritime trade. The proto-type of this path is
evidenced through the records of Srivijaya from the seventh to the tenth century.
Srivijaya was a federation of Malay cities among the Malay Peninsula, Sumatra
Island, and Java Island. Each port city reaped profits and benefits from maritime
trade and, in return, the unified kingdom was a recipient of Buddhism from the
Indian subcontinent (Munoz 2006).
While Southeast Asia enjoyed the proto-type of trade-based economic devel-
opment comprising intra-Asian and intra-regional trade by the fifteenth century
(Fig. 3.1), its economy stepped into a new age of modernization at the beginning
of the sixteenth century, when European traders began participating in economic
activities. It was the beginning of the age of economic globalization when the Euro-
peans began to connect Eurasia, Africa, and the Americas.
3.3 Maritime Trade in the Early Modern Period
The global economy entered a new stage at the beginning of the so-called Columbian
exchange in the late fifteenth century (Crosby 1972), when the Americas were con-
nected by Christopher Columbus and his followers. International connections truly
developed on a global scale. As part of this global economic evolution, the Southeast
Asian economy witnessed several changes.
Goa was conquered by the Portuguese in 1510 and became a center for the Por-
tuguese maritime empire in Asia. In the next year, the Portuguese attacked the king-
dom ofMalacca (Melaka) gaining control of this key port in Southeast Asia. Soon the
Portuguese also acquired the maritime lines to the Moluccas (Maluku Islands) and
toMacau fromMalacca. It is generally believed that gaining control of the Moluccas
was highly important for Portuguese global trade, as the islands were the only place
in the world where the valuable spices of clove, nutmeg, and mace were produced.
These spices were key commodities in the Euro-Asian trade by the Portuguese in the
sixteenth century.
The spice trade was one of the main sources of profits for the Portuguese empire.
Indeed, the Portuguese were also engaged in intra-Asian trade, which also brought
impressive profits. They had several trading bases in maritime Asia, some of which
were Portuguese colonial cities such as Goa, Hormuz, Colombo, Malacca, and
Macau. On the other hand, they also had trading posts in port cities under the con-
trol of Asian indigenous political regimes, such as Cambay (Khambhat) in Gujarat,
Ayutthaya in Thailand and Nagasaki in Japan. Through their trading networks in
maritime Asia, the Portuguese obtained large profits (Souza 1986).
3 Southeast Asia and International Trade: Continuity … 59
The history of the Portuguese provides us with a unique insight. It is true that the
European arrival was a symbolic event in Southeast Asia during the early modern
period. However, from the point of view of the region, the Portuguese were simply
a new participant in Asia’s maritime trade. The Portuguese were engaged in both
intra-Asian trade and Euro-Asian trade, and these trading activities contributed to
economic development of the region.
What the combination of Euro-Asian trade and intra-Asian trade could ultimately
achieve were made much clearer by the Dutch East India Company (Verenigde Oost-
indische Compagnie, hereafter VOC), which existed from 1602 to 1799. The initial
aim of the VOC was to directly procure Asian products for the European market.
Spices such as pepper, nutmeg, mace, clove, and cinnamon in maritime Asia were
the most desirable products for the VOC, although sugar, coffee, and tea emerged in
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries as other important Asian products. In order
to acquire these products, the VOC brought American silver to Asia through Europe
as a means of payment.
Besides Euro-Asian trade, the VOC attempted to participate in intra-Asian trade.
Before the arrival of European traders tomaritimeAsia in the sixteenth century, intra-
Asian trade was conducted by several indigenous traders such as Arabs, Persians and
Chinese. Through commercial negotiations and military actions, European traders
came to join this branch of trade. In the sixteenth century, local Portuguese traders
were one of the most powerful groups of traders, while in the seventeenth century,
the VOC began engaging in intra-Asian trade on a much larger scale. The VOC
was a unique participant, as it was a single organization, which conducted both long
distance trade and intra-regional trade on a large scale. Other European companies
such as English and French East India Companies were engaged in Euro-Asian trade
without such a commitment in intra-regional trade (Shimada 2006).
It is impossible to disregard themagnitude of maritime trade conducted by indige-
nous Asian merchants. Asian traders were clearly more important than European
traders in the early modern period. The most remarkable among them were Chi-
nese merchants. Before the arrival of Europeans, Chinese merchants were actively
engaged in intra-Asian trade. Not only Chinese traders, but also overseas Chinese
traders conducted trade between Southeast Asia and China, while also participating
in regional trade within Southeast Asia.
Set against this background, we see the emergence of the Chinese maritime net-
work in the eighteenth century as a natural course of development. When political
peace was realized in the late seventeenth century after the confusion caused by the
Ming-Qing transition, the Chinese economy expanded, which caused greater demand
for Southeast Asian products such as rice and tin. Some scholars refer to this period
as “the Chinese century” (Reid 1997; Blussé 1999), indicating the influence of the
Chinese economy, which grew in Southeast Asia through international trade with
China by Chinese traders (see Chap. 4 of this volume).
Muslim traders were also important in Southeast Asia. Bugis and Malay traders
were active in regional maritime trade in insular Southeast Asia from the second half
of the eighteenth century (Barnard 2003). Their trading networks were also highly
important in the context of the expansion of Islam. Through these networks, Arabian
60 R. Shimada
religious influence kept expanding, which enabled the immigration of Arabs from
Hadhramaut into Insular Southeast Asia in the mid-eighteenth century (Abushouk
and Ibrahim 2009).
3.3.1 The Case of Batavia
To examine the international economic links of Southeast Asia, the case of Batavia
provides a helpful example. In general, the trade of Batavia had four spheres: long
distance trade, intra-Asian trade, regional trade with the Indonesian archipelago, and
coastal and inland trade (Table 3.1).
The long-distance trade of Batavia was first conducted by the VOC, which estab-
lished the city in 1619. The office ofGovernor-General,whooccupied the top position
in business andmilitary administration of the VOC governing the entire Asian waters
was located in Batavia. The VOC was engaged in two types of maritime trade, as
mentioned above. The first type of trade was Euro-Asian trade. The VOC supplied
silver to Batavia from the Netherlands, and of course most silver was brought to
Europe from Latin America. On the other hand, the VOC sent Asian products for
the European market. Spices such as pepper, clove, nutmeg, mace, and cinnamon
were major Asian products with great demand in Europe in the latter half of the
seventeenth century, while Indian cotton textiles, Javanese sugar, Javanese coffee
and Chinese tea became important in the course of time. Batavia played a key role of
serving as the entrepôt to collect Asian products and ship them to the Netherlands.
It acted as Asia’s center of the Euro-Asian trade of the VOC.
In the nineteenth century, several Western private traders took the role of connect-
ing Batavia with Europe and Americas. When the VOC perished at the end of the
eighteenth century, the administration ofBatavia and colonies in Java fell to theDutch
colonial authorities under the government of theNetherlands except for a short period
from 1811 to 1816, when the British occupied Java. Compared to the seventeenth
and eighteenth centuries, the trade became open and its scale grew. In particular,
with the freedom of participation, Western traders entered into the maritime trade
of Java. Not only the Dutch, but also British, French, German, North European, and
Table 3.1 Four spheres of the trade of Batavia
Sphere Type of trade Major trading partners
1 Long-distance trade The Netherlands, Europe, USA
2 Intra-Asian trade Japan, China, Siam, India, Persia
3 Regional trade within the Indonesian
archipelago
Ambon, Bali, Bima, Banjarmasin,
Palembang
4 Coastal and inland trade Semarang, Surabaya, Ommelanden,
Priangan
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American traders called Javanese ports such as Batavia and Surabaya, and engaged
in the business of Euro-Asian or American-Asian trade (Shimada 2013).
The sphere of intra-Asian trade in Batavia were also controlled mainly by the
VOC. The VOC had several trading posts in maritime Asia from Japan to Arabia. By
connecting these trading posts, it succeeded in developing several patterns of intra-
Asian trade. One representative pattern is the triangular trade that emerged between
Japan, India and Southeast Asia. Japan exported silver, gold and copper to India.
India then exported cotton textiles to Southeast Asia, where primary products such
as sugar, sappanwood (a dye source), and deer hides were produced for the Japanese
market. The VOC entered into this triangular trade with fierce force, and earned large
profits. The profits from intra-Asian trade contributed to the success of the VOC,
because the company was able to reduce the export of silver from the Netherlands to
Asia and saved costs. For this intra-Asian trade Batavia was an important transit port
in the VOC’s shipping network, which linked up maritime Asian countries such as
Japan, China, Siam, Mughal India, and Persia. This contributed to Asian economic
development by establishing a system of international division of labor in maritime
Asia, in which Batavia played a pivotal role in the VOC’s trading network.
In these two spheres of trade, the Javanese economy played the role of exporting
primary products. Sugar, coffee and later indigo were good examples. The huge
demand for Javanese primary products was a stimulus for the economic development
of Java and contributed to the growth of the port of Batavia.
The third sphere of trade was concerned with regional trade within the Indonesian
archipelago. This trade was conducted mainly by Asian traders such as Chinese
and Muslim traders, although it also involved the participation of the VOC in the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and by privateWestern traders in the nineteenth
century. The port of Batavia was not designed only for the Dutch vessels even in the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Indigenous Asian traders also utilized this port.
Overseas Chinese traders in Batavia were the most significant customers of the port.
While they accepted junk ships from mainland China and Chinese immigrants, they
conducted their own shipping business. They sent their ships not only to other ports in
Java such as Semarang and Surabaya but also to ports in the Indonesian archipelago
like Bali and Banjarmasin (Shimada 2013). Their trading network formed a basis
for the development of overseas Chinese power in the Indonesian archipelago. In
this regional trading world, Batavia was one of the trading centers accustomed to
importing and exporting regional products.
The fourth sphere was coastal trade and inland trade. Batavia was supplied with
essential items like food products and timber through coastal trade. These products
were necessary for the urban people of Batavia. This trade was conducted by Asian
traders, the VOC and, later, Western private traders. In addition, the port of Batavia
was an important port to which primary products could be sent from the hinterland.
Already in the early eighteenth century, Batavia exported sugar produced in its sub-
urban areas (Ommelanden) and coffee produced in Priangan. In this way, it was a
significant trading port for the economic development of East Java (Jacobs 2006).
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3.4 Social Changes in the Early Modern Period
During the early modern period from the fifteenth century to the mid-nineteenth
century, Southeast Asia experienced a change towards the formation of the modern
economy and society (Fig. 3.1).
3.4.1 Expansion of the Overseas Market
European entry into Southeast Asia’s international trade expanded the market for
primary products from Southeast Asia. Simultaneously, tropical agricultural produc-
tion was developed due to the large demand in the overseas market. In the sixteenth
and seventeenth centuries, large volumes of spices were exported to Europe. Pepper
was exported from Sumatra and Java, while nutmeg, mace, and clove were exported
from the Moluccas. Besides spices, cane sugar and coffee bean were exported from
Java since the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, respectively. Apart from these
agricultural products, tinwas also an important Southeast Asian product for the Euro-
pean market. It was produced in southern Thailand, the Malay states of the peninsula
and, since the eighteenth century, Bangka Island.
In addition to the European market, Asian demand for Southeast Asian products
increased as well. Highly connected links within maritime Asia were spurred by the
competition among Asian as well as European traders. Southeast Asia maintained
and expanded their trade links with East Asia and South Asia. For example, Japan
imported cane sugar from Java and sappanwood, rayskin, and animal hide from
Thailand. China imported rice, tin and dried marine products such as sea cucumber
from Southeast Asia. India imported cane sugar, spices and tin. In exchange for these
products SoutheastAsia obtained silver fromEastAsia and cotton textiles fromSouth
Asia (Shimada 2018).
Ricewas themost important product for both intra-Asian trade and intra-Southeast
Asian trade. Even before the European entry, Thai rice was exported to many areas
in Southeast Asia. In addition to Thai rice, Javanese rice was traded in both intra-
Southeast Asian and coastal and inland trade. It was exported to other parts of the
Indonesian archipelago, and through coastal trade within the island of Java. As the
surrounding zone of Batavia became specialized in the production of sugar cane,
rice had to be imported into Batavia from northeast coastal area of the island. In
the middle of the first half of the eighteenth century, Thailand began to export rice
to China. This was because China was facing a shortage of rice due to the rapid
population increase during the eighteenth century. This Thai rice trade with China
became the key trade for the Thai economy until the twentieth century.
Intra-Asian trade was conducted not only by Asian traders but also by European
traders. The latter, such as the VOC and English and Portuguese private merchants,
as well as Chinese and Indo-Persian traders engaged in comparatively long-distance
trade. On the other hand, Asian traders such as overseas Chinese, overseas Arab, and
Bugis specialized in coastal trade and regional trade in Southeast Asia. Rice trade,
interestingly, was not conducted by European traders but was left to Asian traders.
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3.4.2 A New Pattern of Production
Due to the growth of international trade, the mode of production changed over the
course of time. One remarkable changewas the introduction of the plantation system.
Early European powers in Southeast Asia introduced the plantation system for sugar
cane production. In the middle of the seventeenth century, the VOC attempted it in
Taiwan. Although it was unsuccessful because of the abandoning of theDutch colony
in Taiwan in 1662, the VOC again attempted the introduction in Java on a large
scale (Yao 2003). The Company sold the lands around Batavia to private European
citizens, who in turn leased the land to Chinese entrepreneurs. These entrepreneurs
managed the sugar cane cultivation and the cane sugar production for export (Blussé
1986). Laborers in this sugar industry were not only local Asians but also Chinese
immigrants. In fact, overseas Chinese laborers outnumbered local Asians.
The mining sector too witnessed a change. Formerly, tin mining operated as a
small-scale industry in southern Thailand and the Malay Peninsula. Tin was mined
there by indigenous people as side work, and they contributed their products to the
states as a sort of head tax. However, a new mode of production was introduced in
the first half of the eighteenth century in Bangka and in the late eighteenth century in
the Malay Peninsula. It involved a group of Chinese immigrant miners. Around fifty
miners formed a group with a Chinese head, who was in charge of all the processes
of mining and refinery (Shimada 2015). In addition to the tin mining sector, gold
mining was also developing in West Borneo during the eighteenth century. The so-
called Lanfang Republic (1777–1884) was a sort of state founded by prominent
overseas merchants, who accumulated profits from gold mining in Borneo (Somers
Heidhues 2003).
Without a doubt, the most predominant sector in Southeast Asia was the agricul-
tural sector. It was traditional but was in transition. Recent research claims that in the
early modern period small-scale, family-based patterns of agricultural production
became widespread in the northern part of the mainland of Southeast Asia such as
northern Vietnam and Burma (Lieberman 2003). This change in the unit of agricul-
tural production was a similar phenomenon to that seen in East Asia, and resulted in
an increase in living standards among small-scaled agricultural producers.
With regard to other parts of Southeast Asia, traditional patterns of small-scale
agricultural production seem to have continued in the greater part of the agricultural
sector. However, the fact that the traditional pattern evolved in response to the over-
seas demand cannot be ignored. Under the framework of the traditional small-scale
family farming system, peasants had to work for a fixed number of days, for example
a hundred days per year, to be submitted to the head of local community as tax. This
compulsory labor systemwas authorized and exploited by European colonial author-
ities or local states, which could collect agricultural products for export through the
heads of local community as efficiently as possible. The Dutch cultivation system of
the nineteenth century is the best example (Elson 1994).
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3.4.3 Immigration and Multi-ethnic Society
The establishment of colonial cities in Southeast Asia was driven largely by the
Europeanmerchants desire to increase their efficiency in international trade.Malacca,
which was originally the capital of the state of Malacca, is a good example of a
European colonial city. Yet, it was occupied by the Portuguese, followed by the
Dutch and the British. Spanish Manila and Dutch Batavia are also typical examples
of European colonial cities established in the early modern period. These two cities
were the centers of trading business for the Spanish and Dutch merchants in the
initial stage; they served as capitals of the Spanish/US Philippines and the Dutch
East Indies in the nineteenth century and are currently two megacities in Southeast
Asia.
Even in European colonial cities, Europeans did not comprise the majority of the
population. It was made up of huge varieties of Asian ethnic groups. The population
of Batavia, for example, included a large number of Chinese immigrants with some
Malay,Bugis,Balinese, Indo-Persians, and soon.TheseAsianpopulacesweremostly
immigrants to the colonial city. Batavia in 1699 had a population of 21,911. Among
them, European citizens accounted for only 8%, the Chinese 17%, Asian Portuguese
freed-slaves (mardijker) 11%, South Asians 2%, Malay and Javanese 1%, and the
Balinese and Makassarese 1%, although Asian slaves, who were immigrants or their
descendants, accounted for more than the half of the total population (Raben 1996).
Being composed of several ethnic immigrants, these colonial cities were literally
multi-ethnic societies. Through the long history of multi-ethnicity since the early
modern period, the Southeast Asian society has accumulated the experiences of and
benefits from multi-ethnic culture. This provided a powerful socio-cultural basis
for the economy and society, which would willingly attract and accept immigrants,
foreign products, overseas technology, and international trade.
3.5 The High Colonial Period and After
Throughout the nineteenth century, international trade rapidly increased in South-
east Asia. Although Table 3.2 shows the steady rise of merchandise exports from
Southeast Asia from the first half of the nineteenth century to the end of the twenti-
eth century, the whole structure of international trade and the economy of Southeast
Asia changed drastically around 1870.
First, in terms of international trade, long-distance trade with Europe and USA
expanded, as seen in Table 3.3. It was because of the increase in exports of primary
products and imports of cotton textiles. Southeast Asia exported rubber, sugar, cof-
fee, and tea while it imported manufactured goods from Europe and USA where
industrialization was in progress. Moreover, the opening of the Suez Canal was a
turning point not only in terms of shipping but also in terms of the impact on the
whole economy. The canal was opened in 1869 and a huge number ofWestern steam
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Table 3.2 Merchandise Exports at Current Price, 1870–1998 (million dollars at current exchange
rates)
Year 1820 1870 1913 1950 1973 1990 1998
Burma – – – 303 358 1,671 3,831
Indonesia 31 270 582 800 3,211 25,675 48,847
Philippines 29 48 163 331 1,885 8,068 27,783
Thailand 7 43 94 304 1,564 23,071 54,455
Total 67 361 839 1,738 7,018 58,485 134,916
Source Maddison 2001: 360
Table 3.3 Trading Partners of International Trade in Southeast Asia, 1883–1938 (million pounds
sterling)












Export 15.0 6.7 15.2 14.7 56.8 42.2 142.4 90.9 94.2 46.4
Import 13.5 8.4 16.0 14.2 48.0 31.7 96.8 59.1 63.9 35.7
Note Asia includes China, Japan and India only
Sources Sugihara 1996: 14, 96–97
vessels annually called on Southeast Asian ports. The shipping services were run
by Western companies, which brought the Southeast Asian economy closer to the
global market.
In addition to the global spread of steam vessels, the British policy of free trade
spurred international trade in Southeast Asia. It is true that Southeast Asia comprised
formal colonies under the British, Dutch, French, Spanish, and American empires,
except for Thailand. Yet, basically, the order of international trade was fixed by the
British policy of free trade, which was followed by other Western countries, and
the policies of the Netherlands in particular. Singapore was established as the most
important center in Southeast Asia for global and regional trade (see Chap. 5 of
this volume). The trading network became well-equipped, as the facilities of the key
ports improved and commercial institutions such as banking in sub key ports such
as Batavia and Manila were modernized (Sugihara 2001).
Second, thanks to the emergence of long-distance trade with theWest, intra-Asian
trade expanded. Table 3.3 shows the values of intra-Asian trade, which comprised
trade betweenSoutheastAsia and other parts ofAsia (exactly speaking, itmeans trade
with China, Japan, and India). Although intra-Asian trade never exceeded trade with
the West, it also rapidly expanded from 1883 to 1928. This growth was realized by
Asian factors as well. Alongside the economic development of Japan, India, and
China over the course of time, Southeast Asia expanded the market for its primary
products in these countries. Furthermore, Southeast Asia imported manufactured
goods such as cotton textiles andmiscellaneous products likematches, tooth brushes,
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andmedicine especially from Japan in the first half of the twentieth century (Kagotani
1995).
Third, intra-SoutheastAsian trade also expanded.Rice tradewas especially impor-
tant. Rice cultivation expanded in the delta areas in Mainland Southeast Asia as well
as Java. This rice was exported to countries outside Southeast Asia but also to insular
Southeast Asia except for Java, where imported rice was a crucial commodity for
the laborers engaged in plantation agriculture.
International trade in this high colonial period, however, was a sort of exceptional
case in the history of Southeast Asia. In general, the engine of international trade
was intra-Asian trade with India and East Asia. Yet, in this period, trade with the
West became the engine that drove the entire international trade of Southeast Asia.
Nevertheless, similar to other periods, Southeast Asia played the role of supplying
primary products, while it imported manufactured goods from outside the region.
This equation continued even after World War II, until the mid-1970s.
To sum up, Southeast Asia stepped into the high colonial period in the fourth
quarter of the nineteenth century, causing an increase in international trade, which
was led by long-distance trade with theWest. This development in international trade
influenced Southeast Asia’s economy and society. In the process of responding to
rising overseas demand for Southeast Asian products, the economy experienced the
development of the agricultural sector, which resulted in economic growth, as well
as the growth of population.1
In addition to economic and population growth, what were the other features
of this period that have influenced the direction of economic development which
remained after independence? The following two points stand out.
3.5.1 The New Institutional Framework
The colonial authorities and the Thai government attempted to introduce the modern
landholding system, but in vain. However, in terms of commercial and financial
affairs, the authorities succeeded in introducing modern institutions for economic
growth. An example of this is the banking system for the supply of capital.
In the late nineteenth century, Southeast Asia received an influx of European
capital. Before this, foreign capital was invested first in agricultural, then in mining
and shipping sectors: this was done directly by individual private entrepreneurs.
However, over the course of time of this high colonial period, the colonial banking
system became well-formed, and operated to facilitate the investment of European
capital (Lindblad 1998). Through Western colonial banks, there was an influx of
capital from home countries into the colonial economy. Western private banks as
1Population growth is estimated as follows: InBurma from4,245,000 in 1870 to 19,488,000 in 1950;
in Indonesia, from 28,922,000 in 1870 to 79,043,000 in 1950; in the Philippines, from 5,063,000
in 1870 to 21,131,000 in 1950; in Thailand, from 5,775,000 in 1870 to 20,042,000 in 1950; and in
Vietnam, from 10,146,000 in 1870 to 25,348,000 in 1950 (Maddison 2001: 213).
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well as colonial central banks were suppliers of capital for projects in Southeast
Asia.
Banking became a key business for wealthy Chinese merchants and replaced tax
farming developed in the nineteenth century. These merchants were engaged in the
international transfer of money from Southeast Asia to mainland China. In addition,
there were family bankers with their own capital, who lent money to small-scale
overseas Chinese and indigenous Asian customers. Besides their own capital, some
Chinese merchants were provided with capital by Western colonial banks, and they
lent Western capital as brokers to local merchants and entrepreneurs.
3.5.2 Increase of Chinese Immigrants
The second key characteristic concerns Chinese immigrants. Not only Western
impacts but also other Asian impacts were significant for the economic develop-
ment of Southeast Asia. Among several Asians, the influence of overseas Chinese
stands out (Skinner 1957; Claver 2014).
Continuing from the pre-early modern period, a vast number of Chinese people
immigrated to Southeast Asia. While their geographical origins in mainland China
were mostly in Fujian in the early modern period, the Chinese origins expanded to
the provinces of Guangdong andHainan after themid-nineteenth century.When they
arrived in Southeast Asia they began to work as manual laborers in several sectors
such as plantation and mining or as dockworkers. Chinese immigrants were mostly
male and although they eventually returned to China after several decades, some of
them remained in Southeast Asia. Because Southeast Asia’s population was scarce
at the initial stage, Chinese immigrants were a very important source of labor.
Besides manual laborers, Chinese merchants were also key contributors to the
Southeast Asian economy. They took on the role of entrepreneurs in several sectors.
Mostly theywere engaged in the commercial business. Since the earlymodern period
overseas Chinese merchants managed retail shops in port cities and organized ped-
dlers in the hinterland. Moreover, some of them were engaged in maritime trade by
making use of their network comprising Southeast Asia and the Chinese coastal area.
From the late nineteenth century onwards, exports to Asian countries increased in
general, which would not have been realized without the Chinese network especially
regarding exports to East Asia. When Western steam shipping companies emerged
in Asian waters in the late nineteenth century, overseas Chinese merchants became
key shippers. By and large, they functioned as maritime traders as well as mediators
to connect international maritime trade with inland producers and consumers.
In addition to the commercial business, wealthy Chinese merchants extended
their business interests to other sectors. Some of them invested in and managed a
few industrial ventures such as plantation, food processing and mining. Before the
beginning of large-scale European immigration in the twentieth century, overseas
Chinese were almost the only ethnicity that ran the industrial sectors in Southeast
Asia. On the other hand, tax farming was also a key business of wealthy overseas
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Chinese merchants. Several sorts of taxes such as market tax, gambling tax, and
opium excises were collected mostly by these merchants, although tax farming was
abolished from the late nineteenth century to the early twentieth century.
In this way, while Western and Chinese influences flourished at the height of
colonialism, Southeast Asia made efforts to decrease the influence of Western and
Chinese ethnic elements from the Great Depression of the 1930s and continued these
efforts during the period of decolonization after the region’s independence from colo-
nial rule. The imaginary of the concept of nation-state building was useful for this
purpose, although the characteristic of multi-ethnicity, historically accumulated in
Southeast Asia remain in essence even today. In addition, in the context of inter-
national trade, the Southeast Asian economy was still a typical supplier of primary
products to the West even after the region’s independence, until the mid-1970s.
3.6 The Contemporary Period and Conclusions
This chapter traced the role of international trade in Southeast Asia’s long-term
path to socio-economic development, by dividing the region’s history in accordance
with changing relationships between trade and the economy and society. The rela-
tionships have been strong, and the economic development of Southeast Asia has
been influenced by the changing trend of international trade. The region is located
between China and India, both of which had been powerful economic forces, and has
been economically and culturally influenced by the two civilizations. When Euro-
peans participated in the trade of Southeast Asia in the early sixteenth century, the
Southeast Asian economy was faced with greater demand for primary products. The
high demand from outside Southeast Asia served as a strong motivation for socio-
economic changes in the region.
From the arrival of the Europeans to the mid-nineteenth century, Southeast Asia
experienced the following changes: The development of international trade and the
large demand for Southeast Asian products from outside the region resulted in the
development of agricultural and mining sectors. With regard to agriculture, the plan-
tation system was introduced, while small-scale peasant agriculture also developed.
In both cases, these changes were reflections of the high demand for Southeast Asia’s
primary products in international trade. In addition, the mining sector and the plan-
tation system needed immigrants and technology from outside. Both of them were
managed bywealthy overseas Chinesemerchants. On the other hand, European colo-
nial cities gathered immigrants from Asia and Europe, which resulted in the general
acceptance of multi-ethnic societies in port cities.
During the high colonial period, the development of international trade brought
about economic changes in Southeast Asia. With the introduction of modern institu-
tions, foreign merchants received benefits when conducting their business in South-
east Asia. These foreign merchants were not only European and American but also
Chinese. In particular, overseas Chinese merchants were successful in banking and
tax farming as well as in trade and commerce. These changes brought about by the
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development of international trade became distinctive characteristics of the Southeast
Asian economy. They remain so today.
Large influences of international trade on the Southeast Asian economy continues
to this day as well. Throughout the process of decolonization after World War II,
the Southeast Asian economy acted as a supplier of primary products to Europe and
USA. Rubber, rice, timber and sugar were the main items exported from Southeast
Asia. However, in the mid-1970s, the economic links with East Asia became more
significant. While the Japan’s high-speed economic growth was put to an end in
the early 1970s due to the Nixon Shock in 1971 and the oil crisis in 1973, South
Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and even Singapore began to enjoy economic growth as
Asian Newly Industrializing Economies (Asian NIEs). This gave a momentum to
many Southeast Asian countries to treat economic links with Asian countries more
seriously rather than sticking to traditional links with Europe and USA. Thus the
Southeast Asian economy began to direct its path of economic development, with
intra-Asian trade and the international division of labor in maritime Asia in mind.
This meant that the region partly served as a supplier of resources (oil and natural
gas, as well as agricultural, forestry andmarine products) but also acted as a producer
of manufactured goods, or at least of manufacturing parts as part of supply chains of
manufactured goods, thus promoting industrialization. Of course, it is well-known
that the process of the economic growth in the fourth quarter of the twentieth century
was often accompanied by the developmental directorship, at least in the initial
period.
To conclude, as seen in Fig. 3.1, the SoutheastAsian economyhas strong historical
roots and has obtained considerable benefits from international trade. Since the entry
of theEuropeans in thebeginningof the sixteenth century in particular, SoutheastAsia
has been in touch with a wide range of overseas markets in Asia and Europe. Large
demands for Southeast Asian products have stimulated the economic development of
the region. The economy was largely developed for the mass production of primary
products. Development of the delta areas, introduction of the plantation system, and
the acceptance of Chinese immigrants are good examples of the region’s capacity
to respond to changes, before the production of manufactured goods became more
important in the late twentieth century.
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Chapter 4
Role of State and Non-state Networks
in Early-Modern Southeast Asian Trade
Atsushi Ota
4.1 Introduction
An important characteristic in the history of economic growth of Southeast Asia is
that the region had developed brisk trade networks well before the launch of the
modern colonial rule during the nineteenth century. The precolonial trade develop-
ment is a common phenomenon in parts of Europe and West, South, and East Asia,
but it is not always the case in other regions including many parts of Africa and
South America. Its historical uniqueness therefore deserves scholarly attention, as
this can be considered one of the elements related to the recent economic growth of
the region.
The precolonial trade in Southeast Asia had a long history, and its patterns were
changing throughout different phases of history. Among them “the Age of Com-
merce” is a famous concept which highlights the trade boom in Southeast Asia
from c. 1450 to 1680 (Reid 1993a). After a period of the VOC trade domination
(c. 1680–1750), the late eighteenth century had been long considered as the period
of decline and fragmentation in Southeast Asia. More recently, however, scholars
proposed a concept of the “Chinese century,” indicating the trade recovery in a
reorganized form in the eighteenth century (Reid 1997; Blussé 1999). The Age
of Commerce and Chinese century can be labelled as the early-modern period in
Southeast Asia. In spite of the new understanding of the Chinese century, the trade
patterns and systems in the early-modern period are still assumed to be very different
from those in the following modern colonial period. We tend to consider that mod-
ern technology, capital, and political systems dramatically changed Southeast Asian
economy and trading patterns during the colonial period, and they were finally subju-
gated to the West-dominated world economy. As a result, we tend to assume that the
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modern colonial economic systems formed large parts of the basis of Southeast Asian
economy today, disconnected from its early-modern past.
Against these assumptions, I argue in this chapter that the elements that char-
acterizes in Southeast Asian trade were created and developed in the early-modern
period, especially after the Age of Commerce. I rename the Chinese century as the
Age of China-oriented trade, because what characterizes this period was not only
Chinese trade and migration, as was often assumed, but the fundamental change in
the state-commerce relationship, in which Southeast Asian actors played a crucial
role, as a result of the shift in the nature of trade. I also argue that the China-oriented
trade remained important until around 1870, buttressing the growing long-distance
trade with Europe during the so-called early colonial period (c. 1820–1870), and
beyond. Special focus is given not only to state politics on trade, but also to the role
of non-state networks, in which crucial actors were traders as well as commercial-
military groups, which are sometimes also called pirates. Because of my specialty,
the discussion of this chapter concentrates on insular Southeast Asia.
In this chapter state refers to any autonomous political body that claims to exercise
supreme authority over a certain territory and more strongly over people living there.
This vague definition covers a wide range of political bodies from an early-modern
petit statelet to a colonial state with rigid legal and taxation structure. Nevertheless
such awide coveragewill enable us to explore various elements in politico-commerce
relationship in a single framework, and to discuss their diversity and development
effectively.
4.2 Age of Commerce
4.2.1 The Rise of the Trade and Its Basic Pattern
“TheAge of Commerce” is a concept raised by the historianAnthonyReid, to refer to
the trade boom from c. 1450 to 1680. In search of precious Southeast Asian products
such as spices (e.g. nutmeg, mace, and clove), wood (sandalwood and aloeswood
etc.), pepper, and various kinds of forest products, traders from West, South, and
East Asia, and later those from Europe visited a number of trading ports in Southeast
Asia.1 These foreign traders brought their items either from their places of origin or
from the transit ports that they passed by on the way. The most significant among
them in Southeast Asian trade were Indian textiles, Japanese silver, and Chinese
manufactured products such as porcelain and metal works.
According to Reid, the important elements to trigger the boom are (1) the incor-
poration of Southeast Asian states into the China-centered tributary system, (2) the
arrival of Muslim traders fromWest Asia and Northwest India, and (3) the inflow of
American and Japanese silver. First, in 1402 Yongle Emperor of the Ming dynasty
1Formore information of the external elements that affected Southeast Asian trade, such as Chinese,
Indian, and European traders, see Chap. 3 of this volume.
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called for Asian rulers of independent states to participate in the Chinese tributary
system, to expand his influence throughout maritime Asia. Under this system, south-
ern “barbarian” rulers were requested to send their tributary missions to Nanjing,
the Ming capital at that time, thereby accepting the authority of the Ming Emperor.
In return they were granted the official permission to conduct trade with China, a
lucrative commercial opportunity amidst the strict trade ban of the Ming dynasty. In
addition, as the Ming Emperor strictly forbade the rulers under the tributary system
from fighting with each other, the system also guaranteed peace among them.
Second, under the rule of the powerful empires such as the Abbasid Caliphate
(750–1258, 1261–1517) and the Safavid dynasty (1501–1736), the activities ofMus-
lim traders like the Arabs, Persians, and Gujaratis expanded to Southeast Asia, in
search of precious tropical products. Third, the Japanese and American silver, the
production of which expanded in the sixteenth century, was brought into South-
east Asia in large quantities, which facilitated the transactions of Southeast Asian
products.
Southeast Asia was attractive for foreign traders, first of all because the region
produced precious products available only in very limited areas, such as nutmeg
and mace grown only in Banda Islands and clove in Ternate and Tidore islands. On
the other hand, the demand for these Southeast Asian products were very strong in
Asia and Europe because they were not only used for flavoring but also for medical
purposes.
The basic pattern of trade in the Age of Commerce was the exchange between
precious natural products from Southeast Asia (spices and woods etc.) and foreign
manufactured products (especially Indian textiles and Chinese porcelain). In terms
of traders, Southeast Asians were most prominent in the local trade (trade between
producing areas and transit ports in Southeast Asia), while the regional trade (trade
between transit ports in Southeast Asia) was conducted by Chinese, Indian and
Southeast Asian traders. In long-distance trade (trade between Southeast Asia and
other parts of the world) Chinese, Indian, and European traders were most prominent
in the respective routes from their places of origin. Main consumers of Southeast
Asian products in this period were a small number of rich and powerful people, such
as members of the royal families, nobles, and privileged merchants, and items that
they demanded were small-volume, high-value products (Reid 1993a). This basic
trade pattern significantly changed in the mid-eighteenth century, as I discuss later.
4.2.2 Southeast Asian Characteristics
Considering the fact that a similar trade boom did not take place in many other parts
of theworld, such asAfrica and SouthAmerica, it is worth askingwhy the trade boom
happened particularly in Southeast Asia. The existence of the products available only
in this region, and its location between the great civilizations of India and China are
frequently mentioned reasons, but they do not fully explain the trade boom. Outside
traders would not have found these products, if there were not for local knowledge
76 A. Ota
of the usefulness of the products, and for the local trade, which brought the products
to the attention of outside traders. Local people created the network to bring the
valuable products from the producing areas to nearby markets and transit ports. It
was the existence of active local trade that gave foreign traders access to the precious
products in Southeast Asia.
Why were the locals able to develop local trade in Southeast Asia? In fact, South-
east Asians had a very long history of maritime activities. Austronesians migrated
from Taiwan to most areas of maritime Southeast Asia before 1500 B.C., fully mak-
ing use of their excellent knowledge of shipbuilding and maritime navigation. Local
trade in Southeast Asia must have been active before the first century B.C., as is
known in Chinese sources, perhaps with the knowledge of monsoon winds. Indian
traders were regularly dealing in spices grown only in small islands in East Indone-
sia in the first century A.D., according to a Greek text, perhaps because Southeast
Asian traders brought them to transit ports. In addition, environmental elements
were also favorable for trade. The seas among numerous islands are relatively calm,
and a number of rivers were navigable. Deep forests provided ample wood materi-
als for shipbuilding. The combination of these trade-friendly environments and the
ancient knowledge of shipbuilding, long-distance navigation, and monsoon winds
was unique in Southeast Asia, and this became the basis for the region to enjoy a trade
boom in the early-modern era, in addition to the precious natural products grown or
collected only in this region.
4.2.3 State Politics and Its Impact on Society
In order for foreign traders to obtain popular Southeast Asian products, it was neces-
sary to find convenient transit ports, as the producing regions of these products were
often very far from the main routes of maritime trade between China and India. They
emerged in nodal points of traffic, such as the coast of theGulf of Thailand, both sides
of the Straits of Malacca, and the north coast of Java, and provided opportunities for
foreign traders to exchange their goods they brought with them with the products
from remote areas of Southeast Asia (Reid 1993a).
The growth of the transit ports soon led to the emergence of a particular type
of state in Southeast Asia in the Age of Commerce—port state.2 Different from the
older agriculture-oriented states such asAngkor andMajapahit,3 the rulers of the port
states relied their wealth and power on maritime trade. Not only did they obtain large
parts of income from the customs and trade-related taxes from local and foreign
traders, but also they organized trade fleets by themselves. The typical examples
2This type of state has often been called port polity, probably in order to include small statelets
typical in Southeast Asia in discussion. However, for the purpose of simplifying discussion, I use
the term port state to mean any scale of political body, which relies its economic, political, and
ideological base on ports under its influence.
3The Srivijaya Kingdom was also a sort of alliance of port states. See Chap. 3, Sect. 3.2.
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of port states include Ayutthaya, Pasai, Aceh, Perak, Palembang, Banten, Demak,
Gresik, Makassar, and Brunei, although they rose and fell in different periods during
the Age of Commerce.
The politics of port states focused on the promotion of trade. In order to protect the
ships laden with precious cargos from the attacks of pirates and gangsters, the rulers
built walls and bulwarks, and organized naval fleets. As traders naturally preferred
well protected ports, effective protection promised rulers more income from trading
ships.
In order to effectively promote trade, however, military power was not enough.
First, rulers attempted tomake use of the knowledge and skills of foreigners, to attract
their compatriot traders. The rulers often created special quarters for particular ethnic
groups to reside in or immediately outside their capitals. These foreign communi-
ties actively conducted trade within and beyond the host state, and the rulers often
appointed the representatives of each community in an important position such as the
harbor master (shahbandar). As a result, the multi-ethnic formation of major port
cities became the tradition in Southeast Asia, far before the colonial rule. Second,
rulers attempted to establish peace and order in their ports and nearby waters, by
issuing rules and regulations in their state. The Malay law codes, a corpus of rules
and regulations first promulgated by the sultan of Malacca, was such an example.
Many of the rules and regulations were concerned with smooth operation of trade
and commercial transactions. Third, some rulers attempted to attract Muslim traders,
by creating places for worship, such as mosques. In insular Southeast Asia, some
rulers also chose to convert themselves to Islam.
The conversion to Islam and the promulgation of law codes were also elaborated
strategies on the part of rulers for their legitimacy. For example, in the north coast
of Java, rulers of the newly emerging port states like Demak adopted Islam as a
new source of legitimacy, in order to counter the land-based Hindu Kingdom of
Majapahit. Being the propagator of Islam in their states also meant that the ruler
became a mediator between the local secular world and the (imagined) holy outside
world. This must have attracted the awe and admiration from local people. Likewise,
the rulers who established law codes were respected as the protector of peace and
order. The wide application of Malay law codes and the popular use of the Malay
language in commerce enhanced the position of the sultan of Malacca as the center
of the Malay World.
The state was also involved in trade. The rulers monopolized not only the trade
of important export items such as nutmeg and pepper, but also their production. For
example, the rulers of Banda and Banten placed strict state control on the production
of nutmeg and pepper respectively, and forced the cultivators to sell the products
only to the rulers.
Through these sorts of politics, states played a prominent role in the promotion
of trade. This is a most important characteristic in the Age of Commerce. State
rulers protected their ports militarily, and they organized the systems for smooth
transactions by creating amicable environments for traders. As these features were
not necessarily the case after the eighteenth century, it is worth considering why it
took place in the Age of Commerce. First, it should be noted that important export
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items in theAge of Commerce, such as nutmeg,mace, clove, pepper, and sandalwood
were produced only in very limited areas, and therefore state control of the production
and trade of these items was relatively easy. The ships laden with these high-value
itemsmust have tended to anchor in ports under the powerful ruler, in the expectation
of effective protection.As ships tended to concentrate on a small number of influential
ports, powerful port states had a chance for further prosperity. Second, these powerful
states tended to monopolize the import of weapons. When state rulers were powerful
enough to dominate trade, other influential members, either within or outside the
royal family, had less chances of obtaining weapons from foreign traders. From
these reasons, states were in a position to take an initiative in local and regional trade
during the Age of Commerce.
What sort of impact did the trade boom during the Age of Commerce have on
society in the history of Southeast Asia? First, the development of regional trade
strengthened common material culture in Southeast Asia, such as the custom of
betel chewing, flavoring with fermented fish, and the use of cotton for clothing.
Second, as local trade developed, some port cities and cash-crop producing areas
abandoned food production, relying on the supply from food-producing areas. The
division of labor was considered to be a condition of economic development, and
this took place particularly in the Age of Commerce in Southeast Asia. Seen from
a different angle, however, the intensified division of labor also meant that some
areas lost economic self-sustenance. Some port cities and cash-crop producing areas
had to depend on trade to obtain food and other necessities. Food-producing regions
also increased the production of food such as rice, by importing necessities such
as textiles. This is how certain areas of Southeast Asia became a trade-dependent
society during the Age of Commerce. This would explain the continuation of local
trade in the following centuries.
Although influential merchant elites emerged in several trade-oriented states, cap-
ital did not accumulate among them. As Reid explained, this can be attributed to the
strong interests of state rulers in commerce. Because they enthusiastically attempted
to benefit from trade and production control, they were equally enthusiastic to pre-
vent powerful merchants from becoming so rich and influential as to threaten their
wealth and power (Reid 1993a). Capital accumulation did not take place, in the way
that it did to prepare the birth of capitalism in Europe around the same time.
Reid explained that the Age of Commerce ended around 1680, when the Dutch
East India Company (Verenigde Oostindisch Compagnie or VOC) had created their
trade network centered on its Asian headquarters in Batavia. In return for military
supports in internal conflicts in local states, the VOC forced the rulers to conclude
treaties, which allowed monopoly rights for the VOC to trade their major export
items. These items were first sent to Batavia, from which they were re-exported to
many places in Asia and Europe. Finally, defeating its major rivals, Macassar and
Banten by the 1680s, the VOC reorganized the trade pattern from the decentralized
open system in the Age of Commerce to their centralized monopolistic system. In
the states under their influence, the Dutch often placed the production of important
cash crops under control. This usually resulted in production decline in many places
because cultivators disliked the enforcement and unfavorable prices that the VOC
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had set. Some influential states such as Mataram and Aceh, losing their interest
in external trade, concentrated more on the agricultural production in the inland.
According to Reid, regional and local trade in Southeast Asia thus fell into decline
in the late seventeenth century (Reid 1993a).
4.3 Age of China-Oriented Trade
4.3.1 Rise of a New Trade Pattern
Several years later after the publication of The Age of Commerce in Southeast Asia,
however, Reid revised his argument of the trade decline after the late seventeenth
century. Now he has emphasized the trade recovery in the mid-eighteenth century,
which he has called the “Chinese century.” He argues that Sino-Southeast Asian
trade and the Chinesemigration to Southeast Asia developed from themid eighteenth
century, because of the newChinese interest in SoutheastAsian products (Reid 1997).
My own research largely agrees with Reid’s view, while there are some differences in
the following points. First, the term “Chinese century” gives an impression that the
Chinese played a far more important role than others in the story of trade recovery.
In fact Southeast Asians such as Bugis, Iranun, and Malays also took a crucial role.
Second, the increase of trade in this period did not only mean the participation of
new players and new trade items. It should be emphasized that it brought a total
reorganization of trade patterns and state formation in Southeast Asia. Third, the
“Chinese century” did not endwith the fall of independent states during the nineteenth
century, as Reid seems to imply, but it survived the colonial trade pattern. I call the
new trade pattern that emerged in mid-eighteenth century Southeast Asia the China-
oriented trade, and I identify the period of this trade pattern as roughly from c. 1750
to c. 1870. In this section I will explain the development and characteristics of this
trade pattern, and the typical local politics towards the trade.
It was the economic growth in China that triggered the boom of Sino-Southeast
Asian trade, as Reid has explained. First, in order to meet the food demand caused
by the rapid population growth, the Qing government started to import rice from
Saigon and Ayutthaya by loosening its maritime ban. Second, the expanding middle
strata of the society in economically advanced areas, such as the South China coast,
Beijing, and the middle- and downstream Yangzi basin, witnessed growing demand
on exotic tropical products from Southeast Asia, such as marine products like sea
cucumber and shark’s fin, forest products like rattan and resin, and others such as
birds’ nests, pepper, and tin. Southeast Asian traders collected these products in
numerous places in insular Southeast Asia, and brought them to regional trade hubs,
from which Chinese traders brought them back to South China coast. This is how
a new trade pattern, dealing with China-bound Southeast Asian natural products,
emerged in the mid eighteenth century.
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The demands on the abovementioned types of Southeast Asian products in China
seem to be related to the “middle-class luxury” (Pomerantz 2000) among those who
enjoyed growing purchasing power under the strong economyduring the long reign of
Qianlong Emperor (1735–99). It was around this period that dining places increased
in large cities, and the royal cuisine spread to the wider circle of society. Those
who newly obtained economic power wanted to have higher self-esteem and social
recognition through the consumption of items that were consumed in the upper circle
of society, among them imported items. Exotic edible items from Southeast Asia,
such as sea cucumber, shark’s fin, and birds’ nests, were typical items for this type of
consumption. These items were indeed rare and expensive, but they were still much
more easily available than clove and sandalwood during theAge of Commerce. Other
Southeast Asian items were also related to mass consumption. Tin was used for tea
container and also for fake paper notes burnt in rituals, while rattan was processed
into various kinds of furniture. These were new types of mass consumption items,
whichwere still considered luxurious butwidely used today across thewide spectrum
of society.
4.3.2 Shifting Trade Hegemony
The Chinese traders headed for Southeast Asia in large numbers, especially after
the lifting of maritime ban in 1727, and they tended to call at transit ports outside
the Dutch sphere of influence. This is partly because they disliked the regulations
imposed in Dutch ports such as Batavia and Malacca, and also because the Dutch
were not interested in the China-bound items. Riau (South of Singapore), Saigon,
Jolo (Sulu islands in the Southwest Philippines), and Spanish Manila were typical
ports from which China-bound Southeast Asian items could be obtained.
Stimulated by the growing Chinese demand in Southeast Asian products, British
traders joined this new pattern of trade. After the opening of Canton (Guangzhou) to
Western traders in 1757, British, Dutch, and other European traders imported large
amounts of tea from China to Northwestern Europe such as Britain, France, and the
Netherlands. Tea party became an important opportunity for socialization among
upper-class ladies in these states, and the custom of tea party expanded from the
Netherlands to other countries, and also to wider strata of society. This is how this
growing demand on China tea was also related to the emerging mass consumption
culture in Northwest Europe. Europeans, however, did not have attractive items from
home for the China market. In order to save precious silver drained in the purchase
of tea, the English East India Company (EIC) and British country traders (those who
conducted trade in Asia with the official permission from the government of British
India) attempted to bring Asian products demanded in China. Large parts of their
items brought to Guangzhou were Indian cotton and opium, but not small amounts of
Southeast Asian tin, pepper, and other items were also imported (Ota 2006). In order
to obtain these SoutheastAsian items,British country traders also visited independent
ports outside the Dutch sphere of influence, for the same reasons as those of Chinese
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traders. To Southeast Asia, British country traders mostly brought Indian textiles and
opium, and Western weapons. Because these items had strong demand among local
rulers, country traders soon became a main player in Southeast Asian trade. Because
the state-chartered EIC had difficulties to deal with these clandestine items, it was
mainly private country traders who dealt in them.
The visit of an increasing number of Chinese junks and British country traders
to non-Dutch ports transformed the trade pattern in maritime Southeast Asia. Not
only Chinese and British but also local traders gathered in these ports for the busi-
ness with foreign traders after the mid-eighteenth century. Receiving these traders,
independent ports such as Riau and Jolo, the capitals respectively of the Johor and
the Sulu Kingdoms, emerged as important trade hubs. This development inevitably
undermined the position of the VOC.
Although the abovementioned China-bound items were out of Dutch interest,
the rise of these ports was a crucial threat for the VOC. For example, Jambi and
Palembang started to export their tin and pepper to Riau, not to Batavia, in spite of
the fact that these items were supposed to be placed under the VOCmonopoly. Local
traders preferred Riau because of the better conditions offered by Chinese and other
traders. The rise of independent ports and their growing trade seriously undermined
the VOC trade control.
From the 1780s Johor Sultanate and the VOC fiercely competed over the trade
hegemony in Malay waters. The tension culminated in the military clash in 1784,
and it resulted in the VOC conquest of Riau. Scholars had considered that the fall of
Riau brought confusion and trade decline in Malay waters because it resulted in the
absence of a strong state power to control trade before the British establishment of
Singapore in 1819. However, I have discussed elsewhere that the Dutch conquest of
Riau in the 1780s did not mean the end of active trading in the surrounding waters.
First, although Riau indeed lost the function of a trade hub after the Dutch conquest,
several other ports, such as Sukadana and Pontianak, soon emerged as alternatives.
Chinese, Southeast Asian, and British traders visited these ports, in order to obtain
China-bound Southeast Asian products (Ota 2010).
Second, although there were a number of records of “pirate” attacks in the Straits
of Malacca after the fall of Riau, this did not necessarily mean trade decline. For
example, after the end of the 1780s Dutch pepper trade was indeed heavily dis-
turbed by so-called pirates, consisting of Bugis, Malay, Iranun, and other Southeast
Asians. They frequently made assaults on passing cargo ships and on the inland
pepper-producing areas in Lampung in South Sumatra, the largest pepper provider
in Southeast Asia at that time. As Lampung pepper was supposed to be sold exclu-
sively to the VOC on the basis of a treaty with the sultan, the “pirate” attacks were
a serious problem for the VOC. For VOC officials, these Asian attackers were no
doubt pirates. However, the pepper deprived by these groups was in fact circulated
on a commercial domain. The attackers usually sold their pepper, a part of which
they sometimes purchased in the producing regions, to Chinese and British traders
waiting in meeting points outside Lampung. In a VOC record, the pepper deprived
by non-Dutch actors around Lampung amounted to 3,400 picols or about 36% of the
VOC pepper trade in Batavia in a year (Ota 2006). Considering the usual activities of
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Chinese and British traders at this time, it is very likely that the deprived Lampung
pepper was finally brought to China. In this way, so-called pirates played a role to
bring the pepper placed under the Dutch monopoly to the China market, to meet the
strong demand there. It therefore seems reasonable to call them armed traders or
commercial-military groups. Because of their contribution trade actively continued
in the Malay waters after the fall of Riau.
4.3.3 New Migration Patterns
In addition to the growth of the trade of China-bound products, another remark-
able feature in the Age of China-oriented trade was active migration of various
groups of people. As Reid and other scholars have discussed, Chinese migration was
most prominent among them. Local rulers of thinly populated tin-mining regions in
Malay Peninsula andBangka Island agreedwithChinese traders to introduceChinese
labor and skills, in order to increase the production. Gold mines in West Kaliman-
tan attracted waves of Chinese laborers. Chinese migrants also opened pepper and
gambir gardens in Terengganu, Brunei, and Riau, to meet the demand in China. The
products of these mines and gardens were almost exclusively exported to China by
Chinese traders. These migrants were mostly from Fujian and Guangdong Provinces
in South China. Under the population pressure during the eighteenth century, a num-
ber of Hokkien, Cantonese, Hakka, and Teochew, many of whom had experiences
in commercial agriculture and mining in their hometown, headed for Southeast Asia
(Reid 1997).
The Chinese migrants in this period often created their communities in inland
areas around mines and gardens, different from those in the previous centuries, when
Chinese communities usually concentrated in the coastal areas. The transit ports in the
coastal areas, such as Malacca, Riau, and Pontianak, and later Singapore and Kuala
Lumpur, played an important role in the trade with upstream migrant communities,
to export the products from Chinese gardens or mines, and to import necessities
for the Chinese migrant communities. Although it is generally understood that the
emergence of this type of Chinese migration was a phenomenon in the high colonial
period, in fact it started in the late eighteenth century, though on a smaller scale and
without any colonial settings.
It should be also noted that not only Chinese but also Southeast Asians actively
migrated in the Indonesian and PhilippineArchipelagos, and they played a significant
role in the transformation of the trade pattern. One of the prominent migrant groups
was the Bugis, originally from around Makassar in South Sulawesi, known for their
excellent knowledge and skills in maritime navigation, commerce, and battle. Dur-
ing and after the Makassar War in 1660–66, with which the VOC finally conquered
Makassar, the Bugis took refuge to various parts of the Indonesian Archipelago,
and they created their communities in the coastal areas. As the China-oriented trade
developed, the Bugis played an important role in bringing marine and forest products
to transit ports, utilizing their extensive network throughout insular Southeast Asia.
4 Role of State and Non-state Networks in Early-Modern … 83
Another prominent migrant group, the Iranun, was originally from Magindanao in
South Philippines, and formed an influential group in the Sulu Kingdom. As its cap-
ital Jolo grew with the expanding China-oriented trade, the activities of the Iranun
also expanded. They collected marine products, and more notoriously abducted peo-
ple to use them as marine-product collectors, rowers of their ships, and slaves in
their communities. Malays and some other groups also actively migrated within the
Indonesian Archipelago, conducting the trade of marine and forest products. It was
also very common that different ethnic groups acted together under an outstanding
leader (Ota 2014).
TheseSoutheastAsianmigrantswere routinely involved in local and regional trade
in a heavy-handed way, using their networks and violence, to obtain particular items.
It was this type of migrant groups that formed the abovementioned commercial-
military groups.
4.3.4 Basic Trade Pattern
Although Asian traders regained the leading role in the trade in this period, the new
trade pattern was different in many respects from that in the Age of Commerce.
The composition of major Southeast Asian exports changed from high-value small-
volume natural products to the bulkier mass-consumption items, such as marine and
forest products, tin, pepper, and birds’ nests.
In return, Southeast Asia imported Indian textiles via Indian traders, opium and
Western weapons via British traders, and Chinese sundry items such as paper and
pottery from Chinese traders. Although Indian textile trade had shrunk towards the
end of the Age of Commerce, Southeast Asians seem to have restarted its import.
Opium consumption in the eighteenth century seems to have mostly concentrated on
Chinese migrant workers. This type of opium consumption was well known in the
high colonial period, but it surely started in some Chinese communities such as sugar
gardens outside Batavia in the Age of the China-oriented trade (Ota 2006). These
things seem to indicate that Southeast Asians had a significant purchasing power,
most probably through the export of China-bound items, which Chinese traders
bought with silver. The Outer Islands (the territory of Dutch East Indies apart from
Java and Madura) had a sizable export surplus in the nineteenth century, as shown
in the following section, largely as a result of the growing export of natural products
to China. Probably there were similar developments in the eighteenth century.
In terms of traders, Chinese junk traders and British country traders took part of
the trade between South China coast and Southeast Asian ports. Apart from British
traders, Europeans did not play an important role. British traders cooperated local and
Chinese traders and commercial-military groups to trade (often clandestine) items
in defiance of the VOC monopoly. For local and regional trade, Southeast Asian
commercial-military groups played a crucial role in bringing natural products from
the producing areas to local transit ports.
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The shift inmajor Southeast Asian exports from small-volume high-value items to
bulky mass-consumption items exerted powerful impacts on the producing regions.
Different from the major exports in the previous centuries such as precious spices
and wood, marine and forest products were collected spanning much larger areas.
This means that the state control of the collection and trade of export products, as
attempted in the Age of Commerce, became much less effective and therefore it was
hardly conducted on the items such as rattan and shark’s fin.4 Without hardly any
state monopoly, a much larger number of people came to be involved in commercial
activities acrosswider areas. It seems very likely that local people becamemuchmore
accustomed to commercial transactions, and became increasingly market-oriented
through the collection of export items.
4.3.5 Commercial-Military Groups and States
The trade of forest and marine products made the role of the commercial-military
groups more important. The producing and collecting areas of those products were
usually far from state centers and state protection. Traders therefore had to arm
themselves to defend their cargos and ships against attackers on seas and rivers. In
order to obtain human captives to sell as slaves, military power was essential, while
heavy armament was also advantageous to get an upper hand over commercial rivals.
Maritime migrants such as the Bugis, Iranun, and Malay therefore tended to heavily
arm themselves and organized commercial-military groups. These non-state groups
obtained weapons, which were much more easily available than in the previous
centuries. As mentioned earlier, British country traders brought Western weapons
including firearms. Spanish and Dutch records tell that a number of commercial-
military groups bought weapons from British traders in Sulu and the Malay waters
(Warren 1981; Ota 2006).
The rise of commercial-military groups also had an impact on the state formation.
States no longer played so prominent a role in the control of trade as they did in
the Age of Commerce. States in this period often attempted to promote trade by
establishing a strong connection with commercial-military groups. These groups
were useful for states not only to obtain China-bound products, but also to gain
military support for conflicts with their rivals. In return, states provided privileges
such as a high official position and tax exemption. For example, Johor Kingdom,
which had received waves of Bugis migrants after theMacassarWar, gave influential
Bugis families a hereditary position of RajaMuda (viceroy). The Sultan of Sukadana
provided migrant groups with a place to settle down and tax exemptions, and granted
their leader with a high official position (Trocki 1979; Ota 2010).
4There are records of state priority in the purchase of birds’ nests in West Kalimantan, but the same
records also indicate that the attempt was not very successful. The local chiefs of the producing
region sold only a small part of the products to the state ruler, because of the weak state control
(Ota 2010).
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Some stateswere indeed establishedby the leaders of commercial-military groups.
The founder ofMempawa inWest Kalimantan was a legendary prince who took self-
refuge after the Makassar War (Andaya 1995). The founder of Pontianak had been
the leader of a notorious commercial-military group who had assaulted the south and
east coasts of Kalimantan. After years of roaming, he went with his 200 followers
to West Kalimantan, to establish the new state of Pontianak. His group consisted of
a mixed group of people who were attracted to his charisma in his leadership in the
successful trade and assaults (Ota 2010). This type of leadership to achieve economic
success through commerce and violence formed a stronger basis of the legitimacy
of the ruler in this period, than becoming a religious mediator or a promulgator of
law codes, as was the case in the Age of Commerce.
States in the Age of the China-oriented trade were generally smaller, and they
played a less prominent role to sustain the trade network than those in the Age of
Commerce. It was rather commercial-military groups that played a larger role in
the trade in insular Southeast Asia. Considering their role discussed above, it is
possible to argue that commercial-military groups played a significant role in the
continuation of local and regional trade, regardless of the rise and fall of states. For
example, as I explained before, after the VOC conquest of Riau in 1784, trade con-
tinued using different hubs such as Sukadana and Pontianak. Lampung pepper was
exported through commercial-military groups to China toward the end of the eigh-
teenth century. These things mean that commercial-military groups took an initiative
to continue trade under weak state control.
There is virtually no trace of capital accumulation among the commercial-military
groups in this period. They were oriented not only to increase their economic wealth
but also to enhance their military and political power, so that they did not always use
their economic gain to accumulate capital nor to invest it in a newenterprise. They had
to use large parts of theirwealth for their armament and formilitary/political conflicts.
Under the weak state authority there were neither effective state protection of safe
commercial activities nor development of a legal framework to guarantee private
properties. Local producers and collectors of China-oriented exports had a chance
to get involved in small-scale commercial activities, but the economic environments
were not so friendly for larger-scale entrepreneurs to increase their wealth.
4.4 Transition to Colonial Trade, c. 1830–1870
4.4.1 End of the Chinese Century?
In his edited volume discussing the “Chinese century,” Anthony Reid and other
contributors explored the development of local economy, state diplomacy, and com-
mercial politics in the independent states in Asia. Many of them ended their dis-
cussions with the fall of the independent states during the colonial period. This
gives an impression that the trade patterns of the Chinese century ended with the
86 A. Ota
establishment of colonial rule, and they were taken over by the colonial trade. Indeed
the new trade pattern developed soon after the establishment of British Singapore in
1819, and the regional trade of Southeast Asia was increasingly channeled to the one
centered on Singapore throughout the nineteenth century, as Kobayashi discusses in
the following chapter in this volume.
The rapid growth of Singapore, however, did not mean the disappearance of the
China-oriented trade. On the contrary, the China-oriented trade steadily grew during
the colonial period, at almost the same pace of the growing colonial trade bound for
Western countries (Fig. 4.3). How was it possible?
4.4.2 Trade in the Outer Islands
I take the ports in the Outer Islands under the Dutch influence (hereafter the Dutch
Outer Islands ports) for the examination of this question, as we have a standardized
set of statistic records created byDutch officials in a number of ports from Sumatra to
Maluku.These ports includeonly those inwhich theDutch authorities collected taxes,
and therefore these sources do not include the trade of powerful independent states in
Aceh and Bali, for example.5 Figure 4.1 indicates the major exports from the Dutch
Outer Islands ports from 1846 to 1869. In this figure, I categorize Southeast Asian
export products into three groups, on the basis of producer, collector, or investor,
as follows: “Local products” mean those collected or produced by local people,
such as forest and marine products bound for China. “Chinese products” are mostly
pepper, gambir, and tin produced bymigrant Chinese workers and exported to China.
“Colonial products” are those produced with Western investments and exported to
Western countries for industrial use or formass consumption, such as rubber, tobacco,
and coffee. Until the 1850s tin and gambir were exported mainly to China and partly
to other parts of Southeast Asia for traditional use (tin as explained before, and
gambir as an ingredient of betel chewing), but in the 1860s a tin mine in Belitung
and gambir gardens in Riau were reorganized on a much larger scale with Western
investments for exports to Europe and the US for industrial use (tin for canned food,
5The interpretation of this set of statistics involves particular difficulties, which derives from the
different degree of accuracy in the information collected from different places. For example, the
volume of “the import from the Outer Islands to Java” collected in the Outer Islands is sometimes
about three times larger than “the export from the Outer Islands to Java” collected in Java in 1846,
although they refer to exactly the same trade. This resulted from the fact that the ability for the
authorities to capture the trade in the ports in the Outer Islands was weaker than that in Java. In the
Outer Islands, considerable number of traders seem to have evaded trade taxes by using small ports
outside the Dutch control. Although this type of confirmation is possible only between Java and
the Outer Islands as statistics are compiled in the same format, the same tendency probably took
place in other places. We have to take into account this inaccuracy in the trade volume, but the trade
trend, such as the distributions of exports to different destinations and those of different origins of
import, is still reliable and deserves analysis. The ability of the port authorities to capture trade later
improved, and by 1869 the volume of the trade measured in Java was only 1.2 times larger than that
of the same trade measured in the Outer Islands (Ota 2013).











Fig. 4.1 Export from the Dutch ports in the Outer Islands, 1846–69 (Dutch guilders). Sources
Direkteur der Middelen en Domeinen 1851–70
and gambir for leather tanning). Therefore, the export of these products is included
in the “Colonial products” in 1869 of Fig. 4.1.
Local products and Chinese products in Fig. 4.1 were mostly exported to China,
and these consists of various kinds of items such as tin, pepper, birds’ nests, sea
cucumber, and rattan, that is, typical items of mass consumption in China in the
China-oriented trade. This figure thus clearly indicates that the China-oriented trade
was growing from 1846 to 1869 as almost steadily as the export of colonial products,
the great majority of which in this period was coffee from West Sumatra and North
Sulawesi. In fact the export of colonial products skyrocketed after the 1870s,when the
Dutch colonial government allowed private companies for more freedom in trade and
production, and as a result the productionof tobacco, sugar, andother products rapidly
expanded in East Sumatra and some other places. Unfortunately it is impossible to
analyze the trade trend in this phase in the same manner because of the significant
changes in the format of statistics after 1870. It is very clear, however, that the
China-oriented trade was still growing in the Outer Islands from 1846 to 1869, the
period when the Singapore-centered regional trade was rapidly expanding and thus
the colonial trade structure was being established (Ota 2013).
Figure 4.2 shows the trend of imports from various regions to the Dutch Outer
Islands ports from 1846 to 1869, based on the same sources used in Fig. 4.1. This
figure indicates that an increase of European products, among them textiles, wasmost
remarkable. Most of them were British cotton textiles, the import of which expanded
after the Dutch authorities accepted the British request to lower their discriminative
customs against British products in Dutch East Indies in the 1820s (Kobayashi 2013).
Indian textiles occupied about 10.8% of the total import in 1846, but in the following
years the trade considerably shrunk. The “household items”was explained in the orig-
inal sources to have come from China, Manila, and Siam, but considering the trade




















Fig. 4.2 Imports into the Dutch Outer-Islands Ports, 1846–1869 (1,000 Dutch guilders). Sources
Direkteur der Middelen en Domeinen 1851–70
textiles were distributed almost exclusively via Singapore, while other items came
mostly either via Singapore or Javanese ports such as Batavia and Surabaya, and the
small remaining part via Manila and other ports (Ota 2013). These observations sug-
gest that in imports, the Singapore-centered trade pattern increasingly incorporated
the Outer Islands. Chinese and Indian imports no longer played a crucial role, while
British cotton textiles seem to have taken over the demand for imported textiles.
The available statistical sources inform us, under the heading of “export destina-
tions,” of only the first ports to which items were sent, even though large parts of
themwere re-exported to other places. Nevertheless the “export destinations” deserve
analysis, as a first step, in order to grasp the pattern of regional trade. Figure 4.3 indi-
cates that the export to Java and Madura was steadily growing from 1846 to 1869.
This is a result of the Dutch efforts to create Java-centered trade networks, redirect-
ing the Singapore-centered trade to ports in Java, by offering favorable conditions
such as tax reductions. Many traders, however, still preferred Singapore, where they
were able to find items demanded in the Outer Islands, such as British cotton textiles,
more easily. The result was almost the same pace of expansion of the trade to Straits
Settlements (mostly Singapore) and the trade to Java. Second, the figure indicates
the increasing importance of the long-distance trade. The largest increase took place
in the export to Europe and the U.S. This is a result of the Dutch attempts to increase
the direct export of coffee to the Netherlands first fromWest Sumatra, and then from
North Sulawesi, in order to reduce the dependence on Singapore. In terms of export
destinations, therefore, the increasing importance of the colonial setting is obvious.
The Singapore was a powerful colonial port equipped with modern facilities such as
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Fig. 4.3 Destinations of items exported from the Dutch ports in the Outer Island, 1846–69 (Dutch
guilders). Sources Direkteur der Middelen en Domeinen 1851–70
large-scale harbors and advanced legal andfinancial systems, and sowereDutch ports
like Batavia and Surabaya to a lesser degree. Large volumes of natural products were
still exported to China, but traders now preferred these colonial ports as their transit
ports. TheDutch effort to establish a Java-centered networkwasmore successful than
had been assumed so far,6 while Singapore also increasingly attracted Outer-Islands
exports. Trade hubs significantly shifted from dispersed numerous small ports in the
Age of the China-oriented trade to a small number of modern ports in the colonial
period.
The traders who participated in this changing trade pattern were a mixture of new
and old actors. After the 1830s Chinese traders based in Singapore became influential
in the trade between Singapore and various ports in the Outer Islands. Among them
those who obtained Western sailing ships became important players (Wong 1960:
74–84; Reid 1993b: 28–29). In other words, newly emerged merchants in Singapore
took a leading position, making use of new, if not the newest, technology. However,
the Bugis who commanded pinisi, traditional sailing ships in East Indonesia, contin-
ued to play an important role especially between Surabaya and the eastern part of the
Archipelago. These Chinese and Bugis traders carried products bound for the China
and Southeast Asian markets to Singapore and major ports in Java, and in return
redistributed various imported items, among them British cotton textiles, from these
ports to various places in the Archipelago (Ota 2013; Kobayashi 2013).
What have been discussed in this section indicates that the China-oriented trade
maintained its importance in Southeast Asian trade in the mid-nineteenth century,
but it was conducted in the changing settings. Bugis traders continued to play an
6For example, Thomas J. Lindblad discusses that Dutch efforts to create a Java-centered trade
network was not successful because Singapore continued to pull large parts of the exports from the
Outer Islands, on the basis of the observations of colonial officials, but not of statistical sources
(Lindblad 2002).
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important role in the collection of early-modern types of Southeast Asian products,
while they and the newly participated Singapore-based Chinese traders brought the
products not to numerous small ports used in the previous decades but to Singapore
and themajor ports in Java. These traders distributed imported items to the producing
regions of China-bound natural products, but the imported itemswere now not Indian
textiles but mostly European items. Asian traders preferred Singapore, which now
integrated the role of numerous small ports in nearby waters in the previous decades,
while theDutch authorities attempted to attract local traders to themajor ports in Java.
Under the new setting of the colonial economic structure, the China-oriented trade
was maintained with some partial transformations. Some elements that facilitated
the Chine-oriented trade, such as Chinese and Bugis traders and their networks, also
buttressed the colonial trade structure.
Among the Singapore-based Chinese traders, some expanded the scale of their
business and started to accumulate their capital, mainly through intermediation
between British and Southeast Asian or Chinese traders (Kobayashi 2013). Some
of them further expanded their wealth in the later decades. In this sense the continu-
ing China-oriented trade provided the basis of the accumulation of Chinese capital in
the high colonial era, although it did not work well among Bugis and other Southeast
Asian entrepreneurs.
Why did the China-oriented trade continue to the colonial period? First, there was
still strong Chinese demand on Southeast Asian natural products. Second, local peo-
ple in the producing regions of China-bound items were market-oriented enough to
respond to the demand on their products. Third, while these people had an increas-
ing purchasing power through their export of natural products, they seem to have
relied necessities such as textiles on import. The colonial trade structure focused on
the producing regions of export products for the Western market, while the China-
oriented trade continued to deal in the imports and exports in many other regions,
where people had been well market-oriented and trade-dependent.
4.5 Conclusions
Asmentioned at the beginning of this chapter, it is an interesting feature that Southeast
Asia experienced brisk local and regional trade in the precolonial period. Although
the patterns of the precolonial trade were constantly changing, the general trend in
the early-modern era was the shift from state initiative to non-state initiative in the
promotion of the trade. During the Age of Commerce (c. 1450–1680) states played
a prominent role in the militarily protection of trade ports, creation of cosmopolitan
port cities, promulgation of rules and regulations of commerce, and control of the
production and trade of important export products. The state control of production
and trade was possible and effective because they mainly dealt in small-volume,
high-value items such as precious spices and wood, which were produced in very
limited areas and traded in a small number of ports. After the Age of Commerce,
the China-oriented trade started to develop in the mid-eighteenth century. During the
4 Role of State and Non-state Networks in Early-Modern … 91
Age of China-oriented trade (c. 1750–1870), non-state commercial-military groups,
often called pirates, played an important role in local and regional trade. Their heavily
armed fleets were effective to collect marine and forest products demanded in China,
in remote areas under weak state control. State control of production was no longer
effective on these products, which could be collected in numerous coasts and forests.
Many states attempted to maintain a good relationship with commercial-military
groups, providing privileges in return for their commercial and military support.
The colonial trade pattern rapidly made a shape in the 1820s after the British
establishment of Singapore (1819). The colonial trade patterns expanded to entire
Southeast Asia, especially intensively to its insular part, buttressed by the modern
port, legal, and financial facilities in Singapore, and the import of British cotton
textiles,which now took over the demand for Indian textiles.However, the Singapore-
centered trade pattern neither completely brought an end to the China-oriented trade
nor imposed totally new systems. On the contrary, old systems survived in the new
settings. It was existing Bugis trade network that distributed British cotton textiles
to ports in the Outer Islands. People in these ports had purchasing power to consume
imported items because of their export of China-bound products. The Singapore-
centered trade patterns expanded, on the basis of the elements that had developed in
the early-modern trade structure.
What sort of significance did the early-modern trade have in the economic history
of SoutheastAsia?First, large parts of SoutheastAsia came to heavily dependon trade
to obtain food and other necessities. In otherwords, they became trade-dependent and
had to continue trade for their survival. Second, itmade possible the gradual transition
to modern trade patterns. The colonial trade pattern relatively smoothly penetrated
the local society because it was able to make use of the existing trade structure.
Third, during the Age of the China-oriented trade, the production/collection areas
of major export items expanded to much wider areas in coastal and mountain areas.
As a result, much larger areas of people were involved in commercial activities and
they becamemoremarket-oriented. Commercial-military groups, who connected the
producing areas to the transit ports were relatively independent from the states. As a
result, when independent states fell one by one under the colonial rule, their network
and commercial activities continued, because they chose alternative ports, either
independent or colonial. The China-oriented trade was maintained, now making use
of modern elements, such as British manufactured products, modern port facilities
in colonial ports, and shipbuilding technology. In this manner, the colonial trade
developed, by combining itself with the China-oriented trade, not by taking over the
latter.
Considering the continuity from the early-modern to modern eras as discussed
above, it is possible to argue that the basis of the Anglo-Dutch international order, in
which free trade was pursued in colonial Asia (Sugihara 1996), had been created in
the early-modern era. Southeast Asian and Chinese traders and producers preferred
free trade, in which state intervention was minimum, to an increasing degree, from
the Age of Commerce to the Age of the China-oriented trade. It was the tradition of
trade-dependent and market-oriented society that made possible the pursuit of free
trade without state protection.
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The pursuit of free tradewithout state protection and legal framework to guarantee
private properties also had its drawbacks. Until the colonial regimes brought legal
framework to protect their business and properties, there was virtually no capital
accumulation in insular Southeast Asia. States did not have enough experiences to
promote commerce and trade through appropriate economic policy.
All these experiences and lack of experiences seem to have created the basis
of Southeast Asian economy in the following periods until today. Society is trade-
dependent and market-oriented, while capital accumulation was extremely limited
until recent decades, except for those who were strongly connected to the state and
outside capital. States were not really capable to conduct appropriate economic pol-
icy, and legal framework did not develop well to guarantee the safe and amicable
business environment. Because of this basis the regional division of labor (between
export item-producing regions and food-producing regions) developed in the high
colonial period, while capital-intensive industrialization did not fully develop in the
period after independence in most parts of Southeast Asia until quite recent decades,
although micro-scale commerce has relatively well developed. The lack of capital
accumulation and effective state economic policy were bottleneck of the economic
development in many Southeast Asian states for several decades after independence.
In recent years, however, while manufacturing industry stands still, micro-scale ser-
vice industry based on internet facilities without large capital is mushrooming in
several states. Southeast Asia seems to follow its historical path of economic devel-
opment, and its market-oriented tendency embedded in society, without heavily
depending on state protection, will perhaps have advantage in non-capital-intensive
industries in the coming years.
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Chapter 5
Growth of Regional Trade in Modern




During the nineteenth century, Southeast Asian countries were progressively
colonised by the West; their economic relations with the Western capitalist econ-
omy intensified through the expansion of long-distance trade. As a result, Southeast
Asia was incorporated into the international division of labour, exporting a large
amount of primary goods in exchange for capital investment and imports of man-
ufactured goods (Cowan 1964; Drabble 2000; Maddison and Prince 1989). While
long-distance trade grew in Southeast Asia, Singapore—the British colonial empo-
rium—prospered as a trade hub by providing industrial products to the neighbouring
Southeast Asian countries and re-exporting regional primary goods to industrial
countries (Huff 1994; Wong 1960). In addition to trade articles, money, Western
trading firms, and Asian merchants accumulated in Singapore, leading to remark-
able trade growth based on the trade relationships with Southeast Asian countries.
Thus, Singapore became the centre of international trade for Southeast Asia, which
accelerated its regional integration into theWest-led global economy. Singapore also
played a pivotal role in connecting production and consumption within the region
through the development of regional trade (Chiang 1978; Wong 1978). Unveiling
such multifaceted trade development in Southeast Asia, this chapter intends to shed
light on the growth of regional trade in Singapore during the nineteenth century.
Previous studies have stressed the significance of Singapore as a trading hub for the
growth of Southeast Asian trade. However, it remains unclear how this port-city was
singled out to develop into such a prominent trade centre in the region, and what kind
of mechanism operated for the growth of its regional trade. One bias in the literature
is that previous studies have considered the late nineteenth century as the watershed
period for Singapore’s trade growth, specifically with the opening of Suez Canal
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in 1869. The primary research relating to Singapore’s economic history addressing
before and after this period exists, but they have often been treated separately (Wong
1960; Chiang 1978; Huff 1994). As a result, the remarkable growth of Singapore’s
trade after the 1870s tended to be associated with the effect of the revolution of
transport and communication driven byWestern colonialismand the growing demand
for raw material in Western industrial countries. The regionally specific mechanism
of trade growth, running through the nineteenth century, has not been fully explored.
To reconsider the significance of Singapore’s regional trade, we must re-examine
its progressive development beyond the periodic gap before and after 1870. The
present chapter tackles this assignment, and in so doing, we estimate the real growth
rate of Singapore’s trade from 1831 to 1913, suggesting the steady growth of its
trade throughout the nineteenth century. In addition, we investigate the factors and
mechanism for the long-term growth of this trade.
Singapore’s regional trade was closely connected with each country’s local trade.
Manufactured goods transported into Singapore via long-distance trade were then
carried to rural port-cities by regional trade, and further supplied to local inhabitants
through internal local trade, such as coastwise and riverine trade (Warren 1981;
Li 2004; Lindblad 2002). Therefore, the functional linkage of Singapore’s regional
trade with local trade in each country was significant in integrating Southeast Asia
with the growing international economy. However, we are not familiar with how
Singapore’s regional trade built its connections with each country’s local trade, and
what sort of changes local trade underwent in response to the expansion of regional
trade. Due to the lack of focus on local trade, we are not adequately able to assess
the significance of Singapore’s regional trade for the whole of nineteenth-century
Southeast Asian economy. Therefore, we shed light on the process of consolidating
the linkage between regional and local trade to comprehensively understand the
regional trading system. Section 4 addresses this subject by focussing on the case of
Sarawak.
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 2 shows the long-
term growth of Singapore’s trade, and analyses the trade structure during the nine-
teenth century. It also discusses the factors that influenced the growth of regional trade
with focus on trade policy and merchants’ business. Section 3 highlights the emer-
gence of the intra-regional circulation of consumer goods by analysing the changing
commodity composition. Section 4 focuses on the expansion of Sarawak’s trade to
explore the connectivity of regional trade with local trade. Section 5 concludes the
chapter.
5.2 Rise of Singapore’s Regional Trade
Singapore was founded as a British colonial port in 1819 under the initiative of
Thomas Stanford Raffles (Turnbull 1977; Trocki 1979). According to the Anglo—
DutchTreaty of 1824, Singaporewas officially acknowledged as aBritish possession,
and in 1826, it became one of the three colonial port-cities of the Straits Settlements.







































































Fig. 5.1 Singapore’s regional export index, 1831–1913. Source Tabular Statements, 1839–1865;
Blue Book, 1868–1913. Note The export index is expressed in real terms and estimated by deflating
the nominal export value by the export price index. The price index is adopted from Kobayashi
(2017)
Throughout the nineteenth century, the colonial authority maintained the status of
free port—no tariff and port dues—in Singapore, enticing Western trading firms and
Asian merchants. Through the commerce of various mercantile parties, Singapore
developed multilateral trade relationships with Western and Asian countries.
We first explore the growth in Singapore’s trade during the century after its estab-
lishment. Figure 5.1 shows the regional exports from Singapore by three regional
classifications: trade with Southeast Asia, trade with Asia (except Southeast Asia),
and trade with theWest. This export index represents growth trend in real terms. The
figure indicates that Singapore’s export index increased four-fold between 1831 and
the early 1870s. It further increased from the rate of 4 in the early 1870s to 16 in 1913.
It follows that Singapore’s exports grew at 16 times during these 80 years. Figure 5.2,
which depicts Singapore’s import data, shows an increasing tendency as well, where
the index increased from 1 to 4 during 1831–1870, and further grew to nearly 20
by 1913. This higher growth rate for imports suggests that the imports of consumer
goods increased at a faster pace in response to the increasing local demand as a result
of Singapore’s rapid urbanisation and population growth, from about 10,000 in the
1820s to approximately 230,000 in the early twentieth century (Saw 1969).
Figure 5.1 also presents the destinations for Singapore’s exports, aggregated by
regional classification, that is, theWest, Asia, and Southeast Asia. We see that, while
Singapore had close trading relations with Southeast Asia, which was fundamental
for its overall trade, theWest, specifically Britain, was also a significant trading coun-
terpart for the colony. According to the data, more than 40% of Singapore’s exports
were bound for Southeast Asia throughout the period examined. Exports to Asia,











































































Fig. 5.2 Singapore’s regional import index, 1831–1913. Source Tabular Statements, 1839–1865;
Blue Book, 1868–1913. Note The import index is estimated using the same mean as that in Fig. 5.1
until the 1860s, suggesting that, during the early period of its trade growth, Singapore
served as a transit port for the international circulation of commodities, including
the re-exports of Chinese products to Britain. However, following the 1870s, with
Asia’s significance in Singapore’s exports gradually diminishing, it appears that the
port enhanced its function as a trading hub for Southeast Asian countries. In addition
to export data, Fig. 5.2 shows the origins of Singapore’s imports with three regional
classifications. We see that Southeast Asia held a bigger share than that of Asia and
the West, maintaining this share at more than 50% after the 1880s. Thus, Southeast
Asian countries were significant trading counterparts in Singapore’s trade during the
colonial period.
The role of Singapore as a transit port began developing at the onset of its colonial
history. When Raffles founded the East India Company’s (EIC) factory at Singapore,
he had two economic aims (Turnbull 1977). The first was the expansion of British
trade with China via Singapore, and the other was the establishment of a British
trade centre in Southeast Asia to confront Dutch colonial power. In terms of his first
ambition, Singapore fulfilled the role of a transit port, offering the British mercantile
community with a trade route to the Chinese market. Table 5.1 lists the ratios of
Singapore’s key import and export articles; we can see that ‘East Asian goods’,
including Chinese raw silk and tea, occupied a relatively large share in both imports
and exports before the 1840s. This indicates that Singapore was a depot for transit
trade, importing Chinese articles and re-exporting them to Britain. However, this role
was later assumed by Hong Kong, which was founded in 1842 as a British trading
base in Southern China. Thereafter, Singapore’s trade began to focus on trades with
Southeast Asian regions to satisfy Raffles’ second ambition. Table 5.1 also shows
that the share of ‘Southeast Asian foodstuffs’, including rice, pepper, and sugar, and
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Table 5.1 Imports and exports in Singapore’s trade, 1822–1913




27.6 21.1 19.9 13.3 15.3 5.1 4.5
Opium (%) 22.1 10.8 20.7 12.9 10.9 5.3 2.1
East Asian
goods (%)
4.5 20.1 9.2 6.0 8.0 7.1 5.1
S. E. Asian
foodstuffs (%)




10.2 4.6 5.7 11.3 19.0 28.7 29.1
Others (%) 22.0 34.9 31.3 39.4 21.9 32.7 35.5




21.6 11.4 10.1 15.8 12.1 4.8 3.4
Opium (%) 22.6 8.9 20.1 12.5 9.9 5.3 1.8
East Asian
goods (%)
5.1 19.6 11.4 3.2 3.6 2.1 1.6
S. E. Asian
foodstuffs (%)




13.7 6.0 8.6 18.6 24.6 38.0 39.5
Others (%) 20.9 43.8 31.9 32.2 24.1 25.9 26.0
Total exports 2,624,740 8,438,150 10,182,478 18,750,166 46,162,886 186,616,348 257,861,006
Source Data for 1822 is from Sumatra Factory Records; data for 1828 is from Straits Settlements Factory Records; data
for 1840 and 1862 are from Tabular Statements; and those for 1880–1913 are from Blue Book
Notes ‘Manufactured goods’ include Indian and British cotton piece goods. ‘East Asian goods’ consist of silk piece
goods and raw silk. ‘S. E. (Southeast) Asian foodstuffs’ comprise rice, salted fish, coconuts oil, sugar, tapioca, pepper,
areca nuts, sago, tobacco, tea, and coffee. ‘S. E. Asian raw materials’ include tin, gutta percha, gambier, hides, rattan,
copra, coal, petroleum, and rubber. The values are expressed in Straits dollars
‘Southeast Asian raw materials’, such as tin, forest produces, and rubber, increased
over time.
In addition, Table 5.1 shows that, together with opium, the ratio of manufactured
goods in Singapore’s trade was relatively large during the mid-nineteenth century.
In fact, before 1850, there was a shift in cotton products from Indian handloom
textile to British industrial products in the trade of manufactured goods. The rise of
British cotton products in place of Indian products was a driving force in the growth
of Singapore’s trade. The expansion of cotton goods’ trade was augmented by two
factors: the predominance of trade liberalisation and the vigorous reaction of local
Asian merchants. Next, we examine these factors.
The expansion of free trade influence assisted the growth of British cotton
products’ trade in Singapore. Through the industrial revolution following the mid-
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eighteenth century, Britain achieved the import substitution of Indian fabrics, and
began exporting cotton manufactured goods worldwide. When British cotton goods
flowed into Southeast Asia, Singapore was becoming the gateway to the regional
market. British articles were transported there via long-distance trade, and finally,
re-exported to neighbouring countries through regional trade. However, the regional
circulation of British cotton goods encountered an obstacle—the Dutch protectionist
tariffs (Van der Kraan 1998; Kobayashi 2013). After the 1820s, the Dutch govern-
ment set a discriminatively high tariff on the imports of British cotton goods from
Singapore at Dutch colonial port-cities. In fact, during the mid-1830s, the tariff rate
reached 70%, hindering Singapore’s regional trade, which considerably relied on
the exports of British cotton goods. These circumstances provoked British diplo-
matic protests against the Dutch discriminative tariff. By the early 1840s, the Dutch
government amended the tariff rate against Singapore to 25%. Following the early
1840s, the exports of cotton goods from Singapore to the Dutch ruling places rapidly
increased (Kobayashi 2013). Thus, after the mid-nineteenth century, British indus-
trial cotton goods were widely circulated across Southeast Asia via Singapore, and
promoted the growth of its regional trade. The rivalry over the Anglo–Dutch tariff
policy and resultant free trade also defeated protectionism, and coordinated the insti-
tutional setting for the growth in Singapore’s regional trade. Thereafter, the Dutch
tariff on the imports of British cotton goods remained unaltered until the later 1860s,
after which the tariff rate was progressively lowered to 16%. In 1874, the differential
duties between British and Dutch products were corrected (Korthals-Altes 1991).
Another primary factor affecting the development of Singapore’s regional trade
was the reorganisation of commercial relationships among merchants. In Singapore,
British trading firms and merchants imported industrial cotton products and pur-
chased Asian produce that were in demand in their home country (Drabble andDrake
1981). Thus, they had to transact with Asian merchants to sell industrial fabrics and
obtain native produces in Singapore. However, most British merchants were inexpe-
rienced in conducting transactions in local markets, and thus, required middlemen
who could deal with the local traders. Chinese merchants who moved fromMalacca
to Singapore satisfied this requirement (Lee 1978; Wong 1960). Before moving to
Singapore, Chinese merchants, whose ancestors immigrated from China’s southern
provinces, had a long history of trading in Southeast Asia. Therefore, they were
familiar with local commerce and able to speak not only English, but also the ver-
nacular languages of the Malay Archipelago. Since some of the merchants held an
administrative position, it was easier to ensure themselves trustworthy for the West-
ern community. Using these aptitudes, the Chinese middlemen purchased industrial
products from British merchants, and in exchange, delivered local Southeast Asian
produce.
Furthermore, the Chinese middlemen played a significant role in drawing local
traders’ commerce to Singapore and re-organising their diverse activities. Even after
the collapse of the Johore–Riau Kingdom in the 1780s, while there seemed to be no
influential trade hub in the Malay Archipelago, local traders, such as Bugis, Malay,
and Chinese traders, were scattered across the region, and maintained active trading,
based in tiny port-cities (see Chap. 4 of this volume). However, the emergence of
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Singapore changed these circumstances. As Singapore began to function as a free
port that offered lucrative business opportunities, such as a deal for British industrial
products, the port started to attract local traders from across Southeast Asia. Bugis
traders came to Singapore with abundant regional produce, such as forest and marine
products from the petty ports in Borneo and Celebes, and Malay traders brought
various agricultural and mineral produces from theMalay Peninsula and Sumatra. In
addition, Chinese junks imported foodstuff, such as rice and sugar, from mainland
countries like Siam and Cochin China. The local traders generally purchased their
commodities from Chinese middlemen, who could offer merchandise ranging from
British fabrics to regional foodstuffs (Kobayashi 2013). In other words, by trading
with the Chinese middlemen, local traders who arrived at Singapore could acquire
every commodity that was demanded in their homelands. Under the circumstances,
an efficient deal warranted the alleviation of high transaction costs, and this in turn
was likely to have enhanced the bargaining position of the Chinesemiddlemen. Thus,
Chinese middlemen came to play a pivotal role in the circulation of commodities in
Singapore at the onset of its trade growth.
Although Singapore was newly built in the early nineteenth century, its trade
growth did not begin from nothing. For the development of Singapore’s regional
trade, it was significant that Chinese merchants who had accommodated to local
commerce operated intermediary business not only between Western merchants and
local traders, but also among the various local traders. The extra-regionally pro-
duced commodities, such as cotton manufactured goods, Indian opium, and Chinese
goods, flowed into Southeast Asia via Singapore. In exchange for its exports, South-
east Asian produces were brought and further transported to consuming countries.
Consequently, through these reciprocal linkages between long-distance trade and
regional trade in Singapore, Southeast Asian trade grew, and the regional trading
system was established by the mid-nineteenth century. This trade structure further
developed after the 1870s, and led to the overall growth of Southeast Asian trade, as
we see in the next section.
5.3 Mechanism of Demand Linkage in Southeast Asian
Trade After the 1870s
Prior to the late nineteenth century, Singapore’s trade mostly comprised the general
pattern of transit trade. Extra-regional products brought into Singapore by long-
distance trade were re-exported through regional trade, and regional products were
transported overseas through reverse flows. However, this pattern changed follow-
ing the 1870s. In particular, the change took place in the regional trade, and the
new pattern of the regional commodity circulation fuelled the expansion of primary
goods’ exports from Southeast Asia. In this section, we discuss the development of
Singapore’s regional trade after the 1870s with focus on the mechanism of demand
linkage.
102 A. Kobayashi
After the 1850s, the expansion ofWestern economic influence further accelerated;
regional economies were also affected by the movements of international trade. In
particular, in Insular Southeast Asia, including Malay Peninsula, Dutch East Indies,
and the Philippines, tin mines and plantations were developed under the surge of
Western colonisation, and large exports of raw materials were initiated to the West.
Exports of forest products, including resin, rattan, and oils, also expanded. In some
inland regions, the livelihoodof the local populations shifted towardsmarket-oriented
agricultural production and labour income at plantations (Lindblad 2002, 100–105;
Murray 1980). However, because the population was relatively small in most island
countries, immigrants became indispensable as labour in order to increase primary
goods production. Chinese and Indian immigrants met this requirement. Following
the 1870s, a large number of Chinese began to immigrate to Southeast Asia from
China’s southern provinces, such as Guangdong and Fujian; in fact, the average num-
ber reached approximately 200,000 per annum (Sugihara 2005). While most of them
returned to China after saving a certain amount of income fromworking in the mines
and plantations, some settled in Southeast Asia. Likewise, Indian immigrants worked
in rubber plantations under the Kangani system in the Malay Peninsula (Sugihara
1996; McKeown 2004). This international movement of labour force reinforced the
production of rawmaterials in Insular Southeast Asia, and products were exported to
the West either directly or via Singapore. Table 5.2 shows that the ratio of Southeast
Asian raw materials in Singapore’s regional imports conspicuously increased after
the 1860s, and the share of tin dramatically soared following the 1880s, suggesting
the increasing production of raw materials in the neighbouring countries. Finally,
they were re-exported from Singapore to the West by long-distance trade.
In mainland Southeast Asia, the Western colonies, British Burma, and French
Cochin China (Indochina after 1899), were established, and the Kingdom of Siam
barely remained independent. In those countries, the production of primary goods
expanded in response to the growth of international economy. Nevertheless, the
nature of primary goods produced there somewhat differed from that of primary
goods in Insular Southeast Asia. Following the 1850s, the reclamation of the deltas
in Burma, Siam, and Cochin China rapidly proceeded, and farmers began to settle
there. As a result, the yield of rice increased in those lands. Consequently, local
farmers began exporting surplus rice abroad on an unprecedented scale, and rice
became themost significant export article from themainland countries (Owen 1971).
Although Europe imported some of the Burmese rice, which was used as starch for
paper manufacturing, Asian countries imported most of the rice as a staple food item.
Rice produced in the Burmese Irrawaddy Delta was shipped to vicinities, such as
British India and the Straits Settlements, and rice reaped in the Chao Phraya Delta
in Siam and the Mekong Delta in Cochin China was exported to Insular Southeast
Asia, China, and Japan. Siamese and Cochin Chinese rice was exported through
the country’s emporiums, Bangkok and Saigon. The rice supply from the mainland
countries facilitated the shift of labour force from the agricultural to export sector;
in other words, it led to the rise of plantation and commercial agriculture in Asian
countries. Thus, the exports of primary goods from the mainland mainly comprised
foodstuffs, which supported the enhancement of productivity in theAsian economies.
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Table 5.2 Imports and exports in Singapore’s regional trade, 1828–1913
1828 1840 1862 1873 1880 1900 1913
Regional imports
Rice (%) 10.1 11.0 31.1 19.9 24.8 16.4 21.7
Manufactured
goods (%)
2.3 4.3 4.6 4.8 0.6 1.0 0.4




4.5 3.3 8.9 24.3 26.7 23.7 19.9
S. E. Asian
foodstuffs (%)
27.5 35.7 22.9 28.1 23.6 18.6 18.6
Others (%) 43.1 36.2 29.0 20.5 23.2 14.6 14.4












0.9 2.8 1.5 2.2 2.2 3.4 1.3
Rice (%) 2.2 0.8 5.7 12.5 18.3 20.3 28.1
S. E. Asian
foodstuffs (%)
4.5 6.3 3.9 6.1 8.7 15.5 18.1
Others (%) 27.9 31.8 34.5 28.5 27.0 40.6 42.3
Total 2,026,323 2,440,884 6,010,299 14,772,414 22,769,850 76,637,644 102,167,243
Source Data for 1828 is from Straits Settlements Factory Record; data for 1840 and 1862 are from Tabular Statements;
and those for 1873–1913 are from Blue Book
Note The total values are expressed in Straits dollars
The food supply from mainland Southeast Asia was critical in the production of
raw materials in Insular Southeast Asia. Numerous Chinese and Indian immigrants
had arrived in the island regions, and this increasing population was likely to induce
greater food demands. Without food supply, the immigrants could not engage in pro-
duction in mines and plantations. Thus, the exports of foodstuffs from the mainland
indirectly assisted the growth of raw materials exports in the island. In addition,
Singapore played a central role as an emporium in the rise of the intra-regional
circulation of foodstuffs.
Next, we explore the commodity compositions in Singapore’s regional trade.
Table 5.2 indicates that the percentage of rice in Singapore’s regional imports
increased by the 1860, and the high ratio of no less than 16% sustained till 1913. A
certain share of rice imported into Singapore was locally consumed, while the major-
ity was re-exported to neighbouring regions, such as theMalay Peninsula, Dutch East
Indies, and British Borneo. The share of rice in Singapore’s regional exports surged
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from less than 6% to more than 20% after the 1870s, replacing the commanding
shares of cotton piece goods and Indian and Chinese products (Table 5.2). That is,
a certain amount of mainland’s rice was transported to Singapore, and distributed to
the island regions, to satisfy the growing food demand by Chinese and Indian immi-
grants, as well as local inhabitants. In addition, Table 5.2 shows that the percentage
of Southeast Asian foodstuffs, including sugar, oil, and salted fish, increased after
the 1880s, suggesting the expansion of food distribution across Southeast Asia with
Singapore as its hub. Thus, after the late nineteenth century, Singapore transformed
from a transit port for long-distance trade between the West and Asia to an empo-
rium coordinating intra-regional trade, and connecting production and consumption
within Southeast Asia.
At the same time, there were several changes in Singapore’s mercantile activities.
Until the mid-nineteenth century, local traders, such as Bugis, Malay, and Chinese
traders, carried regional produce from the neighbouring islands to Singapore, and
transacted the merchandise with Western merchants through Chinese middlemen.
The establishment of such a transaction system between Asian and Western mer-
chants smoothed the commodity circulations between regional and long-distance
trade in Singapore. However, within the realm of regional trade, newcomers from
China were gradually expanding their businesses in place of native traders who
were visiting Singapore from remote islands. After 1850, the port of Singapore was
equipped with transport infrastructure: its harbour was upgraded to accommodate
huge steamships, and regular steamship lines were inaugurated, with Singapore as a
hub of maritime traffic (Bogaars 1956; Boon 2013). The new transport infrastructure
in Southeast Asia was vigorously used for commerce by not onlyWesternmerchants,
but also Asian ones (Tan 1902; Huff 1989; Boon 2013). Furthermore, the telegraph
system was constructed after the late nineteenth century to promote communication
among staple cities across the globe, for which Singapore was one of the network
hubs (Latham and Neal 1983). The telegraph dramatically reduced the communi-
cation time between Asia and Europe, and facilitated the exchange of commercial
and political information. These technological innovations benefitted Singapore’s
mercantile community, particularly Chinese merchants, by enabling them to extend
their trade to the remote islands. Until then, native traders, such as Bugis and Malay
traders, primarily conducted Singapore’s regional trade with the eastern islands,
such as Borneo, Celebes, and Sumatra. Following the 1850s, however, new transport
and communication tools reduced the physical and temporal distance to the east-
ern islands, and alleviated hindrances faced by Singapore’s traders who wanted to
advance there in search of lucrative commerce.
In addition to improved trade infrastructure, social relationships were another
advantage for Chinese traders. Chinese immigrants who came to Southeast Asia
during the high-colonial period built a society on the basis of each home province,
such as Fujian, Guangdong, and Teochew, and the fellowship of each provincial
group was close and strong (Lee 1978). We assume that the mutual trust among
the members mitigated the risk of undertakings in Southeast Asia, and provided the
opportunity of business success, even for the newcomers from China. To explore
trading operations by a Chinese petty trader, we cite an excerpt from a contemporary
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article that describes trading by a Chinese peddler in the late nineteenth-century
Singapore (Tan 1902).
A new-comer from China, or a return immigrant, would scrape together from friends and
other accommodating creditors sufficient means to buy a cart-load of such necessaries as
rice, salt, salt-fish, tobacco, kerosene, matches, sugar, biscuits, manufactured cotton goods,
umbrellas, etc., and proceed to a distant village some miles from the nearest trading centre,
and at once commence operations by building a hut and planting a small vegetable garden
for his own requirements, and opening a “kedai [shop]”. … His shop is soon the rendezvous
of the natives, who resort thither on all occasions or when they have leisure. For such among
them who possess jungle produce, such as gutta, garroo-wood, rattan, gum-damar, areca-
nut, etc., the shopkeeper is ready to barter in exchange the goods of his shop. … The goods
thus obtained are carefully stored until, after a few years’ collection, the man finds he has
sufficient to load two or three carts, when after first disposing of his shop, good-will, and
stock-in-trade to a successor, he would start with his goods to the port of embarkation. Here
[Singapore] he would dispose of them to the best advantage, pay off his creditors, and he is
then ready to take a trip to China to enjoy a holiday with his family.
The above description suggests thatChinese expatriateswho simply visited South-
east Asia could start their own trading business by raising funds fromChinese fellows
and creditors without any collateral. We suppose that the trade-by-credit sale, which
was based on the partnership amongChinese provincial groups,was aimed at expand-
ing commerce from Singapore to the remote rural villages, although there may have
been many defaults in the harsh milieu of business in Southeast Asia.
Thus, we suggest that the expansion of the geographical range of Chinese com-
mercial activities through unique credit sale fuelled the circulation of merchandise
between Singapore and Southeast Asian countries. In particular, Gregg Huff (1989)
emphasises the significance of rice trade by Chinese mercantile groups in Singa-
pore. According to Huff, Singapore’s Chinese merchants who imported rice from
Siam passed it to Chinese traders who exported consumer goods, including rice, to
neighbouring islands in exchange for primary goods; the latter paid the former after
earning a profit from the transaction. For these Chinese merchants, it is assumed
that rice was a medium of exchange based on a solid partnership, and a way to cope
with the deficiency of currency by providing liquidity for commerce. Such a chain
of credit sales among the Chinese promoted the development of the intra-regional
circulation of consumer goods centred on Singapore and raw materials exports. In
sum, the formation of a transaction system for Chinese mercantile communities in
Singapore and its expansion across the neighbouring countries accelerated the growth
of regional trade in Southeast Asia.
5.4 Linkage with Local Trade: Pattern of Sarawak’s Trade
Development
In 1841, James Brooke, as Rajah appointed by the Sultan of Brunei, founded Sarawak
Kingdom in North-Western Borneo. The ruling by the Brooke family lasted until
World War II. After the second half of the nineteenth century, Brooke’s Sarawak
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progressively took over the territory of Brunei, causing its trade to also grow (Ooi
1997; Kaur 1998). Various types of primary goods were exported from Sarawak in
exchange for overseas imports, such as manufactured goods, foodstuffs, and money.
Amajority of Sarawak’s overseas exports were sent worldwide via Singapore, which
also served as a route for imports. We can assume that Sarawak’s trade growth
increased through the strong connection with the regional trading system centred in
Singapore. However, this close relation with Singapore was not sufficient to maintain
Sarawak’s trade growth. Its trade development also critically hinged on the linkage
between overseas and local trades.
The structure of Sarawak’s trade was as follows. During its course of trade
growth, Kuching—Sarawak’s capital—established close trade relations with Sin-
gapore (Chew 1990; Kobayashi and Sugihara 2018). Manufactured goods and food-
stuffs were imported into Kuching from Singapore, and in exchange, Sarawak’s
local primary goods were exported to the international market via Singapore. Asian
merchants primarily engaged in overseas trade in Kuching, and Chinese merchants
particularly traded with Singapore. At the same time, while some imports were con-
sumed by inhabitants in Kuching and its hinterlands, the rest were shipped to rural
cities through coastwise trade. Finally, these foreign products were transported to
forest dwellers via a riverine from markets near an estuary to the inland villages. In
the reverse commodity flow, forest and agricultural products delivered by local folks
were bound for Kuching via riverine and coastal trade, and finally, exported abroad.
Although the coastwise and riverine trade had allegedly been controlled by Malay
traders, as Sarawak’s trade grew and strengthened the connection with Singapore,
Chinese traders began to overpower native traders in terms of business, and domi-
nated internal trade (Chew 1990). Most Chinese traders were small-scale peddlers
and had long-term commercial relationships with Chinese merchants in Kuching,
who provided funds or commodities through credit sales. Likewise, Kuching’s mer-
chants were likely to hold business relations with Singapore’s Chinese merchants.
Thus, consumer products imported from overseas were circulated across Sarawak
through the chain of transactions by the Chinese traders, and Sarawak’s primary
goods were remitted to industrial countries via Singapore. Moreover, the systematic
linkage between foreign trade and domestic coastwise and riverine trade promoted
trade growth in Sarawak.
Figure 5.3 depicts the trends of foreign trade and coasting trade in Kuching from
1860 to 1917. We see the synchronising growths between foreign and coasting trade;
particularly, their volumesweremore or less the same before the 1890s. This suggests
that the growth of foreign imports led to that of coasting exports through the provision
of external articles. The same relationship existed between coasting imports and
foreign exports. Following the 1890s, however, a large amount of pepper produced
on the outskirts of Kuching was exported without going through coasting trade, and
from the 1910s, another commodity, a large amount of rubber was exported from
Kuching and Sibu via direct steamship lines to Singapore. As a result, the growth
of foreign trade left coasting trade behind, as seen in the widening gap in Fig. 5.3.










































































Fig. 5.3 Foreign trade and coasting trade in Kuching, 1860–1917. Source Sarawak Gazette,
Sarawak Trade Returns; Sarawak Government Gazette, Sarawak Trade Returns. Note The units
are expressed in Straits dollars
Nevertheless, the figure shows similar trends for foreign and coastwise trade after
the beginning of the twentieth century.1
In addition, we explore commodities to gain deeper insight into the sectoral link-
ages of Sarawak’s trade. Table 5.3 presents a general pattern for commodity compo-
sitions in foreign exports and coastal imports in Kuching during the late nineteenth
century. Although Sarawak’s trade statistics reported numerous local and extra-local
products (a total of 119 articles) during 1870–1904, we aggregated them to specific
items in the table. The upper half lists the percentages of items for foreign exports
fromKuching, and indicates large shares of natural resins, forest products, and sago2
before the 1890s, and also of minerals, if for a brief period,—mostly gold dust pro-
duced in the Kuching’s hinterland. The lower half of the table shows that coastal
imports that include similar items—such as natural resins; forest products, such as
rattans; and sago—maintained a predominant share throughout the late nineteenth
century. It suggests that most local products imported into Kuching via coastal trade
were re-exported abroad. In the articles for foreign exports, the percentage of peppers
substantially increased in the 1880s, and became a significant export item after the
turn of the century. As discussed, the expansion of pepper production by Chinese
immigrants in Kuching’s vicinities created a gap in the trade growth between foreign
and coastwise trade, which indicates that, with respect to the rest of commodities,
foreign and coastwise trade had close linkages in Sarawak, and the commodities of
coastal trade were probably transported through riverine trade, eventually reaching
1According to statistical data for Singapore’s trade, Sarawak was a minor trading partner that
maintained an approximate 5% share for Singapore’s entire trade.
2Sago is a traditional starch food extracted from the indigenous palm in Insular Southeast Asia.
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Table 5.3 Commodities of foreign exports and coasting imports in Kuching, 1870–1904




58.0 11.5 25.4 13.4 18.3 13.5 26.7 13.2
Rattans (%) 0.0 6.6 2.4 12.5 10.6 7.5 6.5 1.2
Forest
products (%)
3.8 12.1 3.8 6.4 5.4 5.5 3.6 1.9
Gambier (%) 0.0 0.0 8.2 10.5 7.8 9.5 4.6 2.3
Peppers (%) 0.1 0.1 0.3 10.5 14.0 10.9 28.9 34.5
Sago (%) 8.9 32.4 28.8 19.2 20.2 31.1 17.3 11.0
Minerals (%) 6.1 16.0 12.1 8.3 7.9 8.9 3.0 24.8
Others (%) 7.2 11.8 9.2 10.0 10.9 7.8 5.1 6.9
Treasures (%) 15.8 9.6 9.6 9.1 4.9 5.3 4.2 4.2




58.2 16.2 33.7 23.3 31.6 28.8 42.4 38.0
Rattans (%) 0.0 3.3 0.3 17.6 14.1 12.2 9.9 4.2
Forest
produces (%)
3.2 8.3 3.2 9.9 5.4 9.0 2.7 2.6
Pepper (%) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 3.6 3.0 3.7 1.4




3.3 4.8 6.4 11.0 5.7 5.5 4.6 2.8
Minerals (%) 0.5 2.3 2.1 3.2 2.3 2.5 1.7 5.2
Others (%) 3.9 6.8 5.5 5.0 5.6 4.0 2.2 12.4
Treasures (%) 19.7 20.3 14.5 9.2 8.8 12.1 5.4 9.2
Total 855,882 515,637 762,957 632,570 751,044 872,565 2,307,416 1,925,170
Source Sarawak Gazette, Sarawak Trade Returns, 1870–1904
Note The total values are expressed in Straits dollars
inland forest dwellers. Such a functional linkage among the discernible trade sectors
was established in Sarawak.
Nevertheless, the question remains of how the regional trading system centred on
Singapore affected Sarawak’s trade growth. As discussed, with growing rawmaterial
exports from Southeast Asia to Western industrialised countries, the intra-regional
circulation of consumer goods also expanded in response to the increasing demand
for primary goods’ producers. In particular, following the 1870s, mainland Southeast
Asian rice was transported on a massive scale to the island countries via Singapore’s
regional trade. The development of Singapore’s regional trade was highly likely to
have influenced Sarawak’s trade growth because the former was the latter’s most sig-
nificant counterpart. Rice maintained an approximately 10–20% share in Sarawak’s
growing foreign imports during the pre-war period: most of the rice was supplied





























































Fig. 5.4 Coastal rice exports and imports in Kuching, 1881–1930. Source Sarawak Gazette,
Sarawak Trade Returns; Sarawak Government Gazette, Sarawak Trade Returns; Sarawak Annual
Report. Notes The values are measured in piculs
from the mainland via Singapore. Once imported into Kuching, foreign rice widely
circulated in Sarawak, and helped the country augment its primary goods’ exports.
Next, we explore how the internal circulation of rice developed in Sarawak.
Figure 5.4 depicts the coastal rice exports and imports in Kuching. It is assumed
that coastal exported rice was originally imported from overseas, particularly from
mainland countries via Singapore, and coastal imported rice was primarily produced
by local Sarawak inhabitants. The figure also shows an increase in foreign rice exports
from Kuching to the coastal areas, and a secular decline in the distribution of locally
produced rice.
As for foreign rice, annual imports soared from about 60,000 piculs in the early
1880s, to about 170,000piculs in the early 1900s, andfinally reached roughly 420,000
piculs in the late 1930s (Trade Returns in SarawakGazette and SarawakGovernment
Gazette). According to these numeric values and the data presented in Fig. 5.4, while
most foreign rice imported into Kuching was consumed by the city dwellers and
neighbourhood, approximately 11–25% was likely to turn into coastwise exports.
However, focussing on the early period in Fig. 5.4, it is evident that the volumes
of coastal imported rice were comparable to those of coastal exports until the end
of the 1880s. It is likely that the inland rice was transported to Kuching via coastal
trade, and finally, consumed by its residents and surrounding inhabitants. While the
unit price of foreign imported rice, on average, was 2.55 Straits dollars per picul
during the 1880s, the coastwise imported rice was priced at 1.01 Straits dollars dur-
ing the same period (Trade Returns in Sarawak Gazette and Sarawak Government
Gazette). Foreign imported rice was priced higher most probably because its quality
was superior to native rice like paddy—husked rice—produced by swidden agricul-
ture. Meanwhile, it is likely that the cheaper native rice was provided to labourers
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in the primary goods’ industry, and contributed to the competitiveness of export in
Sarawak. Thus, its circulation remained in the domestic trade until the 1880s.Accord-
ingly, we can assume that the domestic trade did not just work for the dynamism
of international trade as an extension that carried foreign products to natives, but
also exhibited sustained adaptability to regional demand. Until the 1880s, while the
Sarawak economy was responsive to the growing world economy, it maintained an
autonomous system of local trade.
Nevertheless, after the 1890s, Sarawak’s economy eventually integrated into the
Singapore-centred trading system. Figure 5.4 shows that the volume of coastal
imported rice gradually decreased after the 1890s. Rice was scarcely imported via
coastwise trade after 1900, although around 1920, its imports temporarily increased,
possibly to cope with the fall in coastal rice exports. By contrast, the volume of
coastal exported rice from Kuching to rural cities was increasing at a rapid rate,
and was expected to facilitate the expansion of the production of primary goods,
such as pepper, rubber, and forest products. Due to the massive inflows of foreign
rice from Singapore, local rice was no longer demanded, and thus, its domestic
circulation almost ceased. Therefore, a majority of the commercial productions in
Sarawak’s economy further focussed on industrial raw materials; the region inten-
sively exported them to Western industrial nations in exchange for the imports of
manufactured goods and regional foodstuffs. This was the effect of integration of
Sarawak into the regional trading system centred on Singapore. Thus, Singapore
served as an interface for Sarawak to connect with both long-distance trade with the
West and regional trade with Southeast Asia.
5.5 Conclusions
The previous sections discussed one of the trade growth patterns in nineteenth-
century Southeast Asia by focussing on Singapore’s regional trade. This section
summarizes the above discussion.
Following its foundation in 1819, Singapore’s trade grew as a result of tran-
sit trade connecting long-distance and regional trades. The initial driving force for
trade growth was the influx of British cotton goods. With Singapore at the centre,
British cotton goods circulated across the region as reasonably priced consumer
goods freely or even with the tariff barrier set by the Netherlands. The massive
imports of industrial products induced the growth of primary goods’ exports to the
West, thus moving the terms of trade in favour of Southeast Asia (Kobayashi 2017).
In other words, by initiating the inflows of industrial products, while preserving the
momentum of China-oriented trade since the eighteenth century (see Chap. 4 of this
volume), Southeast Asian trade progressively consolidated its trade relationship with
the West in line with Singapore’s trade growth. In addition, the vigorous commerce
by Asian merchants who managed Singapore’s regional trade was indispensable to
the circulation of industrial products at this time. Asian merchants’ reaction towards
the emerging business opportunity, that is, the arrival of British industrial products,
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drove the trade growth of Singapore as a new-born emporium, and the trading system,
centred on Singapore, flourished by the end of the mid-nineteenth century.
Following the second half of the nineteenth century, owing to the improvement
of transport infrastructure, the geographical range of Chinese mercantile activities
expanded to unexplored areas, such as theMalay Peninsula and Dutch ruling islands,
where native traders dominated the commerce. Furthermore, after the 1870s, numer-
ous Chinese and Indian immigrants began flowing into Insular Southeast Asia, and
began to work in mines and on plantations.With the arrival of immigrants and expan-
sion of raw materials production, the demand for consumer goods surged. To satisfy
the rising demand for food, mainland Southeast Asia exported a large amount of
rice to the island countries via Singapore. In exchange for the supply of foodstuffs,
industrial raw materials were imported into Singapore and re-exported to the West.
The final section discussed the linkage between Singapore’s regional trade and
Sarawak’s local trade. Sarawak’s trade grew as a result of the connectivity between
foreign and local trades. At a glance, Sarawak’s local trade seemed to be a mere
extension of the foreign trade. However, the internal circulation of rice, for example,
indicates that local traders distributed the country’s commodity to fulfil local demand.
Singapore’s regional trade could not exert a strong influence on Sarawak’s local trade
solely by providing industrial products. Eventually, after the 1890s, as the circulation
of foreign imported rice expanded across Sarawak via local trade, the production of
raw materials for industrial economies was reinforced. Thus, the development of
Singapore’s regional trade consolidated the linkage with each country’s local trade,
and as a result, the Southeast Asian economy strengthened the intra-regional trading
relations and the connection with the West-led global economy.
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and the Emerging State in Pre-war Japan
Masayuki Tanimoto
6.1 Introduction
It is widely asserted that the “success” of emerging states in Asia rested on the adop-
tionof a development strategybasedon export-oriented insteadof import-substitution
industrialization. In fact, the growth of export trade that started with labour-intensive
products seems to have played a significant role in fostering the emerging economies
and states beginning in the 1970s, especially in East and Southeast Asia.
On the other hand, it is also widely known that the Meiji government, established
through the Meiji Restoration in 1868, adopted “Shokusan-kogyo seisaku”, or the
economic policy of encouraging new industries as a means of catching up with the
“advanced” states in the West. In fact, the government tried to transplant brand-new
industrial technologies and institutions, such as mechanized cotton spinning mills,
iron works, shipyards, arsenals, and so on. It is clear that these newly transplanted
and more or less capital-intensive industries targeted to promote import substitu-
tion. If they played a central role for Japan’s economic development after the Meiji
Restoration from 1868 onwards, how can we evaluate the role of export-oriented
industrialization in Japan’s development, a distinctive example of emerging state
prior to WWII?
Based on the recent literature discussing the multi-layered nature of Japan’s eco-
nomic development,
1
this chapter reconsiders the significant role of labour-intensive
industrialization in pre-war Japan. In doing so, the chapter specifically examines its
1 In regard with the term “multi-layered nature of Japan’s economic development”, see Sawai and
Tanimoto (2016), 148–149. I also keep the discussion about “balancedgrowth”, initiated byTakafusa
Nakamura, in mind. See Nakamura (1971/1983).
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role in import and export trade, to which the discussion of the development strategy
mentioned above pays special attention. After an overview of the features of Japan’s
economic development, the chapter demonstrates the role of labour-intensive indus-
trialization by exemplifying cases of cotton related industries, followed by a discus-
sion on the changing pattern of export-oriented industries, with a focus on urban
small-scale manufacturers. The last section touches on the prospects in the post-war
period.
6.2 The Nature of Industrialization in Modern Japan
According to Fig. 6.1, Japan’s per capita GDP nearly reached the level of those in
industrialized Western states in the 1970s through the so-called “rapid growth era”
in the late 1950s and the 1960s. Although this post-war economic growth is eye-
catching, the figure also reveals the catching up process of Japan’s per capita GDP
beforeWorldWar II, starting from a level of less than one-quarter of that of the U.K.,
the most advanced state in terms of economic development, and around 40% of those
of France and Germany, relatively backward states which were trying to catch up to
the U.K. in the 1870s and the 1880s. The pre-war economic growth achieved 40% of
the GDP of the U.K. and around 50% of those of France and Germany in the 1930s.
The speed of catching up was more rapid in terms of the state’s total GDP, reflecting
the relatively high population growth in Japan. Considering the destructive effect of
WorldWar II on Japan’s economy, the post-war rapid growth can be positioned as the
last stage of the long-term catching up process that continued from the second half of
the nineteenth century. In other words, Japan can be regarded as an emerging state,
at least in the early twentieth century, whose growth was “trapped” in the 1940s and
the early 1950s. In this regard, Japan’s pre-war experience deserves to be explored
in light of the emerging state argument.
The next concern is a question as to whether the focus on labour-intensive sectors
deserves a better understanding in Japan’s industrialization. Oneway to approach this
question is to consider the relative contribution of labour-intensive sectors to overall
Japanese production. Since it is difficult to estimate the relative weight in value-
added terms, we will use the contribution to employment as a way to approach this
problem. Table 6.1 shows the estimated composition of manufacturing workers by
employment size in 1909. Among 3,337 million people occupied in the manufactur-
ing sectors, only 0.92million workers were affiliated with “factories” employing five
workers and more, or established by the government. In other words, approximately
70% of the manufacturing work force was working in industrial sites recognized as
non-factory workshops. A similar estimation for the year after the rapid growth dur-
ing World War I, based on the first national census of population carried out in 1920,
also reveals the dominance of small workshops in manufacturing sectors. Among
the total working population engaged in the manufacturing sectors, approximately
4.56 million, 62.9% of the total working population were engaged in non-factory
workshops (Tanimoto 2006, 6). Since the strong positive correlation between firm
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Fig. 6.1 GDP per capita in comparison with Japan

















Male 2,030,600 1,630,586 307,139 66,275 30,537 92,875 81,466
Female 1,306,500 788,618 493,498 42,141 80,742 24,384 23,528




39.2 32.6 61.6 38.9 72.6 20.8 22.4
Source Noshomusho ed, Kojotokeisohy, Noshomutokeihyo and Honpokogyoippan, Umemura et al.
(1988)
size and capital intensity is confirmed by the industrial survey conducted in 1932
in Tokyo, the prefecture comprising the largest manufacturing population from the
1920s onwards, it is plausible to use employment size as a proxy for labour inten-
sity in working sites (Tanimoto 2013a, 156). Thus, it is clear that Japan’s pre-war
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Fig. 6.2 Japan’s export, import and trade balance against GNP. Source Ohkawa et al. (1974)
The contribution of labour-intensive sectors in Japan’s international trade is also
worth discussing. As Fig. 6.2 suggests, the degree of dependence upon foreign trade,
the total value of export and import per GDP, rose along with GDP growth. On
top of that, the trade balance tended toward imbalance except during specific peri-
ods, and the margin of the imbalance occasionally grew significantly. The structural
change of trade is also worth noticing. According to the overviewing of the trade
based on the estimated long-term statistics, the main import commodities changed
from finished manufactured goods to intermediate and capital goods, followed by
an increase in raw materials in tandem with the development of the manufacturing
sectors. The expenditure for these imported commodities should have been financed
by revenue from the export trade, from mining products such as copper and coal, to
silk related commodities and newly developed manufactured products (Yamazawa
and Yamamoto 1979: 5–9). The changing role of the labour-intensive sectors can be
effectively examined by observing the trade related aspects, touching on a discussion
of the effect of import-substitutive and export-oriented strategies.
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6.3 The Role of Labour-Intensive Sectors in Pre-war Japan
6.3.1 The Cotton Industry for Import Substitution2
It is well known that the Opening of the Ports in 1859, the end of the “seclusion
policy” of Tokugawa Shogunate, had a great impact on the cotton industry in Japan’s
archipelago. In fact, the increase in English cotton cloth grew to occupy nearly 40%
of the domestic market for cotton cloth in the early 1870s. However, the proportion of
imported cotton cloth to domestic cotton demand had begun to decrease in the mid-
1870s, and fell to around 10% before 1880. On the other hand, as Table 6.2 shows,
the volume of imported cotton yarn exceeded cotton cloth during the latter half of the
1870s. This transformation, from importing finished goods to intermediate goods,
suggests a structural change in the production aspects of cotton goods in Japan’s
archipelago.
What happened were drastic re-organizations of the industry. The importation of
cotton yarn almost eliminated domestic hand-spun yarn from the yarn market. Natu-
rally, as it provided material for spinning, cotton cultivation also suffered. However,
it was not before the late 1880s that cotton cultivation in Japan had clearly declined,
since the self-use of cotton for spinning and weaving continued in a certain portion
of peasant households. It was the penetration of ‘new’ cotton cloths produced in the
domestic weaving districts, which were relatively cheap as well as suitable to con-
sumers in Japan, that ruled out the self-use production of cloth in the rural areas. The
appearance of these ‘new’ cloths showed the consequences of the re-organization of
the cotton weaving districts, the other phase of re-organization of the cotton industry.
Unlike imported cloth, imported yarn that came from England at the early stage,
followed by British Indian yarn in the next stage, provided weaving districts with
the opportunity to survive, or even develop. The relative low price of machine-made
imported yarn enabled theweaving districts to realize competitive prices compared to
imported cloth, as well as to develop a new kind of cloth, whose quality was different
from those made of hand-spun yarn (Tamura 2004). The import substitution of the
cloths can be accounted for by the response of these weaving districts, and these
districts could have been prosperous under the circumstances of themarket expansion
for cloth in the 1870s. Based on this transformation, Japan’s cotton industry started
development of both weaving and spinning sectors. The former provided the market
that was indispensable for establishment of the latter. However, there was a huge
difference in terms of the production form within the industry. Regarding this as a
multi-layered structure, we will see their development from the 1880s onwards in
the light of labour-intensive industrialization.
When it comes to the cotton weaving industry, producers were divided into two
different categories. One comprised weaving mills that were attached to the cotton
spinning companies that emerged in the late 1880s, at the earliest. Such mills were
equippedwith British orNorthAmerican power looms, and they employed numerous
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Table 6.3 Distribution of businesses and workers by production forms of weaving industry in 1905
Total Form of production





448,609 3,097 138,833 14,370 292,309
Number of
workers




95.3 88.5 95.7 89.4 97.6
Worker per
business
1.7 29.5 1.7 4.1 1.3
Source Noshomusho ed, Noshomutokeihyo
young female workers, just like the cotton spinning mills that we will discuss later.
This type represents a factory system directly transplanted from Western countries
(Takamura 1971; Nakaoka 2006). However, this production system produced at most
only about one-third of the total output of cotton fabrics even in 1914 (Abe 1990:
24). The rest of the cotton weaving was carried out in regional industrial districts,
sanchi, most of which originated in the production area prosperous in the 1870s or
before. In these districts, clothiers and other manufacturers worked together in areas
characterized by a highly concentrated presence of merchants dealing in products
and materials. Even in 1905, as Table 6.3 shows, workers in “factory” production
units employing 10 employees and more accounted for only 12% of the total number
of workers in the entire industry. The statistics show that 30% of the workers were
employed in workshops with less than 10 workers, and that 50% of the workers
were in workshops organized under the putting-out system.3 In addition, the average
number of workers in these workshops was less than two. The power loom ratio (the
number of power looms divided by the total number of looms) remained as low as
16% in 1914 (Abe 1989: 46).
We exemplify the development of theseweaving districts by considering the Iruma
region, which thrived at the turn of the twentieth century.4 The Iruma region, a south-
western part of Saitama prefecture adjacent to Tokyo, was a cotton-weaving district
developed immediately after the Opening of the Ports. By the 1880s, the driving
force was import of machine-made cotton yarn from overseas. This was followed
by domestic cotton spinning mills, which replaced the expensive hand-spun yarn
provided by nearby rural areas. Production initially developed under the Kaufsystem,
3Considering the working hours of weavers in each category, namely fulltime workers in the large
factories and the seasonal side line weavers in the small workshops, the factories seem to have
occupied larger proportion in terms of volume of the production than that of number of workers.
4The historical facts on Iruma weaving districts are obtained from Tanimoto (1998), Chaps. 6 and
7.
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where rural factors collected and purchased fabrics from weavers scattered around
villages. At the end of the 1880s, however, the putting-out system, then a new way
of organizing production in Japan, replaced the Kaufsystem. This was accompanied
by an increase in the total volume of production. Putting-out continued to be the
prevalent form of production organization until the mid-1920s. In this form, the
direct producer, a Chin-ori (literally, a ‘piece rate wage weaver’) was supplied with
dyed and warped yarn by the putting-out master, or clothier, and the producer wove
fabrics according to a piece rate.
This transformation from the Kaufsystem to putting-out was triggered by compe-
tition in themarket. Since cost reduction through the introduction of power loomswas
not a feasible choice because imported power looms were too expensive, it became
vital for clothiers to enhance their competitive edge through improving the quality of
their products. Under these circumstances, the putting-out system based on the sup-
ply of yarn served to improve the quality using standardized materials. Moreover, the
clothier was able to provide wage-weavers with detailed market information, such as
texture and design of fabrics, by supplying dyed, warped yarn, which played a pivotal
role in the evaluation of product quality. The introduction and implementation of the
putting-out system should then be seen as an adaptation strategy to emerging market
conditions.
This case indicates that the newly introduced dispersed production system based
on labour-intensive technology, weaving with a hand-loom, worked as a promoter of
industrial development in modern Japan. It is also noticeable that this type of indus-
trial growth was accompanied by a concentration of related traders within a relatively
narrow area. The activities of clothiers were supported by merchants engaged in pro-
viding materials or selling products, dyers, and financial institutions, as well as trade
associations and institutions of vocational education. Indeed, in Iruma, we can con-
firm the agglomeration of merchants and dyers in Tokorozawa town, a local centre in
this area, together with the establishment of two trade associations and a local bank.
The association also ran a small training school for dying skills in the 1900s. This
was the formation of an industrial district, distinguished from a mere concentration
of producers.
Around 1910, clothiers trying to introduce power looms emerged in certain weav-
ing districts such as Izumi (Osaka prefecture), Chita (Aichi prefecture), Enshu
(Shizuoka prefecture) (Abe 1989). Although this trend worked to transform the
production form from putting-out to a factory system, it is worthwhile noticing
that almost all power-looms introduced in these weaving districts were domestically
manufactured machines whose prices were one third or less of imported British
or North American power looms. Manufacturers near the leading weaving districts
exploited low costmachines, substitutingwooden staffs formetal parts to save expen-
sive iron materials(Minami et al. 1982; Suzuki 1996). Since the relatively low price
of domestic power looms lowered the barrier for clothiers to establish a machine
equipped weaving factory, small scale factories proliferated in certain weaving dis-
tricts from the 1910s onwards. Therefore, the introduction of domestic power-looms
and establishment of small and medium sized factories in these cases, where the
capital equipment rate was still lower than in full scale weaving factories, can be
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recognized as a continuous path of industrial development up to the 1930s, rather
than a transformation from a labour-intensive to capital-intensive path.
In contrast, the Osaka Spinning Corporation was the first cotton spinning mill
equipped with British spinning machines, comprising tens of thousands of spindles
and employing several hundreds of spinners. Following its success, the proliferation
of cotton spinning factories from the late 1880s onwards was apparently the capital-
intensive path of industrialization, considering the amount of fixed capital required
for machines and the facilities of a mill. In fact, almost all the spinning firms of this
type adopted the newly introduced model of a joint stock company, rallying more
than a hundred investors to cover the fixed cost. However, it is alsoworth emphasizing
that the invested capital should have brought about high profits because the interest
rate, or the price of capital, was relatively high in contemporary Japan, as is often
the case in an industrializing economy. Continuous operation of factories was the
key, and the assimilation of the technological knowledge by Japanese engineers,
together with the provision of repair parts based on metal processing skills among
domestic craftsmen, enabled the reduction of idle time caused by machine troubles
(Nakaoka 2006, Chap. 5). On top of that, operation time was increased by adopting
day and night shifts. Even though the night shift was costly because of the extra
wage and the deterioration of workers’ attentiveness, enhancing capital turnover was
essential for higher return on equity (ROE). In other words, the capital-labour ratio
of spinning mills tended to be lowered by increasing labour input through the double
shift system (Takamura 1971; Sugihara 2013). It is also worth mentioning that the
adoption of ring spindles from the late 1880s, which contributed to enhance total
factor productivity of the spinning firms, was accompanied by the introduction of
cotton mixing processes which required further labour inputs (Otsuka et al. 1988,
Chap. 3). Thus, the labour-intensive nature can be discussed even in the case of exact
transplantation of the Western factory system.
It is also noticeable that both sectors of the cotton industry, weaving and spinning,
commonly depended on rural farming households as their source of workers. The
order list of Takizawa Kumakichi, a leading putting-out master in Iruma, reveals
that almost all the orders were directed to nearby farming villages, concentrating
specifically in the middle layer of farming households there. In other words, piece
weavers existed within the households that were inclined toward agriculture. In fact,
the orders placedwith the piece weavers by Takizawas showed strong and continuous
seasonal fluctuations that clearly reflected the nature of this source of labour. Indeed,
orders in May and June accounted for less than 10% of the yearly totals in almost all
the years from 1896 to 1920. It is not surprising that the seasonal fluctuations in time
devoted to weaving were inversely related to the labour demand for farming within
peasant households. The May–June period was harvest time in the region for wheat
and tea, and peak season for silkworm breeding (for springtime).
In contrast, workers in cotton spinningmills came from the lower layer of farming
households, whose cultivating lands were smaller than those in the middle layer.
The well-known industrial report, Orimono Shokko Jijo (The Working Conditions
of Weaving Workers), published by the central government in 1903, pointed out
a distinction between the ‘factory’ pattern of labour organizations and that of the
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“peasant’s side-line business”. The report stated that “It is more beneficial for local
women to weave fabrics according to a piece rate at home than to work for the
factory that binds them for a long period of time. Therefore, in general, female
workers at weaving factories are looked down upon in villages”.5 The report also
recognized two separate sources of labour in the following remark: “Today, most
of the local women employed at factories seem to come from financially-pressed
families” (ditto). In fact, spinningmills organized a recruiting systemseeking juvenile
female workers with low opportunity costs, who were expected to exist in the lower
layer of farming households scattered among rural villages that were usually far away
from the location of the spinningmills in urban areas. As factory statistics6 reveal, the
ages of female workers were highly concentrated under 25; in 1909, more than half
were teenagers. The duration of their factory workwas limited to their younger years,
followed by re-inclusion in either farming or urban households as a household head’s
spouse, usually under the plural self-employment system. Although their working
sites differed from home to factory, the underlying logic of labour provision was
common, determined by the labour allocation strategy formed in each household.
Thus, the development of the cotton industry in late nineteenth to early twentieth
century Japan strongly entailed the nature of labour-intensive industrialization being
also effective for import substitution of cotton manufactured goods from Britain,
British India, and other Western states. On the other hand, it is important to recall
that the development of the cotton industry itself was a major factor in the growing
trade imbalance. The key factor was importation of raw cotton fromBritish India and
the US, as already suggested in Table 6.2. The balance of payments for cotton related
trade (the difference between the excess of exports in yarn and cloth and the excess
of imports of raw cotton and cotton related machines) was apparently constantly
negative, forming themajor cause of the trade imbalance shown in Fig. 6.2 (Ushijima
and Abe 1996). Although the cotton industry in those years could meet the growing
domestic demand, it did not have a competitive edge in the rich market of Europe
and North America. In this context, the significant role of export-oriented industries
in financing the payments created by the growth of the import trade comes up. The
next section discusses the dynamism of labour-intensive sectors in export-related
industries.
6.3.2 Dynamism of Export-Oriented Industries7
It is well known that textiles constituted the largest part of Japan’s export trade
during the pre-World War II period. Raw silk (silk thread) was continuously Japan’s
single largest export until the early 1930s. The second largest export item shifted
5Cited from reprinted version; Noshomusho (1903/1998), vol. 2, p. 178.
6Kojotokeihyo (Statistical Tables of Factories) edited by Noshomusho (Ministry of Agriculture and
Commerce).
7This section is mainly based on Tanimoto (2013a), 162–166.
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from silk cloth to cotton yarn in the early 1890s, and then to cotton cloth after
World War I. Despite their significant role, textiles did not monopolize exports. The
sum of various consumer goods (hereafter, miscellaneous goods) other than textiles
contributed a considerable proportion of manufactured exports, although individual
categories accounted for only small proportions. Indeed, by the 1930s, the combined
export output of the following products made them joint contenders with cotton cloth
or yarn for the second biggest export position:matches, knitted goods, hats, footwear,
buttons, accessories, ceramics, glassware, enamel ironware, straw plaits, fancy mats,
Western-style umbrellas, brushes, trunks, and toys.8
Apart from the volume, the changing patterns in the composition of export-
oriented miscellaneous industries were also noteworthy. We can roughly distinguish
three categories among the miscellaneous exports in Fig. 6.3, defined by the timing
of their respective places in the export supply. Ceramics and lacquerware comprised
the first category, with exports beginning soon after Japan’s opening of ports in 1859.
The second category comprised goods whose exports surged in the 1880s, including
matches, trunks, straw plaits, and fancy mats, and accounted for a significant part of
aggregate exports from the 1880s to the 1900s. It is notable that the export of these
goods commonly decreased sharply in the 1920s, and were unable to recover their
position in the export trade throughout the interwar period. The third category com-
prised accessories, knitting goods, glassware, enamel ironware, and toys, exports of
which increased gradually from the 1880s, surged during World War I, and main-
tained an almost constant level in the 1920s. In the 1930s, there was a rapid increase
in the export of some of these goods; for instance, toys, which we will focus on later.
Behind the shifting composition of these sales, there was an evolutionary pro-
cess in production, such as changes in technology or location. The miscellaneous
goods exported soon after the opening of the ports were characterized as traditional
craft products, which attracted an overseas consumer market with a particular taste
for Japanese style. Their production system, including technologies, skills, and the
nature ofworkers,must have been inherited largely from theTokugawaperiod.On the
other hand, the straw plaits and fancymats that made up 40% ofmiscellaneous goods
exports during the late 19th century were inferior goods to those available in overseas
markets, such as carpets in the US. In addition, Japanese matches were regarded in
South and East Asia as inferior goods to those imported from Europe. With regard
to the system of production, a large portion of the output of straw plaits and fancy
mats was produced as a side line by peasant households. Furthermore, even where
the factory system had been adopted, it was established in the countryside and was
based on handicraft technology with indigenous materials. In contrast, matches were
produced mainly in urban settings, using imported technology. However, both types
of production systems commonly involved a widely available source of labour—un-
skilled females—to produce relatively simple, uniform products. In this sense, they
were typical labour-intensive industries but entirely different from the traditional
crafts industry that employed skilled male workers.







Fig. 6.3 Export of miscellaneous goods. Source Toyokeizai Shinposha (1935)
In contrast to these two categories, a distinct feature of the third category of export
products was that they were ‘new’ items produced by ‘transplanted’ technology with
‘new’ materials, such as metals or chemical products, rubber, and celluloid. In addi-
tion, it is noteworthy that each individual industry in the third category manufactured
various kinds of products with different uses or designs. Although the goods con-
tinued to be inferior in quality, their manufacturers were required not only to supply
low-priced goods but also to respond to consumer tastes. In other words, these indus-
tries had to be able to acquire market information and hold ‘skilled’ labour, broadly
defined, to reflect market information in the products.
Table 6.4 shows this direction of transformation from another angle. The table
compares the export markets of industries with significant shares of total exports
in 1937. The export markets are divided into four areas. A includes ‘Manchuria’ in
northeast China and the ‘Kwantung Leased Territory’, also in China. B includes the
rest of Asia, excluding the areas in the Japanese Empire, such as Korea and Taiwan.
C includes Central and South America, Africa, Oceania, and the Middle East. D
includes Europe and North America. For manufactured products, barriers to entry
appeared to be highest in the case of markets in the industrialized countries in D.
On the contrary, barriers to entry could have been lowered by Japanese political
influence in area A. Barriers to entry in areas B and C were in between those two.
In fact, machine-manufacturing industries, which were technologically backward
compared with those in the Western industrialized countries of those years, mostly
limited their market to area A. By contrast, almost all raw silk was exported to
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area D, particularly to the US, based on the tight ties between the weaving and
knitting industries in that country, and their supplier of intermediate goods in Japan.
Meanwhile, cotton cloth made up the largest volume of consumer goods exports.
Less than 10% of cotton cloth exports were to area D. In contrast with all these
categories of exports, a distinct feature of the miscellaneous goods was the relatively
high proportion of exports to area D. In addition, this area was the largest market
for toys, accessories, ceramics, and table lamps, and these goods almost matched the
items included in the abovementioned third export category.
Therefore, the export-oriented development of Japan’s miscellaneous industries
during the interwar period was made possible by penetrating the markets of high-
income countries in the face of competition from within those industrialized coun-
tries. This was one of the industrial frontiers for the Japanese economy in those years.
The case of the toy industry discussed in the next section exemplifies this dynamism
well.
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6.3.3 The Development of Japan’s Toy Export9
Toy exports increased continuously from the turn of the 20th century, declined after
the Japan–Russo War, and soared from World War I to the period of the post-war
boom. Exports dropped sharply in 1920 and stagnated during the first half of the
1920s, followed by a certain level of recovery in the latter half of the decade.Although
there was a negative effect from the Great Depression around 1930, toy exports
rose from 1932 up to 1938, when the war economy placed great limitations on
the manufacture of ‘non-necessities’. Comparing these export statistics to those of
import andproduction,we can identify the distinct feature of toymanufacturing. First,
the export-production ratio exceeded 100% in many years. This seemingly irrational
percentage can be understood partly by considering the limits of the original statistics,
such as coverage of the production data.10 Still, it is realistic to assume that most toy
products were manufactured for overseas markets. Second, it is important to mention
that there were very few imports of toys from the late nineteenth century. Third, the
breakdown of the materials used in exported toys also reveals that more than half
were made of rubber, celluloid, and tin from 1920 onwards.
These facts suggest an intriguing argument in considering the relationship between
trade patterns and industrial development. The development of the toy industry had
been consistently led by the growth of export trade through the manufacture of newly
developed items made from materials originating in foreign ‘advanced’ countries
with very small importation of the original goods. Thus, toy manufacturing did not
follow the typical ‘flying geese model’, where development patterns are a series
of steps from importation to import substitution, and from saturation of domestic
markets to exportation (Yamazawa 1984). It was the demand from overseas, not the
domestic market, that formed the starting point for the toy industry. This pattern
differs not only from the cotton industry, which fitted the flying geese model well by
exemplifying efforts for import substitution discussed in the previous section, but also
from the export-oriented raw silk industry, which exemplified the changing patterns
of indigenous industries that had long been dependent on the domestic market, and
started exporting after the opening of the ports in 1859.
Although Japanese toys occupied the US import market duringWorldWar I in the
absence of Germany, a dominant provider to the international toy market, the share
of Japanese toys in the USmarket fell drastically throughout the 1920s. These trends
clearly reveal the lack of global competitiveness of Japanese toymanufacturing at that
time. However, the situation changed from the late 1920s, when the share of Japanese
toys in the US andUKmarkets started to rise gradually, and even soared in the 1930s,
displacing German toys. It is noteworthy that the trend started to change before 1932,
when the depreciation of the yen began to provide favourable conditions for export.
9The discussion in this section draws on Tanimoto (2017). For the sources of the following
descriptions, see the footnotes and references in Tanimoto (2007).
10Although trade statistics covers, in theory, all exported toys, the most consistent statistics for pro-
duction, Kojotokeihyo (Statistical Tables of Factories), covered factories and workshops employing
five or more employees only.
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Fig. 6.4 Production organization of the toy manufacturing industry in Tokyo
This fact suggests that the competitive edge of Japanese toys rested not only on
the deterioration of price, but also on improvement in the quality of the products. In
fact, the foreign trade division of Shokosho (theMinistry of Commerce and Industry)
stated in its trade reports11 that the toy industry went beyond the emulation stage, and
acquired the ability to create innovative designs. The focal point is the fact that this
improvement was carried out under the context of labour-intensive industrialization.
Figure 6.4 illustrates the production organization of the toy manufacturing indus-
try. The merchant organizers were located between manufacturing workshops and
the export markets, connecting manufacturers to distributors. They often related
to the production process by coordinating workshops for manufacturers, who took
charge of the partial processes. It is notable that the number of non-factory work-
shops far exceeded the number of factories that employed more than four workers.
The workforce was composed of employers, family workers, ‘apprentices’, and adult
labourers. Based on their role in the organization of production, there are two cat-
egories of manufacturers: core manufacturers producing finished goods, and rather
small workshops performing partial processes. The former tended to be associated
with factories; however, it was not unusual for non-factory workshops to provide fin-
ished goods to wholesalers. In contrast, the work assigned to domestic workers was
limited to partial processing or simple assembly, and even small workshops placed
orders with domestic workers. In addition, the gender composition of the workforce
differed by type of workers, as most domestic workers were female.
11Honpo Gaikokuboekigaikyo (The overview of the foreign trade of Japan) edited by Shokosho.
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The origin of the competitive edge of the toy manufacturing industry lay in this
organizational character. In fact, it was usual to economize labour cost by subcon-
tracting to domestic workers. The employment of juvenile workers as ‘apprentices’
might have also had a similar effect on the labour cost of small-scale workshops.
However, toys were not the kind of goods whose demand was determined mostly
by price. They were subject to fashion, and supplier had to match or even develop
the taste of consumers in order to increase their sales. In this context, it is rather
notable that each category of actor—merchant organizer, factory workshop, and
non-factory workshop—included firms that had the ability to design the goods. The
records of the registration of designs and devices, held either at the National Patent
Office or by the trade association of toy manufacturing, reveal that firms in each of
these three sometimes succeeded in registering theirs ideas. In other words, several
small workshops, as well as merchant organizers and “factories”, were capable of
creating the original models of products. Therefore, we should not simply assume
that the relationship between merchant organizer and manufacturer, or between con-
signer and consignee among manufacturers, was complementary or exploited the
division of labour. While the influential merchant organizer vertically coordinated
the production process under its own control, there were manufacturers, including
non-factory workshops, who designed and produced finished goods on their own
accounts. These manufacturers sometimes held relatively strong positions in the
negotiation processes with merchant organizers. The relationship between merchant
organizers and manufacturers included competition on the same grounds, as well as
transactions based on the vertical division of labour. Thus, the production organiza-
tion of the toy manufacturing industry was by no means static for the traders, and
this competitive nature among traders was maintained through vigorous new entries
that resulted from the establishment of independent workshops, as a product of the
life course of the workers.
In addition to the endogenous factor of the organization, we can point out some
other external factors that support the competitive edge of the industry. One of the
conspicuous features of the toy manufacturing industry was the agglomeration of
the traders within a relatively small area. For example, in Tokyo, the centre of toy
production from the 1920s onwards, the location of more than 40 merchant organiz-
ers in 1933 was almost entirely limited to only two blocks in the commercial area.
Metal toy manufacturers were concentrated in three blocks, with 39 in one block
(Umayabashi). The situation was almost the same for celluloid toy manufacturers.
The highly concentrated location of traders suggests the positive effects of agglom-
eration, reminding us of the arguments of Alfred Marshall and others regarding the
effects of external economies in industrial clusters (Marshall 1920). For instance,
for merchant organizers, proximity to other traders engaged in the same industry
might have increased their opportunities to acquire market information, which was
indispensable for the sale of fashionable goods. The agglomeration also facilitated
development of the division of labour among traders, which might have increased
the productivity of the industry.
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Moreover, it was noticeable that traders located within each cluster were not
limited to toy traders. In fact, as the directory of celluloid traders of 1939 indicates, it
is better to say that celluloid toy workshops were located within the agglomeration of
traders of various celluloid goods. This appears to have been true of traders inmetal or
rubber toys as well. These facts suggest that the traders might have moved in among
industries that used the same material. Indeed, by matching the trade directories of
different years, we can confirm that several celluloid toy manufacturers changed
their product to other celluloid goods during the course of time and vice versa. This
flexibility among traders appears to have relieved the blows of market fluctuations.
Although this buffer function was probably limited, as market trends of the industries
would not have been inversely correlated to compensate for the slump of the other
industry, it might have provided more opportunities to survive, at least for traders
with a relatively high ability to respond to the unstable economic environment.
Meanwhile, the coexistence of related industries in the same area was impor-
tant for the toy traders as well. Mould producers were a typical example. In order to
acquire the fruits of product innovation, it was vital for traders to possess the moulds.
However, a relatively high level of skills was required to produce the moulds, and
it was rather difficult for the traders, particularly small workshops, to internalize
this process. In this situation, the mould ‘factories’ generated within the agglomer-
ation of metal-processing workshops near the agglomeration of toy traders, or the
mould-processing workshops whose locations overlapped with those of celluloid toy
manufacturers, played an important role in actualizing the originally generated ideas
as real products. Similar roles were played in the areas of businesses that required
relatively high skills, such asmanufacturing springs and gears, and printing tin plates.
The agglomeration of related industries provided complementary factors that were
indispensable to the development of the dispersed production organization based on
small workshops. Thus, the competitive edge of toy production was largely rooted
in its location in urban settings, specifically the metropolis of Tokyo. In fact, as is
seen in the following section, Tokyo became the largest industrial city comprising
the agglomeration of various kinds of small scale workshops in the interwar period.
6.3.4 The Structure of Small-Scale Industries in Interwar
Tokyo
Table 6.5 is based on data extracted from an industrial census conducted by the
Tokyo Municipal Office in 1932 (Kogyo Chosa-sho).12 It indicates the proportion
of small workshops run on a self-employment basis in the manufacturing sector. In
light of the number and composition of workers, workshops with 2,000–4,999 yen
of capital appear to be the upper threshold for self-employment-based workshops.
These workshops comprised 87.7% of all workshops and factories, and employed
12The following discussion on the structure of small-scale industries is a summary of Tanimoto
(2013a), 154–162.
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49.3% of all workers. It is apparent that family workers, including employers, played
significant roles in theworkforce. Thehighproportion of ‘apprentices’ recorded in the
census is also striking. There were more ‘apprentices’ than ‘labourers’. This implies
that these workshops depended greatly on workers other than ‘labourers’, who were
the main work force of the large factories. On the other hand, we can estimate by the
industrial census thatmore than half of theworkshops belonging to the layer of capital
of 2,000–4,999 yen were equipped with prime movers. Although the difference in
per capita fixed capital according to scale was clear, small workshops were not
simple equivalents of the traditional handicraft manufacturing industry. Thus, not a
few small workshops were engaged in processing newly introduced materials with
relatively small fixed capital; in other words, resting their production more on labour
than on capital when compared with large factories. In this sense, we can certainly
regard small workshops as being labour-intensive. How then did labour-intensive
workshops manage to survive or even develop in the face of the competition with
capital-intensive factories? To tackle this question, let us focus on the nature of their
workforce.
As mentioned above, small workshops had three types of workers: ‘family work-
ers’, ‘labourers’, and ‘apprentices’. With respect to gender, we should point out the
high proportion of male workers, accounting for more than 70% in each type. This
gender bias contrasts to that of the textile industries in both types of factories, as
well as in side-line jobs, and suggests the different nature of the workforce in urban
small-scale industries. On the other hand, it is noteworthy that the age range clearly
differed according to the composition of the workforce. The number of ‘apprentices’,
which is the highest among the three main categories of workers, was greatest among
teenage workers, accounting for two-thirds of the workers in the same age group. In
contrast, ‘family workers’, including employers, accounted for more than 80% of the
workers over the age of 30. In between were the ‘labourers’, who accounted for the
highest number of workers in their twenties, but the smallest number of workers over-
all. These facts enable us to suggest that a strong tendency existed to change one’s
industrial status from that of an ‘apprentice’ to ‘labourer’, and from ‘labourer’ to
‘family worker (employer)’. The latter change implies the existing intention among
employees to be independent by establishing their own workshops, and the former
suggests the importance of skill formation to become a full-fledged worker.
According to an industrial survey carried out in 1936 in Tokyo,13 more than
70% of the manufacturers across 26 trades replied that they required more than
two years of training. In the case of six of these trades, more than 40% of the
manufacturers claimed that a period of five years of training was necessary. This is
in sharp contrast to the case of “domestic workers” in the same survey. Half of the
domestic workers could work without any training, and another quarter could work
with trainingof less thanonemonth.These observationsmake it clear that aworkforce
with a certain level of skill was required for the small workshops, and this attribute of
the workforce provided the foundation for an ‘apprentice’ being distinguished from
a mere ‘juvenile labourer’. We do not possess any concrete evidence to confirm that
13Tokyo Municipal Office ed. (1937).







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































an institutionalized apprenticeship with a formal training period or restriction of job
entry was effectively operating in these trades at that time. However, we can probably
assume that substantial needs existed for the training of workers, and it was natural
that some system, though not a formal institution, emerged to meet the demand. The
fact that the word ‘apprentice’ was commonly used in the official investigation might
be evidence that one existed.
An investigation of the “apprentices”, which was conducted around 1938 and
based on 3,768 samples, including 2,990 males, supports this speculation.14 The
investigation reveals that more than half of the male juveniles intended to undergo
training at the workplace. Judging from the data on age, working period, and the
experience of changing jobs, it appears that a majority of the male ‘apprentices’
had worked at the same workshop for at least two years. These findings are almost
consistent with the data on the training period mentioned above. On the other hand,
as we see in the following part of this section, the low wages of these juvenile
workers were profitable for the employers. The employers also needed ‘apprentices’
for cheap labour. Though we do not possess any further information for analysing
the equilibrium between the cost of training and low wages, we can probably assume
that being trained as an ‘apprentice’ during their teens, albeit informally, was built
into the early stage of the life course of the workers in the small-scale industries.
What was the outcome of these small workshops? Table 6.5 presents the average
value-added labour productivity of the workshops in each layer. Since income data
tended to be underreported for fear of tax liability, the calculated value-added may
be understated. Despite this, great differences between the layers in value-added
productivity are apparent. For example, the average productivity of theworkshops (or
rather, factories) with the largest capital of 500 thousand yen or more, was recorded
as four times higher than those with capital of 2,000–4,999 yen. Labour productivity
increased in accordance with the increase in capital employed. Therefore, the higher
physical productivity of labour achieved by utilizingmachines or primemoversmight
account for most of the productivity differential. In other words, the market value
of the products of the small-scale workshops could not compensate fully for their
relatively low physical productivity. Although some products might have realized
higher market value based on unique technology or skills, in general, the small-
scale workshops should be recognized as an industrial sector with relatively low
productivity.
However, the difference in productivity was not the decisive factor undermining
the competitiveness of the small workshops. Their earnings, after deduction of costs
including wages, can be caluculated from this industrial census. It is clear that scale
greatly influenced earnings, since the earnings of the small workshops were signifi-
cantly below the wages of labourers employed in the large-scale factories. However,
it should be noted that the earnings of workshops capitalized at 2,000–4,999 yen or
more apparently exceeded the highest wages of the labourers employed. Even the
earnings of the next layer down, with capital of 1,000–1,999 yen, almost equalled
the second highest wage level of factory labourers. This level of earnings might not
14Tokyo Prefectural Office (1939).
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have discouraged employed labourers from establishing their own workshops. In
fact, the wages of employees in workshops whose capital were under 10,000 yen,
and which employed more than half of the total employees, could not reach the level
of earnings mentioned above. This implied that employees with lower wages had
no chance of increasing their income as long as they remained employees, given the
low possibility for workers to move from small workshops to large ones. Therefore,
establishing one’s ownworkshopmust have appeared as a promising option, although
it involved considerable risks. The differential wages according to the scale of work-
shops, which also reflected small workshops’ use of juvenileworkers as ‘apprentices’
(as mentioned above), enabled small workshops to earn a certain amount, although
their value-added labour productivity was considerably lower than that of large-
scale factories. On the other hand, this motivated adult labourers to establish their
own workshops.
In summary, we may assume a particular life course of workers employed in
urban industries. Teenaged males worked in small workshops, undergoing on-the-
job training and acquiring a certain level of skills. After being employed in their
twenties as adult labourers, some of them might succeed, possibly with some luck,
in establishing their own workshops. It was this shared perspective of a certain life
course that enabled the skill formation and lowwage compatibility in urban industrial
settings.
6.3.5 Prospects to the Post-war Development
Thus, the development of urban small-scale industries represented the dynamic
nature of labour-intensive industrialization in pre-war Japan. Specifically, export-
oriented manufacturing sectors such as toy making showed distinctive growth in
the 1930s, driving the relatively faster recovery of the Japanese economy from the
Great Depression.
On the other hand, it is plausible that the “success” of these export-oriented indus-
tries intrinsically entailed tension between Japan and its trading partners, or among
trade rivals. In fact, it is well known that the expansion of cotton textiles exports
to South and Southeast Asia in the 1930s resulted in a bilateral trade negotiation
between Japan and Britain, British India and the Netherlands, the colony and the
suzerain states. Regarding urban toys, the United States imposed more than 100%
duties in 1930 (converted to an ad valorem tax). Even Britain, which had advocated
a free trade regime, imposed 15–25% ad valorem duties on Japanese toys in the
1930s.15 Furthermore, the progress of the controlled economy following the out-
break of Sino-Japan war from 1937 onwards suppressed the manufacturing sectors
producing consuming goods irrelevant to military needs. In fact, the production of
export-oriented goods such as toys, textile goods and ceramics deteriorated signifi-
cantly under the war-economy from the late 1930s to 1945.
15Regarding duties imposed on Japan’s exported toys, see Tanimoto (2013b), 61.
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Fig. 6.5 Japan’s export trades after World War II. Source Tsushosangyoseisakushi Hensaniinkai
(1992)
Despite resulting in the disastrous situation, however, it is still important to notice
the fact that the development of urban-based export-oriented industries during the
interwar period can be regarded as one of the industrial frontiers for the Japanese
economy, as mentioned in the previous section. The distinct feature was that their
markets primarily targeted the demands of high-income countries, where they won a
competition with their counterparts in those industrialized countries. It was not just
the achievement of industrialization in the pre-war stage, but it also appears to have
been the forerunner of industries exporting finished consumer products to Western
industrialized countries after World War II.
According to Fig. 6.5, cotton textile goods led export trade soon after the end of
WWII, followed by toys, ceramics, optical instruments (binoculars and cameras),
and sewing machines as the second group. It is noticeable that the continuous export
trends, such as toys and ceramics from the pre-war period, overlapped those of the
latter two that newly emerged after WWII. Furthermore, this trend can be extended
to the exportation of radios and watches in the 1960s by creating a category of “light
machines”,16 from binoculars to sewing machines to radios.17 In fact, these products
can be categorized as finished goods targeting markets in high-income states, despite
the differences in technological basis. Table 6.6 clearly shows that these finished
goods, included under the headings of “machines” and “others” in this table, had
largely helped compensate for the decline in raw silk in export trade to the US,
which had formed more than 80% of Japan’s exports to the US in 1929, but sharply
deteriorated after the Great Depression. Recalling the growing weight of export trade
16Sawai and Tanimoto (2016) explicitly touches on, though briefly, the role of “light machine” in
post war Japan (p. 386).
17Sawai (2013) discussed the development of Japan’s export of binoculars from the 1950s to 1960s.
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Table 6.6 Proportion of commodities in export to US
1937 1960 1965
Food 8.2 5.6 2.9
Textile 66.1 26.7 18.4
Raw silk 51.2
Clothing 8.4 5.8




Potteries 3.1 3.6 1.6
Metal and metal goods 1.1 14.2 25.7
Steel 0.0 5.6 17.3
Machinery 0.3 14.4 26.1
Sewing machines 0.0 2.0 1.3
Radio 0.0 5.7 3.8
Others 14.4 32.3 21.4
Toys 2.6 5.2 1.8
Optical instruments 0.1 3.0 3.3
Plywood 0.0 3.7 1.8
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source Okurasho ed. Dai-Nihon Boeki Nenpyo and Gaikoku Boeki Gaikyo
to the US after WWII, we may recognize that the production of these finished goods
embodied the direction of the industrialization that led post-war Japan’s economic
development. In that sense, the development of small scale urban-based industries,
such as toys, was one of the distinct aspects of labour-intensive industrialization in
pre-war Japan and continued through post-war Japan’s rapid economic growth.
6.4 Concluding Remarks
Japan’s pre-war economic development can be seen as the case of an emerging state,
trying to catch up to the “advanced” west after the Opening of the Ports and Meiji
Restoration. The concept of labour-intensive industrialization workedwell to explain
its development, specifically by considering the changing role of labour-intensive
sectors. From the late nineteenth to early twentieth century, the rural-based dispersed
cotton weaving industry played a significant role in substituting for imported cotton
textiles typically factory-manufactured in “industrialized” states. The success of the
transplantation of factory-based cotton spinning should also be explained, if partly,
by the reduction in the capital-labour ratio through adoption of a double-shift system
and a cotton-mixing technic required for introducing ring spindles. The invention
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of narrow-sized power-looms made from a mixture of iron and wood, saving the
expensive iron parts, was another example of the capital-saving way of assimilating
imported technologies.
On the other hand, the development of import-substitutive industries, such as
cotton related manufacturing, had to be complemented by export-oriented industries
to relax the trade imbalance caused by the increase in imports, consisting of raw
materials and, in some cases, advanced machines; in the case of the cotton industry,
these were raw cotton and spinning machines. The urban-based, export-oriented
small-scale industries deserve special attention in this regard. Their growth in the
interwar period supported the expansion of export trade, particularly in the 1930s,
compensating for the decline of raw silk, which was previously the major component
of exports. They based the labour force on male workers with a certain level of
skills acquired by being a kind of apprentice when they were young. The potential
possibilities of moving from employees to employers through the establishment of
their own workshops encouraged juvenile workers to invest in skill formation, and
made them tolerate relatively lowwage levels, both supporting the competitiveness in
the world market. Thus, the composition of the workforce was distinctively different
from the textile industry, which had been the major labour-intensive industry up
to the interwar period, endowing Japan’s labour-intensive industrialization with its
dynamic nature.
In fact, it was in a new wave of export trade targeting mainly the demands of
high-income countries where they won a competition with their counterparts in those
industrialized countries. On one hand, this achievement might have resulted in caus-
ing, at least partly, a rural-urban divide in domestic settings,18 and trade conflict in
an international sphere. This can be seen as comparable to the concept of the “middle
income trap” in the contemporary emerging states argument, since Japan’s economy
became stagnant and even deteriorated from the late 1930s to 1940s because of the
war economy. At the same time, the achievement of the pre-war stage can be regarded
as the basis for industries exporting finished consumer products to Western industri-
alized countries afterWorldWar II, the emergence of new competitive products from
binoculars to watches, and probably to home electronics appliance and transportation
machines. In this sense, the perspective of labour-intensive industrialization is open
to the post-war rapid economic growth, the last stage of the Japanese economy as an
emerging state.
18There are quite a few discussions on this issue in diverse streams of literature from pre-war period
to the present. For brief overviewing of the discussions underlying the literature, see Minami et al.
(1998).
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Chapter 7
Changing Patterns of Industrialization




Itmight be a problemwhetherwe should studyChina as an emerging country, because
she had her own history as a great empire. But it is obvious that after the middle of
the 19th century, China started to struggle for industrial development and eventually
achieved it. In particular, industrialization during Mao Zedong’s era in the middle of
the 20th century left us with such a distinctive impression. So we expect the study
on the process of China’s industrialization will shed light on the study of the nature
of emerging states.
This chapter distinguishes four periods of China’s industrialization, and discusses
them by referring to the three factors that have shaped the economic development of
modern China, the global economy, private enterprises, and the government. Such
an understanding will help us to situate Mao’s era in the whole process of China’s
industrialization.Wewill also make it clear that China had two types of industrializa-
tion with particular reference to the significance of the wartime controlled economy
under the Nationalist government.
The first factor, the global economy, is mainly reflected on the roles of foreign
trade and foreign investment. They include investments in railway construction and
the development of domestic river shipping industry and mining and manufacturing
industries, which have been beneficial for both the investor countries and China.
The second factor, private enterprises, includes large enterprises in cities, smaller
enterprises throughout the country, and lots of small-scale industrial activities in the
countryside. The third factor is the government, which provided the infrastructure
necessary for industrial development, managed state enterprises, and implemented
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various economic policies. In this chapter, I will examine the influences of these
three factors in the following four periods of the economic development of modern
China.
7.1.1 Development Led by the Global Economy, 1880s–1900s
Increasing demand for industrial materials and food stuffs in Europe stimulated Chi-
nese exports of agricultural products. This increase allowed China to import more
manufactured goods, including machines for industrialization (Table 7.1). Trade bal-
ance was also supported by overseas Chinese remittance and foreign investment
(Table 7.2). Foreign investment promoted the development of the Chinese trans-
portation system, especially railway and domestic river steamship lines, which in
turn facilitated trade expansion further (Tables 7.3 and 7.4). China’s relationship with
the global economy stimulated economic development and increased the accumula-
tion of capital, which created conditions fundamental to the development of import
substitution industrialization policy. When the First World War began, imports of
industrial products from European countries by Asian countries decreased drasti-
cally; however, this provided a wonderful opportunity for Asian countries to develop
their own industries. China used this opportunity to enlarge several of its industries,
such as the cotton and flour industries, and to promote import substitution industri-
alization.
Table 7.1 General trends of foreign trade, 1871–2013 (100 million US$)
Year Export Import Balance Index of quantity
(Average of three years) Export Import
1871–73 1.11 1.07 0.04 100 100
81–83 0.95 1.11 −0.16 123 132
91–93 1.14 1.50 −0.36 176 230
1901–03 1.31 2.00 −0.69 250 391
11–13 2.77 3.59 −0.82 385 564
21–23 5.40 7.38 −1.98 508 628
31–33 2.70 4.47 −1.77
51–53 8.67 12.20 −3.53
61–63 15.43 13.00 2.43
71–73 39.66 34.07 5.59 100 100
81–83 221.94 208.99 12.95 348 325
91–93 828.71 827.75 0.95
2001–03 3,433.10 3,171.60 261.50
11–13 20,520.33 18,372.93 2,147.40
Source Kubo et al. (2016: 138)
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Table 7.2 General trends of foreign investment, 1902–2014. Million US$
Year Total Direct Investment (%) Loan (%)
1902 788 503 (63.9) 285 (36.1)
14 1,610 1,085 (67.3) 526 (22.8)
31 3,243 2,532 (78.1) 711 (21.9)
36 3,483 2,717 (78.0) 767 (22.0)
1985 22,947 6,060 (26.4) 15,547 (67.8)
90 69,602 20,691 (29.7) 45,673 (65.6)
95 230,665 134,868 (58.5) 91,255 (39.6)
2000 520,450 348,348 (66.9) 147,157 (28.3)
05 809,150 622,429 (76.9) 147,157 (18.2)
10 1,250,443 1,048,381 (83.8) 147,157 (11.8)
14 1,719,861 1,513,256 (88.0) 147,157 (8.6)
Source Kubo et al. (2016: 148)









Military and government 20.5 13.2
Source Kubo et al. (2016: 150)
7.1.2 Development Led by Private Enterprises Under
Protectionist Policy, 1910s–1930s
Industrialization by private enterprises proceeded under the protectionist policy of
the government of the early 20th century. The Industrial Production Index clearly
shows marked industrial development from the 1910s to 1930s (Table 7.5, Fig. 7.1).
The domestic supply of industrial goods increased during this period (Table 7.6).
Many private industrial enterprises were established in China during this period.
Such enterprises were successful during the First World War and throughout most
of the 1920s. For example, as Chinese cotton mills produced good cotton yarn and
low-cost products, they could compete with Japanese cotton mills in the Chinese
market. At the same time, China recovered tariff autonomy, which allowed it to
pursue aprotective policy after 1928. International circumstances during the inter-war
144 T. Kubo
Table 7.4 Railway construction, 1890–2014 (km)
Year Distance in business
High speed railway Foreign management (%)
1890 220 – –
1900 1,066 – –
10 8,233 – 3,718(45.2)
20 10,954 – 3,755(34.3)
30 13,807 – 4,145(30.0)
36 20,009 – 7,275(36.4)
40 24,383 – 10,229(42.0)
46 26,857 – –
50 22,200 – –
60 33,900 – –
70 41,000 – –
80 53,300 – –
90 57,900 – –
2000 68,700 – –
10 91,200 5,133 –
14 111,800 16,456 –
Source Kubo et al. (2016: 76)
period helped Chinese industrialization. The development of domestic transportation
and communication networks and commerce and banking systems were increasing,
although the economic relationship with foreign countries did not develop much
after the end of the First World War. During this time, Chinese industrialization was
mainly limited to the light industry. Although heavy and chemical industries were
starting to develop in some areas, they did not have an intimate connection with the
domestic light industry. Nevertheless, heavy and chemical industries began to grow
in importance as the possibilities of a Japanese invasion and a second world war
increased.
7.1.3 Development Under a Controlled and Planned
Economy, 1940s–1970s
During a period of successive wars (Sino-Japanese War, Second World War, Korean
War, Cold War), Chinese economic development became strongly colored by the
development of heavy and chemical industries. However, as heavy and chemical
industries needed investment and a long lead time to develop, government aid was
needed. Almost half of the companies established in Free China during the Sino-
Japanese War were government-owned companies (Fig. 7.2). This trend became























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Fig. 7.1 Industrial production index, 1912–1949. Source Table 7.5
Table 7.6 Ratio of domestic supply of Chinese industrial production, 1890–1936 (%)
Year Cotton yarn Cotton pieces Cement Soda ash
1890 5.8 1 … –
1900 40.4 7.4 … –
10 38.4 8.2 … –
20 68.9 19.4 59.9 –
30 102.3 55.3 84.6 35.6
36 102.3 86.5 92.0 52.7
Source Kubo et al. (2016: 23, 24, 52, 54)
clear when the Communist government emerged in 1949 in response to the Cold
War. As heavy and chemical industries rapidly developed from the 1950s to the
1970s, the ratio of heavy and chemical industries of the whole economy markedly
increased (Tables 7.7 and 7.8). This was Mao Zedong’s era. It can be said that
such a path of partial development was possible because light industry had already
been sufficiently developed. However, during this period the economic relationship
with foreign countries decreased, and the domestic commerce and banking systems
declined. In addition, limited investment in the transportation and energy industries
damaged them.This resulted inmanyproblemswithin heavy and chemical industries,
but ultimately resulted in marked economic development throughout the 1970s.














Fig. 7.2 Ratio of paid-in capital of governmental and private companies in free China, 1936–1944
Source Kubo (2004: 183)
Table 7.7 Composition of production, 1933–2014 (value added) (%)
Year Agriculture Manufacturing Service Total
1933 54.1 19.6 26.2 100.0
36 53.4 19.8 26.8 100.0
40 53.2 24.7 22.2 100.0
52 51.0 25.2 23.9 100.0
60 23.6 51.6 24.8 100.0
70 35.4 44.8 19.8 100.0
80 30.2 52.9 16.9 100.0
90 27.1 47.6 25.3 100.0
2000 15.1 52.1 32.8 100.0
10 10.1 51.4 38.5 100.0
14 9.5 51.7 38.8 100.0
Source Kubo et al. (2016: 19)
7.1.4 Further Development with the Global Economy,
1980s–2010s
The end of 1970s marked the start of the fourth period of economic development
in modern China. The agriculture and light industries showed renewed development,
and the bias toward development of heavy and chemical industries gradually waned.
Improvements in the relationships with Western countries meant that economic rela-
150 T. Kubo
Table 7.8 Composition of industrial production, 1933–1993 (%)
Year 1933 1953 1963 1970 1980 1985 1990 1993
Fiber
industry
40.0 38.1 21.8 20.9 19.5 19.1 14.5 13.1
Food
industry
34.5 35.1 26.5 16.4 14.7 13.4 14.8 12.7
Metal
industry
4.0 6.6 15.1 14.8 11.6 9.3 12.8 17.9
Machine
industry
4.3 7.6 17.8 24.4 26.9 31.5 30.4 27.8
Chemical
industry
6.4 3.7 12.5 18.8 21.4 20.5 23.4 17.4
Pottery
industry
2.5 2.8 2.5 2.9 4.4 4.9 6.4 8.3
Wood
industry
0.9 6.0 3.9 1.9 1.5 1.3 1.1 1.8
Light
industry
74.5 73.2 48.2 37.3 34.1 32.5 25.3 25.8
Heavy
industry
14.7 17.9 45.3 57.9 59.9 61.3 63.9 63.1
Source Kubo et al. (2016: 73)
tionships with foreign countries rapidly increased, eventually reaching the highest
level in China’s history. The commerce and finance sectors became very active, and
the transportation and energy industries also developed. As a result, contemporary
China became the second largest economy in the world while maintaining a high
rate of economic growth. However, throughout China’s economic development, the
disparity among provinces and social classes has increased and environmental pol-
lution has become a serious issue, suggesting that economic development will not
proceed so smoothly in the future.
7.2 Industrialization in China
Scholars generally agree that there are two types of industrialization—capital-
intensive industrialization and labor-intensive industrialization. In China, we can
find capital-intensive industrialization and labor-intensive industrialization proceed-
ing simultaneously. In this section, as examples of capital-intensive industrialization,
I will examine the development of the Chinese cotton and iron industries. Then, as an
example of labor-intensive industrialization, I will discuss the development of small
cotton mills in Jiangnan, a geographic area covering the lower Yangzi Delta.
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7.2.1 Development of Machine-Made Cotton Yarn Industry
in Big Mills as an Example of Capital-Intensive
Industrialization in China
Increasing imports of foreign machine-spun cotton yarn in the latter half of the 19th
century led several western businessmen in China to consider building cottonmills in
Chinese open ports. For example, the business plan of British mercantile companies
in Shanghai from the 1860s to 1870s was to produce machine-spun cotton products
that imitated domestic cotton pieces to sell alongside domestic products in the cotton
market. However, Chinese cotton merchants protested the plan because it threatened
their interests. The Qing government ignored the plan because they were concerned
for the livelihoods of the farmers engaged in small-scale weaving and wanted to
avoid the promulgation of foreign-managed mills. Thus, ultimately, the plan of the
British mercantile companies failed (Suzuki 1992).
The famous comprador and merchant Zheng Guangying (1842–1922) and his
colleagues established the first Chinese cotton mill, called the Shanghai Machine-
made Cotton Pieces Mill (Shanghai Jiqi Zhibuju), in 1880 with the support of Li
Hongzhang (1823–1901), a high-class administrator of the Qing government. The
mill began operation in 1890 producing machine-spun cotton yarn and woven prod-
ucts for the domestic market. The plan for the mill did not face any opposition from
Chinese merchants dealing in domestic cotton pieces, and received the support of
the Qing government (Hatano 1961). It was considered that reducing the imports of
cotton products, which accounted for one-third of total imports, would improve the
“red ink” in China’s trade finances.
After the signing of theSino-JapanesePeaceTreaty in 1895,which granted foreign
investors the right to build mills in Chinese open ports, several new cotton mills were
established by western mercantile companies in Shanghai (Tanaka 1973). Chinese
merchants were able to follow suit and establish their own cotton mills, which cost
around C$200,000 each (approx. US$150,000 at the 1900 rate), because conditions
by then had allowed them to accumulate sufficient capital. From the end of the 19th
to the middle of the 20th century, the Chinese cotton industry developed rapidly,
arriving at a level of self-supply. They could meet almost all of the domestic needs
of machine-spun cotton yarn and about 80% of the domestic needs of cotton pieces
in 1930s (Table 7.9). This kind of development was pursued mainly by Japanese and
Chinese cotton mills, rather than by Western cotton mills (Fig. 7.3). In fact, most of
the cotton mills established by western mercantile companies failed because of the
high costs of management and low profits, and they were ultimately sold to Chinese
merchants or Japanese companies (Nakai 1996).
There were several reasons that Japanese cottonmills were able to develop rapidly
inChina. For example,most Japanese cottonmills built inChina hadbeen competitive
in the Chinese domestic market, because large Japanese cotton industrial companies
had directly invested their capital and technology in China. Also, Japanese cotton
companies needed to invest in China because the Japanese domestic market was
shrinking. In addition, workers’ wages were rising in Japan, a 5% customs tariff
152 T. Kubo











10,000 tons 10,000 tons 1 million m2 1 million m2 1 million m2
1880 – 0.9 – 451.6 –
90 0.4 6.5 5.2 518.2 –
1900 6.1 9.0 42.3 531.6 –
10 8.6 13.8 50.5 566.5 –
20 16.8 8.0 160.4 670.5 2.2
30 44.0 1.0 565.3 500.7 43.9
36 39.7 0.5 1,203.1 196.5 8.1
50 43.7 – 2,520.0 – 27.7
60 109.3 – 5,450.0 – 591.7
70 205.2 – 7,800.0 – 695.5
80 292.6 – 8,710.0 – 1,086.3
90 462.6 – 10,825.0 – 2,221.6
Source Kubo et al. (2016: 24–25)
Fig. 7.3 a Proportion of
spindles in Chinese and
foreign cotton mills,
1894–1936, b proportion of
weaving machines in
Chinese and foreign cotton
mills, 1894–1936 Source
Kubo et al. (2016 :25)
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Table 7.10 Geographical distribution of spindles of Chinese and Japanese cotton mills in China,







Chinese Japanese Chinese Chinese Japanese Chinese
1922 624 587 420 230 85 165
(65) (51) (81) (104) (22) (65)
1930 953 1,148 518 221 379 255
(100) (100) (100) (100) (100) (100)
1936 1,117 1,331 672 112 689 330
(117) (116) (130) (51) (182) (130)
Source Kubo et al. (2016: 27)
Notes Yangzi Delta includes Jiangsu and Zhejiang provinces. North China, Costal Cities includes
Qingdao and Tianjin
was imposed in China, and the technical disparity between Japanese and Chinese
cotton mills was closing, resulting in a loss of competitiveness of exports of Japanese
cotton products made in Japan; thus, the Japanese cotton industry needed to invest
in building mills in China (Takamura 1982).
Chinese cotton mills were in direct competition with Japanese mills in China. By
classifying the number of spindles by location andmill-owner nationality, we can see
that Japanese cotton mills were dominant only in the coastal cities in North China,
which are areas where Japan was applying strong political and military pressure
(Table 7.10). In Shanghai and other districts, Chinese cotton mills were dominant.
Regarding profit rates, Chinese cottonmills (such asYong-an or Shenxin in Shanghai,
Huaxin in Xi County, and Jinhua in Yuci City), had profit rates comparable to those
of Japanese mills (Fig. 7.4). Yong-an or Shenxin in Shanghai had stable management
fundamentals and relatively advanced technology. In addition, they could use cheap
raw cotton imported from foreign countries. In contrast, Huaxin in Xi County in
Henan Province, Jinhua in Yuci City in Shanxi Province, and other such mills built in
inner districts had a superior location to buy raw cotton directly from farmers and also
to sell cotton yarn directly to weavers. Other factors important for the development
of the Chinese cotton industry included (1) decreased imports due to the First World
War, (2) implementation of a protective tariff policy implement by the Nationalist
government from the end of the 1920s to the 1930s, (3) improved movement of raw
cotton as a result of the cooperation between the government and private companies,
and (4) increased domestic supply of spinning and weaving machines (Kiyokawa
1983).
In particular, the domestic supply of spinning and weaving machines had a very
important affect on promoting the transfer of technical knowledge from developed
countries to developing countries. The first generation of cotton mills established at
the end of the 19th century imported all of their spinning andweavingmachinery from
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Chinese cotton mills
Japanese cotton mills
Fig. 7.4 Profit rates of Chinese cotton mills and Japanese cotton mills in China, 1922–36. Source
Kubo et al. (2016: 28)
ever, this technological transfer had various knock-on effects from the 1920s to the
1930s. For example, Dalong Machinery Manufacturing in Shanghai began to make
cotton-spinning machines from 1936, although the quality of these machines was
somewhat low. However, technological developments by factories such as Zhongguo
Fangzhi JiansheGongsi (ChineseCotton IndustryConstructing,CCIC) ShanghaiNo.
1 Machinery Manufacturing (formerly Toyoda Boshoku Sho Tekkobu, established
in 1935), CCIC Shanghai No. 2 Machinery Manufacturing (formerly Naigaiwata
Tekkosho, established in 1941), and CCIC Qingdao No. 1 Machinery Manufactur-
ing (formerly Toyoda Tekkosho, established in 1938 with two others) continued the
development of Japanese cotton mills in China.
The system for educating engineers was also developed with Dasheng Cotton
Mill in Nantong and Shenxin Cotton Mill in Wuxi in the 1910s. The School of
Spinning and Weaving (Fangzhi Chuanxisuo), a famous educational organization in
modern China, was attached to Dasheng Cotton Mill in Nantong in Jiangsu Province
in 1912, changed its name to Nantong College (Nantong Xueyuan) in 1930, and
had educated 1,750 engineers by 1952. Beijing Business High School (Jingshi Gao-
deng Xuetang), Beiyang University (Beiyang Daxue), and Tianjin Industrial High
School (Tianjin GaodengGongyeXuetang) were founded in northern China between
the end of the Qing and the early Republican period, all of which had a major in
spinning or weaving. At the same time, in Yangzi Delta, Suzhou Industrial High
School (Suzhou Gongye Zhuanmen Xuexiao) and Hangzhou Industrial Business
High School (Hangzhou Gaoji Gongye Zhiye Xuexiao) also started to educate spin-
ning and weaving engineers (Zhongguo Jindai Fangzhishi Bianweihui 1996–1997).
The spinning and weaving educational system developed in Shanghai when the cot-
ton industry was expanding under the conditions created by the Sino-Japanese War.
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These developments in the educational system provided valuable manpower for the
Chinese cotton industry when the Japanese abandoned their cotton mills in China at
the end of the Second World War.
The Sino-Japanese War also had a huge influence on the development of the
Chinese cotton industry. Overall, the level of production decreased during the war
not only because of direct war damage but also because of the removal of equipment
by the Japanese Army. However, Japanese cotton mills in China were still able to
make a profit during the war because of the rise in the price of cotton products. In
addition, the Japanese Army assumed management of captured Chinese cotton mills
(Takamura 1982). Despite the circumstances, Chinese cotton mills operating in the
Shanghai settlement were still able to make a profit (Wang 1990). Moreover, many
small cottonmills were able to escape being taken over by the Japanese Army. Newly
established Chinese cotton mills in Free China, especially in Sichuan or Shanxi, also
developed and were successful.
After the end of the Sino-Japanese War, the Nationalist Government took over
the Japanese cotton mills as part of the reparation agreement and one state company,
China Spinning and Weaving Construction Company (CSWCC; Zhongguo Fangzhi
Jianshe Gongsi), began tomanage all of the mills. Originally, the intention was to sell
the mills to private companies after three years (Kawai 1987). However, before the
three years had passed, the Nationalist Government fell and the People’s Republic of
China emerged. The central government of the People’s Republic of China took over
not only CSWCC but it also nationalized other private cotton mills until eventually
all of the cotton mills in China were under government control. This was because
the central government prioritized financing the national budget and supplying the
population with clothes. According to trial accounts, the profit rate for cotton yarn
reached 26%, which provided the central government with C$10 billion within five
years (Onoe 1971). This prompted the central government to invest intensively in
improving the equipment of the cotton industry, using from 80 to 90% of the total
investment for the fabric industry. Particular attention was paid to develop the cotton
industry in districts such as Xian or Shijiazhuang as part of the central government’s
economic strategy to develop inner China. Many engineers in the cotton industry
were educated from the 1930s to the 1940s, and technology transfer progressed via
Japanese cotton mills during the same period. Such achievements in the Republican
period undoubtedly helped the government of the People’s Republic of China pursue
their policies.
7.2.2 Development of the Iron and Steel Industries Before
1949 as a Second Example of Capital-Intensive
Industrialization in China
The starting point of China’s development of iron and steel industries was the estab-
lishment of Hanyang Iron Foundry (Hanyang Tiechang) in 1894. The founder, Zhang
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Zhitong, a high-class administrator of the Qing government, wished to develop an
industrial base in Wuhan district, which was where he was posted at the time, and to
supply steel for the construction of a railway between Wuhan and Beijing (Hatano
1961). However, because the Hanyang Foundry used the Bessemer process, which
was not suitable for their phosphorus-rich iron ore, and they needed to import coke
from Britain, and because Wuhan was far from the iron ore and coal mines, the
iron produced by the Hanyang Foundry was very expensive and was not suitable for
railway construction (Chuan 1972).
After the Hanyang Foundry introduced a Martin-Siemens open-hearth furnace,
which was suitable for their Daye iron ore, and built a new railway to bring coal
from Pingxiang coal mine, they finally succeeded in producing high-quality iron. At
that time, Hanyang Foundry became part of a large united company called the Han-
Ye-Ping Company (Han-Ye-Ping Gongsi) in 1908. However, such improvements
needed additional investment, but since this was too much of a financial burden for
the Qing government to accept, Han-Ye-Ping Company introduced private capital
and Japanese debt.
However, the management of Han-Ye-Ping Company itself were experiencing
problems. Private investors demanded high dividends, and the company did not have
enough assets to strengthen its competitiveness. As soon as the post-war depression
began after the end of theFirstWorldWar, it faltered until finally it stopped production
in 1925.
While the Han-Ye-Ping Company was in decline, the Japanese iron industry in
Manchuria, including the Anshan Foundry and the Benxihu Foundry, was rapidly
developing (Table 7.11). In Anshan, the Japanese attempted to get mining rights of
iron ore under a joint Sino-Japanese company. China, which had enacted the law
to protect domestic mining rights, saw that this joint venture was to be effectively
under Japanese control, and resisted to grant the rights in April 1916. Aggressive
negotiations by Japan continued, however, and eventually forced the compromise.
A large Japanese state-owned company, South Manchuria Railway Company thus
began to build the Anshan Foundry in October 1916, which started operation in
April 1919 (Nakura 1984). In Benxihu, after Japan secured the rights to engage in
mining there under the Sino-Japanese Agreement on Five Problems in Manchuria
in September 1909, Benxihu Coal Mining Company, led by Okura Financial Group,
was established in May 1910. The company changed its name to Benxihu Coal and
Iron Company in October 1911 and started operation in January 1915 (Murakami
1982). This process shows that the Japanese iron industry in Manchuria was realized
due to Japanese imperialistic policy pursued before and after the First World War.
The development of both foundries cannot be separated from the development
of Japanese imperialism. Anshan Foundry had to invest heavily to deal with the
low iron content of the ore it used. Nevertheless, South Manchuria Railway Com-
pany supported the foundry by supplying cheap coal, discounting railway fares, and
providing a special low assessment of depreciation. In addition, South Manchuria
Railway Company itself invested heavily in developing newmethods to deal with the
low iron content of the ore until high-output low-cost production could be achieved.
In the case of Benxihu Foundry, because they were already producing high-quality
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Hanyang Baojin Yangzi Anshan Benxihu
1918 139 – – – 45
19 166 – – 32 79
20 126 – 8 76 49
21 124 – 15 58 31
22 148 … 15 67 –
23 73 … – 73 24
24 27 … 15 96 52
25 53 … – 90 50
26 – 5 – 165 51
27 – … – 203 51
28 – 5 6 224 63
29 – 3 11 210 76
30 – 3 – 288 85
31 – 6 4 269 66
32 – – 19 300 81
33 – 5 29 312 116
34 – 4 17 347 153
35 – 3 … 472 151
36 – … … 492 160
37 – … … 677 136
Source Kubo et al. (2016: 66)
steel for ship building and arms manufacture for the Japanese Navy due to their sup-
plies of high-quality coal and iron ore, the foundry was able to secure a low-rate loan
from the Japanese government to develop their management. Both of the Japanese
foundries established in Manchuria developed under Japanese state organization and
policy, exporting most of their products to Japan (Table 7.12). Thus, these products
were not a part of China’s national economy until Japan’s defeat in 1945.
In mainland China, the Nationalist Government planned to establish new state-
owned foundries after the decline of Han-Ye-Ping Company in the 1930s and 1940s.
The plan to build a new foundry in Ma’anshan near Nanjing proceeded with Ger-
man support before 1937; however, the location was changed to Zhuzhou in Hunan
Province because of the threat of a Japanese invasion. But even this new plan could
not be realized because of the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War in 1937 (Hagiwara
2000). However, the Nationalist Government established several small foundries in
Free China during the Sino-Japanese War and these foundries played a very impor-
tant role in supporting China’s resistance against Japan, even though their production
was only 77,000 tons per year at its peak.
Japan’s defeat fundamentally changed the situation of the Chinese iron indus-
try. Former Japanese foundries in Manchuria were taken over by the army of the
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Table 7.12 Sales of Anshan and Benxihu foundries (1,000 tons (%))
Year Anshan Foundry Benxihu Foundry
Total(A) For Japan
(B)
% (B/A) Total(A) For Japan
(B)
% (B/A)
1923 77 57 (74) 24 15 (63)
24 81 62 (76) 53 37 (71)
25 113 87 (77) 51 39 (76)
26 147 121 (83) 49 37 (76)
27 208 175 (84) 53 37 (69)
28 212 172 (81) 62 38 (62)
29 200 160 (80) 76 52 (69)
30 163 120 (74) 74 48 (66)
31 277 227 (82) 65 51 (78)
32 350 309 (88) 88 74 (84)
Source Kubo et al. (2016: 68)
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), and were requisitioned by the Resource
Commission of Nationalist Government, finally becoming a very important part of
state-owned enterprises in the People’s Republic of China as a result of the 1949
revolution. The army of the USSR took over six of the nine furnaces in the Anshan
Foundry and two of the four furnaces in the Benxihu Foundry. In spite of such big
losses, 1,300,000 tons of iron was produced by the two foundries in 1953, which
accounted for 60% of total Chinese iron production. The remaining Japanese engi-
neers and newly dispatchedRussian engineers cooperatedwith the Chinese to rebuild
the foundries inManchuria (Matsumoto 2000). In addition, Shijingshan Foundry and
some other small foundries were developed in northern China by Japan during the
Sino-Japanese War, and they too became part of the state-owned enterprises of the
People’s Republic of China.
7.2.3 Development of the Small-Mill Cotton Industry
as an Example of Labor-Intensive Industrialization
in China
One of the factors that supported the production of cotton yarn and products in the
People’s Republic of China was the development of many small cotton mills in the
countryside. Despite the low-efficiency of their machinery, these small cotton mills
used cheap labor in the countryside to realize cheap products that could compete in
the market. In Jiangnan in the lower Yangzi Delta, small cotton mills moved from
Japanese-controlled cities to the countryside during the Sino-Japanese War.
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In Wuxi, one area in which these small mills developed, there were seven big
modern cotton mills with the total of 237,000 spindles. However, three mills burned
down and the other four mills were damaged in October 1937 in the midst of the
Sino-Japanese War. Only 45,000 spindles of the Qingfeng and Zhenxin Cotton Mills
were in operation in the summer of 1939 (Koain 1940: 294). The first response to
this situation was to move the cotton mills to the foreign settlement in Shanghai,
where they could continue to operate safely, using imported raw cotton and selling
their products in Shanghai’s large market. The second response was to reopen the
mills under Japanese control in occupied cities. However, both responses produced
limited results as foreign trade became difficult after the start of the Asia-PacificWar
at the end of 1941. As a third response, some of the Chinese cotton mills moved their
equipment to the countryside, separating it among many small mills. According to
statistics published by the Preparatory Association of the Shanghai Cotton Industry
in 1947, in Jiangnan district alone there were 16 large cotton mills each equipped
with an average of 31,031 average spindles and 57 small cotton mills equipped with
an average of 2,979 spindles (Shanghai-shi Mianfangzhi Gongye Tongyegonghui
Choubeihui 1950).
Among the semi-official books on local history one finds explanations such as the
following:
Cotton mills in Shanghai, Wuxi, and Suzhou, one after another, removed a large proportion
of their spinning machines and brought them to cotton-growing areas such as Changshu
County to establish new small mills. Twenty small mills equipped with 41,092 spindles were
established in Changshu County in Jiangsu Province. (Changshu shi Difangzhi Biansuan
Weiyuanhui 1991: 337)
In 1944, Litai Cotton Mill in Taicang County in Jiangsu Province used their equipment and
capital to establish more than 10 new mills in different places. These small mills were each
equipped with about 2,000 spindles. (Changshu shi Difangzhi Biansuan Weiyuanhui 1991:
272)
Small mills built in cotton-growing areas could easily obtain cheap raw cotton
and then supply cotton products during the wartime period, thereby securing large
profits (Zhongguo Jindai Fangzhishi Bianweihui 1996–1997: II 34).With these small
mills increasing their demand for cotton yarn, small dye houses and weaving mills
also profited and were able to develop. These mills got good results because most
of them were located in old, cheap buildings and used simple equipment such as
charcoal engines (Zhongguo Jindai Fangzhishi Bianweihui 1996–1997: I 277–278).
Most of them were equipped with cheap secondhand spinning machines, although
some of them introduced a new simplified spinning machine called a Xinnong shi
Fangjiji (Xinnong-typeSpinningMachine) (Zhongguo Jindai FangzhishiBianweihui
1996–1997: I 43). It should be noted that appreciation for the significance of such
small mills was spreading among Chinese engineers. For example, when Zhang
Fangzuo, (1901–1980, graduate of Tokyo Technical High School), manager of Xinyu
Cotton Mill in Shanghai, wrote a textbook to educate engineers, he recommended
establishing a small mill equipped with 1,200 spindles. He pointed out that such
small mills were suitable for meeting contemporary demand, were easy to start a new
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business, and were beneficial for the rural economy (Zhang 1945: 127–128). Thus,
such viewpoints began to act as footlights for the arrival of the People’s Republic of
China.
However, small mills in the countryside lost their competitive edge after the end
of the Sino-Japanese War, when the electricity supply was returned to the cities and
cheap raw cotton could be imported from America. In addition, as the transportation
system was disturbed as a result of the civil war, it became difficult to bring raw
cotton from Jiangbei to the cotton market in Jiangnan. These conditions put pressure
on cotton mills in Wuxi district to stop operation (Zhenhuai 1946) and it seemed
that the era of small mills was over. Many small mills moved back to the cities
from the countryside and were merged with big mills. For example, in Changshu,
a famous mill district in the countryside, Jinfeng Mill moved to Hankou, Fusheng
Mill moved to Weinan, Taishan Mill and Changan Industrial Company moved to
Nanjing, Dakang Mill was merged with Anda Mill in Shanghai, and Yongfeng Mill
and Home Industrial Company were merged with QingfengMill inWuxi (Changshu
shi Difangzhi Biansuan Weiyuanhui 1991: 338). In Taicang, another famous mill
district in the countryside, most of the small cotton mills were merged with big
cotton mills in cities and only one cotton mill, Litai Cotton Mill, existed in 1956
(Taicang xian Xianzhi Biansuan Weiyuanhui 1991: 272).
Nevertheless, many small cotton mills in Jiangnan revived at the end of 1950s.
Many smallmills reopenedwhen theDepartment of theCotton Industry of the central
government of the People’s Republic of China transferred the right to establish mills
to local governments on 7 March 1958, the eve of the Great Leap Forward (Guojia
Jingji Maoyi Weuyuanhui 2000: 313–314). In the case of Jiangyin County, most
small cotton mills managed by the Peoples Commune emerging from the end of the
1950s to the 1960s used old equipment and could make only coarse yarn (Jiangyin
xianXianzhi BiansuanWeiyuanhui 1992: 370). It is likely that the level of technology
of such small mills was similar to those established during the Sino-Japanese War.
Small cotton mills began to revive in Jiangnan in the 1970s. Many small cotton
mills came and went in accordance with demand and supply. Such factors certainly
continued to support the production of cotton products in the People’s Republic
of China since 1950s. In the background, there was the experience during Sino-
Japanese War. Undoubtedly, some of the policy makers in the Department of the
Cotton Industry and the other governmental organizations intentionally revived the
industrialization process during the War. Thus Zhang Fangzuo, the engineer who
stressed the importance of small cotton mills during the war, became a leading figure
at the Institute of Spinning and Weaving Science in the People’s Republic of China.
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7.3 Wartime Controlled Economy Under the Nationalist
Government: The Controlled and Planned Economy
Before Mao’s Era
Economic policy played a very important role in China’s economic development.
With regard to a controlled economy, in particular, the attitudes of modern Chinese
governments went through significant changes. Such changes could not be explained
away by the difference between the Nationalist government and the Communist
government, as under the Nationalist government, there was a period of controlled
economy and a period of open economy. After the Communist government emerged,
the range of changes in economic policy became much wider than the period of
the Nationalist government. In a controlled economy the state puts most economic
activities under its direct control. By contrast, in an open economy intervention in
economic activities by the state is kept to a minimum and the open market plays
an important role. Needless to say, there are various economic systems between
these two extremes. Furthermore, in a planned economy the state decides various
economic targets to ensure that the economy develops according to a predetermined
plan. A planned economy is closely related to a controlled economy and this was a
characteristic of the USSR type of socialism in the 20th century (Elleman 1979).
7.3.1 Economic Construction by the Nationalist Government
on the Eve of War
As most western countries adopted controlled economy policies to defend against
economic depression and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics spread propaganda
hailing the success of their planned economy, many countries began to consider the
idea of a controlled and planned economy during 1930s. The idea of a controlled or
planned economyalso becameactive inChina under theNationalist regime.However,
the economic policies of the Nationalist government originally proceeded along the
lines of a protective tariff policy to promote domestic industries and currency reform
to unite and stabilize the Chinese currency (Kubo 1999). No one was thinking of
a controlled and planned economy, including the former leader of the Nationalist
Party, Sun Yatsen, in his grand plan for economic construction written in 1910s. As
a result, in spite of many calls for implementing a controlled and planned economy,
the Nationalist government refused.
The National Economic Committee established under the National Government
in 1931 was very active from 1933 to 1938, when it was absorbed into the Depart-
ment of Economy. The committee comprised officials in the relevant government
departments, famous entrepreneurs in private enterprises, and specialists and engi-
neers from industry. The NEC succeeded in improving the quality of the raw cotton,
cocoon, and tea, constructing national highways, expanding the irrigation system
by using foreign aid, including American loans, and cooperating with the League
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of Nations (Kawai 1982). Thus, the NEC was instrumental in promoting economic
development led by private enterprises in the light industry in the 1930s.
The vice-chairman of the NEC, Song Ziwen, in his address to the members of
the committee, stressed that the state would help private enterprises. Although he
specifically mentioned a controlled economy, his position was far from supporting
a true controlled economy. At that time, one of the economists criticized the NEC,
saying that it was not the organization to implement a controlled economy and that
this interest in a controlled economy was only a passing fad. In reality, although a
controlled economy was often mentioned, their real intentions were actually closer
to an open economy (Kubo 1996).
In contrast, the Resource Commission, led by the many technocrats in the Nation-
alist government, clearly announced their intention to promote development under
a controlled and planned economy from the latter half of the 1930s to the 1940s. At
first, the Resource Commission was a secret commission, established as the Defense
Planning Committee under the General Staff of the Nationalist Army in 1932; how-
ever, it was reorganized as the Resource Commission under the Military Committee
of theNationalist Government in 1935. In 1938, the Resource Commissionwas again
reorganized and enlarged under theDepartment of the Economy. The Resource Com-
mission promoted the establishment of a controlled and planned wartime economy,
attaching importance to heavy and chemical industries, strengthening development
of inner districts, and using barter trade comprising the export of strategic materi-
als and import of machinery and equipment. This viewpoint helped the Resource
Commission achieve its aim (Zheng et al. 1991; Ishikawa 1991).
Weng Wenhao, the Head of the Resource Commission, was a respected geologist
in China, receiving his doctoral degree from Ruben Catholic University in Belgium.
He was appointed Secretary of Executive-Yuan by the Nationalist government in
1935 and led Chinese economic policy during the very difficult period during and
after the Sino-Japanese War. In 1933, before his appointment, Weng already knew
about the five-year plan of the USSR and its economic system, and had criticized the
economic policy of the Nationalist government saying that it did not have systematic
planning (Kubo 1996).
The leading organization of the economic policy of the Nationalist govern-
ment changed from the NEC to the Resource Commission in the 1930s, and the
basic thought on economic development changed from an open economy to a con-
trolled economy accordingly. The outbreak of the Sino-JapaneseWar accelerated this
change. TheNationalist government had other organizations related to economic pol-
icy, including the Construction Committee, which mainly supervised power stations,
and the Department of Industry, which promoted an export-orientated policy under
Chen Gongbo until 1937, but the basic trend was not influenced by the activities of
such organizations.
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7.3.2 Wartime Economy Under the Nationalist Government
The Nationalist government moved from Nanjing to Chongqing, the preliminary
capital, to continue its resistance against Japan. The government promoted the estab-
lishment of new factories in inner districts such as Sichuan or Yunnan to strengthen
Chinese economic power for the ResistanceWar, and some of the industrial factories
in the coastal districts moved to inner districts. The Chongqing government invested
state funds to establish modern iron foundries, machine factories, electronic facto-
ries, and chemical factories, which supported the state-owned munitions industry.
The Resource Commission played a decisive role in these activities. According to
statistical data, industrial production in Free China increased more than 50% from
1938 to 1942. However, in spite of such growth, the ratio of Free China’s industrial
production of the total national industrial production reached only about 10% and
the quality of industrial products was poor (Kubo 2004). Nevertheless, the historical
perspective that China could resist invasion by developing a state-owned munitions
industry in its inner districts seriously influenced the management of China’s econ-
omy after the end of the Sino-Japanese War.
Policies for trade control were an important aspect of the controlled economy of
theNationalist government. First, the government tried to stop tradingwith Japanese-
occupied areas after the Sino-Japanese War started. At the same time, it established
the Trade Adjustment Commission under the Military Committee in October 1937,
conducting collective purchases and sales for exporting agricultural products and
ores through their three state-owned trade companies. The Trade Adjustment Com-
mission was reorganized to become the Trade Commission under the Department of
Finance in February 1938. The Trade Commission aimed to maintain a trade balance
to continue importing munitions and securing foreign loans. Although several prob-
lems occurred, such as corruption of officials, the controlled trade system allowed
the government to use transportation efficiently and adjust trading price adequately
(Zheng 2004).
However, the situation changed after the outbreak of theAsia-PacificWar.Because
trade routes between Free China and the outside world were almost stopped, the
lack of various materials became more serious in Free China. So the Chongqing
government changed the aim of its trade policy to acquire materials, promulgating a
new act on 11th May 1942. This loosened the control of trade to allow the imports
of materials essential for the construction of defense base and the daily necessities
of the population.
Another control policy concerned the control of price and production. As the
amount of food and cotton goods in the market decreased, their price increased in
Free China. The Chongqing government tried to limit the price of several foodstuffs
and cotton goods in the largest cities. In addition, the government pursued collective
purchase and sale of such materials; however, the results were limited. For example,
in the case of raw cotton, as the supply decreased, the production of cotton yarn
also decreased. Cotton farmers did not want to sell their raw cotton for the low price
decided by the government, and so a considerable amount of raw cotton flowed
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out from Free China to Japanese-occupied areas. Furthermore, under the controlled
economy, private cotton mills ceased operation (Feng 1948).
Thus, the policies of a controlled economy realized by the Chongqing government
obtained limited results, because the government was not powerful enough to pursue
the necessary policies and the wartime circumstances limited the supply of materials.
7.3.3 Other Phases of the Wartime Economy
It was not only in Free China that the number of state companies increased and a
controlled economy developed. Powerful policies of a controlled economywere exe-
cuted in Manchuria and north China by Japan while under the Japanese occupation.
In Manchuria, the Japanese Kanto (Guandong) Army decided on a “Five-year indus-
trial development plan” to establish a “Manshu koku (State of Manchuria)” in the
lead up to the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War. However, after the war started, the
Japanese government demanded enlargement of the original plan to supply sufficient
materials such as steel, coal, and magnesium for the production of munitions. Japan
invested five billion yen and made intensive efforts for the exploitation of several
resources (Yamamoto 2003). However, although the steel and coal industries devel-
oped, only a partially developed industrial structure was built, and left as a legacy
after the war.
In central China, the state-owned development company Naka-Shina Shinko
Kabushiki Kaisha, capitalized with 100 million yen, was established by Japan in
August 1938. The Japanese government invested half of the capital and private
Japanese companies invested the other half. Naka-Shina Shinko Kabushiki Kaisha
wanted to develop and manage the transportation, communication, electricity, min-
ing, and fishery industries in occupied areas of central China. Similarly, Kita-Shina
Kaihatsu Kabushiki Kaisha, capitalized with 350million yen, was also established in
north China in November 1938. Subsequently, supported by both these state-owned
companies, many Japanese private companies came to China to run their business. In
north China, iron foundries reached a production capability of 756,000 tons per year
and a large electricity transmission network was constructed (Ju and Zhang 1997).
This electricity network played an important role in the controlled and planned econ-
omy of the People’s Republic of China (Tajima 2008).
The trend to develop state companies and adopt a controlled economy increased in
FreeChina,Manchuria, and Japanese-occupied areas ofChina. The content and range
of control differed in these areas and they could not usually get good results, except
for the Resource Commission’s activities in Free China and the partial industrial
development in Manchuria. Nevertheless, the experience of economic development
by state companies and controlled economyduring thewar period influencedChinese
management of the post-war economy.
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7.4 Concluding Remarks
One of the historical roots of industrialization in China was certainly the investments
and various economic policies made by the state, but the role of the state was limited
in the 19th century. The influence of the global economy, including foreign trade and
investment, strongly promoted Chinese industrialization in its early stage.
China’s struggle toward becoming a modern nation state started at the end of the
Qing dynasty and continued through the Republican period.Many private enterprises
developed under the various protectionist policies pursued by the newly emerging
nation state. In particular, the protective tariff and currency reform of the Nationalist
government played a decisive role.
Two kinds of industrialization can be seen in modern China from the 19th to the
20th century—capital-intensive industrialization characterized by the development
of the large cotton mills in Shanghai and the Japanese iron foundries in Manchuria,
and labor-intensive industrialization characterized by the development of the small
cotton mills in Jiangnan, and both types of industrialization proceeded simultane-
ously.
The sphere of the state’s economic activities widened from the 1940s to the 1970s
under a controlled and planned economy, as China adopted a wartime economy first
against the Japanese invasion and then against the United States of America and
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The development of state companies and
adoption of a controlled economy increased in Free China,Manchuria, and Japanese-
occupied areas during the Sino-Japanese War, and this trend was continued and
strengthened during Mao Zedong’s era. As a result, although heavy industries and
munitions industry developed, the process of industrialization faced many problems.
At the end of the 1970s, after China opened its door to the world again, industri-
alization in China began to proceed under an intimate relationship with the global
economy. It also involved amuch greater number of private enterprises, ranging from
large enterprises in cities and smaller enterprises throughout the country to lots of
small-scale industrial activities in the countryside.
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Chapter 8
Historical Roots of Industrialisation
and the Emerging State in Colonial India
Chikayoshi Nomura
8.1 Introduction
Following a clear shift towards economic liberalisation in economic policy in the
early 1980s, India’s economic growth rate rose from the notorious ‘Hindu growth
rate’ of 3% to over 6%, helping improve the welfare standard of its one billion
plus population, while providing market opportunities to producers and investors
elsewhere in the world. The high growth rate resulted in the awakening of India,
which has received worldwide attention.
One of the driving forces of the high growth rate is the expansion for 3 decades in
the activities of private industrial enterprises, whose origins date back to the colonial
era. By the time of independence, India already had various ‘modern’ industrial sec-
tors covering mining, textile, iron and steel, and chemical. Some had even reached
global standards in terms of production and employment, although the overall indus-
trialisation level was far from sufficient. The history of active private industrial enter-
prise has formed one of the important foundations of the current high rate growth of
Indian economy since the early 1980s. This chapter reviews India’s industrialisation
in the colonial era, focusing on its stagnated nature and three known hypotheses on
the causes of the stagnation.
The chapter consists of six sections. Section 8.2 reviews the stagnated nature of
colonial India’s industrialisation. The next three sections review three hypotheses
on the possible causes of the stagnated industrial development in colonial India.
Section 8.3 addresses the common hypothesis proposed by scholars such as
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M.D. Morris, which argues that India’s limited progress in industrialisation can
be explained by its labour abundant and capital scarce mix of factor endowments.
Section 8.4 deals with another well-known hypothesis advanced by scholars such
as A.K. Bagchi, which argues that the adoption of laissez-faire economic policies,
which was part of a pivotal framework of British rule in colonial India, explains the
stagnated industrial growth based on the understanding that proactive government
interventions in economic activities can promote industrialisation. Section 8.5
addresses a persuasive hypothesis advanced mainly by Japanese economists
(Kiyokawa 1976a, b, 1983; Otsuka et al. 1988) that compared growth in cotton
textile industries in colonial India and imperial Japan, and conclude that India’s
stagnated industrialisation can be explained by factors related to its insufficient
adoption and innovation of useful technological knowledge. They argue that insti-
tutional and organisational factors, such as the weak technical education system
or insufficient long-term perspective of management, conditioned colonial India’s
sluggish technology transfer and innovation. The final section offers conclusions.
8.2 Stagnated Industrialisation in Colonial India
‘Modern’ industrial enterprises in colonial India started to grow in the mid-19th
century. The derivation of the monopolistic status of East India Company in the early
19th century fostered buoyant private economic activities in India, where modern
industrial enterprises financed both by British and Indian capital were set up in
various fields. The cotton milling business grew steadily throughout the second half
of the 19th century, achieving high international competitiveness as early as the end
Table 8.1 Top seven cotton spindle holding countries (1,000)
U.K. U.S Germany France India Russia Japan
1875 n.a. n.a. 4,700 5,000 1,100 n.a. n.a.
1880 n.a. 10,653 4,800 4,800 1,464 4,400 n.a.
1890 40,512 14,384 6,071 5,040 3,274 6,000 358
1900 n.a. 19,472 8,031 n.a. 4,945 n.a. 1,274
1910 53,400 28,000 9,900 6,700 6,058 7,900 1,955
1925 57,200 37,937 9,500 9,428 8,500 n.a. 5,292
1930 55,200 34,031 11,070 10,250 8,907 7,624 7,072
1935 42,700 30,110 n.a. 10,157 9,613 9,800 9,944
Source Mitchell (1980, 1982, 1983, 1988). Bombay Millowners’ Association. Report of the mil-
lowners’ association, Bombay
Note 1 The table are sorted by descending order in 1930
Note 2 Data in italic are from Bombay Millowners’ Association






















































































































































































































































































U.S. 42,200 1,064 2,027 350
Germany 11,500 512 2,001 180
U.K. 9,400 1,069 2,790 190
France 6,600 336 1,356 160
USSR 4,300 175 53 30
Italy 3,300 259 401 80
Japan 2,500 241 451 40
Canada 2,400 627 336 250
Belgium 1,900 209 448 240
Czechoslovakia 1,600 156 395 110
Australia 1,400 510 30 220
India 1,200 684 305 4
Source League of Nations (1945, p. 84)
of the 19th century.1 Jute mills also expanded rapidly in Calcutta in response to
a mounting global demand for ropes and other products, occupying a large share
of the international market by the late 19th century. In addition, brewing, paper-
milling, leather-making, matches, and rice-milling industries also developed during
the century, while heavy industries such as the iron industry were also established as
early as 1814 by British capital.
Due to progress in modern industrial enterprises, some industries reached global
standards by the beginning of the 20th century. The cotton mill industry in India
had 9 million spindles in the 1930s, which placed India fifth globally in terms of
the number of spindles (Table 8.1). The Indian jute mill industry was the largest in
the world in terms of the amount of raw jute consumed for production at the end of
the 19th century. India’s iron industry was ranked eighth in the world in terms of
output in 1930 (Table 8.2). Just before the Great Depression, India was ranked as
the twelfth largest industrialised country measured by the value of manufacturing
products (Table 8.3).
This comparatively steady progress of industrial production in colonial India was
not accompanied by a general transformation in its economic structure, which is,
according to Kuznets, represented by a rise in the share of the manufacturing sector
against GDP/NDP. Kuznets shows that the industry share in the UK rose from 34%
in 1841 to 40% in 1901. In the US, which was late to industrialisation, the share
rose from 31% in 1839 to 51% in 1879 (Kuznets 1966). India’s industrial growth
1The Indian cotton mill industry’s high international competitiveness in the second half of the 19th
century is reviewed in Sect. 8.4 of this chapter.















































































































Fig. 8.1 Sector shares in NDP in India. Source Sivasubramonian (2000)
was insufficient to bring such general transformation in its economic structure, and
the net domestic product (NDP) share of the manufacturing sector (excluding small
scale and cottage industries) barely reached 7% even in 1946. India’s slow progress is
conspicuous in comparison to the astonishingprogress of another early industrialising
country in Asia, Japan. According to Fig. 8.1, the share of the manufacturing sector
in India (total of manufacturing and small scale and cottage industries) in total NDP
grew gradually from approximately 10% in the early 20th century to over 20% in the
1960s. On the other hand, Japan’s manufacturing sector share, which also includes
the shares of large- and small-scale industrial manufacturing enterprises, reached
over 30% as early as in the 1930s (Fig. 8.2). Considering its slow progress, the share
of factory employment in India was also small (i.e. 0.4% of the total population in
1900 and 1.4% in 1941). In Japan, it was 1.6% in 1900 and reached 9.9% in 1940
(Umemura et al. 1988). The slow transformation of the economic structure formed
the foundation of the long-held understanding that India’s industrialisation stagnated
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Fig. 8.2 Sector shares in GDP in Japan. Source Okawa et al. (1974)
8.3 Factor Endowment Hypothesis
8.3.1 Overview
In the mainstream economic history of colonial India, there are two main hypothe-
ses that explain its stagnated industrialisation. The first hypothesis assumes factor
endowment as the main cause, while the second considers the laissez-faire economic
policy of the colonial government. In the following two sections, we review the
general features of the two hypotheses and assess them.
Morris David Morris, a leading proponent of the factor endowment hypothesis,
assumes that the Indian economy was driven by market forces led by private ini-
tiatives. Morris wrote, ‘the Indian economy in the 19th and first half of the 20th
centuries was pre-eminently a private enterprise economy…(whose) economic deci-
sions… were made by private individuals, households, and groups’ (Morris 1987).
Morris also assumes that the colonial government played only a limited role in eco-
nomic affairs in the one and half century of British rule. According to Morris, ‘In no
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decade between 1872 and 1947 did the state’s annual share of GNP average more
than 10%; usually it was less than that’ (Morris 1983). Based on the market based
understanding of economic activity in India,Morris construes its abundant labour and
scarce capital factor endowment as the main causes of stagnated industrialisation.
Morris writes,
[Modern economic growth in colonial India had] very serious inhibitions on the supply side…
most factors of production were costly…Only raw labour was cheap and on occasion – as in
the jute and cotton industries – it provided an industrial advantage. But cheap labour typically
worked against mechanisation. The expansion of demand for a product did not necessarily
put pressure on labour supply or on labour cost relative to other costs. To the contrary, the
businessman was encouraged to expand existing organisation rather than shift to techniques
where capital requirements were relatively greater. And even where mechanised industries
grew up, they invariably used more cheap labour per unit of capital than was true in the
West. All this was a rational response to relative factor price relationships but it slowed the
expansion of factory organisation (Morris 1983).
According to Morris, due to its particular factor endowment characteristics, India
had less incentives to seek capital-intensive economic growth, which was essential
for industrialisation. The view that factor endowment is the main cause of India’s
stagnated development has been espoused by other recent economic historians, such
as Roy and Gupta (Roy 2005, 2006; Gupta 2016).
8.3.2 Statistical Analysis
How robust is the hypothesis? We validate the hypothesis by using historical data of
recent works, such as Sivasubramonian (2000). More specifically, we compare the
wage-rental ratio of colonial India and imperial Japan for several decades from the
beginning of the 20th century. Comparing the wage-rental ratios trends in the two
early Asian industrialising countries is a worthy first step to test the factor endow-
ment hypothesis for the following two reasons. First, as is well-known, the important
features of factor endowment of a specific area/year arewell represented by thewage-
rental ratio, which is the nominal wage divided by nominal interest rate.2 In other
words, India’s wage-rental ratio should have been relatively lower if it really had
abundant labour and capital scarcity in comparison to other countries whose eco-
nomic development level was higher. Second, the comparative study could aid our
assessment of the level of wage-rental ratio in India as India and Japan started indus-
trialisation at almost the same time in the second half of the 19th century. Despite the
similarity in its initial starting point for industrialisation, Japan’s economy succeeded
in growing rapidly from the end of the 19th century, and eventually, its industriali-
sation outpaced India’s from the early 20th century. Clear differences in wage-rental
ratios trends between the two countries would indicate that the hypothesis is a good
2To be precise, rental price is equal to ‘machine price× real interest rate+depreciation rate’. Here,
we assume that (1) machine prices in colonial India and imperial Japan were the same or had same
trends, and (2) deprecation rates in both the countries were the same.
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explanation for the sluggish mechanisation and industrialisation of the Indian econ-
omy. If there is no such difference, the hypothesis will need to be supplemented by
further explanations.
Analysingwage-rental ratio trends requires interest rate and nominalwage data for
the long-term. India had three distinct interest rates for short-term lending/borrowing,
reflecting the risks involved: bank rate of the quasi-central bank, the hundi rate, and
the bazaar rate. The bank rate of the quasi-central bank was the rate charged for
short-term lending by, for instance, the Bank of Bengal, the Imperial Bank of India,
or the Reserve Bank of India, all of which functioned as a bank of bank note issuer,
as a bank of the East India Company prior to the mid-19th century, and of the British
government of India subsequently, and as a deposit bank under strict regulation of the
East India Company and the British government. These quasi-central banks supplied
short-term capital to leading financial and commercial agencies using a discount rate,
which is called the bank rate. Bagchi mentions that the discount rate was higher than
2% of the bank rate of the Bank of England, and was influenced by the bank rate of
the central bank in London (Bagchi 1997). The hundi rate was used by large-scale
local bankers for their short-term lending to small-scale manufactures and traders.
The bazaar rate was charged by money lenders for short-term lending to the wider
public, and was generally much higher than the other two types of interest rates.
Banking and Monetary Statistics (BMS), published in 1954 by the Reserve Bank
of India, the central bank of independent India, included data on these interest rates,
some of which date back to the early 20th century. According to the BMS, discount
rates of the Bank of Bengal (January–June) remained relatively stable at 6% prior
to the end of the 1910s (average 6.44%; min. 5.56% in 1904; max. 7.25 in 1915)
(Fig. 8.3). The corresponding rates in the 1920s (bank rate of the Imperial Bank of
India) hiked in the 1920s, reaching 8.05% in 1924 when the Indian money market
experienced shortage of market liquidity owing to the Indian government’s joint use
of the retrenchment policy and increase in government bond issue. The discount rates
gradually returned to pre-war levels after the mid-1920s, reaching 6.02% in 1932.
In 1933, the rate plunged to 3.5% and remained at the level throughout the 1930s.
Hundi rates, whose data is available for 1909 and after, were generally lower than
the bank rates of the quasi-central bank of colonial India in the 20th century. It was
approximately 4% before WW1, rose to 5–7% for almost 15 years after the outbreak
of the war, and sharply decreased to 3% after 1933. For bazaar rates, whose data
is available only after 1922, the BMS shows that the rates were much higher than
the other two. For instance, the Calcutta bazaar rate in June remained approximately
9–10% for a decade from1922. Even after 1933when the above two rates plummeted,
the bazaar rate in Calcutta remained as high as 7.5%, although it decreased to 5.5%
in 1936.
In terms of nominal interests, we observe that India did not suffer from a short-
age of short-term capital in comparison to Japan. Japan had two short-term lend-
ing/borrowing interest rates: the bank rate of the Bank of Japan and the market rates
of major private banks. The two Japanese rates correspond to the first two interest
rates in India. Bank rates of the Bank of Japan, the central bank of Japan, were used
for money lent for securities and roughly corresponds to the bank rate in India. The














































Japan's bank rate (Bank of Japan) Japan's market rate
India's bank rate₁ (Jan to June) India's hundi rate₂ (June)
India's hundi rate₂ (Dec.) India's bazaar rate (June, Calcu a)
Fig. 8.3 Nominal short term interest rates (%). Sources Nomura (2018). Note 1 India’s bank rates
from Jan. to June were generally higher than those from July to Dec. Note 2 India’s hundi rates in
June were generally equivalent to the average annual rates
market rate, which was used by major private financial institutions for short-term
lending (less than 3 months), roughly corresponds to the hundi rate of colonial India.
According to The Oriental Economists Yearbook (Keizai nenkan), the bank rates in
the 1900s were approximately 6%, as were the Indian bank rates, although there
were relatively larger fluctuations (average 6.55%; min. 4.82 in 1910; max. 8.76 in
1901) (Fig. 8.3). The bank rate rose to 8.03% in 1920 and remained at that rate until
1924. Subsequent to 1925, the rate started to decrease gradually and reached 5.84
in 1931, then it suddenly dropped to 4.38% in 1932, 3.65% in 1933, and 3.29% in
1936. These bank rate trends in Japan indicate that there were no clear differences
in bank rates of the central/quasi-central banks in Japan and India.
178 C. Nomura
Considering the market rate, the rates in Japan were in general higher than the
hundi rates, the corresponding Indian rates.The Oriental Economists Yearbook shows
that the Japanese market rate remained over 10% in the 1900s, except for 9.89% in
1907 (Fig. 8.3). The rate decreased to approximately 7–9% throughout the 1910s;
however, it rose again to over 9% in the first half of the 1920s. Subsequent to the mid-
1920s, the rates started to decrease gradually from 9.45% in 1926 to 7.85 in 1931,
and rose again in 1932 to reach 9.31, although the rates gradually declined again after
that year to 7.01% in 1937. Overall, the Japanese market rate trends clearly indicate
that leading private financial institutions charged higher interest rates for their short-
term lending than India’s financial institutions. Surprisingly, Japanese market rates
in the 1930s were higher than India’s bazaar rates, which have been notorious among
economic historians of colonial India for its exploitive nature.
This clearly indicates that India suffered from short-term capital supply less seri-
ously than Japan throughout the first half of the 20th century when the two countries
started to show distinct patterns of industrial development.
To test the factor endowment hypothesis, we not only compare interest rate trends,
but also nominal wage trends in India and Japan. For data on long-term nominal
wages in manufacturing in India, we use Sivasubramonian’s estimation of daily
nominal wages of skilled and unskilled labour at ‘small-scale and cottage industries’
spanning 47 years from 1900/01 (Sivasubramonian 2000). Sivasubramonian defines
carpenters, blacksmiths, and masons as skilled labour, and weavers and potters as
unskilled labour. Unfortunately, Sivasubramonian did not estimate similar long-term
nominal wage trends of workers in ‘modern’ manufacturing sectors, such as the
cotton mill industry. However, we can assume that wages at ‘small-scale and cottage
industries’ approximate wages at similar posts in modern manufacturing sectors as
India already had high labour mobility in general by the end of the 19th century, as
Bagchi stresses (Bagchi 1972).
After carefully analysing several historical wage data utilised by economic his-
torians, Sivasubramonian estimated that the nominal daily wages of urban skilled
labour, most of whom were adult male, grew steadily from Rs. 0.51 in 1900 to Rs.
0.90 in 1917 (Fig. 8.4). After 1918, wages started increasing marginally, rising from
Rs. 0.99 in 1918 to Rs. 1.60 in 1925. After peaking in 1925, the nominal daily wages
of urban skilled labour in India began to decrease gradually in the 1920s and rapidly
in the 1930s, returning to the level of 1918, Rs. 1.01, in 1939. Sivasubramonian also
estimated the nominal daily wages of unskilled labour and those of cotton weavers,
most of whom were adult male. Both unskilled labour and cotton weavers, who may
have be ‘slightly better off than the agricultural labourers in the rural areas’ (Siva-
subramonian 2000), received almost half of the wages of urban skilled workers. The
nominal daily wages of unskilled labour steadily grew from Rs. 0.25 in 1900 to Rs.
0.48 in 1917. After 1918, it rose marginally, as did for urban skilled labour. The
wages rose from Rs. 0.53 in 1918 to Rs. 0.82 in 1925. Further, the wage started to
decrease fromRs. 0.80 in 1926 to Rs. 0.46 in 1939, gradually in the 1920s and rapidly
in the 1930s. The nominal daily wages of cotton weavers, whose data are available
only for 11 years from 1910, were similar to the wages of unskilled labour, which
validated Sivasubramonian’s classification of weavers as unskilled labour.
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India : co on weaving workforce
Japan : co on spinning workforce (male)
Japan : co on spinning workforce (female)
Japan : co on weaving workforce (male)
Japan : co on weaving workforce (female)
Fig. 8.4 Nominal daily wages formanufacturing labours (in Indian rupee). SourcesNomura (2018)
Note 1 The sharp drop in wages in Japan during the 1930s was due to a marked decline in yen-based
nominal wages and a sudden depreciation of the yen against the rupee after 1931 (Rs./Yen decreased
from 1.47 in 1931 to 1.05 in 1932 and 0.79 in 1933)
The nominal daily wages in India was not so different from that in Japan in the first
and last years of the first half of the 20th century. According to Fujino (Fujino et al.
1979), a pioneering compilation work of economic statistics of modern Japan, rupee-
based nominal dailywages ofmaleworkers of the cotton spinning andweaving sector
of Japan,whichwas one of the leading ‘modern’manufacturing sectors in Japan,were
at similar levels to India’s urban skilled workers in small-scale and cottage industries
before 1918 and after 1933 (Fig. 8.4). Additionally, Sivasubramonian (2000) and
Fujino (Fujino et al. 1979) jointly show that rupee-based nominal daily wages of
‘female’ workers of the Japanese cotton and spinning sector in two periods (before
1918 and after 1933) were only approximately 10–20% higher than the rupee-based
nominal daily wages of Indian unskilled adult worker, who were ‘slightly better off
than the agricultural labourers in the rural areas’ (Sivasubramonian 2000). Wage
trends in the two countries diverged for 15 years after 1918, although the difference
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disappeared completely in the early 1930s due to the sharp decline in Japanese yen-
based nominal wages in Japan, and amarked depreciation of the Japanese yen against
the Indian rupee after 1931 (Rs./Yen decreased from 1.47 in 1931 to 1.05 in 1932,
and 0.79 in 1933).
We should pay special attention to two facts in assessing the above-mentioned
wage trends in the two countries. First, female workers were the majority in some
leading ‘modern’ manufacturing sectors in Japan, such as the cotton mill indus-
try, while adult males constituted the majority in most of the ‘modern’ as well as
traditional manufacturing sectors in India. Second, as was pointed out previously,
Indian skilled and semi-skilled workers at ‘modern’ business enterprises and those
at ‘small-scale and cottage industries’ could be construed to have received approxi-
mately similar wages for the following reasons. Prices and Wages, one of the most
well-known historical statistics of colonial India, indicates that both sizers in the
sizing department and slubbers in the card-room department of India’s cotton mills
received approximately similar wages to those of blacksmiths and carpenters work-
ing at Indian railway companies in the early 20th century. Assuming that blacksmiths
and carpenters working at railway companies and those working at small-scale or
cottage industries received similar wages in a highly mobile labour market due to
similarity in job specifications, Indian male adult workers at skilled or semi-skilled
posts of ‘modern’ manufacturing sector, such as slubbers in the card-room depart-
ment of cotton mills, may have received, at least, similar nominal wages to that of
skilled labour such as blacksmiths or carpenters as shown in Fig. 8.4. Based on these
two facts, we conclude that Indian workers in manufacturing received no less than
the amount of nominal daily wages received by workers at ‘modern’ manufacturing
sector in Japan in the two periods (before 1918 and after 1933).
Comparing interest rates and nominalwages in India and Japan does not lead to the
conclusion that India was capital scarce and labour abundant at least in comparison
to Japan in the early 20th century. Rather, India’s factor endowment was similar
to that of Japan in the time period. Despite the similarity, India failed in achieving
similar pattern of ‘labour intensive’ industrialisation that Japan achieved since the
end of the 19th century, during which time, the labour intensive industrialisation led
Japan’s modern economic growth in its early phase. What could explain the causes
of the failure of colonial India’s labour intensive industrialisation? We will check
with another hypothesis that has been proposed to answer the question.
8.4 Laissez-Faire Economic Policy Hypothesis
8.4.1 Overview
Based on the understanding that governments can lead industrialisation through
comprehensive interventions in economic activities, scholars such as Amiya Kumar
Bagchi stress that India could have developed its industries more robustly if the colo-
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nial government had taken interventionist policies to boost overall industrial devel-
opment (Bagchi 1972). They assume that the colonial government had no intention
or capacity to undertake such interventionist economic policies as the government
considered laissez-faire policies as its pivotal policy framework to protect British
interests in colonial India. Under the common acceptance of market mechanisms
guided by the ‘invisible hand’, the colonial government assumed that laissez-faire
policies merited both British and Indian interests. Additionally, this framework was
welcomed by the colonial government as it significantly limited the scope of colonial
governance and left wide-ranging, sometimes bothersome, business matters in the
hands of private entities. This non-interventionist philosophy is well summarised by
Morris David Morris, who wrote that ‘there can be no question that in India during
the century and a half of British rule the market was given its head. British India
was one of the great social experiments in letting self-interest and market forces do
virtually everything’ (Morris 1987). The laissez-faire economic policy framework,
according to Bagchi and others, resulted in stagnated industrialisation in colonial
India.
8.4.2 Statistical Analysis
Testing the entire scope of the laissez-faire economic policy hypothesis is beyond
the capacity of this short essay. On the one hand, the assertion that weak govern-
ment intervention caused stagnation in industrialisation is a challenging hypothesis
to prove, considering the weak performance in the post-colonial era when interven-
tionist policies were adopted. On the other hand, we also know that some types
of interventions into the economy could help promote industrial growth from the
case study of Asian Miracle stories in South Korea after 1960s and Southeast Asian
countries after the 1970s, when developmental directorships played a part in rais-
ing the growth rate of the manufacturing sector in these countries. A full assessment
requires an in-depth investigation on government interventions that could have poten-
tially affected industrial growth. This requires a full-fledged analysis on an optimal
interventionist policy portfolio, and any negative influence by laissez-faire policies
on such a portfolio. Such an analysis is far beyond the scope of this short essay.
Leaving the full-fledged analysis for future work, this section describes the basic
features of India’s laissez-faire economic policy framework as an initial step in ver-
ifying this hypothesis. Similar to the above section, we use historical data that have
been compiled by recent scholars.
An important feature of the Indian laissez-faire policies was the limited share of
government revenue in the total GDP, which Morris refers to in his quote mentioned
above, and is verified by historical data. Figures 8.5 and 8.6 indicate the shares of
total government revenue in the total GDP/NDP for India, Japan, and the UK prior
to the 1940s. The figures clearly indicate the limited annual financial capacity of the
Indian government in comparison to the other two countries. Figure 8.5 also indicates



















































Land tax / NDP Total revenue(central and local) / NDP
Fig. 8.5 India’s share of government revenue against NDP. Source Data of NDP from Sivasubra-
monian (2000). Data of British India’s government revenue from Reserve Bank of India (1954).
Data of population size of British India and princely states from Government of India. Statistical
Abstract of British India. New Delhi: Department of Commercial Intelligence and Statistics. Note 1
The government revenue includes revenues of both British India’s central and local government
of, which was separated from the central government after an enactment of the Government of
India Act 1919. Note 2 Original data of the government revenue in Banking and Monetary Statis-
tics includes only central and local government revenue of British India, while excluding data on
revenue of princely states. We estimate the government revenue of the princely state based on their
relative size of population. According to Statistical Abstract of British India, total population in
British India and princely states are as follows. 231 million and 63 million in 1901, 244 million and
70 million in 1911, 247 million and 71 million in 1921, and 271 million and 81 million in 1931.
Based on these figures, we assume that the government revenue of the princely states were 22%
of the government revenue of British India throughout the period of the figure. On the assumption,
we firstly estimated total government revenue of India. And then, to figure out the India’s revenue
share in NDP, the estimated government revenue of India was divided by Sivasubramonian’s total
India’s NDP, which includes NDP data of both British India and princely states
in the 1930s largely owing to the sharp drop in NDP in the decades following the
Great Depression.
In addition to the relative scale of government revenue in the total GDP/NDP, the
absolute scale of India’s government revenue was smaller, for instance, than that of
Japan. As Fig. 8.7 indicates, initially, India’s revenue gradually grew at a similar pace
to that of Japan. This may lead some to conclude that the relatively smaller share of
Indian revenue against its NDP should not be overemphasised. However, as the figure
also indicates, Japan’s revenue scale outpaced India’s after the early 1920s when its
revenue scale stagnated. More importantly, India’s government revenue maintained
the welfare standard of its population, which was more than 200million as early as in
the 20th century, when the population in Japan was only approximately 60 million.
Moreover, the Indian government was required to spend approximately 30% of its
revenue on defence, part of which was used to maintain British troops inside and
































































Japan total ordinary revenue / GDP UK total revenue / GDP
Fig. 8.6 Japan and the UK’s share of government revenue against GDP. Source Data of Japan’s
government revenue fromEmi and Shionoya (1966). Data of Japan’s GDP fromOkawa et al. (1974).
Data of the UK from Mitchell (1988). Note 1 The government revenues include revenues of both












Fig. 8.7 Government revenue (absolute figure inmillion rupee). SourceData of exchange rate from
same source with Fig. 8.4. Other data are from same sources with Figs. 8.5 and 8.6
outside India. Overall, the Indian government’s revenue was, as acknowledged by
economic historians, small not only in its relative scale, but also in absolute terms.
One of the leading causes of the limited capacity of government revenue is the
land tax assessment system called the ‘permanent settlement system’, which was
applied to the leading part of the colony from the early stage of colonial rule in
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the late 18th century. Under the system, land tax per acre was fixed at the initial
stage of colonial governance in the late 18th century. It was fixed to avoid costs
related to reassessment of the rates, as well as insurgency risks by taxpayers against
any reassessments. As a result, government revenue, as is clearly shown in Fig. 8.5,
suffered from a gradual decline in real terms owing to the steady rise in general
prices throughout the colonial period (Kumar 1983). The inability to raise revenue
from lands through a reassessment may imply limited legitimacy of the colonial
government to govern its subjects.
The Indian government’s limited financial capacity is also observed in Fig. 8.8,
which shows the shares of the central government’s public debt against GDP/NDP of
India, Japan, and the UK until the 1940s. According to the figure, India’s share (total
of debt in rupees and in sterling) was higher than its counterparts in the early 1900s.
This is owing to the UK’s strict observance of liberalisation economic policies, as
well as Japan’s weak capacity to borrow from abroad at that time. However, the
Indian government strengthened its conservative debt policy throughout the period,
while its counterparts expanded their debt, particularly after WW1.
Attempts by the Indian government to limit its public debt to a ‘necessary min-
imum’ are well-known among economic historians as an important feature of its
‘imperial commitment’. For instance, Brian Tomlinson, a well-known economic his-
torian of colonial India, explained it as follows. ‘[as a colonial state forming a part
of British empire], irreducible minimum’ for Government of India were ‘to provide
a market for British goods, to pay interest on the sterling debt and other charges
that fell due in London, and to maintain a large number of British troops from
local revenues and make a part of the Indian army available for imperial garrisons’
(Tomlinson 2013). Tomlinson called this irreducible minimum an ‘imperial commit-
ment’, which shaped British policy foundation in India. Tomlinson argues that the
Indian government adopted an automatic, self-regulating system of currency man-
agement to protect British investor interests. Imperial commitment resulted in Indian
officials not playing an active role in matters important to the domestic economy, as
seen in the limited public debt during the colonial period, which in other words, indi-
cates India’s strict observance of conservative fiscal policy throughout the colonial
period.
The significance of the imperial commitment is also observed in India’s exchange
rate policy, which has also received wide scholarly attention. Before the end of the
19th century, India employed the silver standard, while the UK employed the gold
standard. Subsequent to the early 1870s, when silver prices began to decline due to
the decisions of leading European countries to employ the gold standard, the rupee
exchange rate declined abruptly against the sterling pound. To tackle the decreasing
value of the rupee against the sterling pound and to stabilise international finance,
the Indian government decided to introduce the gold exchange standard by the early
20th century. Figure 8.9 shows that the rupee exchange rate against the sterling pound
remained stable for over a century since the early 19th century, despite the difference
in the economic growth rate between India and theUK in the period. On the one hand,
the stable exchange rate trend helped British investments by reducing the exchange
rate risk in India, which occupied a large part of British overseas investment since



















































India- central governemnt debt(rupee only)/ NDP
India- central governemnt debt(rupee + sterling)/ NDP
Japan-central government debt / GDP
UK- central government debt / GDP
Fig. 8.8 Shares of central government’s public debt against GDP/NDP. SourceData of India’s NDP
fromSivasubramonian (2000).Data ofBritish India’s central government debt fromReserveBank of
India (1954).Data of Japan’sGDP fromOkawaet al. (1974).Data of Japan’s central government debt
from Emi et al. (1988); Toyo Keizai Shinposha, The Oriental economist (Toyo Keizai Shinposha),
Tokyo: Toyo Keizai Shinposha. Data of the UK from Mitchell (1988). Note 1 As was the case of
Fig. 8.5, original data of the government revenue in Banking and Monetary Statistics includes only
central government debt of British India, excluding data on princely states’ debt. Again, using the
population size, we assume that the princely states’ government debt were 22% of the government
debt of British India. On the assumption, we estimated total central government debt of India.
And then, to figure out the India’s central government debt share in NDP, the estimated central
government debt of India was divided by Sivasubramonian’s total India’s NDP, which includes
NDP data of both British India and princely states
the mid-19th century, while on the other hand, the stabilised exchange rate limited
the flexibility in managing fiscal and financial policies for the colonial government.3
Under the non-interventionist, ‘experimental’ laissez-faire policies, the Indian
government limited its intervention to the minimum, leaving the coordination of
economic transactions to the market. Among the market fundamentalist economic
policies, the tariff policy is well-known. For instance, general import duty was
reduced from 10% in the early 1860s to zero in 1882. India’s tariff rate remained low
at approximately 5% before the 1920s, while the rate rose drastically after that due
3Figure 8.9 also shows the exchange rate trends of Japanese yen against sterling pound since 1895.
The figure indicates that Japanese yen gradually decreased its value against the Indian rupee in
the 1920s and abruptly in the 1930s. The relative decrease in the Japanese yen value against the
Indian rupee roughly went along with the positive debt policy of imperial Japan after WW1, which






























































































Fig. 8.9 Exchange rate of Indian rupee and Japanese yen against Sterling pound. Source Indian
rupee data before 1918/19 from Shirras (1920). Indian rupee data after 1919/20 from Government
of India. Statistical Abstract of British India. New Delhi: Department of Commercial Intelligence
and Statistics. Japanese yen data from Government of Japan (1949)
to various reasons, one of which was the fiscal stringency of the colonial government
(Fig. 8.10).4
Another significant policy under the laissez-faire policy frameworkwas the policy
to invest in transportation facilities to promote free trade. One of the most influential
transportation facilities was the railway network. An initial attempt to construct
railway networks dates back to the 1840s, when the then Governor-General of India
proposed the construction of a railway network to promote trade, administrative, and
military efficiency. Under his leadership, the first railway company was incorporated
in 1849, which was followed by additional networks, and resulted in the Indian
railway networks ranking fourth in operated lines globally in 1913.
The historical data based test on Indian policy choices validate the hypothesis that
it operated under a strict laissez-faire policy framework. The colonial government
limited its commitment to the economy to a lesser extent than the Japanese or British
governments, while the private sector thrived under this framework.
The free rein given to private business entities formed a foundation for the growth
of modern industrial enterprises in India. However, it is also clear that these policies
led to limited industrial development. This recognition may have led to the adoption
of proactive government interventionist policies after independence. As we have
already mentioned, fully addressing the impact of the laissez-faire economic policy
framework on stagnated industrialisation is left for future work.
4Figures 8.5 and 8.10 jointly indicate that custom revenue helped the government to maintain its
revenue share among NDP, particularly after WW1.

























































Tariff rate Custom revenue / government revenue (central and local)
Fig. 8.10 Import tariff rate and custom revenue share among total government revenue in India
(%). Source Tariff rate data fromMitchell (1995). Custom revenue and total revenue data from same
sources with Fig. 8.5. Note 1 Tariff rate is estimated by custom revenue divided by total imports
8.5 Sluggish Technical Transfer Hypothesis
In addition to the two hypotheses mentioned above, there is another hypothesis to
explain colonial India’s stagnated industrialisation, which has mainly been proposed
by Japanese economists, such as Kiyokawa (1976a, b, 1983) andOtsuka et al. (1988).
Examining the rapid withdrawal of Indian cotton mills from the international market
in the early 20th century, the studies argue that factors affecting technology choice
had a profound influence on the stagnated growth of the Indian cotton mill industry,
which was a representative industry of colonial India. They argue that the underlying
factors include India’s institutional and organisational challenges that go beyond
factor endowment or colonial government laissez-faire based economic policies.
The cotton mill industry led industrial development in both India and Japan in the
initial phase of their industrialisation. In India, the first steam-powered cotton mill
was founded nearCalcutta in 1817/18 by anEnglishman, although the foreign capital-
led attempt failed to achieve steady growth. The first successful attempt was made in
the 1850s in Bombay by C.N. Davar, a wealthy Parsee merchant and his associates.
The cotton milling business grew steadily throughout the second half of the 19th
century, particularly from the 1870s, achieving high international competitiveness
by the end of the 19th century. The success can be observed in the drastic rise in
India’s coarse yarn export to China. Indian export of coarse yarn grew rapidly from
6 million lbs in 1876 to 18 million lbs in 1878, 141 million lbs in 1894, and to
254 million lbs in 1899. Considering that the 1899 figure amounted to almost five
times the Indian finer-count yarn import from the UK, Kiyokawa comments that the
miraculous growth deserves more academic attention (Kiyokawa 1976a). However,
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the miraculous growth in the Chinese market suddenly came to an end in the early
20th century. Export to China plummeted from 243million lbs in 1905 to 172million
lbs in 1910 and 87 million lbs in 1913 (ibid., p. 238).
Japanese cotton mills supplied coarse yarn to China from the 1910s, replacing
Indian export. While the first modern cotton mill was founded in Japan in 1867 under
the leadership of the Satsuma-han, one of the most powerful feudal loads under the
Tokugawa shogunate, it was only after the 1880s that Japanese cotton mill industries
started to show the signs of success. Under the leadership of Eiichi Shibusawa, known
as the ‘father of Japanese capitalism’, Japanese cottonmills grew rapidly and steadily
to form one of the foundations of Japan’s industrial development by the end of the
19th century. Otsuka et al. (1988) indicates that Japanese yarn exports to China and
Hong Kong increased from 15.3 million lbs in 1895 to 102.4 million lbs in 1910
and to 170.3 million lbs in 1915. Japanese coarse yarn found its market even in
India after the 1910s. Otsuka et al. (1988) shows that Japanese yarn exports to India
increased from null in 1905 to 1.4 million lbs in 1915, 13.7 million lbs in 1920,
and 26.0 million lbs in 1925. The divergence in the development of the cotton mill
industry in India and Japan continued further after the early 1920s. India’s cotton
mill industry confined its outlet to the domestic market, while Japan extended its
reach to countries in East, Southeast, and South Asia.
According to Kiyokawa and Otsuka et al., a salient factor that differentiated the
developmental pattern of cotton mill industries in the two countries was their atti-
tudes towards technological adaptation and innovation in the spindle section. Spindle
section, which forms the final process of yarn production, occupies more than 30%
of the cotton mill’s entire production facility. Hence, Kiyokawa writes, ‘technical
progress in spinning frames has a crucial effect, and even a slight improvement in
them leads to a great increase in productivity as a whole’ (Kiyokawa 1983).
As explained by Kiyokawa (1976a, b, 1983) and Otsuka et al. (1988), cotton mill
industries in India and Japan had two types of spindles, mule and ring spindles.
Mule spindles could produce high quality yarn and had long been used in the UK
due to its strong preference for high quality yarn. On the other hand, ring spindles
could produce coarse yarn that was dominantly consumed in both countries for a
long time. In the initial phase of cotton yarn production before the 1870s, mule
spindles dominated yarn production in both countries as they both imported spindles
from the UK. However, over time, ring spindles replaced mule spindles due to cost
efficiency in both the Asian countries where capital was scarce and labour abundant
in comparison to the factor endowment structure in the UK. Otsuka et al. summarises
the advantage of ring spindles as follows, ‘The ring machinery had a clear advantage
over mules in requiring less skilled labour. Moreover, by adding workers to tie the
broken yearn, rings could be run at higher speeds. Consequently, for any given yarn
count up to at least the 40s rings are muchmore labour-intensive thanmules’ (Otsuka
et al. 1988).
Despite the advantage of ring spindles over mule spindles, Indian cotton mills
were slow in making the transition. The slow transition is apparent in comparison to
the speedy diffusion of ring spindles in Japan, as shown in Figs. 8.11 and 8.12. Ring
spindles started being used by the 1880s in both countries. However, it was only
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Fig. 8.11 Percentage of rings and mules: India. Source Otsuka et al. (1988, p. 9)
after the late 1930s when ring spindles dominated more than 90% of Indian mills.
It took 20 years to reach a point where 50% of the spindles were replaced in India.
Surprisingly, there were even cases of new installation of mule spindles in the early
20th century when the advantage of ring spindles over mule spindles was obvious. In
Japan, as Fig. 8.12 indicates, the 50% replacementmarkwas reached as early as at the
end of the 1880s, only a few years after replacement attempts began in themid-1880s.
Furthermore, more than 90% of mule spindles were replaced by ring spindles by the
end of the 19th century. According to Otsuka et al. (1988), the speedy diffusion
of the ring spindles in Japan explains 55–80% of total factor productivity growth
of Japanese cotton mills in the 1890s, when its cotton mill industry experienced
magnificent growth that formed the foundation for booming export to China in the
1900s.5
What explains the slow transition in colonial India? Both Kiyokawa (1976a, b,
1983) and Otsuka et al. (1988) focus on organisational and institutional factors to
explain the cause. By examining the cotton mill’s depreciation allowance policy,
Kiyokawa (1976a, b) clarifies that India’s slow transition was due to the poor depre-
ciation allowance policy adopted by its myopic management. In his work in 1983,
Kiyokawa also focuses on the continuing installation of mule spindles in the early
20th century as a sign indicating another salient feature of slow transition in India.
Based on a rigorous statistical analysis, Kiyokawa shows that ‘the high Mule ratio
reflected the joint presence of foreign (British) staff in both top and middle manage-
ments supported by the mediating function of a foreign manager’ (Kiyokawa 1983).
Kiyokawa concludes by stating that, ‘This analysis confirms the important role of
5Otsuka (1995) also clarifies that capital-output ratio (spindle/ton) of Indian cotton mills came to be
more than double in comparison to Japanese mills by 1900, while there was much less differences
between the ratios in the two countries around the 1890s.
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Fig. 8.12 Percentage of rings and mules: Japan. Source Otsuka et al. (1988, p. 10)
foreign technicians in the decision-making on choice of technique …they (British
technicians) were generally inclined to stick with old but familiar technology based
upon their experience in Great Britain… In short, technological adaptation in India
was greatly influenced by the British experience and by British patterns of techno-
logical development (ibid.)’. Kiyokawa also referred to India’s slow development in
technical education as a factor in the heavy reliance on British technical experts. He
added, ‘While it cannot be denied that the government was not especially eager to
advance technical education in India, the Indian top management class has to share
the responsibility as well for not having promoted technical education in real earnest
by encouraging a more open and meritocratic society in the industrial world’ (ibid.).
Otsuka et al. (1988) sheds light on the different aspects of India’s institutional
and organisational specificities to explain the slow transition. Initially, they argued
that prices, such as factor prices and domestic prices under tariff protection, influ-
enced the speed of technical diffusion. For instance, they mentioned that ‘The
price distortions commonly observed in developing countries are likely to result
in both “inappropriate” choices of technology and an “inappropriate” direction for
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technology change’ (Otsuka et al. 1988). However, they assert that rigorous statis-
tical examination ‘permit us, moreover, to proceed beyond the simple factor price
distortion story in explaining comparative technological performance’. After point-
ing out the importance of Japan’s innovative activities in fields such as cotton mixing
procedures for the efficient adaptation of ring spindles to the lower average staple
length, they point out that ‘the choices made by an individual Japanese entrepreneur
[of cotton mills], in contrast to his Indian counterpart, illuminate the importance of
differences in institutional and organisational environments (ibid.)’. In terms of the
institutional and organisational environment in Japan, they focus on the existence
of competitive pressure in the domestic market influenced by business associations,
the availability of ‘formal education and learning by opportunity’, and ‘the legal
convenience of a petty patent system’ (ibid.), none of which sufficiently existed in
India.
Overall, Kiyokawa (1976a, b, 1983) andOtsuka et al. (1988) focus on the influence
of institutional and organisation factors that were established both by private and
public initiatives to explain the divergence of cotton mill industries in India and
Japan, which were leading sectors of modern industrial growth in both countries.
8.6 Conclusions
After surveying the stagnated industrialisation nature of colonial India, this chapter
reviewed three hypotheses to explain this phenomenon: the factor endowment
hypothesis; the laissez-faire economic policy hypothesis; and the sluggish technical
transfer hypothesis. In the review, we also briefly examined the first two hypothe-
ses using historical data compiled by recent scholars. This chapter reveals that the
factor endowment hypothesis needs to be supplemented by further investigations,
while the laissez-faire economic policy hypothesis requires further analysis on how
laissez-faire policies negatively affected India’s industrialisation. Augmenting the
two hypothesesmay require further analysis, for instance, on the effects of fiscal strin-
gency under laissez-faire policies on India’s institutional and organisational devel-
opment for mass and vocational education, patent system, or industrial financing
system as it could have affected the performance of industrial enterprises through
raising efficiency in labour or capital transactions. Further clarification on India’s
institutional and organisation development, on which Kiyokawa (1976a, b, 1983)
and Otsuka et al. (1988) strongly focused, would help us deepen our understand-
ing on factors underlying the stagnated nature of industrialisation in colonial India.
However, this is an agenda for future work.
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Transformation in Asia and Africa
Yuki Higuchi and Go Shimada
9.1 Introduction
Industrial policy has long been a controversial issue among researchers and poli-
cymakers. Proponents of industrial policy, including early development economists
like Hirschman (1958), Nurkse (1953), and Rosenstein-Rodan (1943), argue that big
push-type policy to promote industrial development is central to economic develop-
ment. Opponents argue that such interventionist policy will distort markets, and have
a deleterious effect on economic growth (e.g., Baldwin 1969; Krueger and Tuncer
1982; Lal 1983). According to Newman et al. (2016, Chap. 2), the international trend
of industrial policy can be divided into three phases. The first phase took place in
the 1960s and 1970s, when the industrial policy was favorably accepted in the post-
independence countries. In this period, import substitution industrialization (ISI)
policies were adopted to promote certain domestic industries by means of tariffs
and subsidies in many African countries under socialist regimes, such as, Ghana,
Tanzania, and Zimbabwe. The ISI policies, however, failed to promote industrial
development because these policies lacked linkages with markets and ignored the
comparative advantage of the economy.
1
1The failure of African industrial policy in the 1960s and 1970s is similar to the experience of post-
independence India, briefly discussed by Nomura (2018) in this volume. In both post-independence
India and Africa, the government did not support labor-intensive industries, in which the country
had comparative advantage.
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The second phase took place in the 1980s and the 1990s, when the Washington
Consensus became an international norm, and structural adjustment programs (SAP)
were adopted by the Bretton Woods Institutions, including the World Bank and the
International Monetary Fund (IMF).2 In this second phase, the failure of ISI policies
provoked harsh backlash against governmental intervention in industries, and the
SAPprogramwas favorably accepted, partially because of thewidespreadworldwide
support for neoliberal regimes. The proponents of SAP policies emphasized the risk
of government failure and political capture.
The third phase began in the 2000s when industrial policies were reconsidered
as an important policy tool for economic development, as the rise of emerging
economies like China, India, Brazil, and South Korea was observed. In this phase, the
importance of narrowly defined industrial policy, in the form of previously failed ISI
policies, has been muted, but the importance of policy to promote industrialization in
general and to reform investment climate has been recognized. Although there is no
universally accepted definition of industrial policy, the scope of industrial policy has
expanded to include the selection and promotion of an industry in which a country
has comparative advantage (e.g., Hausmann et al. 2005; Lin 2012) and even broader
measures to correct market failures, including information asymmetry, externality,
and coordination failure. The latter includes infrastructure development, job training,
and research and development support to promote the industrial sector as a whole,
not just specific industries (Harrison and Rodríguez-Clare 2010; Stiglitz et al. 2013).
In this chapter, we do not formally define industrial policy, but we discuss the general
importance of industrial policy and its potential in Africa.
The renewed attention to industrial policy in recent years has been called “the
return of industrial policy” by Rodrik (2010), and a series of influential books have
been published by Noman and Stiglitz (2015, 2016). The reasons behind the ris-
ing interest in industrial policy include the general recognition of the importance of
job creation in the developing world, particularly after the Arab Spring, when unem-
ployed educated youths started an economically motivated riot that ignited a political
movement (World Bank 2012). In addition, a recent sign of successful industrializa-
tion in Ethiopia and Rwanda illustrated that industrial policy can promote structural
transformation from the agricultural to the non-agricultural sector in Africa (Oqubay
2015; Noman and Stiglitz 2015; Dinh et al. 2012).
Furthermore, the importance of industrial policy in the history of the U.S. and
Europe was rediscovered in recent studies (e.g., Chang 2007; Reinert 2007), and
nascent literature empirically investigates the effect of industrial policies (Aghion
et al. 2017; Criscuolo et al. 2012). Admitting that the literature is still emerging and
not yet conclusive, Nunn and Trefler (2010) run a cross-country growth regression,
and find that subsidies targeted to skill-intensive sectors promote economic growth,
suggesting the ubiquitous role of industrial policy both in developed and developing
countries. Lane (2017) attempts to establish causal impacts on industrial policy by
2The only international donor against the SAP was Japan. In 1993, the Overseas Economic Coop-
eration Fund (OECF, now JICA) published a paper in favor of industrial policy (OECF 1993). It
caused controversy between the OECF and the World Bank (Mosley et al. 1995; Wade 1996).
9 Industrial Policy, Industrial Development … 197
examining the case of Korea’s big-push industrial policy from the 1970s. Using
newly digitized data, and exploiting the unexpected beginning and sector-choice of
the policy, Lane (2017) finds that industries targeted by the policy had significantly
higher growth rates even after the termination of the policy, which also had a positive
spillover effect on downstream industries.
In this chapter, we first discuss how industrial policy can help industrial devel-
opment and economic growth using a simple conceptual framework. Based on our
framework, we illustrate that industrial policy contributes to economic growth by
enhancing labor productivity and reallocating labor from low productivity to high
productivity sectors. Second, we use macroeconomic data from Asian and sub-
Saharan African countries to present a sharp contrast between the two economies.
Asian economies successfully achieved economic growth, which was led by the
industrial development, particularly in labor-intensive sectors, whereas African
economies have long been stagnant since independence, which can be attributed
to the failure of industrialization. We also conduct decomposition analysis to show
that the degree of labor reallocation is particularly limited in Africa. Lastly, we argue
that managerial capacity is missing in Africa, and introduce a feasible strategy that
has potential to stimulate African economic growth.
9.2 Conceptual Framework
We denote Y as the real GDP and L as the population of a country so that Y /L
indicates the country’s GDP per capita.3 Furthermore, we denote Yk as the real GDP
in sector k, where k agriculture (agr), industry (ind), or service (ser), and Lk as
the employment in sector k. Now, we obtain the following equation:
Y/L  (Yagr + Yind + Yser
)
/L  Σ(Yk/L)  Σ{(Yk/Lk) ∗ (Lk/L)} (9.1)
In the last expression, Yk /Lk represents intra-industry labor productivity and Lk/L
represents sectoral share of labor. Assuming the standard production function where
output is a function of labor and capital with a given level of technology, the intra-
industry labor productivity is a function of capital per capita (that is, capital deepen-
ing) and technology.
In this framework, industrial policies can enhance the intra-industry labor produc-
tivity or reallocate labor from a low productivity to a high productivity sector. The
intra-industry productivity will be enhanced by infrastructure investment, institu-
tional reform, and technology borrowing. In the agricultural sector, the land endow-
ment is fixed, and thus, an increase in agricultural share of labor (Lagr /L) reduces
3We assume that the whole population is employed, but the main discussion remains the same if we
define GDP per capita as Y /N , where N is the total population. Then, Y /N is the product of Y /L and
L/N , where the latter term represents the employment share of population. Under our assumption,
we hold L/N constant at one because the availability of the employment share data is limited.
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agricultural labor productivity (Yagr /Lagr) because of diminishing marginal product
of labor. Although agricultural productivity may be improved by irrigation, land
reform, or the use of improved agricultural technology and inputs, the value-added
of share of agriculture (Yagr /L) does not dramatically increase because of these off-
setting effects.
In contrast, an increase in industrial share of labor (Lind /L) does not necessarily
reduce industrial labor productivity (Yind /Lind) because the industrial sector is not
constrained by land endowment. In particular, development of labor-intensive indus-
tries will increase both industrial productivity and industrial share of labor, so that
the value-added of share of industry (Yind /L) will dramatically increase. In addition,
holding the service sector constant, the increase in industrial share of labor reduces
agricultural share of labor, which in turn, increases agricultural labor productivity
by reallocating surplus labor from the agriculture to industrial sector.
Indeed, the importance of the labor reallocation, or it can be stated as structural
transformation, has received increasing attention both by researchers (e.g., Diao
et al. 2017; Herrendorf et al. 2014; Hsieh and Klenow 2009; McMillan et al. 2014)
and policymakers. A leading example is the Nairobi Declaration adopted after the
Sixth Tokyo International Conference onAfricanDevelopment (TICADVI) in 2016,
where the heads of 54 African countries assembled. One of the three pillars of
the declaration for future African economic development is “promoting structural
economic transformation through economic diversification and industrialization.4”
Hence, Eq. (9.1) illustrates the role of industrial policy in productivity improvement
and labor reallocation.5
The service sector has traditional sub-sectors, mostly consisting of non-tradable
goods and services, and modern sub-sectors, including finance and ICT-based ser-
vices (Jensen 2011). An improvement in productivity in the former sub-sector is
limited because of fixed local demand for non-tradable goods and services, whereas
the latter sub-sector has potential for productivity increase. The modern sector, how-
ever, employs a small number of educated and highly skilled workers, and thus, the
labor absorption capacity is limited (Goswami et al. 2011). Although the service
sector is not constrained by land endowment, it is difficult to increase both service
share of labor (Lser /L) and service productivity (Yser /Lser). Taken together, the devel-
opment of the industrial sector, particularly the labor-intensive industrial sector, is
the most important channel for economic growth, particularly for countries that have
comparative advantage in labor-intensive industry with abundant unskilled labor.
The wage structure in Africa is characterized as dual, in which a small number
of highly skilled and educated workers earn high wage, whereas the rest earn low
(Hino and Ranis 2013). In addition, fertility rates are still high in African countries so
that they can take advantage of the population bonus. Hence, Africa has comparative
4http://www.mofa.go.jp/af/af1/page3e_000543.html (retrieved on November 23, 2018).
5Estudillo et al. (2018) in this volume discuss the labor allocation from agriculture to non-agriculture
(i.e., industry and service sectors taken together) inAsia andAfrica. They argue that the development
of the non-agricultural sectorwas a key component ofAsian economic growth andpoverty reduction,
whereas the majority of Africans are still engaged in the agricultural sector, and the structural
transformation was slow.
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advantage in its unskilled labor with low wage, even compared with Asian coun-
tries whose recent economic growth puts upward pressure on wage. Importantly, the
educational system has been developed and many African countries started to adopt
free primary or even free secondary education programs, and thus, their labor force,
which is not highly educated, but educated enough to be employable in the industrial
sector, is increasingly available at relatively low cost.
Lastly, using Eq. (9.1), we adopt a canonical shift-share decomposition, originally
developed by Fabricant (1942) and applied by McMillan et al. (2014) and De Vries
et al. (2015) among others, to decompose the economic growth. The growth rate of
GDP per capita can be decomposed as follows:
(Y/L)  Σ{(Yk/Lk) ∗ (Lk/L)} + Σ{(Yk/Lk) ∗ (Lk/L)}
+ Σ{(Yk/Lk) ∗ (Lk/L)}, (9.2)
where the first term on the right-hand side represents the within-industry labor pro-
ductivity growth, the second term represents the static labor reallocation, and the
third term represents the dynamic labor allocation. We conduct decomposition anal-
ysis based on Eq. (9.2) to examine the importance of labor productivity growth in
each sector and structural transformation in the histories of Asia and Africa.
9.3 Empirical Analyses
9.3.1 Sectoral GDP Per Capita
We use GDP per capita data from the PennWorld Table (PWT) version 8.1 (Feenstra
et al. 2015) and sectoral share data from theWorldBank’sWorldDevelopment Indica-
tors (WDI). Combining the two datasets, Fig. 9.1 shows changes in sectoral GDP per
capita (in 2011, constant USD at purchasing power parity) in log scale.We include 17
major Asian countries for analyses in this chapter: Bangladesh, China, Hong Kong,
Indonesia, India, Japan, Cambodia, South Korea, Laos, Sri Lanka, Malaysia, Nepal,
Pakistan, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, andVietnam.However, the sectoral share
data for 1970 (and other years) is not available for Hong Kong, Cambodia, Laos,
Singapore, and Vietnam, and thus, these five countries are excluded from Fig. 9.1 so
that we can remove influences from the inclusion of sample countries, and focus on
time-series changes of sectoral GDP per capita (see Appendix for data availability of
our sample countries). In addition, the economic development of Japan, which started
in the 1950s, was exceptional among the Asian countries, and thus, Japan’s changes
in sectoral GDP are separately presented in Panel B, whereas weighted averages of
other emerging Asian countries are presented in Panel A.
Similar to Japan, South Africa was exceptional compared to other sub-Saharan
African economies because, for instance, its GDP in 1970 accounted for a quarter
of total GDP of all 45 sub-Saharan African countries. Therefore, weighted averages
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of sub-Saharan countries, excluding South Africa, are presented in Panel C, whereas
Panel D presents the numbers for South Africa. In Panel C, we restrict our sample
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Fig. 9.1 Changes in sectoral GDP per capita in Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa. Source Penn World
Table, World Development Indicators. Note GDP per capita is in USD (in PPP-adjusted 2011 con-
stant price) and is presented in log scale. Panel A presents weighted averages (weight by population)
of BGD, CHN, IDN, IND, KOR, LKA, MYS, NPL, PAK, PHL, and THA and Panel B presents
numbers in JPN. Similarly, Panel C presents weighted averages of BDI, BEN, BFA, CAF, CIV,
CMR, COG, GHA, GNB, KEN, LSO, MDG, MLI, MRT, MWI, NER, RWA, SDN, SLE, SWZ,
TCD, TGO, UGA, ZMB, and ZWE and Panel D presents numbers in ZAF
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Panel C: Sub-Saharan Africa (excluding South Africa)















1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Year















1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Year
Changes in sectoral GDP per capita in South Africa
Total Agriculture Industry Service
Total Agriculture Industry Service
Fig. 9.1 (continued)
Although we limit our analyses to the 26 countries, the average level of GDP per
capita is similar in Panel C and Fig. 9.2, which includes all the 45 sub-Saharan
African countries for which GDP data is available, at around 2,000–3,000 USD,
and thus, these 26 countries give a representative picture of the entire sub-Saharan
African region.
Figure 9.1 corresponds to the second expression in Eq. (9.1), and presents a sharp
contrast in the economic development of Asian andAfrican economies. Panels A and
C illustrate that theGDPper capitawas at a similar level in 1970 inAsia andAfrica. In
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1970, for instance, Korea’s GDP per capita was 2,088 USD, which was comparable
to that of Congo (2,281 USD) or that of Tanzania (1,750 USD), and was much lower
than that of Ghana (2,843 USD). The two regions’ economies have diverged, and the
stagnation of African economies in the 1970s and 1980s, as discussed by Easterly
and Levine (1997) among others, is evident in Panel C. The increase in Asia’s GDP
per capita seems to be a result of the increase in industrial GDP per capita and service
GDP per capita, whereas the industrial GDP remained stagnant in Africa.
Using the same data as Fig. 9.1, Table 9.1 presents sectoral GDP per capita and the
contribution of each sector in selected years. There are three major points to note.
First, the agricultural GDP per capita is almost constant in the last four decades,
particularly in Africa. As Gollin et al. (2014) find, the increase in agricultural pro-
ductivity is cancelled out by the decrease in the labor share in agriculture, and thus, the
agricultural GDP per capita did not increase despite the productivity improvement.
This supports our argument in the previous section that economic growth cannot be
achieved only by developing the agricultural sector.
Secondly, similar to the agricultural sector, the industrial GDP per capita has been
stagnant at a low level over the past four decades in Africa. This suggests that neither
the ISI policies adopted in the post-independent era of the 1960s and 1970s nor the
SAP policies in the 1980s and 1990s helped industrialization in Africa. The SAP
comprised market-oriented policies without governmental intervention, which can
be considered an absence of industrial policy. The absence of industrial policy and
subsequent failure in industrialization in Africa in the 1980s and 1990s is reminiscent
of India’s experiences as discussed byNomura (2018) in this volume.Using data from
Nigeria, Austin (2014) argues that the failure, as well as the absence, of industrial
policies resulted in the failure of labor-intensive industrialization despite its potential
for offering ample employment opportunities.6
In contrast, Asian economies experienced a rapid increase in industrial GDP
per capita, which led to Asian economic growth. Otsuka et al. (2017a) discuss
that industrial development played a critical role in Asian economies by increas-
ing income without expanding inequality because labor-intensive industrial sectors
created ample job opportunities. Similarly, Tanimoto (2018) and Kubo (2018) in this
volume illustrate that labor-intensive industrialization took place in the early stage of
economic development, which was followed by the development of capital-intensive
industries in Japan and China, respectively. Stiglitz and Uy (1996) and Wade (1990)
argue that such economic “miracle” of Asia, led by Japan and followed by Asian
Tigers (Hong Kong, South Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan), was a consequence of
industrial policies not in the form of ISI policies that ignored the comparative advan-
tage but in the form of export-oriented policies that was friendly with markets and
took advantage of the comparative advantage.
6We admit that there are other factors, other than industrial policy, that hampered African industri-
alization. For instance, Frazer (2008) empirically finds that influx of used-clothing donation, which
ended up being sold in Africa, had large negative impacts on apparel production. Discussing all
possible factors that affected a specific industry is beyond the scope of this chapter, and we focus
our discussion on industrial policy.
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Third, the service GDP per capita increased both in Asia and Africa. In particular,
the modest growth of GDP per capita after 2000 in Africa has been led by service
sector growth. The GDP per capita increased from 2,494 USD in 2000 to 3,240 USD
in 2010, and most of the increase can be attributed to the service sector growth.
This phenomenon is known as premature deindustrialization (Haraguchi et al. 2017;
Rodrik 2016) and premature shift to service industries (Page 2012). In Asia, Philip-
pines and India are examples of economic growth driven by service sector growth,
and a similar pattern is observed in Rwanda and Senegal. The labor absorption capac-
ity, however, is limited in the service sector, particularly in modern service sectors
like finance and ICT without backward and forward linkages in industries. These
countries experience widening inequality within each country, and thus, this pattern
of economic development seems to be unsustainable.
9.3.2 Sectoral Employment
Next, we show the sectoral share of employment in Table 9.2. As the data availability
is severely limited, we replace a missing observation with the nearest observation
of the same country within the four-year interval.7 We must note, however, that the
number of observations is still small, particularly in the early period in our analyses.
Our data shows that the agricultural share of employment has continuously decreased
both in Asia and Africa, whereas the service sector share has continuously increased.
Admitting that sample countries do not overlap, Tables 9.1 and 9.2 suggest that
industrial productivity has increased in Asia, but decreased in Africa, where the
increase in employment share exceeds the increase in industrial GDP per capita. This
stands in contrast to Duarte and Restuccia (2010) and Rodrik (2013), who find that
manufacturing labor productivity unconditionally converges all over the world. Such
exceptional absence of industrial productivity growth in Africa illustrates the failure
of industrial development. At the same time, however, the low industrial productivity
and global convergence suggests that there is potential room for increasing industrial
labor productivity through industrial policies.
9.3.3 Finer Sectoral Classification
In order to analyze the contribution of specific industries to economic growth, we
alternatively denote k in Eq. (9.1) as narrowly defined industries, such as mining,
manufacturing, trade, and finance, rather than the broadly defined industrial sector
vis-à-vis agriculture and service sectors. We use data taken from the Groningen
Growth and Development Centre (GGDC) 10-Sector Database (Timmer et al. 2014),
which categorizes economic activities into ten groups, which are comparable across
7For instance, the employment share data of Burkina Faso is replaced with its 1994 value for years
1990 and 1995, but the observations are missing for 1985 and earlier (see columns toward right in
Table 9.5 in Appendix).
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Table 9.2 Sectoral share of labor in selected years
Panel A: Asia
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
Agriculture (%) 38 38 41 44 39 32 33
Industry (%) 24 23 22 19 19 21 21
Service (%) 37 37 35 35 40 46 45
N 11 12 14 17 16 16 17
Panel B: Sub-Saharan Africa
1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
Agriculture (%) 84 75 68 62 57 53
Industry (%) 5 6 7 9 11 13
Service (%) 10 15 20 27 29 34
N 2 6 7 13 17 14
Panel C: Sub-Saharan Africa (including all countries)
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
Agriculture (%) 55 67 60 56 53 54 45
Industry (%) 11 8 10 11 12 11 14
Service (%) 32 24 27 30 34 32 40
N 3 6 16 17 22 28 26
Source Penn World Table, World Development Indicators
Note Simple averages in Asia and Sub-Africa are presented. Asia includes BGD, CHN, HKG, IDN,
IND, JPN, KHM, KOR, LKA, MYS, NPL, PAK, PHL, SGP, THA, and VNM and selected Africa
includes BDI, BEN, BFA, CAF, CIV, CMR, COG, GHA, GNB, KEN, LSO, MDG, MLI, MRT,
MWI, NER, RWA, SDN, SLE, SWZ, TCD, TGO, UGA, ZAF, ZMB, and ZWE
countries and over time. Although the GGDC data has advantages over comparable
and finer classifications of industries, the data coverage is limited. The sample Asian
countries includeChina,HongKong, Indonesia, India, Japan, SouthKorea,Malaysia,
Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand (nine of the original 16 sample countries) and
the sample African countries include Botswana, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Mauritius,
Malawi, Nigeria, Senegal, Tanzania, South Africa, and Zambia (11 of the original
45 sample countries).
Table 9.3 shows the sectoral contribution to GDP per capita and employment. The
agricultural share of GDP per capita has decreased, and the share of the service sector
has increased, particularly the finance sector both in Asia and Africa. In the previous
sub-sections, the industrial sector included both mining and manufacturing sectors.
The share of mining sector is larger in Africa than in Asia, particularly because
the African sample countries incudes Botswana and Nigeria, resource-rich countries
with relatively high per capita GDP in Sub-Saharan Africa. The employment share
of mining, however, is small because the sector is intensive in capital-use and the
employment creation is limited.
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The manufacturing sector, which is represented by labor-intensive industries and
absorbs large amounts of labor, presents clear contrast in the two regions. The man-
ufacturing share of value added in Asia was already much higher than in Africa
at 18.9% in 1970, and further increased to 23.3% in 2010 so that almost a quarter
of Asian value-added is from the manufacturing sector today whereas the share in
Africa has been stagnant at around 10%.Moreover, the value-added share of theman-
ufacturing sector has increased more than the employment share in Asia, indicating
that the labor productivity in the manufacturing sector has increased. Therefore, the
manufacturing sector creates numerous high value-adding jobs, and contributes to
Asian economic growth.
9.3.4 Decomposition Analysis
Table 9.4 shows the results of decomposition analyses based on Eq. (9.2). Row (A)
corresponds to the first term on the right-hand side, and represents within-industry
labor productivity growth. Both in Asia and Africa, this accounts for a large pro-
portion of labor productivity growth. Row (B) represents static labor reallocation,
whereas row (C) represents dynamic labor allocation. In Africa, the latter is nega-
tive and large in magnitude. Africa is experiencing urbanization and expansion of
urban slums, and the urban service sector, mostly in informal economy, absorbs
labor from rural areas. The productivity of such sector, however, remains low. On
the other hand, the reduction of surplus agricultural labor increases agricultural labor
productivity. Therefore, the contribution of dynamic labor reallocation is negative
because the labor shifts away from agriculture, whose productivity increases, to other
sectors—mostly the service sector, where the productivity does not increase.
We combine rows (B) and (C) to examine the total effect of labor reallocation. In
Asia, the contribution is positive. Between both 1990–2000 and 2000–2010, labor
reallocation contributes to about 1% of annual productivity growth. However, the
contribution of labor reallocation is negative in Africa. In other words, the structural
transformation does not account for economic development.Although the labor shifts
from agricultural sector to other sectors, the productivity is low in these sectors.
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9.4 What Is Missing?
The comparison of macroeconomic data of Asia and Africa shows a sharp contrast
between the two regions’ economies. Admitting that there are various differences
in the two regions, in terms of population (Asia with 4 billion and Africa with 1
billion) and land size (Asian countries spread over a vast area, and African countries,
many of them landlocked, are concentrated in relatively small areas), Asia success-
fully achieved economic growth led by industrialization, and Africa’s economies
have long been stagnant. Although African economies have recently achieved mod-
est growth because of the expansion of the service sector and improved agricultural
productivity (mostly because of the declining share of agricultural employment), this
is not a sustainable way of economic growth. The land endowment is limited, and
subsequently, labor absorption capacity is limited in the agricultural sector, and the
modern service sector also has limited capacity for labor absorption. If only the mod-
ern service sector grows and creates high-income jobs for a handful of educated and
highly skilled workers, the problem of inequality will be a social concern. Therefore,
Table 9.4 Decomposition of GDP per capita growth
Panel A: Asia (excluding Japan)
1990–2010 2000–2010
Annual GDP per capita growth
(%)
4.0 5.2
(A) Within sector labor
productivity growth
3.1 4.3





Panel B: Sub-Saharan Africa
1990–2010 2000–2010
Annual GDP per capita growth
(%)
1.5 3.0
(A) Within sector labor
productivity growth
1.7 3.8





Source Authors’ calculation using Penn World Table and WDI
Note Asia includes BGD, CHN, HKG, IDN, IND, JPN, KHM, KOR, LKA,MYS, NPL, PAK, PHL,
SGP, THA, and VNM and Sub-Saharan Africa includes BDI, BEN, BFA, CAF, CIV, CMR, COG,
GHA, GNB, KEN, LSO, MDG, MLI, MRT, MWI, NER, RWA, SDN, SLE, SWZ, TCD, TGO,
UGA, ZAF, ZMB, and ZWE
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development of the labor-intensive sector is important for sustainable and equitable
development.
Recent empirical studies find that firms’managerial capital ismissing in the devel-
oping countries, particularly in Africa (e.g., Bloom et al. 2012). Although firms are
the drivers of industrial development, firm owners and managers have limited capac-
ity tomanage their firms andworkers, and consequently, their business is unstable and
short-lived. A number of recent studies, however, find that such managerial capac-
ity can be taught by training, consultation, or coaching (e.g., Higuchi et al. 2015;
McKenzie and Woodruff 2014; Shimada and Sonobe 2017). Hence, the capacity
building of firms is an important policy tool for promoting industrialization.
Otsuka et al. (2017b) further advance the discussion, and propose the training-
infrastructure-finance (TIF) strategy as a plausible set of policies for stimulating
economic growth in Africa.8 Unlike failed industrial policies in the past that ignored
the comparative advantage, the TIF strategy aims to upgrade the existing industries,
rather than developing new industries. Sonobe and Otsuka (2011) find that there
are numerous industrial clusters of labor-intensive industries, such as apparel, shoe-
making, foodprocessing, andmetalworking,whichwere spontaneously formed in the
developing world. These industries survive in markets because they take advantage
of abundant labor, but their products are usually of low-quality because of the limited
capacity of firms in developing countries, particularly in Africa. Therefore, the TIF
strategy aims to support and upgrade these existing industries.
The essence of the TIF strategy is to provide training, infrastructure, and finance
as a strategic sequence. The first of the sequence is to provide training to invest
in human capital in general and managerial human capital of firm owners and man-
agers in particular, and then, to invest in infrastructure, particularly the establishment
of industrial parks or zones, and lastly, to provide financial support for competent
entrepreneurs.9 This strategy beginswith identifying potential entrepreneurs and nur-
turing their managerial capital, which eventually increases Lind /L. Together with the
investment in human capital, investment in infrastructure helps increase productivity,
Yind /Lind . The establishment of industrial parks, in particular, helps increase industrial
productivity by taking advantage of agglomeration economies, such as knowledge
spillover, input-output linkages, and skilled-labor market formation. This, in turn,
further increases Lind /L by creating not only entrepreneurial jobs, but also hired
employment. The financial support further helps to create hired employment and
improve productivity by supporting promising enterprises.
8Similar industrial policies are recommended by Shimada et al. (2013) and Dinh et al. (2012),
although the importance of sequence is not emphasized. Otsuka et al. (2017b) emphasizes the
importance of sequence in providing training, infrastructure, and finance as a strategic set of policy
instruments.
9Hashino and Otsuka (2016) find from the Japanese history that governmental support for industrial
clusters was an effective policy to enhance productivity.
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9.5 Conclusion
This chapter compares the performance of Asian and African economies in the
past half century. Starting with almost similar levels of GDP per capita at around
2,000 USD in 1970, the Asian economies experienced rapid economic growth and
GDP per capita increased almost to 10,000 USD in 2015. On the other hand, the
African economies had long been stagnant, and GDP per capita in 2015 was about
3,500USD.Weargue thatAsia’s economic success can, at least partially, be attributed
to the industrial development, which increased the industrial productivity and the
share of employment in the industrial sector.
Africa largely lacks industrial productivity growth and structural shift to the indus-
trial sector. Now that Asian countries are losing comparative advantage in labor-
intensive industries because of the increasing wage rates, Africa has a chance for
industrialization. In particular, China, which used to be theworld’s factory, is shifting
away from labor-intensive industries. Hence, decent industrial policies, including the
TIF strategy, are expected to stimulate African industrial development so that Africa















1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Year
Fig. 9.2 Changes in GDP per capita in all Sub-Saharan African countries. Source Penn World
Table, World Development Indicators. GDP per capita is in USD (in PPP-adjusted 2011 constant
price) and is presented in log scale. All Sub-Saharan countries, whose GDP data is available are
included
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Appendix
See Fig. 9.2 and Table 9.5.
Table 9.5 Data availability




Asian countries in sample




CHN China* 1952–2014 1960–2015 1985, 87–2011
HKG Hong Kong* 1960–2014 2000–2014 1980–2008, 10
IDN Indonesia* 1960–2014 1960–2015 1980, 82,
85–2014
IND India* 1950–2014 1960–2014 1990, 94–95,
2000, 05, 10,
12–13
JPN Japan* 1950–2014 1970–2014 1980–2010,
12–13
KHM Cambodia 1970–2014 1993–2015 1995, 98,
2000–01, 04–05,
08, 10
KOR South Korea* 1953–2014 1965–2015 1980–2013
LAO Laos 1970–2014 1989–2015 1995–2010
LKA Sri Lanka 1950–2014 1960–2015 1980–81, 85,
90–98, 2000,
02–14
MYS Malaysia* 1955–2014 1960–2015 1980–93,
95–2014
NPL Nepal 1960–2014 1965–2015 1990–91, 95,
99–2001, 05, 08,
10, 13
PAK Pakistan 1950–2014 1960–2015 1980–2011,
13–14
PHL Philippines* 1950–2014 1960–2015 1980–2014
SGP Singapore* 1960–2014 1975–2014 1980–2006, 10
THA Thailand* 1950–2014 1960–2014 1980–2013
VNM Vietnam 1970–2014 1985–2015 1995–2006, 10,
12–13
Sub-Saharan African countries in sample
AGO Angora 1970–2014 1985–2001 1992
(continued)
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Table 9.5 (continued)




BDI Burundi 1960–2014 1970–2015 1998
BEN Benin 1959–2014 1960–2015 2003, 10
BFA Burkina Faso 1959–2014 1960–2015 1994, 2003,
05–07








CIV Côte d’Ivoire 1960–2014 1960–2015 N.A.
CMR Cameroon 1960–2014 1965–2015 1986, 2001
COD D.R. of the
Congo
1950–2014 1991–2015 N.A.
COG Congo 1960–2014 1960–2015 2005
COM Comoros 1960–2014 1980–2014 N.A.
CPV Cabo Verde 1960–2014 1980–2015 N.A.
ETH Ethiopia* 1950–2014 1981–2015 1994, 2004–06,
2011–13
GAB Gabon 1960–2014 2001–2015 1993, 2005
GHA Ghana* 1955–2014 1960–2015 1992, 99, 2006,
10, 13
GIN Guinea 1959–2014 1986–2015 1994, 2009–12
GMB Gambia 1960–2014 2004–2014 1993, 2014




KEN Kenya* 1950–2014 1960–2015 2005
LBR Liberia 1964–2014 N.A. 2007, 10
LSO Lesotho 1960–2014 1960–2014 1996–97, 99,
2008
MDG Madagascar 1960–2014 1966–2015 2003, 05, 12
MLI Mali 1960–2014 1967–2015 2004, 06
MOZ Mozambique 1960–2014 1980–2015 2003
MRT Mauritania 1960–2014 1960–2014 N.A.
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Table 9.5 (continued)




MWI Malawi* 1954–2014 1960–2015 2013
NAM Namibia 1960–2014 1980–2015 1991, 97, 2000,
04, 08, 10–13
NER Niger 1960–2014 1960–2015 2005
NGA Nigeria* 1950–2014 1981–2015 1983, 86, 2004,
07
RWA Rwanda 1960–2014 1965–2015 1989, 2005, 12
SDN Sudan (former) 1970–2014 1960–2015 2011
SEN Senegal* 1960–2014 1980–2015 2001, 06, 11
SLE Sierra Leone 1961–2014 1964–2015 2003, 04
STP Sao Tome and
principe
1970–2014 2001–2014 1980–84, 91,
2000, 12
SWZ Swaziland 1970–2014 1960–2015 N.A.
SYC Seychelles 1960–2014 1976–2014 2011
TCD Chad 1960–2014 1960–2015 1993
TGO Togo 1960–2014 1960–2015 2006
TZA U.R. of
Tanzania*
1960–2014 1990–2015 1991, 2001, 02,
06, 07, 14
UGA Uganda 1950–2014 1960–2015 2002, 03, 05, 09,
13
ZAF South Africa* 1950–2014 1960–2015 2000–14
ZMB Zambia* 1955–2014 1965–2015 1990, 98, 2000,
05, 08, 12
ZWE Zimbabwe 1954–2014 1965–2015 1999, 2004, 11
North African countries excluded from sample
DZA Algeria 1960–2014 1965–2015 2001, 03, 04, 11
EGY Egypt 1950–2014 1965–2015 1980–84,
1989–2013
TUN Tunisia 1960–2014 1965–2014 1980–82, 89,
2007–14
MAR Morocco 1950–2014 1980–2014 1990–93,
1995–2012
Note Countries indicated with * are included in GGDC data
216 Y. Higuchi and G. Shimada
References
Aghion, P., Cai, J., Dewatripont, M., Du, L., Harrison, A., & Legros, P. (2017). Industrial policy
and competition. American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, 7(4), 1–32.
Austin, G. (2014). Labour-intensity and manufacturing inWest Africa, c.1450–c.2000. In G. Austin
& K. Sugihara (Eds.), Labour-intensive industrialization in global history (pp. 201–230). New
York: Routledge.
Baldwin, R. E. (1969). The case against infant industry tariff protection. Journal of Political Econ-
omy, 77, 295–305.
Bloom, N., Genakos, C., Sadun, R., & van Reenen, J. (2012). Management practices across firms
and countries. Academy of Management Perspective, 26(1), 12–33.
Chang, H. J. (2007). Bad Samaritans: The myth of free trade and the secret history of capitalism.
New York: Bloomsbury.
Criscuolo, C., Martin, R., Overman, H. G., & van Reenen, J. (2012). The causal effects of an
industrial policy. Working paper 17842, National Bureau of Economic Research.
De Vries, G., Timmer, M., & De Vries, K. (2015). Structural transformation in Africa: Static gains,
dynamic losses. Journal of Development Studies, 51, 674–688.
Diao, X., McMillan, M., & Rodrik, D. (2017). The recent growth boom in developing economies:
A structural change perspective. Working paper 23132, National Bureau of Economic Research.
Dinh, H. T., Palmade, V., Chandra, V., & Cossar, F. (2012). Light manufacturing in Africa: Targeted
policies to enhance private investment and create jobs. Washington, DC: World Bank.
Duarte, M., & Restuccia, D. (2010). The role of the structural transformation in aggregate produc-
tivity. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 125, 129–173.
Easterly, W., & Levine, R. (1997). Africa’s growth tragedy: Policies and ethnic divisions. Quarterly
Journal of Economics, 112, 1203–1250.
Estudillo, J. P., Cureg, E. F., & Otsuka, K. (2018). Transformation of rural economies in Asia and
Africa. In K. Otsuka & K. Sugihara (Eds.) Paths to the Emerging State in Asia and Africa. (This
Volume).
Fabricant, S. (1942). Employment in manufacturing, 1899–1939. National Bureau of Economic
Research.
Feenstra, R. C., Inklaar, R., & Timmer, M. P. (2015). The next generation of the Penn World Table.
American Economic Review, 105, 3082–3150.
Frazer, G. (2008). Used-clothing donations and apparel production in Africa. Economic Journal,
118, 1764–1784.
Gollin, D., Lagakos, D., & Waugh, M. E. (2014). The agricultural productivity gap. Quarterly
Journal of Economics, 129, 939–993.
Goswami, A. G., Mattoo, A., & Sáez, S. (2011). Exporting services: A developing country perspec-
tive. Washington, DC: World Bank.
Haraguchi, N., Cheng, C. F. C., & Smeets, E. (2017). The importance of manufacturing in economic
development: Has this changed? World Development, 93, 293–315.
Harrison, A., & Rodríguez-Clare, A. (2010). Trade, foreign investment, and industrial policy for
developing countries. In D. Rodrik & M. R. Rosenzweig (Eds.), Handbook of development eco-
nomics (Vol. 5, pp. 4039–4214). Amsterdam: Elsevier.
Hashino,T.,&Otsuka,K. (2016). Industrial districts in history and the developing world. Singapore:
Springer.
Hausmann,R.,Rodrik,D.,&Velasco,A. (2005).Growth diagnosis. Cambridge:HarvardUniversity.
Herrendorf, B., Rogerson, R., & Valentinyi, A. (2014). Growth and structural transformation. In P.
Aghion& S. N. Durlauf (Eds.),Handbook of economic growth, Volume 2B. Amsterdam: Elsevier.
Higuchi, Y., Nam, V. H., & Sonobe, T. (2015). Sustained impacts of kaizen training. Journal of
Economic Behavior & Organization, 120, 189–206.
Hino, H., & Ranis, G. (2013). Youth and employment in Sub-Saharan Africa: Working but poor.
Washington, DC: World Bank.
9 Industrial Policy, Industrial Development … 217
Hirschman, A. O. (1958). The strategy of economic development. New Haven: Yale University
Press.
Hsieh, C. T., & Klenow, P. J. (2009). Misallocation and manufacturing TFP in China and India.
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 124, 1403–1448.
Jensen, J. B. (2011). Global trade in services. Washington, DC: Peter G. Peterson Institute Inter-
national Economics.
Krueger, A. O., & Tuncer, B. (1982). An empirical test of the infant industry argument. American
Economic Review, 72, 1142–1152.
Kubo, T. (2018). Changing patterns of industrialization and emerging states in twentieth century
China. In K. Otsuka & K. Sugihara (Eds.) Paths to the Emerging State in Asia and Africa. (This
Volume).
Lal, D. (1983). The poverty of development economics. London: Institute of Economics Affairs.
Lane, N. (2017). Manufacturing revolutions: Industrial policy and networks in South Korea. Job
Market Paper.
Lin, J. (2012). New structural economics: A framework for rethinking development and policy.
Washington, DC: World Bank.
McKenzie, D., & Woodruff, C. (2014). What are we learning from business training and
entrepreneurship evaluations around the developingworld?World Bank Research Observer, 29(1),
48–82.
McMillan, M., Rodrik, D., & Verduzco-Gallo, I. (2014). Globalization, structural change, and
productivity growth. World Development, 63, 11–32.
Mosley, P., Harrigan, J., & Toye, J. (1995). Aid and power: The World Bank and policy-based
lending, Volume 1: Analysis and policy proposals. New York: Routledge.
Newman, C., Page, J., Rand, J., Shimeles, A., Söderbom, M., & Tarp, F. (2016). Made in Africa:
Learning to compete in industry. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press.
Noman, A., & Stiglitz, J. E. (2015). Industrial policy and economic transformation in Africa. New
York: Columbia University Press.
Noman, A., & Stiglitz, J. E. (2016). Efficiency, finance, and varieties of industrial policy: Guiding
resources, learning, and technology for sustained growth. NewYork: Columbia University Press.
Nomura, C. (2018). Historical roots of industrialisation and the emerging state in Colonial India.
In K. Otsuka &K. Sugihara (Eds.) Paths to the Emerging State in Asia and Africa. (This volume).
Nurkse, R. (1953). Problems of capital formation in underdeveloped countries. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Nunn, N., & Trefler, D. (2010). The structure of tariffs and long-term growth. American Economic
Journal: Macroeconomics, 2(4), 158–194.
Oqubay, A. (2015). Made in Africa: Industrial policy in Ethiopia. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund (OECF, now JICA). (1993). Issues related to The World
Bank’s approach to structural adjustment: Proposals from a major partner. Occasional Paper No.
1, OECF.
Otsuka, K., Higuchi, Y., & Sonobe, T. (2017a). Middle-income traps in East Asia: An inquiry into
causes for slowdown in income growth. China Economic Review, 46, s3–1s16.
Otsuka, K., Mieno, F., Sonobe, T., Kurosaki, T., Shimada, G., Kitano, N., et al. (2017b). Training-
infrastructure-finance (TIF) strategy for industrial development in Sub-Saharan Africa. Tokyo,
Japan: International Cooperation Agency (JICA) Research Institute.
Page, J. (2012). Can Africa industrialise? Journal of African Economies, 21, 86–124.
Reinert, E. S. (2007). How rich countries got rich and why poor countries stay poor. London:
Constable.
Rodrik, D. (2010). The return of industrial policy. Project Syndicate, 12.
Rodrik, D. (2013). Unconditional convergence in manufacturing. Quarterly Journal of Economics,
128, 165–204.
Rodrik, D. (2016). Premature deindustrialization. Journal of Economic Growth, 21, 1–33.
Rosenstein-Rodan, P. N. (1943). Problems of industrialisation of Eastern and South-Eastern Europe.
Economic Journal, 53, 202–211.
218 Y. Higuchi and G. Shimada
Shimada, G., Homma, T., & Murakami, H. (2013). Industrial development of Africa. In Japan
International Cooperation Agency (Ed.), For inclusive and dynamic development in Sub-Saharan
Africa. Tokyo: JICA Research Institute.
Shimada, G., & Sonobe, T. (2017). Impacts of Kaizen management on workers: Evidence from the
Central America and Caribbean Region. Working Paper. Tokyo: JICA Research Institute.
Sonobe, T., & Otsuka, K. (2011). Cluster-based industrial development: A comparative study of
Asia and Africa. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Stiglitz, J. E., Lin, J. Y., & Patel, E. (2013). The industrial policy revolution II: Africa in the
twenty-first century. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Stiglitz, J. E., & Uy, M. (1996). Financial markets, public policy and the East Asian miracle. World
Bank Research Observer, 11, 249–276.
Tanimoto, M. (2018). Labour-intensive industrialization and the emerging state in pre-war Japan.
In K. Otsuka &K. Sugihara (Eds.) Paths to the Emerging State in Asia and Africa. (This Volume).
Timmer, M. P., De Vries, G. J., & De Vries, K. (2014). Patterns of structural change in developing
countries. GGDC Research Memorandum 149.
Wade, R. (1990). Governing the market: Economic theory and the role of government in East Asian
industrialization. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Wade, R. (1996). Japan, The World Bank, and the art of paradigm maintenance: The East Asian
miracle in political perspective. New Left Review (May–June).
World Bank. (2012). World development report 2013: Jobs. Washington, DC: World Bank.
Open Access This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-
NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-
nc-nd/4.0/), which permits any noncommercial use, sharing, distribution and reproduction in any
medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source,
provide a link to the Creative Commons licence and indicate if you modified the licensed material.
You do not have permission under this licence to share adapted material derived from this chapter
or parts of it.
The images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the chapter’s Creative
Commons licence, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not
included in the chapter’s Creative Commons licence and your intended use is not permitted by
statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from
the copyright holder.
Chapter 10
Transformation of Rural Economies
in Asia and Africa
Jonna P. Estudillo, Elyzabeth F. Cureg and Keijiro Otsuka
10.1 Introduction
Economic transformation, rapid growth, and improvements in living standards are
central features of emerging economies, which are characterized by a shift away from
heavy reliance on agriculture and raw materials exports towards an emphasis on the
manufacturing and service sectors. Escaping from low incomes and poverty is the
main motivation driving emerging states to venture into rapid industrialization and
service sector development as a strategy to achieve rapid aggregate income growth.
Emerging economies are undergoing the so-called “economic transformation,”
which is defined broadly as a process in which the foci of economic activities shift
away from the farm and toward the manufacturing and service sectors. Economic
transformation is always accompanied by aggregate economic growth, which serves
as the main driver of household income growth and poverty reduction (Dollar and
Kraay 2002; Zhuang and Ali 2010). Rapid economic growth is the main reason why
Asia was able to reduce its proportion of poor people to less than one-half much
earlier than in other regions of the world, in line with the Millennium Development
Goals (United Nations 2015).
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This chapter explores the causes and consequences of the long-term process of
economic transformation that triggered the evolution of emerging economies inAsia.
This chapter also assesses to what extent the Asian experience is being replicated in
Africa. By “evolution,” we mean sustained household income growth and poverty
reduction.Weexplore the role of three drivers—populationpressure, the development
of modern agricultural technology, and human capital formation—in the process of
economic transformation.1 Our hypothesis is that, while human capital is a funda-
mental determinant of economic growth (Otsuka et al. 2017), population pressure
on limited cultivable land is a major factor in the deteriorating economic wellbeing
of rural populations in the early stage of economic development, which can be over-
come through the development of land-saving and labor-using modern agricultural
technology (Hayami and Ruttan 1985; Otsuka and Runge 2011).
We examine the Philippines, Vietnam, Myanmar, the Lao People’s Democratic
Republic (Lao PDR), Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka in Asia and Mozambique, Kenya,
Uganda, and Ethiopia in Africa because we have a compilation of panel datasets
drawn from repeated surveys of households in Asia beginning in the mid-1980s and
in Africa beginning in the early 2000s. Bangladesh, the Philippines, and Vietnam
are among the so-called “Next Eleven” (N-11) countries that could exert a BRIC-
like impact and rival the G7 due to their large populations (Goldman Sachs 2007).2
While it is difficult to identify emerging economies or states (Tsunekawa 2017), we
consider all our focus countries in this chapter as emerging economies by virtue of
their rapid income growth and population size. Finally, we present a special case
study of Central Luzon in the Philippines before and after the Green Revolution
for a period encompassing nearly half of a century to demonstrate that agricultural
development is a necessary condition for take-off into a rapid-growth era.
The rest of this chapter has four sections. Section 10.2 describes the nature and
consequences of economic transformation, while Sect. 10.3 explores the role of
the three drivers of economic transformation. Section 10.4 presents a comparative
case study of the transformation of rural villages in our focus countries in Asia and
Africa and illustrates how households in Central Luzon have changed their sources
of livelihood. Finally, Sect. 10.5 presents a summary and conclusion.
1We consider infrastructure to be another important driver. However, reliable data on infrastruc-
ture such as electricity, roads, and telephones remain scanty in our focus countries. This issue is
particularly serious in the case of roads.
2The gross domestic product (GDP) of these three countries accounted for more than 1% of the
GDP of the United States in 2015.
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10.2 Economic Transformation
10.2.1 Characteristic Features
Here, we discuss the size, composition, and growth rate of gross domestic prod-
uct per capita (GDPPc) and labor force composition from the 1980s onward. We
chose the 1980s as our benchmark because of the emergence during that period of
newly industrializing economies (NIEs) in East Asia, such as Singapore, Taiwan,
Hong Kong, and South Korea, which helped trigger the evolution of today’s newly
emerging economies. During the 1980s, the NIEs began a major shift toward the
production of more sophisticated, high-value products using capital-using methods
corresponding to their sharp wage increases while shifting labor-intensive industrial
sectors to Southeast Asian countries, where wages were relatively low at that time.
Emerging economies are characterized by high economic growth rates, as is evi-
dent in the five focus Asian countries. The annual growth rate of real GDPPc from
2010 to 2015 is close to 5% in the Philippines, Vietnam, and Bangladesh and greater
than 5% in Sri Lanka and Lao PDR (see Table 10.1). These economies started to
boom in the 1990s, and many of them peaked between 2010 and 2015. Sri Lanka
and the Philippines have the highest GDPPc, although Vietnam showed the greatest
increase, of more than four times between 1985 and 2015 (see Table 10.1, Cols. A,
B, and C), likely due to Vietnam’s Doi Moi (or liberalization policy) implemented
in 1986. Ethiopia, Mozambique, and Uganda have GDPPc rates that are only about
one-sixth that of Sri Lanka. Annual real GDPPc growth rates are high in Ethiopia
(7.69% from 2010 to 2015) and Mozambique (4.02%). Sustained high economic
growth appears to have started in our focus Asian countries in the 1990s and in our
African countries about 10 years later, in the 2000s.
A rapid transformation away from agriculture and toward industry and services is
occurring, except in Myanmar, where the agricultural share of total gross domestic
product (GDP) rose (see Fig. 10.1). The GDP of the Philippines and Sri Lanka
are increasingly made up of services, while manufacturing dominates in Vietnam.
The agricultural share of GDP has declined furthest in Lao PDR. Similar to the
situation in Asia, Africa has experienced rapid economic transformation, except in
Kenya, where the GDP composition remained the same between 1985 and 2005.
Agricultural GDP declined furthest in Uganda and Mozambique and declined only
modestly in Ethiopia. In our focus countries in both Asia and Africa, the GDP share
of the service sector is rising more than that of manufacturing.
Agriculture accounted for more than 70% of total employment in Lao PDR and
close to 50% in Bangladesh in 2010 (see Table 10.2). Labor is moving out of agricul-
ture and into the service sector in the focus Asian countries. The increasing impor-
tance of the service sector is also evident in Ethiopia, where manufacturing had a
share of only about 7% of total employment in the 2000s. The agricultural labor
force is expected to decline in the long run, primarily because of the low income
elasticity of demand for food. To sum up, economic transformation and economic
growth are faster in Asia than in Africa, though the importance of the service sector
is also increasing in African countries.
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Table 10.1 Growth rate of per capita gross domestic product (GDPPc) in selected countries in Asia
and Africa, 1980–2015
Country Real GDPPc (constant 2010
US$)
Average annual growth rate of real GDPPc
(constant 2010 US$)









Lao PDR 436 1,538 3.52 1.22 3.74 5.18 6.14
Myanmar na na na na na na na
Philippines 1,381 2,635 1.90 −0.70 0.38 2.56 4.51
Vietnam 396 1,685 4.25 2.14 5.63 5.41 4.88
Bangladesh 379 973 2.56 0.81 2.44 3.96 4.94
Sri Lanka 1,100 3,638 3.30 2.58 4.26 4.22 5.58
Africa
Ethiopia 190 486 2.55 −0.82 −0.66 5.13 7.69
Kenya 842 1,133 1.34 0.44 −0.68 0.92 3.18
Uganda 281 673 2.39 −0.36 3.57 3.69 2.00
Mozambique 134 510 3.80 −0.60 4.36 4.64 4.02
Data source World Development Indicators database

















































































Agri, value added (% of GDP) Industry, value added (% of GDP) Services etc, value added (% of GDP)
Fig. 10.1 Sectoral composition of gross domestic product in selected countries in Asia and Africa,
1985–2015. Drawn using data from World Development Indicators database
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Table 10.2 Sectoral composition of total employment in selected countries in Asia and Africa,
1980–2014
Country Percentage of total employment
Agriculture Industry Services
Asia
Lao PDR 1995 85.40 3.50 7.90
2010 71.30 8.30 19.50
Myanmar 1980 67.10 9.80 na
1990 69.70 9.20 na
1998 62.70 12.00 na
Philippines 1980 51.80 15.40 32.80
1997 40.40 16.70 42.90
2014 30.40 15.90 53.60
Vietnam 1996 70.00 10.60 19.40
2004 57.90 17.40 24.80
2013 46.80 21.20 32.00
Bangladesh 1984 58.80 11.00 24.20
2000 62.10 10.30 23.50
2010 47.50 17.70 35.30
Sri Lanka 1981 45.90 18.60 29.30
2002 34.50 22.40 37.90
2014 30.40 25.50 43.40
Africa
Ethiopia 1994 89.30 2.30 7.60
2005 79.30 6.60 13.00
2013 72.70 7.40 19.90
Kenya 2005 61.10 6.70 32.20
Uganda 2002 65.50 6.50 22.10
2009 73.80 7.10 19.10
2013 71.90 4.40 20.20
Mozambique 2003 80.50 3.40 16.10
Data source World Development Indicators database
10.2.2 Consequences
GDPPc is greater and growing faster in emerging economies that aremore diversified
(e.g., Sri Lanka, Vietnam, Philippines), where the manufacturing and service sectors
are more important (see Table 10.1 and Fig. 10.1). The high growth rate of GDPPc in
LaoPDR is largely explained by the nation’s expandingmining andquarrying sectors,
whose share of GDP rose from less than 1% in 2002 tomore than 6% in 2008. Poverty
reduction is greater in economies with higher growth rates, indicating that economic
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Table 10.3 Poverty and inequality in selected countries in Asia and Africa, 1983–2012









Lao PDR 1992 42.61 11.03 34.31
2002 42.73 11.79 34.66
2012 29.95 7.76 37.89
Philippines 1985 32.71 9.32 41.04
2000 18.41 4.44 46.17
2012 13.11 2.74 43.04
Vietnam 1992 49.21 14.95 35.65
2002 38.78 10.37 37.32
2012 3.23 0.58 38.7
Bangladesh 1983 69.55 22.37 25.88
2000 59.97 18.81 33.06
2010 43.65 11.15 31.98
Sri Lanka 1985 13.27 2.55 32.47
1995 8.85 1.6 35.4
2009 2.42 0.41 36.2
Africa
Ethiopia 1981 69.26 24.32 32.42
1995 67.9 27.07 44.56
2010 33.54 9.04 33.17
Kenya 1992 23.08 7.93 57.46
1997 21.5 5.59 46.3
2005 33.6 11.7 48.51
Uganda 1989 87.95 53.13 44.36
2002 62.21 24.47 45.17
2012 33.24 10.13 42.37
Mozambique 1996 85.36 47.28 44.41
2002 80.36 41.53 47.04
2008 68.74 31.41 45.58
Data source World Development Indicators database
growth has benefited the poor. A high degree of poverty reduction occurred in focus
countries in Asia and Africa (see Table 10.3). Ironically, the poverty headcount ratio
(HCR) rose in Kenya by 10% from 1992 to 2005 because of the negative growth
rate from 1990 to 1999 (see Tables 10.1 and 10.3). Poverty reduction was slow in Sri
Lanka, which had the lowest HCR from the mid-1980s.
As is shown by the Gini index of income inequality reported in Table 10.3, the
focus countries inAsia andAfrica have experienced only amodest increase in income
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inequality, which indicates that rapid growth does not necessarily promote inequality.
Kenya is unusual in that, because its poverty is increasing, its inequality is declining,
and economic transformation is slow. Overall, economic transformation is inclusive
of the poor in emerging economies because high economic growth rates have accom-
panied the expansion of employment opportunities for the poor without increasing
income inequality substantially, as shown by Estudillo and Otsuka (2016).
10.3 Drivers of Economic Transformation
We explore the impacts of three drivers of economic transformation: (1) population
pressure, (2) modern agricultural technology, and (3) human capital. In the course of
economic transformation, these three drivers exert their impacts sequentially, from
population pressure to the development of modern agriculture technology and then to









0.42 0.40 0.39 0.38 0.39 0.38
0.33 0.31


























































Fig. 10.2 Arable land per rural population in tropical Asia and sub-Saharan Africa, 1961–2013.
Figure was drawn using data from FAOStat and World Population Prospects (United Nations,
Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division 2015); “Tropical Asia” refers to
Southeast Asia and South Asia
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10.3.1 Population Pressure
Arable land per rural population is a crude proxy for population pressure. Arable
land per rural population was about 0.6 ha in sub-Saharan Africa and about 0.3 ha
in tropical Asia in the early 1960s (see Fig. 10.2). This value declined by more than
one-half from 1961 to 2013 because of a population explosion, which increased the
scarcity of farmland. As Table 10.4 indicates, the growth rate of the rural population
has been declining in tropical Asia but not in sub-Saharan Africa. In fact, rural
population growth in our focus African countries was roughly double that of the
growth of arable land.
According to Chamberlain et al. (2014), while sub-Saharan Africa is typically
regarded as land-abundant, the region’s underutilized land resources are concen-
trated in a small handful of countries, many of which are fragile states. The region’s
surplus land is currently under forest cover and the conversion of forests to cropland
could entail a serious environmental cost. People, markets, and governments seem
to have been responding to the rising rural population densities with agricultural
intensification, diversification to nonfarm activities, rural-to-urban migration, and
reduced fertility rates, which is consistent with the Boserupian thesis (Jayne et al.
2014). The low level of industrialization coupled with population pressure in rural
areas across most parts of the African continent indicate an urgent need for economic
growth through diversification into industries by utilizing Africa’s ample endowment
of unskilled labor outside agriculture (Macmillan et al. 2014).
Table 10.4 Growth rates of arable land and population in selected countries in Asia and Africa,
1961–2013
Country Arable land (% growth per year) Rural population (% growth per
year)
1961–85 1986–2013 1961–85 1986–2013
Asia
Lao PDR 1.14 2.65 1.86 0.91
Myanmar −0.21 0.53 2.14 0.63
Philippines 0.48 −0.04 2.12 0.22
Vietnam 0.29 0.82 2.22 0.66
Bangladesh 0.28 −0.79 1.85 1.04
Sri Lanka 1.2 1.34 1.88 0.94
Africa
Ethiopia 0.37 1.38 na 2.53a
Kenya 0.64 0.56 3.17 2.39
Uganda 1.29 1.38 2.84 3.11
Mozambique 1.04 2.34 1.74 2.17
Source Growth rates of arable land are authors’ calculations from the FAOStat; population annual
growth rates were taken from the World Development Indicator database
aData from 1993
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10.3.2 Modern Agricultural Technology
Hayami andRuttan (1985) pointed out that population pressure induces not only land-
saving technological innovations but also institutional innovations, which evolve
because of the development of new technologies. Asia’s intensification of land use
started as early as the 1950s, with the closure of the land frontier and massive invest-
ment in irrigation. TheGreenRevolution (GR) started in 1966,when the International
Rice Research Institute (IRRI) in the Philippines released IR8 (the first high-yielding
variety of rice). The term “Green Revolution” is intended to express an epochal
change in which “Third World agriculture was embraced in the process of mod-
ern economic growth” (Hayami and Otsuka 1994, 15). Land-saving GR technology
was launched against the backdrop of a huge technology gap in agriculture between
temperate and tropical countries and the fear of famine in Asia in the 1950s due to
the population explosion that occurred after World War II and the region’s stagnant
agricultural productivity (see Chap. 2).
The four technological pillars of the GR are (1) seed-fertilizer technology, (2)
irrigation systems, (3) mechanical technologies, and (4) knowledge-intensive man-
agement practices (Estudillo and Otsuka 2013). Modern rice varieties (MVs) are
broadly classified into two generations: (1) first-generation MVs (MV1), which are
short in stature and potentially higher yielding than traditional rice varieties (TVs);
and (2) second-generation MVs (MV2), which are designed for yield stability, as
they feature improved resistance to pests and diseases, better grain quality, and an
early maturity period. Later MVs were designed to withstand unfavorable climatic
conditions due to extremeweather events such as floods and drought. Hybrid rice and
genetically modified rice are the most recent improved varieties of rice. Knowledge-
intensive crop management practices, such as the timely application of fertilizer to
replenish deficient nutrients, were recently introduced and have started to replace
chemical inputs, thereby improving input efficiency.
In Asia, GR used to focus on irrigated rice land, as it produces 70% of the world’s
rice output. The GR was successful in this continent because it invested heavily
in irrigation well before the advent of IR8. Fertilizer application has risen, partly
because the yield ofMVs is highly responsive to high fertilizer use and partly because
of the use of fertilizer subsidies, which have reduced fertilizer prices in the domestic
market. Yield growth has become the main source of rice production growth in Asia
since the release of IR8, while the expansion of the rice-planted area has contributed
modestly (see Chap. 2). The exceptions are Lao PDR and Myanmar where arable
land is still expanding.
Is the Asian rice GR transferable to Africa? Irrigation investment appears to be
one of the most important conditions for a successful GR. Figure 10.3 shows that
tropical Asia had a large irrigated area as early as the 1960s and that its irrigated
area continued to increase, while the irrigated area in sub-Saharan Africa rose only
modestly. As a result, the area planted with MVs in tropical Asia rose rapidly and
more visibly in the mid-1970s with the advent of IR36 (the first pest- and disease-
resistantMV; see Fig. 10.4). By contrast, GR is slow to take off in sub-SaharanAfrica
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Fig. 10.3 Total area equipped for irrigation in selected countries in Asia and Africa, 1961–2013.
Drawn using data from FAOStat; “Tropical Asia” refers to Southeast Asia and South Asia
because of the broadermix of crops grown in the region, agroecological complexities,
and the region’s heterogeneity, among other factors (World Bank 2008; Otsuka and
Larson 2013, 2016).
Figure 10.5 shows the yields of major staple crops, such as rice, maize, wheat,
millet, cassava, and sorghum, in tropical Asia and sub-Saharan Africa. Yields in
tropical Asia are higher and continuously rising, indicating a widening technology
gap between the two continents. However, tropical Asia and sub-Saharan Africa
have similar yields of wheat, even as early as the 1960s. Wheat is grown in only a
limited area in sub-Saharan Africa, though, as it can be grown in only a temperate
zone. The yield gap is high for maize, millet, cassava, and sorghum but less high
for rice, indicating that the Asian GR that occurred in rice could now be in the early
stage in Africa. Otsuka and Larson (2013, 2016) point out that, unlike the technology
for other crops, Asian rice technology is highly transferable to Africa, including in
favorable rainfed lowland areas, which are found in moist and fertile valley bottoms.
10.3.3 Human Capital
The adoption of seed-fertilizer technology increases farm income through higher
yields and increased cropping intensity, as MVs are short-matured and photo-period
































Bangladesh Myanmar Philippines Sri Lanka Vietnam
Fig. 10.4 Area planted with modern rice varieties in selected countries in Asia, 1966–2012. Drawn
using data from World Rice Statistics
insensitive. Improvements in grain quality, on the other hand, contribute to higher
farm income through higher market prices. Farm income and total household income
rose, leading to a greater investment in human capital [in terms of education, as was
pointed out by Otsuka et al. (2009)]. The discussion below compares the trends in
education outcomes between Asia and Africa.3
Enrolment in both primary and secondary schools has risen almost everywhere
in the developing world. A 100% primary school enrolment rate had been attained
even before the 1970s in the Philippines, Vietnam, and Sri Lanka; this was attained in
1979 in Lao PDR and in 1992 inMyanmar (see Fig. 10.6). In Africa, a 100% primary
school enrolment rate was attained in 1974 in Kenya, in 1977 in Mozambique, in
1997 in Uganda, and in 2014 in Ethiopia. All our focus countries have implemented
a universal primary education policy, which means that primary education is free to
all. We consider that free primary education is one of the reasons primary school
enrolment rose so rapidly.
Secondary school enrolment is higher in Asia, but Africa is catching up. Among
Asian nations, the Philippines and Sri Lanka had the highest rate (about 80% in the
2000s); in Africa, Kenya had the highest rate, whereas Mozambique and Uganda
had the lowest (less than 40% in 2012). Nevertheless, a consistently rising trend
is observed in Fig. 10.7. The high secondary school enrolment in the Philippines
could be partly attributable to the Republic Act 6655 of 1988, which declared that
the State shall provide for free public secondary education to all qualified citizens
3While health cannot be ignored, our discussion of investment in human capital is only on education
because the literature shows a strong relationship between the advent of Green Revolution and
investment in child schooling.



























































































































































































































































































Fig. 10.5 Average crop yield in tropical Asia and sub-Saharan Africa, 1961–2014
and promote quality education at all levels. Mozambique is expected to increase its
secondary school enrolment through the implementation of the first 12 years of public
schooling at no cost and its recent increased investment in classroom construction
and teachers. In 2007, Uganda’s government established a free universal secondary
education (USE) policy, the first among sub-Saharan nations.

































































































































































































































































































































Fig. 10.6 Gross primary enrolment ratio (%) in selected countries in Asia and Africa, 1970–2014
10.3.4 “Push” and “Pull” Forces
The drivers of economic transformation can serve as either “push” or “pull” forces
propelling the growth of emerging economies. The role of each driver as a propeller
of growth appears to be fairly similar between Asia and sub-Saharan Africa.
Asia’s high population growth on a closed land frontier, coupled with stagnant
agricultural productivity in the 1960s, induced technological and institutional inno-























































































































































































































































































































Fig. 10.7 Gross secondary enrolment ratio (%) in selected countries inAsia andAfrica, 1970–2014
vation in response to changing relative factor prices (see Fig. 10.8). Since land is
becoming a scarce factor in Asia, land-saving GR technology started to spread in
response to the increasing price of land. Through this induced institutional innova-
tion, institutions are changing in order to internalize the gains being made via the
new technology.
The GR in rice started with the release of IR8 in 1966 and continued with
the spread of newer and higher-yielding MVs in the 1970s and 1980s, which
led to rapid growth in global rice production. As a consequence, rice prices























































234 J. P. Estudillo et al.
declined in the late 1970s after reaching an all-time high in the early to mid-
1970s, as political conflict between the Soviet Union and the US led to chaos
in the grain trade (see Fig. 2.5). Except for a one-time increase in 1980/81
(due to an oil price increase), rice prices were generally lower from 1980
to 2005 (hovering around US$400 per ton in 2010 US$) than in the 1960s and
1970s. Because of the global food crises from 2006 to 2008, rice prices increased but
remained substantially lower than their 1974 peak of US$1,374. The declining rice
prices from1980 to 2005made rice farming less lucrative. Employment opportunities
in agriculture declined, as did income from rice farming.
The decline in rice prices would have served as a push factor inducing people to
explore employment opportunities outside the rice industry in the nonfarm sector and
to migrate to local towns and cities, or even overseas. Meanwhile, industrialization
and the development of the service sector started in the mid-1970s, partly due to
globalization via business process outsourcing and trade in tasks and partly due to
the economic liberalization policies that began in the mid-1980s in Southeast Asian
countries such as the Philippines, Lao PDR, and Vietnam. The “push” of declining
rice prices and the “pull” of manufacturing and service sector development induced
farmhouseholds to invest in the human capital represented by the younger generation,
who prefer to work in the nonfarm sector and migrate to cities, strengthening the
transformation process (Otsuka et al. 2009; Estudillo andOtsuka 2016). It thus seems
reasonable to assume that population pressure and GR served as the early stimuli for
the growth of emerging economies in Asia through an outmigration of the educated
labor force from agriculture to nonfarm sectors (see Fig. 10.8).
Compared with Asia, population pressure in Africa was weak from the 1960s to
themid-1990s (see Fig. 10.2), which coincides with a period of low grain prices (e.g.,
rice and maize prices: see Fig. 2.5). In all likelihood, GR did not take off in sub-
Saharan Africa primarily because of the disincentive effects of such low grain prices.
Consequently, employment opportunities in agriculture declined because of stagnant
technology as well as low grain prices. There was therefore a “push” to migrate from
rural to urban areas. Meanwhile, the industrial sector did not develop fast enough to
create jobs for the urban migrants. Industrialization was slow on the continent for a
number of possible reasons: (1) a lack of human capital, (2) weak infrastructure (e.g.,
poor roads, congested ports, lack of electricity), or (3) regional leaders’ failure to
pursue appropriate economic policies supporting the labor-intensive industry sector,
which could have facilitated the transfer of advanced technology and management
practices frommore advanced regions (see Chap. 9; Sonobe and Otsuka 2011, 2014).
As a result, African countries have striven to industrialize in recent years.
Population pressure in sub-Saharan Africa appears to have become strong in the
early 2000s owing to the closure of the land frontier and high population growth.
After the 2006–2008 world food crises, there was a “push” for GR as rising income
and urbanization slowly and steadily increased the demand for food. A rising trend
emerged in the share of African imports of rice from tropical Asia, which is expected
to continue and may affect world rice prices. Strong population pressure and urban-
ization are creating a need for GR, which is expected to trigger investments in agri-
cultural research and human capital, as in Asia (Otsuka and Larson 2016). Human
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capital could, in turn, serve as the “fuel” for industrialization and service sector
development. In brief, similar to the Asian story, population pressure and GR have
the potential to serve as a strong base for the emergence of African economies. What
is also needed is an appropriate strategy for African industrialization (Otsuka et al.
2018).
10.4 Economic Transformation in Rural Villages
We explore the features of economic transformation at the household level by analyz-
ing the shift of household income structure away from farm toward nonfarm activi-
ties. Such a shift involves a dynamic process of labor allocation, which, interestingly,
shows similar patterns across emerging economies in Asia and Africa.
10.4.1 Changes in Household Income and Their Sources
in Asia
We trace changes in the sources of livelihoods among rural households in Myanmar,
the Philippines, Vietnam, and Bangladesh. The datasets drawn from the Philippines,
Vietnam, and Bangladesh constitute panel data with the replacement of households
whose heads have died with successor households. We exclude Lao PDR in this
section because its household income data were collected in 2010 only.4 Data for
Myanmar are repeated cross-section data from households living in the same vil-
lages. We divide the sample into farmer and landless household groups in Myanmar
and the Philippines because the landless households, being the poorest in the village
communities, are more geographically mobile and are more likely to have responded
quickly to new employment opportunities. The sample villages in Asia were tra-
ditional rice-producing areas, and thus particularly suitable for exploring the role
of modern agricultural technology during the process of “take-off” into emerging
economies.
The sample villages inMyanmar are located inAyeyawadyDivision (the country’s
rice granary), south of the main city of Yangon. A total of 739 households were
interviewed in 1996 (Garcia et al. 2000) and 900 were interviewed in 2012 (Estudillo
and Otsuka 2016). Four villages were studied in the Philippines: two are located in
Central Luzon (the “rice bowl” of the country) and two are in Panay Island. A
total of 632 sample households in the four villages (474 farmer households, 158
landless households) were interviewed in the benchmark survey in 1985. Estudillo
and Otsuka (2016) conducted a unique survey that traced the children of the original
632 households in 1985; they were able to locate 527 married children from the
4Cross-border migration from Lao PDR to Thailand is an interesting issue (Estudillo and Otsuka
2016, Chap. 2).
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original 474 farmer households and 129 married children from the original 158
landless households. In Vietnam, the sample villages are located in Hanoi and Thai
Nguyen in the north and in Long An and Can Tho in the south. We examined 376
households in 1996 and 344 in 2009, which were divided almost equally between
the north and the south. Ut et al. (2000) conducted the benchmark survey in 1996,
followed by a resurvey of the same households by Estudillo and Otsuka (2016) in
2009.
The Bangladesh panel data cover most parts of the country and comprise infor-
mation from 1,240 randomly selected households in 1988 and 2,010 households in
2008 (Hossain and Bayes 2009). The first survey in 1988 was conducted by the IRRI
when MVs had just started to spread in Bangladesh. Data for Sri Lanka come from
the Household Income and Expenditure Survey (HIES), a nationally representative
dataset collected by the Department of Census and Statistics of Sri Lanka. The earli-
est round of surveys in 1990/91 consisted of 18,246 households, and the latest round
in 2006/07 consisted of 18,363 households (Kumanayake et al. 2014). The HIES
classified households into urban, rural, and estate. We used only the rural households
from the HIES because of our focus on agriculture.
We divided household income into farm and nonfarm sources. Farm income
is obtained from farming and agricultural wage employment. Wage employment
refers to off-farm labor activities, primarily in transplanting, weeding, harvesting,
and threshing in rice farming; these are characterized by low remuneration and high
seasonality. The major share of farm income accrues from crop production (e.g.,
rice, vegetables, and fruits), livestock and poultry propagation, and fishing. Non-
farm income comes from four sources: (1) formal wage employment, (2) informal
wage employment, (3) self-employment, and (4) remittances and othermiscellaneous
income.Nonfarm self-employment income is derived from retail and trade, transport,
rural restaurants, the renting of self-owned equipment and vehicles, handicraft shops,
and other sources. Remittances come mainly from family members (e.g., unmarried
children) working abroad or locally in big cities and towns. Other income sources
include pensions, gifts, and other forms of transfer payments. In Africa, other income
sources include the wages from migrant workers. Poverty measures were estimated
using the FGT index, with US$1.25 per capita per day in PPP 2005 based on private
consumption used as the poverty line.
Myanmar Total household income (US$ PPP in 2005) rose by about 1.8 times
for farmers and 2.0 times for the landless from 1996 to 2012 (see Table 10.5).
Agricultural income is becoming less important: the share of agricultural income
of farmer households declined from 91 to 82% and that of the landless from 68
to 38%. The major sources of income growth were rice farming and formal wage
work for farmers, as income from formal work became the dominant source of
nonfarm income in 2012. Income from rice farming rose because of the increase in
rice yields (which rose from 1.8 to 2.8 tons per ha) and the abolition of government
production quotas (mandatory selling of 0.5 tons of paddy to the government), which
increased the prices received by farmers by about 50%. Recently, nonfarm income
has increased in importance because the more educated children of farm households
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prefer to work in the formal wage sector in Yangon. Nonfarm informal wage work
and nonfarm self-employment activities were the main sources of income growth for
the landless. Landless households appear to have substituted informal wagework and
self-employment activities for agricultural wage work in 2012, presumably because
of the declining labor employment opportunities in rice farming due to decreasing
farm size coupled with low cropping intensity. Poverty decreased moderately among
both landless and farmer households, although the headcount ratio remained high
for the landless (74% in 2012). Given the rising importance of nonfarm income,
it is reasonable to surmise that the development of the nonfarm sector has become
an important driver of household income growth and poverty reduction in rural
Myanmar.
Philippines We have income data for two generations of households in the Philip-
pines: respondents’ generation (G1) and the married children of respondents (G2).
In 1985, a substantial portion of G1 household income (76% for the farmer, 49% for
the landless) came from agricultural sources (e.g., production of rice, nonrice crops,
and livestock; see Table 10.5). The income of farmer households for G1 in 1985 was
about twice that of landless households, and thus poverty was much higher among
the landless (65%) than among the farmer households (42%). Interestingly, nonfarm
income has become the major source of income for G2 (83% for farmer children and
92% for landless children in 2008). Income disparity between farmer and landless
children appears to have disappeared for G2when nonfarm income became themajor
driver of income growth: the ratio of farmer to landless income is only 1.22 for G2
compared with 2.10 for G1. While G2 incomes have largely equalized, poverty inci-
dence among landless children remained higher but, with a mere eight percentage
points difference, compared favorably with that of their parents, for whom poverty
stood at 23% points higher among the landless class. Landless childrenwhomigrated
to local towns and big cities were able to increase their income more than farmer
children could. Such migration was facilitated by the earlier decision of landless par-
ents to invest in their children’s schooling. In brief, participation in the nonfarm labor
market and migration to local towns and big cities are major strategies for moving
out of poverty for the landless poor in the Philippines.
Vietnam Wedivided our sample villages into “northern villages” (referring toHanoi
and Thai Nguyen provinces) and “southern villages” (referring to Long An and Can
Tho). Household income (US$PPP in 2005) in the northern villages rose from$1,547
in 1996 to $4,093 (2.64 times) in 2009, whereas, in the southern villages, income
rose from $2,896 to $11,748 (4.05 times; see Table 10.5). The most important source
of income growth in the northern villages was nonfarm formal wage work (which
almost doubled). An interesting gender specialization can be observed: women in
the northern villages are left on the farms producing high-value products (e.g., citrus,
cut flowers, vegetables, tea, poultry, and pigs), whereas the men work in factories
in the cities and local towns, returning home in the rural villages during weekends
(Estudillo and Otsuka 2016). In the southern villages, the major source of income
growth was rice farming (which rose 4.8 times) because of the increase in rice
yield and, importantly, because of high rice prices in 2009, which captured the rice
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Farm income 2,207 (91%) 3,602 (82%)
Nonfarm income 209 (9%) 785 (18%)
Total annual household
income (US$ PPP in 2005)
2,416 (100%) 4,387 (100%)
Poverty headcount ratio (%) 51 39
Poverty gap ratio (%) 18 19
Myanmar: Landless households
Farm income 736 (68%) 833 (38%)
Nonfarm income 340 (32%) 1,330 (62%)
Total annual household
income (US$ PPP in 2005)
1,076 (100%) 2,163 (100%)
Poverty headcount ratio (%) 85 74
Poverty gap ratio (%) 44 42
Philippines: respondents’
generation (G1)
Farmer households in 1985 Landless households in 1985
Farm income 1,446 (76%) 448 (49%)
Nonfarm income 449 (24%) 460 (51%)
Total annual household
income (US$ PPP in 2005)
1,895 (100%) 908 (100%)
Poverty headcount ratio (%) 42 65
Poverty gap ratio (%) 20 25
Philippines: Married children
of respondents (G2)
Farmer households in 2008 Landless households in 2008
Farm income 1,367 (17%) 565 (8%)
Nonfarm income 6,774 (83%) 6,063 (92%)
Total annual household
income (US$ PPP in 2005)
8,141 (100%) 6,628 (100%)
Poverty headcount ratio (%) 26 34
Poverty gap ratio (%) 12 16
Vietnam: Northern villages
Farm income 1,056 (68%) 1,454 (36%)
Nonfarm income 491 (32%) 2,639 (64%)
Total annual household
income (US$ PPP in 2005)
1,547 (100%) 4,093 (100%)
Poverty headcount ratio (%) 62 26
Poverty gap ratio (%) 28 23
(continued)




Farm income 2,162 (75%) 9,400 (81%)
Nonfarm income 733 (25%) 2,348 (19%)
Total annual household
income (US$ PPP in 2005)
2,896 (100%) 11,748 (100%)
Poverty headcount ratio (%) 35 19
Poverty gap ratio (%) 19 11
Bangladesh 1988 2008
Farm income 718 (56%) 1,665 (43%)
Nonfarm income 555 (44%) 2,169 (57%)
Total annual household
income (US$ PPP in 2005)
1,273 (100%) 3,834 (100%)
Poverty headcount ratio (%) 83 42
Poverty gap ratio (%) 45 16
Sri Lanka: rural households 1990 2006
Farm income 796 (34%) 948 (18%)
Nonfarm income 1,544 (66%) 4,319
Total annual household
income (US$ PPP in 2005)
2,340 (100%) 5,268
Poverty headcount ratio (%) 60 14
Poverty gap ratio (%) 24 5
Africa
Ethiopia 2004 2006
Farm income 275 (90%) 318 (88%)
Nonfarm income 31 (10%) 44 (12%)
Total annual household
income (US$ PPP in 2005)
306 (100%) 362 (100%)
Poverty headcount ratio (%) 82 76
Poverty gap ratio (%) 47 46
Kenya 2004 2007
Farm income 527 (60%) 665 (61%)
Nonfarm income 351 (40%) 426 (39%)
Total annual household
income (US$ PPP in 2005)
878 (100%) 1,091 (100%)
Poverty headcount ratio (%) 42 40
Poverty gap ratio (%) 18 17
Uganda 2003 2009
(continued)
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Table 10.5 (continued)
Source 1996 2012
Farm income 272 (73%) 431 (78%)
Nonfarm income 100 (27%) 122 (22%)
Total annual household
income (US$ PPP in 2005)
372 (100%) 553 (100%)
Poverty headcount ratio (%) 78 57
Poverty gap ratio (%) 47 28
Mozambique 2002 2005
Farm income 565 (80%) 495 (71%)
Nonfarm income 142 (20%) 203 (29%)
Total annual household
income (US$ PPP in 2005)
707 (100%) 698 (100%)
Poverty headcount ratio (%) 79.9 76.1
Poverty gap ratio (%) 48.3 48.2
Data sources Estudillo and Otsuka (2016), Table 2.4 on p. 33 for Lao PDR; Table 3.4 on p. 60
for Myanmar; Table 4.4 on p. 83 and Table 4.5 on p. 86 for the Philippines; and Fig. 5.2 on
pp.103–104 forVietnam;Debnath (2016) andEstudillo et al. (2013,Table 3 onp. 22) forBangladesh;
Kumanayake (2011, Table 4.3 on p. 100) for Sri Lanka; Estudillo et al. (2013), Table 3 on pp. 23–24
for Kenya, Uganda, and Ethiopia; and Cunguara and Kajisa (2009), Table 8.1 on p. 177 for Mozam-
bique
price increase during the world food crises. Concomitant with the rising household
incomewas a remarkable decline in poverty—36%points in the northern villages and
16% points in the southern villages. Clearly, household activities are increasingly
concentrated on rice farming in the southern villages, while household activities
have diversified away from rice farming and toward nonfarm formal wage work in
the northern villages, where farms are much smaller than in the south.
To sum up, as in the Philippines and Myanmar, the migration of rural labor has
become a major strategy for income growth in Vietnam’s northern villages, whereas
commercial agriculture, which is linked to international rice markets, has served as
the driver of household income growth in the southern villages. Modern rice tech-
nology in the southern villages and urbanization and human capital in the northern
villages appear to be important motors of income growth in Vietnam.
Bangladesh Farm income, particularly from rice farming, was by far the most
important source of income in rural Bangladesh in 1988. The share of agricultural
income dropped, however, from 56% in 1988 to 43% in 2008 (see Table 10.5), partly
because of the decline in casual labor employment opportunities in rice farming.
The major drivers of the decline were the rapid adoption of mechanical technology
for land preparation and threshing and increased employment opportunities in the
rural transport sector because of the development of rural roads (Hossain and Bayes
2009). Remittance income rose because of the expansion of the garment indus-
try and construction booms in the cities, as well as increasing overseas migration.
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Incomes almost tripled, and poverty declined from 83 to 42%. Taking up jobs in the
nonfarm sector has been facilitated by the earlier decisions of parents to invest in
their children’s schooling, particularly for their girls, which was, in turn, induced by
household income increases and government policies favoring girls (e.g., food for
education program, cash for education program, and scholarships for girls; Estudillo
andOtsuka 2016). It seems clear that investment in human capital is an integral part of
the long-term and dynamic process of household income growth in rural Bangladesh.
Sri Lanka Nonfarm wage income was the dominant source of rural household
income as early as 1990, and its importance had increased by 2006 (see Table 10.5).
This indicates that rural households are increasingly allocating labor away from
agricultural activities to nonfarm wage employment in the formal wage sector. The
educated children of rural households are those involved in formal wage employ-
ment, as returns to education are bound to be higher in the sector. As a result, the
share of farm income among the rural households declined significantly from 1990 to
2006. Concomitant with the rise in the share of nonfarm wage income is the increase
in the annual household incomes of rural households by more than 2.4 times and a
decline in the poverty headcount ratio from 60% in 1990 to 14% in 2006.
Sri Lanka has households living in estates that continue to be poor, whereas rural
households experienced upper economic mobility when they participated in activi-
ties that produce nonfarm formal wage income. Low and stagnant wage income in
the estate sector in the face of constant cost-of-living increases is the main factor pre-
venting estate people from moving out of poverty (World Bank 2005). Kumanayake
et al. (2014) argue that remoteness is another factor, because basic infrastructure
in the estates remains largely underdeveloped, preventing estate people from tak-
ing advantage of emerging economic opportunities in the nonfarm sector. In other
words, people in estates are examples of “hard-to-reach groups,” those left behind in
the course of the economic development of emerging economies.
To summarize, rural households in our focus countries in Asia have shifted their
main livelihood sources away from farming to nonfarm work and, importantly, non-
farm formal wage work, as well as to overseas migration, as in the Philippines and
Bangladesh; this shift is being accompanied by income growth and poverty reduc-
tion. This story is fairly similar across our focus countries in Asia: the development
of the nonfarm sector has served as a springboard for economic mobility in rural
communities.
10.4.2 Changes in Household Income and Their Sources
in Africa
Rural household surveys in Ethiopia, Kenya¸ and Uganda were conducted as part of
a research project, the Research on Poverty, Environment, and Agricultural Tech-
nology, or RePEAT (Matsumoto et al. 2009). The benchmark survey in Ethiopia
was conducted in 2004, covering 420 households from the central to the southern
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region. The first survey in Uganda covered 94 local councils 1 (LC1s), the smallest
administrative unit (comparable to a village in Asia), and 940 households in most of
the country, except in the northern regions, where there were security concerns. The
benchmark survey in Kenya was conducted in 2003 and covered 99 sub-locations,
an administrative unit that may include a few villages, and 934 households in the
central and western regions. Stratified random sampling of communities was used
in the target regions, and about 10 households for every selected community were
randomly chosen. Data on Mozambique were collected from the two rice-growing
provinces of Zambezia and Sofala, extracted from the National Agricultural Survey
in 2002 and 2005. There were 1,140 households in 2002 and 928 households in 2005;
928 households were included in both surveys (620 from Zambezia and 308 from
Sofala; Cunguara and Kajisa 2009).
Ethiopia In Ethiopia, agricultural income (crop farming and livestock income) in
2006 accounted for as much as 88% of the total household income (see Table 10.5).
Nonfarm income accounted for only 12% of total income, reflecting the low-return
and low-productivity activities in the nonfarm sectors in this predominantly agrarian
economy. Total income rose by only 1.18 times, and the poverty headcount ratio was
high, declining only modestly from 82% in 2004 to 76% in 2006.
Kenya Farm income in Kenya accounted for 60% of the total household income in
2004. The remittances and earnings of migrant workers were an important portion
of nonfarm income, comprising 40% of total income, which reflects the relatively
developed nonfarm sectors in Kenya compared with other countries in Africa. This
indicates the importance of migration as a strategy for increasing household income.
There was a modest increase in total household income (from US$878 in PPP in
2004 to US$1,091 in PPP in 2007). Household incomes in Kenya are comparable
to the incomes of landless households in the Philippines and Sri Lanka and those
of small farmers in northern Vietnam and Bangladesh. Both the poverty headcount
ratio and poverty gap ratio remained essentially the same from 2004 to 2007.
Uganda From 2003 to 2008, farm incomes in Uganda comprised about 70% of
total household income (crop farming had a 60% share, livestock 10%), whereas non-
farm income,mainly from self-employment, comprised 30%.Total annual household
income rose about 1.5 times from 2003 to 2007, primarily due to crop farming. Non-
farm wage employment was not very important, indicating that the nonfarm labor
markets are not yet well-developed. The poverty headcount ratio declined from 78 to
59%. A more recent phenomenon is so-called “mobile money,” which, since emerg-
ing in Uganda in 2009, has been used by more than 35% of the adult population.
Its rate of penetration is rapidly increasing. Mobile money enables unbanked house-
holds to have access to financial services (important for sending remittances) at a
reduced cost.
Mozambique Farm income (mainly from crop production) is by far the most impor-
tant source of household income. Partly because of a drought during the 2002–2005
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survey period, the share of farm income declined from 80% in 2002 to 71% in 2005
(Cunguara andKajisa 2009). Surprisingly, poverty declinedmodestly when the share
of nonfarm income rose. It appears that engaging in nonfarm activities is an important
risk-coping mechanism for households in this country. Migration is not common in
the study sites (remittance income comprised only about 3% of total income), and
income from livestock is small (only about 2%). In brief, diversification out of the
farm and into the nonfarm sector appears to enable people to avoid poverty, but this
opportunity is limited inMozambique to nonfarm activities that are undertaken when
agricultural labor demand is low.
To sum up, farm income remains the most important source of rural household
income in Africa. Nonfarm income in Africa is increasingly made up of remittances
and the earnings of migrant workers, indicating the growing economic importance
of nonfarm income associated with migration. Nonfarm self-employment activities
are largely informal and home-based, intricately tied up with agricultural production
(e.g., brewing of homemade beverages in Mozambique). Although we found that
the shift of livelihood away from farm to nonfarm activities has taken place in both
Asia and Africa, it is occurring much faster in Asia. The main driver in Asia is
the development of the formal nonfarm sector and migration, including overseas
migration. In Africa, the main driver appears to be domestic migration coupled
with employment in informal nonfarm sectors, as livelihood opportunities within the
nonfarm sector are largely confined to the informal sector in urban areas, which tend
to wane in the course of economic development.
10.4.3 Conditions for “Take-off:” A Retrospective View
from Central Luzon in the Philippines
We discuss below the underlying mechanisms behind the rise of Central Luzon (CL)
as an emerging region in the Philippines, in an analysis made possible thanks to the
availability of unusually long-term household data. We describe the socioeconomic
conditions before and after the GR in CL, the most progressive rice-producing area
of the country. The dataset comes from periodic surveys performed at an average
interval of four years beginning in 1966 conducted by the Social Sciences Division
of the International Rice Research Institute. The main aim of the survey is to monitor
changes in the adoption of new rice technology, land tenure, mechanization, and
labor practices. The dataset is called the “Central Luzon Loop Survey” because the
respondents are located along a loop of themajor highways stretching north ofManila
through the provinces of Bulacan, Nueva Ecija, Pangasinan, Tarlac, and Pampanga
(see Fig. 10.9). These provinces are frontrunners in the adoption of modern varieties
of rice in the country. CL, contiguous to the National Capital Region (where the city
of Manila is located), has become one of the fastest-growing regions in the nation.
This is the only dataset drawn from tropical Asia that offers information on house-
hold socioeconomic conditions as far back as half a century ago. The original sam-
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Fig. 10.9 Location of Central Luzon, the Philippines
ple comprised 92 respondents (see Table 10.6), all rice farmers (excluding landless
households). The original sample was intended to be maintained, but its size grad-
ually declined because of retirements from farming and deaths. New samples from
the same villages were added in the 1986 and 2011 surveys.
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Table 10.6 Technology adoption, demographic characteristics, and income sources of sample
households in Central Luzon, the Philippines, 1966–2011
Description 1966 1986 1998 2011
Technology adoption
Number of sample households 92 120 79 93
Average farm size (ha) 2.1 1.8 1.5 1.6
Adoption of new technology
Modern rice (% area) 0 100 100 100
Irrigation (% area) 60 68 65 61
Rice yield (tons per ha) 2.3 3.6 3.4 3.9
Demographic characteristics
Average age of head (years) 46 49 58 59
Average schooling of head (years) 4.6 6.5 7.7 9
Average schooling of children (22 years old and
older) (years)
na 9.9 11.2 11.9
Occupation of children 22 years old and older
Farmer (%) na 3 16 13
Wage work in agriculture (%) na 2 1 1
Nonfarm self-employed (%) na 1 3 2
Nonfarm formal work (%) na 34 27 25
Nonfarm informal work (%) na 14 25 21
Housekeeping/unemployed/retired (%) na 45 28 38
Total (%) na 100 100 100
Sources of household incomea 1966–67 1986–87 1998–99 2011–12
Agriculture (%) 73 62 37 NA
Rice (%) 57 45 23 NA
Nonrice (%) 16 17 14 NA
Nonfarm (%) 27 38 63 NA
Total (%) 100 100 100 NA
Total household annual income (pesos per year,
nominal)
2,011 30,056 113,545 NA
aRefers to June 1966 to May 1967, June 1986 to May 1987, June 1998 to May 1999, and June 2011
to May 2012
Source Authors’ calculations from the Farm Household Survey Database of the International Rice
Research Institute (http://ricestat.irri.org/fhsd/)
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Our discussion on the emergence of CL revolves around a simple story that begins
with population pressure as a trigger for the adoption of modern rice technology. The
GR started in CL in 1966 with the release of IR8. The land reform (LR) program
was implemented in the mid-1970s, when the adoption of modern rice varieties had
reached high level. The LR program converted share tenants into owner cultivators or
leasehold tenants while holding amortization fees and leasehold rents fixed at below
the market return to land. Thus, farmers were able to internalize the gains from the
rice yield growth that occurred under LR, leading to an increase in farm income.
Farmers then invested the increased farm income in children’s schooling induced
by the growing availability of jobs for skilled and semi-skilled workers when the
NIEs delocalized and outsourced some of their production processes to the Philip-
pines. Educated children moved out of the villages and obtained nonfarm work in
local towns, cities, and even overseas, while sending remittances back home. House-
hold income from nonfarm sources has become the main contributor to sustained
total household income growth and poverty reduction. The CL saga underscores the
importance of modern agricultural technology as a springboard of economic trans-
formation in the early stage of development.
Population Pressure and Modern Agricultural Technology The average cultiva-
tion size of farms has consistently declined from 2.1 ha in 1966 to 1.6 ha in 2011 (see
Table 10.6). The decline in farm size can be partly explained by the changes in the
composition of sample farms but is more fundamentally due to population pressure
on the closed land frontier in CL. Inheritance is an institutional mechanism for the
transfer of land across generations. It is common for parents in CL to divide the land
equally among heirs or among male heirs only. Due to relatively large family sizes
and, in some cases, secondary marriages, landholdings have become fragmented as
an outcome of equal inheritance. When rice farming is the only source of income in
a regime of small landholdings and stagnant technology, impoverishment becomes
common.
In 1966, all sample farmerswere planting only traditional varieties of rice. Thefirst
MV, IR8, was released in CL in November 1966. Earlier MVs released prior to the
mid-1970s were the “first-generation” MVs (MV1), which are highly susceptible
to pests and diseases. By 1986, all sample farmers had shifted exclusively to the
“second-generation” MVs (MV2), which have strong resistance to against multiple
pests and diseases. Such a shift has been facilitated by the opening of Pantabangan
Dam in 1977, which provides water for irrigation and electricity via hydroelectric
power generation. As a result, there was a significant increase in rice yield from
2.3 tons/ha in 1966 to 3.6 tons/ha in 1986, partly because of the shift from MV1 to
MV2 and partly because of increased fertilizer application. The total irrigated area
rose from 60% to around 70% between 1966 and 1998.
Over the years, the adoption of labor-saving technologies such as the use of tractors
and threshers and direct seeding increased in response to increases in wages. During
the 1980s, the Asian NIEs ventured into delocalization and the outsourcing of labor-
intensive production processes in Southeast Asian countries to take advantage of the
low wages. At the same time, there was a diversion of international division of labor
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for low-technology and labor-intensive products from high-performing countries
in Southeast Asia to other low-wage countries in Asia, including the Philippines.
These phenomena have created jobs for the semi-skilled and skilled workers in CL,
raising the returns to schooling investments. Moreover, CL saw a growth of small
cities, namely Cabanatuan, San Jose, and the Science City of Munoz, and a growth
in population in the so-called poblacion (town centers) in each municipality. Small
cities emerged partly because of the relocation of industries away fromMetroManila,
which has become congested, thereby pushing up production costs.
History of Land Tenure System and Land Reform Implementation In the
1800s, during the Spanish colonial period, three modes of land acquisition con-
tributed to the pervasive landlordism in CL: royal grants, purchase of realengas,
and pacto de retrovenda arrangements (McLennan 1969). Realengas is the outright
purchase at a low price of real estate from a badly-in-need peasant or from the public
domain. Royal grants and realengas resulted in the proliferation of huge private
haciendas (large blocks of consolidated landholdings) in Nueva Ecija, Tarlac,
eastern Pangasinan, and northern and western Pampanga. Pacto de retrovenda was
equivalent to today’s mortgage system (sangla), whereby amoneylender (commonly
a Chinese mestizo or Chinese merchant) lent a peasant some money and secured
protection for his loan by taking immediate control of the land, allowing the peasant
to remain but as a sharecropper under the Chinese mestizo. Seldom able to pay the
loan at the appointed time, the peasant often relinquished his claim to the land due
to his debt. Pacto de retrovenda extended landlordism in the form of the kasamajan
(sharecropping) system, which resulted in a pattern of land ownership characterized
by scattered, unconsolidated landholdings that was common throughout much
of Pampanga and Bulacan, central Pangasinan, and, in the nineteenth century, in
southern and central Nueva Ecija.
It was in the haciendas, in the growing depersonalized atmosphere of absentee
landlordism (landlords lived in Manila), where peasants became discontented and
began to clamor for land reform. Ferdinand Marcos issued Presidential Decree No.
27 in 1972 declaring the entire Philippines a land reform area, notwithstanding the
fact that only rice and corn landwas included. Under the “land-to-the-tiller” program,
landholdings of more than 7 ha were to be purchased by the government and sold
to individual tenants (up to 3 ha for irrigated land or 5 ha for non-irrigated land).
Tenants would amortize for the value of the land over a 15-year period. Under the
“operation leasehold” program, sharecroppers on holdings of less than 7 ha were to
be converted to leaseholders, paying a fixed rent every cropping season.
Since the implementation of the LR program coincided with yield growth, due to
the spread ofmodern seed-fertilizer technology, amortization fees and leasehold rents
prescribed and fixed by law fell below the prevailing rental value of land, creating
an economic rent that accrued to the land reform beneficiary. Indeed, according to
Otsuka (1991), the LR program in the Philippines (particularly in CL) succeeded
because of the heightened economic interest of tenants in land reform arising from
the divergence of the rental value of land from leasehold rent and amortization fees
prescribed by the LR law. Estudillo and Otsuka (1999) reported that the proportion
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of land area in the sample villages in the Central Luzon Loop survey under owner
cultivation increased from12% in 1966 to 24% in 1994while that under share tenancy
declined from 75% in 1966 to only 9% in 1994, attesting to the successful conversion
of share tenants to amortizing owners and leaseholders due to land reform in CL.
Investments in Human Capital Farm households appear anxious to invest in the
schooling of their children. Household children 22 years old and above had obtained
significantly longer years of schooling than the household heads had (see Table 10.6).
The proportion of adult children with tertiary schooling (more than 10 years of
schooling) increased from 40% in 1986 to 67% in 2011; this is an underestimation
because the more educated children had migrated and were not included in the list of
children living in the households. Only 13% of adult children living in the household
in 2011 were engaged in rice farming, whereas 46% were engaged in nonfarm work,
including work in the formal sector. The average age of household heads rose from
46 in 1966 to 59 in 2011, which indicates that the heads of selected households
remained the same for many years. Clearly, farming remains the main occupation
of the household head, whereas the more educated children are engaged in nonfarm
work.
According to Estudillo et al. (2009), farm income in the early years of the GR
were used to finance investments in children’s schooling at a time when new jobs
in the nonfarm sector were created in the Philippines. These new jobs raised the
returns to schooling, inducing land reform beneficiaries to invest in higher levels of
schooling for their children.
Sources of Household Income The CL respondents have shifted their main source
of livelihood away from farm toward nonfarm activities, as shown by the declining
income share of agriculture (from73% in1966 to 37% in 1998/99) and the subsequent
growth in the share of nonfarm income (see Table 10.6). Remittance income is an
important component of nonfarm income; it has gained importance in recent years
because of the increasing participation of the younger generation in nonfarm work
in cities and overseas, made possible by earlier investments in schooling. Clearly,
CL has experienced the same process of economic transformation as that seen in
our focus countries, but this case highlights the importance of modern agricultural
technology as a force behind economic transformation in its early stage.
10.5 Summary and Conclusions
Emerging economies are in developing countries that are rapidly growing and gain-
ing an increasing share of the global economy. However, little is known about the
underlying mechanisms of how these economies have actually evolved. This chapter
explored three drivers of the evolution of emerging economies: population pressure,
modern agricultural technology, and human capital. We performed a comparison
between selected countries in Asia and sub-Saharan Africa; the former is the more
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dynamic region, and the latter has the potential to follow suit. The three drivers are
distinct in their interaction yet define a common regional path for the emerging state,
wherein agricultural development could serve as a strong stimulus for economic
transformation (or the expansion of the nonfarm sector) through higher farm income
and a subsequent growth in investments in human capital.
The CL case is clearly consistent with the Boserupian thesis that high population
pressure can induce the adoption of labor-intensive agricultural technology. The GR
and the simultaneous implementation of land reform have led to growth in the farm
income of land reform beneficiaries. Meanwhile, rising wages in the newly indus-
trializing economies in East Asia have induced the outsourcing and delocalization
of labor-intensive production processes to Southeast Asia, including the Philippines,
creating jobs for skilled and semi-skilled workers and opportunities for profitable
investments in human capital. Farmers used their farm income to finance investments
in the schooling of their children, who, upon receiving higher education, migrated out
of the villages to small towns, cities, and abroad, thereby contributing to the develop-
ment of nonfarm sectors and improvements in farm households’ income (Estudillo
et al. 2009). Nonfarm wage income and remittances became the main contributors
to sustained household income growth and poverty reduction in rural areas.
What lessons can Africa learn from Asia? Our analysis shows that, to stimulate
the development of the entire economy, it is necessary to first develop agriculture
during the early stage of development. Following the Asian path, a robust agricul-
ture sector in Africa is expected to stimulate the development of the nonfarm sector,
which can eventually lead the entire economy into rapid growth. The Asian path-
way is represented by the advent of the GR, followed by profitable investments in
human capital inspired by the rising demand for semi-skilled and skilled workers
as globalization proceeds. Since Africa is still in an early stage of development and
population pressure has begun, agricultural development could serve as the critical
first step toward sustained income growth and poverty reduction, as occurred in Asia
about half a century ago.
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and Emerging States in Africa
Masayoshi Honma
11.1 Introduction
Agricultural policies used to be regarded as determined by political institutions pecu-
liar to each country. However, broad international comparisons of agricultural policy
and economic performance reveal several common patterns. One is that countries
tend to impose negative policies (taxation) on agriculture in the early stage of eco-
nomic development while adopting positive policies (protection) for agriculture as
the economy develops.
In the early stages of economic development, agriculture is the biggest industry
and employs a large workforce. If economic development is promoted, as Petty-
Clark’s Law says, the agricultural sector shrinks in relative terms and the agricultural
labor force also decreases. Taxation is imposed on agriculture despite the fact that
it is the biggest industry with many workers. On the other hand, when development
progresses, the agricultural sector is protected despite the fact that it shrinks. This
phenomenon is called the “developmental paradox” (De Gorter and Swinnen 2002).
Starting in the 1980s, various models have been proposed to explain agricultural
protection levels.
1
Furthermore, extensive research has been conducted to enable
international comparison of protection levels as well as analysis of the domestic
political economy of agricultural protection and international trade policies. There
has been a rich accumulation of data in this area.
2
1See e.g. Anderson et al. (1986), Honma and Hayami (1986), Gardner (1987), Krueger et al. (1988,
1991), Bates (1989), Tracy (1989), Lindert (1991), Swinnen et al. (2001), and Anderson (2009).
2Also, there have been important developments on political economy in the economics profession.
See e.g. Grossman and Helpman (1994, 2002), Shleifer (1997), Persson and Tabellini (2000), and
Acemoglu et al. (2001).
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The agricultural policies of African countries have been analyzed quantitatively
in a World Bank project published as a single volume (Anderson and Masters 2009).
There are also a couple of comprehensive studies on the political economy of inter-
vention in African agricultural trade (e.g. Bates and Block 2010).3 However, there
remains considerable scope to explore the determinants of agricultural policy in
Africa.
The “developmental paradox” ariseswhen politicians seek tomaximize their votes
in the political market. The outcome is far from optimal from an economic viewpoint
and presents an obstacle to agricultural development. Correcting this paradox is
indispensable for economic growth. The purpose of this chapter is to clarify whether
the “developmental paradox” applies to African agricultural policy and to discuss
the proper strategy of economic growth for Africa’s emerging economies.
11.2 Distortion of Agricultural Markets in Africa
Many agricultural policies intervene in the market, pushing down or pushing up the
prices of agricultural products, which causes distortion in agricultural markets. The
greatest distortion is caused by import duties and export taxes imposed by govern-
ments at the border. Border measures have the effect of isolating the domestic market
from the international market and thus weaken the influence of changes in the inter-
national market. Therefore, the difference between the domestic and international
prices of agricultural products is an indicator of how much the market is distorted.
Various studies have been conducted tomeasure agricultural protection levels. The
most comprehensive is the National and Global Estimates of Distortions to Agricul-
tural Incentives 1955–2011 by the World Bank. It measures agricultural protection
levels in 75 countries over more than 50 years and creates protection indices not only
for distortions by border measures but also by domestic measures such as subsidies
and assistance in non-agricultural sectors.
What was observed was that, as expected, agricultural protection levels varied
depending on the stage of economic development. Agriculture was taxed in the early
stages of development, but as the economy developed, agriculture became subject
to protection. This trend was also found in African countries. However, it was not
as readily apparent as in rapidly industrializing East Asian countries, especially in
those African countries where economic development remained low (Anderson and
Masters 2009).
An important indicator showing the level of protection is the nominal rate of
assistance (NRA). The NRA is defined as the percentage by which government
policies have raised gross returns to farmers above what they would be without
government intervention (or have lowered them, if the NRA is negative). The NRA
is measured for individual agricultural products. In addition, in order to estimate the
country level of protection, a weighted average of the NRA of individual agricultural
3See also Block and Bates (2011), Hoeffler (2011), and Poulton (2014).
11 Agricultural Market Intervention and Emerging States in Africa 255
Fig. 11.1 Nominal rates of assistance to agriculture, by regions, 1980–84 and 2000–04 (percent).
Source Anderson (ed.) (2009). Note LAC is Latin America and Caribbean, ECA is Europe and
Central Asia, ANZ is Australia and New Zealand, and WE is Western Europe
products is calculated with weights of gross values of production at unassisted prices.
Furthermore, the NRA by region is obtained as a weighted average of the NRA for
each country in the region.
Figure 11.1 shows theNRAby region for the twoperiods of 1980–84 and2000–04.
Among developed country regions, the NRA ofWestern Europe (WE) and Japan are
high, indicating that agricultural protection is prevalent. In fact, the figures show that
Japan increased its protection level between the two periods while Western Europe’s
agricultural protection level was on a downward trend. Other developed region-
s—North America and Oceania (ANZ)—which are agricultural exporting areas,
show low levels of agricultural protection.
On the other hand, in developing country regions, the NRA was negative in
1980–84, indicating that agriculture was taxed. Asia, which was heavily taxed in
1980–84, however, turned to positive in 2000–04, revealing a switch to agricul-
tural protection. Africa was only the region where agricultural taxation remained in
2000–2004, indicating that it was impeding agricultural development.
Using NRA data in the World Bank database, Fig. 11.2 shows trends in Africa’s
NRA from 1955 to 2010 along with trends in Asia. Together with Asia, Africa shows
negative values until the mid-1980s, indicating that the agricultural sector had been
suppressedmore than the international market price. However, the degree was lighter
than in Asia. Asia was in the range of −20 to −30%, whereas in Africa it was in the
−10 to−20% in range.Agricultural policies inAsia also turned to positive values, i.e.
protection policy, in the late 1980s. On the other hand, domestic prices of agricultural
products in Africa were still lower than international prices even in later years. In
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Fig. 11.2 Nominal rate of assistance (NRA) in Africa and Asia, 1955–2010. Source World Bank,
National and Global Estimates of Distortions to Agricultural Incentives 1955–2011
from year to year, but looking at the overall trend for the past 50 years, it is clear that
agricultural deprivation policy weakened and gradually switched to protection.
The overall trend in the weighted average of the NRA in Africa obscures a
number of significant variations. The African continent can be divided into three
regions: resource-rich countries, landlocked countries, and coastal countries. Bates
and Block’s analysis of agricultural trade intervention makes a number of impor-
tant observations in this regard. African governments, with the exception of those in
landlocked countries, have tended to protect food crops, raising the level of domestic
prices above those prevailing in world markets, while taxing cash crops. The distor-
tions introduced by government policies have eroded over time, with nominal rates
of assistance for cash crops converging toward zero. Within the region, governments
of resource-rich countries tend to provide the most favorable policy environment
for producers of both food and cash crops, while the governments of landlocked
countries tend to impose the least (Bates and Block 2010).
The major reductions in taxation of farmers have been in such countries as Ghana,
Uganda, Tanzania, Cameroon, Senegal and Madagascar, while in Mozambique, and
to a lesser extent Kenya, there has been a transition from taxing to supporting farmers.
The opposite transition, from slight support to slight taxation, has occurred inNigeria,
while the degree of taxation is still heavy in Cote d’Ivoire, Zambia and Zimbabwe
(Anderson and Masters 2009).
In the past, many studies have analyzed the relationship between agricultural
protection or taxation and economic development. A common understanding is the
change in the political environment accompanying economic development. In the
early stage of economic development the government is required to tax agriculture,
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Fig. 11.3 Rerationship between GDP per capita and NRA in Africa, 1961–2010. Source World
Bank, National and Global Estimates of Distortions to Agricultural Incentives 1955–2011
which is the largest industry in the economy. Also, in promoting industrialization, it
is desirable to keep wages and food prices low. Food prices are an important factor
determining wages in the early stage of development with a high Engel coefficient.
Figure 11.3 shows the relationship between theNRAandGDPper capita inAfrica.
Although it is not very clear, a positive correlation can be observed as a tendency.
In Africa, as economic development progresses, the level of agricultural taxation
moderates, and it seems that there is a tendency towards agricultural protection.
Another variable representing the change in the political environment accompa-
nying economic development is the political power of the agricultural sector. Many
workers are farmers in the early stages of development, but because farmers are scat-
tered throughout the country, a free-rider problem arises (Olson 1965). According to
the theory of collective action, it is difficult for farmers to lobby for favorable policy
outcomes in agriculture. They have no political power to challenge the government’s
tax policy. However, as the number of farmers declines as economy develops, lob-
bying against agricultural taxation can be conducted more efficiently, and if their
number declines further, farmers succeed in introducing protection policies.
Figure 11.4 shows how this hypothesis is applied to Africa. The NRA is compared
with the political power of agriculture in terms of the share of rural population in
the total population. In this case, a negative correlation is observed between the
NRA and the rural population share. It shows that the degree of agricultural taxation
weakens as the share of rural population decreases, that is, as economic development
progresses, and agricultural taxation tends to turn into agricultural protection over
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Fig. 11.4 Relationship between rural population share and NRA in Africa, 1961–2010. Source
World Bank, National and Global Estimates of Distortions to Agricultural Incentives 1955–2011
However, GDP per capita or rural population share alone is not the sole deter-
minant of agricultural policies, which depend on many other factors. Moreover, the
numerical value of the NRA shown here is a weighted average that summarizes
Africa as a whole in a single index. It is reasonable to consider that many different
trends in different countries are hidden in the single NRA and unique characteristics
by country may offset each other. Therefore, more detailed analysis is required.
Now, we focus on individual countries in Africa. Table 11.1 shows the average
GDP per capita and NRA for agriculture for 20 Sub-Saharan Africa countries in
the two periods of 1975–79 and 2006–10 (years varied by country) with the annual
growth rate between the two periods. Excluding South Africa, GDP per capita in
these countries is in the 200–600 dollar range in 2000 US dollars in the recent years.
Although this is still at a low level, many countries grew from the late 1970s with
a positive growth rate between the two periods. Six of 20 countries show annual
growth rates exceeding 1%. Ethiopia, Mozambique and Uganda had a high growth
rate of 1.72, 2.89, and 2.65%, respectively.
On the other hand, the NRAs for agriculture show many countries’ negative val-
ues in the 2000s, indicating that agricultural taxation policies prevailed. Only five
countries—Chad, Mozambique, Nigeria, South Africa and Sudan—had a positive
NRA. However, looking at the annual rate of increase in the NRA between the two
periods, 13 out of the 20 countries show positive values. Thismeans that the degree of
agricultural taxation declined, and some countries switched from taxing to protecting
agriculture.
In the 1975–79 period, 11 countries had an NRA of minus 10% or less. Seven
of the 11 are in coastal regions. Most of the coastal countries exported agricultural
products on which governments imposed export tax. However, this trend in the NRA
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Table 11.1 NRA and GDP per capita in 20 African countries
County (Regiona) Period GDP per capitab NRA (%)c
Benin (C) 1975–79 276 −0.50
2001–05 321 −0.12
Growth rate 0.58 0.01
Burkina Faso (L) 1975–79 159 −1.51
2006–10 263 −7.19
Growth rate 1.64 −0.18
Cameroon (R, C) 1975–79 638 −14.35
2005–09 695 −1.67
Growth rate 0.29 0.42
Chad (L) 1975–79 197 −4.70
2001–05 220 0.13
Growth rate 0.42 0.19
Cote d’ivoire (C) 1975–79 1051 −34.71
2005–09 565 −29.74
Growth rate −2.05 0.17
Ethiopia (L) 1981–85 123 −18.69
2006–10 188 −4.65
Growth rate 1.72 0.56
Ghana (C) 1975–79 238 −25.58
2006–10 328 −3.91
Growth rate 1.03 0.70
Kenya (C) 1975–79 402 −1.66
2006–10 455 −1.20
Growth rate 0.41 0.01
Madagascar (C) 1975–79 346 −27.06
2006–10 248 −2.37
Growth rate −1.08 0.80
Mali (L) 1975–79 251 −2.18
2006–10 276 −4.52
Growth rate 0.31 −0.08
Mozambique (C) 1981–85 176 −29.74
2006–10 359 7.33
Growth rate 2.89 1.48
Nigeria (R, C) 1975–79 439 6.34
2006–10 492 1.85




County (Regiona) Period GDP per capitab NRA (%)c
Senegal (C) 1975–79 495 −22.74
2001–05 475 −1.11
Growth rate −0.16 0.83
South Africa (R, C) 1975–79 3296 3.83
2006–10 3702 2.38
Growth rate 0.38 −0.05
Sudan (L) 1975–79 313 −24.33
2006–10 515 0.77
Growth rate 1.62 0.81
Tanzania (C) 1976–80 n.a. −44.80
2006–10 402 −1.58
Growth rate n.a. 1.73
Togo (C) 1975–79 314 −0.40
2006–10 265 −4.24
Growth rate −0.55 −0.12
Uganda (L) 1981–85 173 −6.79
2006–10 332 −15.83
Growth rate 2.65 −0.36
Zambia (R, L) 1975–79 506 −37.29
2001–05 335 −14.02
Growth rate −1.57 0.89
Zimbabwe (L) 1975–79 594 −28.60
2001–05 492 −37.96
Growth rate −0.72 −0.36
Source World Bank, National and Global Estimates of Distortions to Agricultural Incentives
1955–2011
Note
aRegion is classified as follows: C is coastal, L is landlocked, and R is resource-rich
bGDP per capita is in 2000 US dollars and growth rate is annual compounded gwowth rate between
the two periods
cGrowth rate of the NRA is the annual average of increases between the two periods
diminished by the 2000s. Coastal countries are just one of four that show a nominal
rate of protection (NRP) of minus 10% or less in the 2000s. It is notable that coastal
countries show larger increases in theNRAper year during the two periods than other
regions; eight of 13 countries that have a positive annual increase rate are coastal
countries. In other words, distortions by market intervention in agriculture have been
corrected in coastal countries, which were subject to agricultural taxation.
African countries have adopted policies to tax agriculture for a long time, which
contributed to state finances and kept food prices low, thereby preventing wage
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rises. However, in recent years the agricultural taxation trend weakened and the
price distortion was corrected to some degree. Furthermore, as seen from the Asian
experience of emerging economies, the income disparity between agriculture and
industry tends to expand and become a social and economic problem in someAfrican
countries. Agricultural policy has to deal with that problem.
11.3 The Relationship Between Economic Development
and Agricultural Protection Policy
A formal model showing the relationship between the NRA and economic devel-
opment is presented in this section. First, it is assumed that politicians (or political
parties) seek to maximize votes in elections.
The level of protection (taxation) desirable for politicians is, therefore, the level
that maximizes their political power by maximizing the number of votes in elections.
Even thosewhobenefit fromapolicy or thosewho suffer losses express their intention
by voting. Thus, it is necessary to examine the relationship between the costs and
benefits for politicians who set the level of agricultural protection.
Politicians calculate how many votes they will secure by raising the level of
agricultural protection. These votes will be cast by farmers. On the other hand, they
also have to calculate howmany votes will be lost by choosing the same policy. Those
who previously supported the politicians may change their minds and not vote for
them if they do not like an increase in the level of agricultural protection. They are
most likely consumers.
Politicians calculate votes earned and votes lost in order to maximize their total
vote. Maximizing votes then becomes a matter of setting the agricultural protection
level at the point where the marginal benefit coincides with the marginal cost of the
policy. The marginal benefit is an increment in the votes gained by increasing a unit
of agricultural protection level while the marginal cost is a decrement of votes lost
by the same policy.
Figure 11.5 shows the marginal benefit curve (MB) and the marginal cost curve
(MC), which change along the level of agricultural protection. MB is described as a
line with a downward slope to the right because the marginal utility (gain) of farmers
declines as the level of protection is raised. On the other hand, MC is a line with
an upward slope to the right because the marginal dis-utility (pain) of consumers
increases as food prices are raised. Politicians can maximize votes by setting the
protection level at T at which point MB and MC are intersected shown at point E.
While the level of protection desirable for politicians is not necessarily the socially
desirable level of protection, it is not easy to break this equilibrium because the deter-
mination of the protection level is built into the structure of politics. Market failure
can be caused by monopolies, the provision of public goods, the existence of exter-
nalities and information asymmetries, but not only the market but also governments
and politics can fail.
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Fig. 11.5 Political determination of agricultural protection level
In the early stages of economic development, many farmers benefit from agricul-
tural protection, but there is no organizational capacity or ability to make politicians
increase their supporting votes. The proportion of the products for market sale is
small so that there are few incentives to ask for price support. For politicians, the
increment in support obtained from agricultural protection policy is small and there-
fore the marginal benefit curve is low. On the other hand, political pressures from
industrial sector leaders who oppose agricultural protection are strong and well orga-
nized. Also, as agricultural price rises put pressure on the lives of urban workers and
even cause riots, there are a large number of potential votes lost by increasing the
level of agricultural protection. That is, the marginal cost curve for agricultural pro-
tection is set high. As a result, the level of agricultural protection in developing
countries is extremely low, and in some cases, there is a negative protection level.
Even agricultural deprivation measures are introduced.
However, as economic development progresses, the political environment also
changes. First, as commercialization of agricultural products progresses, farmers’
income becomes more dependent on prices of agricultural products because they sell
the products in the market. The educational level of farmers also increases, and as
transportation and communications develop, farmers become conscious of the gap in
the standard of living between urban and rural areas, which expands in the process of
industrialization. Therefore, farmers have greater desire for agricultural protection
than before.
Voices calling for protection of agriculture are united through agencies such as
agricultural organizations and become political pressures. As the industrial sector
expands, the agricultural sector shrinks and the number of farmers also decreases,
but in reality, this phenomenon itself increases the farmers’ political power. When a
group collectively tries to do something for a purpose, the smaller the members of
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that group, the higher the participation rate in that action and therefore the higher the
efficiency. The reason is that if the number of people is large, the role of an individual
is small, and there is a tendency to think that they have no influence on the whole.
But if the group is smaller, this free rider problem can be prevented. This is what
Olson pointed out in Theory of Collective Action (Olson 1965).
In this way, farmers’ groups, which becomemore efficient at lobbying as the econ-
omy develops, can promise politicians to gain larger numbers of supporting votes in
exchange for stronger agricultural protection. Also, fertilizer and other agricultural
input material industries that depend on agricultural production support agricultural
protection. Therefore, as the economy develops, the marginal benefit curve to politi-
cians for supplying agricultural protection shifts higher upwards.
How about opposition to agricultural protection? As per capita income increases
with economic development, the proportion of food expenses in total consumption
declines. Rising grocery prices do not have as much impact on workers’ lives as
before, and their resistance to agricultural protection diminishes. Also, since the
industrial structure itself shifts from labor-intensive to capital-intensive, the impor-
tance of wages is small for management and capitalists. Thus, their consciousness
of prices of agricultural products diminishes. Furthermore, as the non-agricultural
sector expands, the number of enterprises also increases, and even if they try to act
jointly, the free rider phenomenon described above occurs and cooperation cannot
be achieved at previous levels.
Most people engage in non-agricultural sectors in the developed-country stage.
The cost of protecting agriculture is very small for non-agricultural people on a per
capita basis. The costs necessary to provide the same protection to the small number
of farmers drop drastically so resistance is reduced accordingly. In addition, at this
stage, the importance of the non-economic value of agriculture such as conservation
of green space and maintenance of country scenery in rural areas is increasingly
asserted. Thus, protection of agriculture tends to be easy to accept. These changes
shift the marginal cost curve of agricultural protection for politicians downwards.
For politicians, themarginal benefits from agricultural protection are strengthened
and the marginal costs are reduced, resulting in both MR and MC curves shifting to
the right and agricultural protection levels at the developed-country stage rising.
11.4 Determinants of the Agricultural Protection Level
This section presents a mechanism to determine the agricultural protection level
based on the above model. An important variable that directly affects the number of
votes cast for a politician in terms of agricultural protection policy is the relative farm
household income in comparison with workers’ income of the industrial sector. The
income disparity between the agricultural and industrial sectors is neglected in the
early stages of development. But, as development progresses, remediation of income
disparity becomes a policy issue.
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The labor wage rate is used as the most important variable representing income.
The demand curve for labor is derived asmarginal labor productivity: that is, the phys-
ical marginal labor productivity multiplied by the product price. The wage rate is
determined at the level where the labor demand curve intersects with the labor supply
curve. If the labor market is competitive, the wage rate is the same in agriculture and
industry. However, production resources invested in the agricultural sector aremostly
specific to agriculture and the migration and shifting of agricultural resources to the
industrial sector are difficult and impose a large transaction cost including psycho-
logical costs. Therefore, the wage rate is determined differently between agriculture
and industry equalizing it to the marginal value productivity of labor in each sector
as follows:
Wa  Pa MLa (11.1)
Wm  Pm MLm (11.2)
where Wa and Wm are the agricultural and industrial wage rates, respectively. Pa
and Pm are the price of agricultural and industrial products, respectively. MLa and
MLmrepresent the physicalmarginal productivity of agricultural and industrial labor,
respectively.
As economic development progresses, the income disparity between the agricul-
tural and industrial sectors expands, and it becomes a policy issue to keep this gap at
a certain level. Therefore, in order to balance the wage rate in agriculture with that
in industrial sector at a certain level politically, the following relationship must be
satisfied.
Wa∗  k Wm (11.3)
where Wa* is a politically desirable level of the wage rate in agriculture and k is a
parameter indicating how much the government intends to rectify the income dis-
parity. Politicians expect to increase the number of votes cast by strengthening the
protection of agriculture, namely raising k, while it decreases the number of votes
cast by groups who oppose agricultural protection such as consumer groups. The
value of k is determined so as to equalize the marginal benefit and the marginal cost
for politicians.
Themarginal benefit curve,MB, shifts upward because of the strengthening polit-
ical power of the agricultural sector as the economy develops. The share of rural
population in total population (SA) is an indicator that shows the political power of
the agricultural sector. On the other hand, the marginal cost curve, MC, shifts down-
ward owing to the rising social tolerance of agricultural protection. As an indicator
of the marginal cost, GDP divided by rural population (GA) is used. The variable
GA needs to be explained as follows.
The marginal cost of increasing the level of agricultural protection for politicians
is themarginal loss of votes from consumers. As income goes up, consumers tend not
to be conscious of food prices because the Engel coefficient decreases. Also, if the
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share of farmers in total population declines, the total cost of protecting agriculture is
reduced. Thus, consumers’ tolerance of agricultural protection is a function of GDP
per capita and the share of farmers who are protected. The variable GA is introduced
as a proxy to indicate consumers’ tolerance, which is GDP per rural population
calculated by GDP per capita (GDP/N) multiplied by the reciprocal of the share of
rural population in total population (N/Na), where N is total population and Na is
rural population.
Then, MR and MC are expressed as follows.
MB  f(k,SA) (11.4)
MC  g(k,GA) (11.5)
Since the value of k is determined at the point where MB and MC are equalized
in equilibrium, k is expressed by the exogenous variables SA and GA.
k  k(SA,GA) (11.6)
The domestic price is the international price PW multiplied by the nominal
protection coefficient (NPC), which is the nominal rate of protection (NRP, the
difference between domestic and foreign prices divided by foreign price) plus 1.
Therefore, Eq. (11.1) becomes as follows.
Wa  NPC PWa MLa (11.7)
If the NRP is politically manipulated by politicians who try to correct the income
disparity between the agricultural and industrial sectors, the nominal protection coef-
ficient of the domestic agricultural products can be expressed as follows, using
Eqs. (11.2), (11.3), (11.6) and (11.7).








The level of agricultural protection depends on the share of rural population (SA),
the GDP per capita of rural population (GA), the terms of trade of agricultural prod-
ucts to industrial products in international trade (PWa/Pm), assuming no distortions
in industrial sector, and the marginal productivity ratio of the agricultural sector to
the industrial sector (MLa/MLm).
An important fact is that as long as the marginal labor productivity gap between
agriculture and industry is expanding, the level of agricultural protection needs to
continue to rise to correct it. If economic growth accompanies industrialization and
productivity in industrial sector continues to rise, agricultural protectionwill continue
to be strengthened. In other words, even if the agricultural protection level is kept
high, the political objective cannot be achieved unless the protection level is raised
continuously. Agricultural protection has to grow under this mechanism.
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11.5 Regression Analysis of Agricultural Protection Level
Based on Eq. (11.8), a regression analysis is conducted using pool data of 20 Sub-
Sahara African countries for 1961–2010. Countries in the sample are Benin, Burkina
Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Cote d’Ivoire, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Madagascar, Mali,
Mozambique, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, Sudan, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zam-
bia, and Zimbabwe. The number of years for which data are available is different by
country.
Data for the NRP used in the dependent variable are nra_tott (NRA, all primary
agriculture, total for covered and non-covered) from the series of World Bank’s
National and Global Estimates of Distortions to Agricultural Incentives, 1955–2011.
The data include domestic subsidies as well as the value of differences between the
domestic and international prices of the products. For the country level of protection,
a weighted average of the NRA of individual agricultural products is calculated with
weights of gross values of production at unassisted prices.
Data used for the explanatory variables are as follows. The share of rural popu-
lation to total population (SA) and the GDP per capita of rural population (GA) are
available in the World Development Indicators of the World Bank, where GDP is
expressed in 2010 constant US dollars. For the variable of the terms of trade (PA =
PWa/Pm), data of the import price (unit value) index of agricultural products for each
country are used for PWa while date of the export price (unit price) index of Africa
as a whole are used for Pm. Data are available in the Trade Indices of the United
Nations. For the variable of the marginal productivity ratio of the agricultural sector
to the industrial sector (LA = MLa/MLm), the ratio of average labor productivity in
agriculture to that in the non-agricultural sector is used because data for marginal
labor productivity are not available. The labor productivity of agriculture is derived
from the added value of the agricultural sector divided by rural population while the
labor productivity of the non-agricultural sector is derived from the non-agricultural
GDP divided by the non-rural population. Data are available in the World Develop-
ment Indicators of the World Bank, where GDP is expressed in 2010 constant US
dollars.
The equation for estimation is expressed as follows:
ln(1 + NRAit)  β0 + β1 ln SAit
+ β2 lnGAit + β3 ln LAit + β4 lnPAit + γ i + εit (11.9)
where i is a subscript that represents a country, t is a subscript that represents a year,
γ i indicates the fixed effect of a country unchanged with respect to time, and ε it is
an error term. The expected signs of the coefficients are β1 < 0, β2 > 0, β3 < 0 and
β4 < 0.
The results of the regression analysis using the fixed effect model are summarized
in Table 11.2. First, looking at the relationship between rural population share and
agricultural protection level in estimation (1), it is found that there is a statistically
significant relationship between them. The correlation was not clear in Fig. 11.1,
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Table 11.2 Results of regressions of nominal protection coefficient (NPC) in Africa
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Rural pop share −0.2508*** −0.3757*** −0.2793*** −0.3204***
ln(SA) (0.0500) (0.0731) (0.0957) (0.0200)
GDP per rural pop 0.0566 0.0115**
ln(GA) (0.0351) (0.0072)
Labor productivity ratio −0.0451** −0.0351* −0.0398***
ln(LA) (0.0194) (0.0205) (0.0040)
Relative price −0.0324***
ln(PA) (0.0035)
Constant −0.1045*** −0.2189*** −0.5105*** −0.2549***
(0.0330) (0.0572) (0.1909) (0.0399)
Observations 869 745 735 655
Adjusted R2 0.440 0.428 0.427 0.511
Source Author’s calculation
Note Standard errors in parentheses
*Significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%
which showed the relationship between the share of rural population and the NRA
in a weighted average for Africa as a whole. But the regression result in the country
fixed-effect model here confirms a negative relationship between them.
Next, in estimation (2), the variable of the labor productivity ratio is added to the
rural population share. The coefficient of this variable is also statistically significant
as well as that of the rural population share. It shows that if labor productivity in the
agricultural sector falls behind the nonagricultural sector, the level of agricultural
protection rises. Thus, the hypothesis of the political correction of income disparity
in the course of economic development is proven.
Furthermore, in estimation (3), which adds another political variable—GDP per
capita of rural population—the coefficient takes a positive value as expected, but it
is not statistically significant. This variable indicates whether the people are vital to
protecting agriculture or not, but it could not be confirmed in Africa.
Finally, the relative price variable is added in estimation (4), which includes
all the variables of the model presented in the previous section. The number of
observations used for estimation is reduced because countries and years for which
relative prices cannot be obtained are excluded. In the estimation of the full model,
all the coefficients show signs as expected, and are statistically significant except for
the GDP per capita of rural population variable.
The result of the full model estimation (4) confirms the relationship between
the agricultural protection level and political and economic factors is relevant to
politicians’ behavior in seeking to maximize votes. In African countries, if the rural
population share decreases by 1%, it may cause 0.32% increases in the agricultural
protection level. That is, taxation on agriculture is reduced in the course of economic
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development. If the GDP per capita of the rural population increases by 1%, the
protection level may increase by 0.1%. However, this relationship is not statistically
significant. In other words, if other conditions are kept constant, it can be argued that
in Africa the economy is not growing sufficiently to become tolerant of agricultural
protection. In other words, African consumers and governments have changed the
level of agricultural taxation for other reasons.
An important variable in relation to economic development is the relative labor
productivity of agriculture. The source of economic development is often the growth
in the industrial sector. The rapid growth of the industrial sector expands the disparity
in labor productivity between agriculture and industry, resulting in income disparity.
Although the value of the coefficient is small, the estimation result shows that the
expansion in this productivity gap lowered agricultural taxation and, as seen in recent
years, it turned into agricultural protection.
The variable of the relative price is also statistically significant, indicating that if
the terms of trade become disadvantageous to agriculture, the agricultural protection
level rises slightly but clearly. However, in this estimation, the price of the industrial
sector is represented by Africa’s total export unit value index. An analysis with data
showing more accurate terms of trade would be desirable.
There are a number of residual problems in the statistical estimations. First, the
independent variables of the estimated equations are not mutually independent. The
share of rural population, GDP per capita of rural population, and relative labor
productivity are all indicators that show economic development and are related to
each other. Therefore, a problemofmultiple-collinearitymaybe involved.Changes in
agricultural protection levels also affect the relative labor productivity of agriculture
and even the rural population share. Therefore, the estimated results heremay contain
a simultaneous equation bias.
In the future, it would be desirable to analyze the levels of agricultural protection
in a general equilibrium framework together with growth in the non-agricultural
sector.
11.6 Conclusion
Research on agricultural protection has been very active and many studies have
contributed to clarification of the determinants of protection. Also, construction of
statistical data sets including those of the World Bank made possible consistent
comparisons of levels agricultural protection and distortions internationally. This
chapter has benefited from the availability of data on agricultural protection levels
and has used the data to test the hypothesis called the “developmental paradox” in
Africa. A model to describe the “developmental paradox” has been proposed and
tested by statistical estimations.
Rapid economic development makes the agricultural sector shrink, which may
cause social and economic disorder in rural areas. It also becomes a factor encour-
aging political unrest. Therefore, agricultural protection policies tend to be adopted
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for the purpose of correcting income disparities between agriculture and industry.
Indeed, the “developmental paradox” has been observed in Japan, Korea and Taiwan
during their rapid economic growth period (Honma and Hayami 1986, 2009).
It is somewhat challenging to apply thismodel toAfricawhere economic develop-
ment is still underway. However, the logic of reducing taxation on agriculture is the
same as increasing agricultural protection. Further, it is meaningful to extract com-
mon factors that determine agricultural policies taking into account the differences
in individual countries in a fixed effect model in Africa.
The “developmental paradox” is an empirical question and should be tested for
those countries that are in the course of economic development such as in Africa. It
is based on the behavior of politicians seeking to maximize votes. However, because
of over-simplification, more complicated political and economic behaviors such as
opposition parties’ actions and policy struggles are neglected in the model. Despite
the over-simplification, the statistical tests confirmed the significance of variables
derived from the model, which show common factors that determine the level of
agricultural protection among countries in Sub-Saharan Africa: the share of rural
population, GDP per capita of rural population, relative labor productivity, and the
terms of trade in international markets.
The government plays a major role in economic development. This chapter has
shown that agricultural taxation policy declines as economic development progresses
and that evenAfrican countries have adopted agricultural protection policies.Africa’s
economic development may have been more advanced if agricultural taxation had
been eliminated earlier. If emerging countries in Africa had focused on improving
infrastructure such as irrigation and drainage facilities and on investing in road and
transportation rather than on taxing agriculture in the early stage of development,
they might have been able to achieve agriculture-based growth faster.
Today many African countries still continue to impose agricultural taxes which
need to be eliminated as soon as possible. In addition, emerging countries in Africa
where further economic growth is expected in the future should not follow the experi-
ence of emerging Asian countries, which mistakenly introduced agricultural protec-
tion as an industrial adjustment policy to correct income disparity. Avoiding market
intervention and correcting distortions of farmer’s incentives are necessary even
if correcting income disparity is a political priority in Africa. So-called decoupled
policies such as direct payments with public investment in agricultural infrastructure
should be introduced to promote agricultural growth.
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Chapter 12
Role of Community and Government
in Irrigation Management in Emerging




Maintaining well-functioning irrigation systems is a crucial condition for sustain-
able agricultural development, and many states have implemented different kinds of
policies for this aim. In the less-developed countries (LDCs), a conventional issue
in this policy arena has been how to mobilize abundant local labor for successful
collective management. From the academics, Ostrom’s group has made a signifi-
cant contribution to this end by revealing and synthesizing the conditions for the
success, and then in the policy arena in the 1980s and 1990s, a boom of the com-
munity participatory approach and the irrigation management transfer (to the local
bodies) occurred. The international development society has realized that the use of
community mechanism for local resource management is effective for labor surplus
countries at an early stage of development.
However, rather than abundant labor, a contemporary issue in the agricultural sec-
tor among emerging states, is an increasing labor scarcity. These states have emerged
in the global society with their success in labor-intensive industrialization in the areas
of textiles, garments, and other light manufacturing. It is because of this success that
the agricultural sector has been experiencing labor scarcity. Recent globalization has
been accelerating this process by providing rural people with lucrative job opportu-
nities overseas. Facing this trend, an appropriate direction of change in agricultural
sector is the substitution of capital for labor. However, as we will explain later, the
substitution process entails externalities in a very complicated manner. Therefore,
under such a circumstance, the role of the government increases. Understanding the
role the government for the achievement of a necessary substitution for sustainable,
equitable, and efficient water use is an important contemporary issue of irrigation
policies in the emerging states.
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Two unique features of the emerging states make the policy issue more com-
plicated than the time when the current DCs had dealt with their increasing labor
scarcity. First, groundwater irrigation with private wells and pumps has been becom-
ing rampant. The reduction in the cost of pumps and the excavation of wells have
accelerated the exit of farmers from traditional irrigation systems, resulting in a faster
increase in labor scarcity in traditional water management. Moreover, the private
use of groundwater by individuals entails negative externalities to the neighboring
users who share the groundwater aquifer and thus tends to create the problem of
“the tragedy of commons.” Therefore, an environmental issue comes into the policy
arena more seriously than before.
Second, by a recommendation from international organizations or on its own
initiatives, some LDCs have introduced volumetric irrigation water pricing with
the aim of achieving water savings in their surface irrigation systems. Charging
high prices on surface irrigation water may eventually induce farmers to switch to
alternative sources for irrigation, which is another form of exit from the traditional
irrigation systems. Besides, the implementation of volumetric pricing needs more
sophisticated or more capital-intensive irrigation systems as it requires water volume
measurement and on-demand water volume control, more or less similar to domestic
water systems. Hence, under volumetric pricing system, both labor shortage and the
necessity for substituting capital for labor may increase.
Another important point is that we must explicitly incorporate the framework of
political economy. Many studies have shown that governments tend to raise agricul-
tural protection in the course of economic development, and the level of protection
tends to become excessive. As discussed by Honma in Chapter 10, this is closely
related with rent-seeking activities from a shrinking farm sector. Hence, we must
explicitly take into account the possibility of protectionism and the government fail-
ure as a side effect when the role of the government becomes more important.
In summary, the contemporary issues in irrigation policies of the emerging states
are characterized as the achievement of smooth substitution of capital for labor and
the achievement of optimal groundwater use under the existence of different kinds
of externalities as well as under the pressure of protectionism. The aim of this article
is to examine what is the optimal role of the government and what kind of policies
are appropriate for the emerging states, using examples of rapidly industrialized
or industrializing countries, namely, Japan, China, and India. First, using Japan as a
forerunner, we summarize the historical experiences of Japan’s irrigation policies and
show their pros and cons. Then, using Japan’s experience as a benchmark,we evaluate
recent policies in China and in India, relying on the case studies of a particular place
in each country, namely, Hubei in China and Tamil Nadu in India. Note that Japan’s
experience does not sufficiently cover the groundwater issue aswell as the experiment
of volumetric water pricing. We discuss these issues when we analyze the cases of
China and India for the sake of obtaining useful lessons for other emerging states.
Note, however, that as we rely on the cases of a particular place, we had better refrain
from generalizing the lessons excessively.
The rest of the paper is as follows. Section 12.2 shows data on the increasing
labor scarcity of our study countries. Section 12.3 explains key concepts such as
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externalities in irrigation systems and government failure and rent-seeking in the
political economy framework. Section 12.4 reviews and evaluates irrigation policies
in each country. Finally, Sect. 12.5 summarizes the lessons.
12.2 Changes in Labor Endowment
Figure 12.1 shows the changes in population and employment by sector from 1950
to 2015 in three countries. Our primary variable as a measure of labor scarcity in the
agricultural sector is employment in agriculture.1 Since India has data of this variable
only in two years, we show also rural population, although this variable includes quite
a large number of non-agricultural employment in the rural area, especially in India.
Urban population is also shown as a reference.
In Japan, the rural population dropped sharply during its rapid industrialization
period (from the 1950s to the 1970s). Even after that period, the exit of labor from the
agricultural sector has continued to date as indicated by the employment figure. In
China, the agricultural employment figure is available for a relatively longer period.
It increased until the early 1990s almost parallel with the trend of urban population,
indicating the net labor migration is little. After the take-off of the economy with the
economic reform in the early 1990s, the rural employment (and the rural population
as well) started decreasing, and this trend has continued till 2015. China’s experience
after the early 1990s is similar to that of Japan. India’s case looks slightly different but
is the same in terms of trends. Although the rural population increased continuously,
the growth rate looks slower than that of the urban population in the 2000s.Moreover,
agricultural employment (indicated by two triangles in the figure) decreased from
2005 to 2010. We conclude that similar to Japan, the two major emerging states,



























































































































































Fig. 12.1 Population and employment by sector in Japan, China, and India from 1950 to 2015.
Source FAOSTAT
1This variable is not perfect in twofold; it measures labor use rather than endowment, and it includes
agricultural employment in urban area. Nevertheless, the effects of these problems seem small, and
this variable can be used at least as a good measure of trend.
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12.3 Key Concepts
This section explains four key concepts used in the following case studies: (1) exter-
nalities in surface irrigation systems, (2) externalities in non-agricultural sector, (3)
externalities in ground water irrigation systems, and (4) government failures in agri-
cultural policies.
Externalities in surface irrigation systems is related with technological indivisi-
bility and collective management of the systems, and they are further divided into
two aspects: (a) those related with maintenance of irrigation facilities and (b) those
related with allocation of irrigation water. We explain the maintenance aspect first.
Once a system is installed to supply water to cover a certain command area, it cannot
shrink its supply capacity according to the reduction of the number of users. This is
because such systems need to maintain a certain water pressure and a certain water
level in order to supply water to the tail-end users. If one user, for example in the
midstream, becomes reluctant to fully provide his/her maintenance work or even
completely exits from the irrigation system, the remaining users have to shoulder
the exiting farmer’s maintenance costs to maintain the capacity; this is a negative
externality of the exit on themaintenance aspect. Regarding the allocation aspect, the
exit of a farmer makes the continuity of irrigation water use along the canal broken.
After the exits of some farmers from the irrigation system, the users’ plots become
segmented from each other, which makes coordination and supervision of allocation
among remaining water users more difficult. Although Olson (1965) predicts that the
smaller group can make collective action more effectively, such a mechanism may
not work in the context of irrigation management if the cost of the former (i.e., coor-
dination difficulty due to scattered plots) is greater than the benefit of the latter (i.e.,
effective communication in the smaller group). In this manner, the negative external-
ities are likely to arise on both the maintenance and allocation aspects in the process
of farmers’ exit from the system, and, thus, the involvement of the government is
called for.
The second type of externalities emerge when irrigation water provides non-
agricultural benefits, such as drainage services for residences, fire prevention, envi-
ronmental amenities, and the recharging of groundwater aquifers. Theoretically, these
externalities can be internalized by ensuring all beneficiaries are involved in irriga-
tion management. Practically, however, the non-agricultural benefits are so thinly
and so widely spread that it is difficult to get all involved. It should be noted that
such kinds of externalities also increase with economic development as the numbers
of non-agricultural residents increase in rural areas and as groundwater irrigation
systems becomes popular.
Because of the existence of these externalities, the private incentives for irrigation
investment and management tend to be smaller than the socially optimal level. This
problem becomes more serious as industrialization progresses. In the context of
surface irrigation management, as labor scarcity increases, the substitution of capital
for labor must proceed. However, the necessary investment may not reach to the
socially optimal level. The role of government can be observed in supporting capital
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investment in irrigation systems or the modernization of such systems to correct this
failure.
Now wemove to the case of externalities in groundwater. The over-dissemination
of wells and overexploitation of groundwater is commonly observed. This is indeed a
typical case of “the tragedy of the commons.” The use of groundwater by some indi-
vidual entails negative externalities for otherswho share a groundwater aquifer.With-
out sufficient groundwater recharge, the groundwater will eventually be depleted.
Furthermore, in many developing countries, governments use groundwater develop-
ment as a tool for rural development. Support for such development by the govern-
ment will make the depletion process more rapid. Regulations or interventions are
needed to control for these negative externalities.
Finally, let us discuss government failures. For a clearer understanding of the
formation of irrigation policies, it is important to distinguish between two kinds
of government failures. The first can occur when asymmetric information exists
between the government and the users. The government may fail to provide appro-
priate support if it cannot precisely estimate the demand for water by the farmers.
A possible solution is to get the farmers involved in the project design, which is
well-known as a participatory development approach. However, it seems that the
use of this solution becomes increasingly difficult for emerging states when support
from the government increases and the projects are handled by bureaucrats and tech-
nocrats of the irrigation authorities who are usually public servants, rather than local
farmers. This may be particularly so when the form of support is financial rather
than technical, because an increase in financial support makes the implementation
of irrigation projects similar to the provision of pure public goods.
Another type of government failure is related to the political economy. This prob-
lem occurs in a way that the government, expecting votes, tends to provide public
goods in favor of a particular group of people. As many studies argue, this frame-
work can convincingly explain why agricultural protection rises in many countries
when the comparative advantage of the agricultural sector declines and political
pressure from the farmers’ group increases. In the context of irrigation policies, the
government may use support for irrigation as ameans of protection, resulting in over-
investment in irrigation facilities, pumps, and wells. Note that agricultural protection
can be implemented by many means, such as output price support, input subsidies,
income support, and trade regulation. One may argue that support for irrigation is
better than price support as the former increases productivity while the latter spoils
productivity improvement incentives. Nevertheless, even the irrigation support must
be the one which increases labor productivity because the factor getting scarce is
labor.
In summary, through experiencing an increase in labor scarcity and/or the devel-
opment of groundwater irrigation under conditions of rapid industrialization and
globalization, the level of different kinds of externalities increases, and thus the need
for government interventions increases. Accordingly, the possibility of government
failures also increases. Because of such failures, the level of interventions could
either be too great or too little with a different combination of policies. The govern-
ment must achieve an appropriate level of intervention to facilitate the substitution of
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capital for labor as the resource endowment of the economy changes. This is difficult
but crucially important for sustainable development. In the following section, we
review how Japan, China, and India have dealt with these issues.
12.4 Case Studies
12.4.1 Japan’s Irrigation Policies Since the Late 19th Century
This section provides a historical review of Japan’s irrigation policies since the late
19th century.We divide our review into three periods based on the attitude of the gov-
ernment: (1) community-based management (1880s–1910s), (2) increasing financial
support by the government (1920s–1950s), and (3) financial takeover and modern-
ization by the government (1960s–2010s).
Community-based management (1880s–1910s) The origin of water manage-
ment institutions in which we can find the roots of current systems dates back to the
18th century, the mid-Edo period, when the rapid development of new paddy fields
increased water demand (Tamaki et al. 1984). Traditionally, irrigation infrastructures
were managed by local communities, with some exceptional cases of vast irrigation
systems which received supports from local or national authorities (Tamaki and
Hatate 1974). After theMeiji Restoration, the government replaced old systems with
modern ones, in many respects to “catch up” with the Western world. Exceptionally,
however, regarding water institutions, the government approved traditional water
rights in the River Act (Kasen-hou) of 1886 and allowed traditional communities to
handle the management. In addition, the Irrigation Association Code (Suiri-kumiai-
zyourei) of 1890 stipulated that irrigation development projects must be financed by
private sources (Tamaki et al. 1984).2 The local leaders, usually large landlords in
the rural area, bore the financial burden, and put their efforts into mobilizing local
resources for the development and management of irrigation facilities to improve
the social welfare of their local communities. In this regard, we may claim that the
government left the role of irrigation development andmanagement to the local com-
munities, and that the local landlords behaved as if they were the local government.
The local landlords had incentive to do so not only because they accepted the bur-
den as a local leader and tried to maintain their social status but also because the
improvement of land productivity in the entire community could increase the land
rent from their tenants. This division of work functioned well when the financial and
manpower capacity of the government was limited. Figure 12.2 shows the proportion
of financial support for such land improvement projects (mainly irrigation develop-
2Meanwhile, it was stipulated that projects related to public rivers were publicly financed.
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Fig. 12.2 Proportion of financial support for land improvement investment by the central and local
government in Japan from 1910 to 2004. Sources National Research Institute of Agricultural
Economics (1967) and Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (various years)
ment) undertaken by the central and local governments from 1910 to 2004.3 We can
observe that public financial support was rather low in the 1910s.
Financial support by the government (1920s–1950s) There was a turning point
in the 1920s regarding the roles of the community vis-a-vis the government. The local
landlords lost their interest in investing in the irrigationduring this period.The reasons
included a low rice price due to increased imports from the colonies, a decline in land
rent due to tenancy disputes with tenants, and, above all, an increase in investment
returns from emerging modern industrial sectors. Therefore, the agricultural sector
became a less attractive investment target for the landlords.Moreover, the transaction
costs associated with irrigation development became much greater than the amount
that local landlords could shoulder. As the coverage of the irrigation project area
became larger, the stakeholder farmers began spreading beyond the locality that
local leaders could manage. Therefore, the costs of the coordination of interests,
convincing dissenting farmers, and arranging compensation increased in this period.
Meanwhile, a riot caused by the rice shortage in 1918 led the government to
realize the importance of achieving an increase in the food supply. However, the
government was no longer able to rely on local leaders’ initiative, and thus started
providing financial support for irrigation development. For example, the guidelines
in 1923 (Youhaisui-kansenkairyou-hozyo-youkou) guaranteed 50% financial support
3Nakajima (1998) created this figure from 1910 to 1995. We replicated Fig. 12.2 with the original
data from 1910 to 1995 and extended the years usingMinistry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries
(various years).
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from the government for projects greater than 500 ha of irrigation command area.4 In
summary, as the role of the community (local leaders’ financial initiative) declined,
the government supplemented it in this period. Figure 12.2 shows that support started
increasing in the 1920s. This attitude continued until the 1950s, except during the
Second World War, when the government disproportionately mobilized funding for
the armament industry. In the 1950s, Japan achieved rice self-sufficiency.
Financial takeover and modernization by the government (1960s–2010s)
Japan experienced rapid industrialization and economic growth from the mid-1950s
to the mid-1970s. This led to a rapid reduction in the labor endowment in the agricul-
tural sector. This reduction entailed the loss of experienced water tenders, who were
knowledgeable about the water control and distribution of their irrigation systems.
In parallel, even among those who remained, farming became their side business
as their income from non-agricultural works increased. These changes made strict
and coordinated irrigation management more difficult among the remaining spatially
dispersed farmers, and this difficulty increased further when the experienced water
tenders were no longer available. From the relative resource endowment point of
view, this means that the need for the substitution of capital for labor (including
skilled labor) increased for efficient water use. However, as we explained earlier,
this substitution process does not occur automatically as an outcome of the market
mechanism. This is because there are externalities rooted in the feature of technolog-
ical indivisibility and collective management. Moreover, the other type of externality
(non-agricultural benefits) arose because the numbers of non-agricultural residents
increased in the rural areas adjacent to the urban or industrial zones during the period
of rapid industrialization. Because of the increase in the two kinds of externalities in
this period, the demand for government intervention increased.
Indeed, the Japanese government strengthened its support for irrigation develop-
ment in this period. Among many aspects, financial support increased from around
60% in the 1960s to 80% in the 1990s, and then to more than 90% in the 2000s
(Fig. 12.2).5 The projects in these periods included lining canals with concrete,
the replacement of canals with pipelines, the rehabilitation of water intake, and the
cleaning of dams and rivers with heavy machines. Automation and the remote con-
trol of water flows were also implemented, replacing the roles of the experienced
water tenders. These modernization projects substituted capital for labor. In addition,
the separation of water supply canals from drainage systems reduced the negative
externality from non-agricultural residents.
We can justify the government interventions in this period for two reasons: first,
the externalities were corrected by this public support; second, the changes caused by
such support were consistent with the changes in the relative resource endowment.
These kinds of active interventions were important for smooth economic growth
4To be precise, the threshold size of the project area was 500 cho, which is almost the same as
500 ha.
5There is one exceptional period showing a decrease in the mid-1950s after the achievement of rice
self-sufficiency.
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Fig. 12.3 Japan’s land improvement investment, rice production value, and rice income from 1960
to 2015. Source Data are from the home page of Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries
(Accessed November 2017). The sources of each series are as follows. Land improvement invest-
ment:Nougyou shokuryou kanren no keizai keisan. Rice production value: Seisannnougyou syotoku
toukei. Rice income: Nousanbutu seisanhi toukei. Note Rice income is computed as rice income
per 10 are times rice cultivated area in 10 acre. Rice cultivated area was taken form Skumotu toukei
at the homepage above. The definition of rice income per 10 are is as follows. Income revenue−
(total production cost – (imputed family labor cost+ imputed capital payment+ imputed land rent)).
Subsidies are not included in the revenue
because they circumvented the decline in irrigation services and the stagnation of
agricultural development.
At the same time, however, it is important to note that increased government
interventions raise the risk of government failures. Given the existence of asymmetric
information, the reduction in farmers’ self-finance and the reduction in farmers’
involvement may skew the level of investment toward overinvestment under the
pressure of the rent-seeking from the farmers. In order to examine this possibility, we
show the time series of the land improvement investment, the value of rice production,
and the rice income of Japan from 1960 to 2015 (Fig. 12.3). Although they are rough
indicators, we may say that the figure shows the trend of investment and its returns.
According to the figure, the investment and returns increased almost parallel until the
1980s. However, after that, the production value and the rice income had declined,
while the investment had continued increasing until the early 2000s.
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Major reasons for the decline in the production value from the 1980s to the early
2000s were the double effects of the drop in the rice procurement price and the reduc-
tion in the quantity of rice production.6 Even under such an adverse environment, if
the cost for production were reduced and thus the profitability improved, the income
would not decline this much. However, in reality, the cost was merely reduced,
resulting in a sharp decline in rice income as shown in the figure.7 It seemed that the
investment did not contribute much to the improvement of rice sector profitability
in this period. Note that the financial support by the government in the same period
increased from70 to 90% (Fig. 12.2).Moreover, since the 1970s the investment target
had changed from the modernization of irrigation infrastructure to the improvement
of individual farmers’ paddy fields, where the new target can be regarded as a pri-
vate property with much smaller externalities than irrigation infrastructure. In this
regard, we may claim that there was overinvestment to the less justifiable target by
the government.
After the 2000s, the land improvement investment had declined. Note, however,
that the income subsidies to the farmers (data are not shown in the figure), which have
less incentive for productivity improvement than the support for land improvement,
has been maintained (as of 2017) as a major mean to support the agricultural sector.
In summary, Japan’s experience teaches us that under increasing labor scarcity in
agriculture, it is important to provide public support for the substitution of capital for
labor and, at the same time, to introduce an appropriate mechanism that can suppress
the tendency for overinvestment under the trend of agricultural protectionism.
12.4.2 The Case of a Surface Gravity Irrigation Scheme
in Hubei, China8
Facing a rapid increase in water demand for urban and industrial use, China aimed
to achieve water savings in the agricultural sector, particularly in paddy farming
as this was considered the largest water consumer. The major effort to promote
6We set the comparison period from 1986 to 2003; the beginning year is the year of the record-high
price and the ending year is the year the government stopped the rice procurement policy. In this
period, the price dropped 26% from 18,505 (yen/60 kg) to 13,748 (yen/60 kg), and the production
quantity was reduced 21% from 11,035 (1000t) to 8,698 (1000t) in the same period, resulting in
a 38% reduction in the production value. The reduction of production quantity was mainly due
to the enforcement of the policy of reducing rice cultivated area. (Price data are from Shokuryo
toukei nenpou, production quantity data are from Seisannnougyou syotoku toukei. Production value
data are from Seisannnougyou syotoku toukei. All are taken from the homepage of the Ministry of
Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries)
7The average cost of production was reduced by 2% from 15,312 (yen/60 kg of rice) to 14,963
(yen/60 kg of rice) from 1986 to 2003, while the price was reduced by 26% from 18,505 (yen/60 kg)
to 13,748 (yen/60 kg) in the same period. The total rice income declined by 41%. (Price data are
from Shokuryo toukei nenpou, production cost data are from Nousanbutu seisanhi toukei. All are
taken from the homepage of the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries)
8This section draws heavily on Kajisa and Dong (2017).
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water conservation in the agricultural sector began in the 1990s, with considerable
regional variation in intervention tactics (Lohmar et al. 2007). In 2002, 20 provinces
implemented a reform of taxes and fees called fei gai shui. Before the reform, a water
fee was included in the land tax, equivalent to area-based pricing (i.e., zero marginal
costs for irrigation water). Hence, there was no economic incentive among the users
to save water. The reform called for separate water fees and increased independent
management for each reservoir. In reaction to this change, many reservoirs began
volumetric water pricing and expected this to have a significant impact on farmers’
water-saving behaviors. This subsection evaluates the outcomes of this policy, using
a survey conducted in an irrigation system (Zhanghe Irrigation System) in Hubei,
China, in 2008.
In a surface gravity irrigation system, effective collective action among water
users is needed to save water under volumetric pricing. This is because a feasible
pricing method measures the volume at a canal’s intake, and the total fee is charged
to the water user group (WUG) rather than to individual farmers. The total fee is then
divided among the WUG members by cultivated area. Therefore, the group has an
incentive to save water, while individual farmers within a group may overuse water
unless they are closely supervised. Institutional change must play an important role
in preventing this free-rider problem within a WUG.
After the reform, institutional changes occurred in theWUG’s traditional informal
collective management system. These changes can be classified into four categories:
(1) no change (or upholding informal management), (2) the formal appointment
of water managers, (3) the formation of new smaller groups, each of which was
a much smaller sub-set of farmers from neighboring plots only, and (4) individual
irrigation using water from private ponds. The changes to (2) and (3) can be regarded
as shifts toward water savings through more effective collective management under
a manager or within a small group. The change to (4) comprises an exit from the
irrigation system, resulting in increasing labor scarcity formanagement of the surface
irrigation system. At the time of the survey, farmers’ exit to non-agriculture activities
also accelerated the rural labor shortage.
An interesting point is that we observe cases of “(1) no change,” even when the
price level was high (hence there must have been a large incentive for savings).
Figure 12.4 shows the proportion of farmers within each water management insti-
tution by the volumetric price level of reservoir water (set at zero for area-based
pricing). In the group at the lowest price level, including the case of area-based
pricing, the farmers who chose no change account for the largest proportion (46%).
This is a natural outcome because the farmers had little incentive to implement strict
management for water savings. As the price goes up moderately, the proportion of
manager appointments and that of new smaller group formations increase. When
the price goes up further (beyond the 4th price range category), the attractiveness of
exiting from reservoir water use increases, and the proportion of individual irriga-
tion then increases. Moreover, the proportion of no change also increases, replacing
the other two water-saving institutions (i.e., manager appointment and new smaller
groups). The figure generally shows a U-shaped relationship for the volumetric price
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Fig. 12.4 The proportion of sample farmers in the four types of irrigation institutions by the vol-
umetric price of reservoir water, Zhanghe Irrigation System, Hubei, China in 2008. Source Kajisa
and Dong (2017)
Table 12.1 presents the average water prices and water use of the sample farmers
by water management institution.9 Note that as the no-change cases were observed
either under area-based pricing or under volumetric pricing, we further divide these
cases into two categories. The upper part of the table, which shows WUG-level
average price, indicates that the no-change case under volumetric pricing has the
highest average volumetric price of all (0.080), being consistent with the existence
of this case in the 4th and 5th price categories in Fig. 12.4.
The lower part of the table shows three kinds of farm-level water use statistics:
total water use (mm) consisting of reservoir water use (mm) and individual water
use (mm), where water use is measured in terms of the cumulative net water depth
(mm) applied to a paddy field of a farmer. Our major focus is on the change in
reservoir water use with application of volumetric pricing. The table shows that
farmers reduced reservoir water use in all institutions under volumetric pricing, as in
the cases of (2), (3), and (4). However, it is worth noting that the farmers in the no-
change case—the case of (2)—saved the least water (144 mm, significantly different
from the area-based case, 232mm, at 10%), in spite of the highest average volumetric
price level. Amore significant reduction is observed in themanager appointment case
(102 mm, significant at 1%) and the new smaller group case (89 mm, significant at
9Note that the non-price restriction on water use (e.g., a quota) did not exist in any pricing method.
Hence, this restriction was not the reason for water savings.
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Table 12.1 Water price and water use by water institution of sample farmers, Zhanghe Irrigation






































235 (138) 197 (85) 163* (114) 114*** (81) 175 (133)
Reservoir water use
(mm)
232 (140) 144* (80) 102*** (82) 89*** (66)
Individual water use
(mm)
3 (9) 54** (67) 61* (102) 25 (67) 175***
(133)
No. of obs. (farmers) 11 17 31 25 51
Source Kajisa and Dong (2017)
Note Standard deviations are in parentheses. *Indicates t-test for the mean difference in water use
from (1) Area-based no change, *p <0.1, **p <0.05, ***p <0.01
1%). This narrative is quantitatively verified by means of regression analyses in
Kajisa and Dong (2017).
Whydid volumetric pricingnotwork as expectedwhen the pricewas set very high?
It should be noted that a high price induced the exit of surface gravity irrigation users
and, additionally, that the surface gravity irrigation systems entail externalities. After
the exit of some farmers in favor of private ponds, the remaining surface irrigation
users’ plots became separated by the pond users’ plots and, thus, became segmented
from each other, which made it difficult for a remaining surface water user to observe
the other remaining users’ water use. Moreover, the farmers who exited from surface
irrigationwere likely to putmuch less effort into (or even stop participating in) surface
irrigation management. Hence, the exit of some members from the WUG made the
management and maintenance by the remaining farmers too difficult to continue,
resulting in the failure of water savings among them despite the very high water
price. We note that our study area may be more likely than other areas to suffer this
kind of problem because the topography of the area is rolling and thus it is difficult
to observe other farmers’ irrigation behavior unless they are immediate neighbors.
Furthermore, an increasing popularity of non-agricultural work opportunities would
further decrease incentive for strict management, having aggravated this problem.
Hence, this example may be an exaggerated case and similar cases may not be easily
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found in other areas. Nevertheless, the basic logic may be applicable to other areas as
one of the reasons for declining collective management. Indeed, this case is similar
to Japan’s experience during its rapid industrialization, in which the exit of full-time
farmers resulted in the decline of collective management.
What are the lessons from China’s case? It implies that volumetric pricing is an
effective method for water savings but needs a careful implementation because water
savings failed when strict management became difficult under labor shortage (due to
exit to private ponds in this case). Based on Japan’s experience, we suggest that the
authority may support the substitution of capital for labor, so that the system can be
managed properly with fewer users. A possible option is to support investments in
canals and water control devices to make water flow more visible (and thus measur-
able) and controllable (ideally, the system should be something similar to a domestic
water system). To enhance the effect of this investment, reshaping of paddy fields
into a more regular shape would be effective. Currently, Chinese farmers own several
small parcels over scattered areas. The creation of a few larger parcels through merg-
ing and exchanging with others also makes water management easier. This is indeed
what Japan did in its rapid industrialization period. Another lesson from Japan is that
China seems to already be in the stage of rising agricultural protection and now they
may have to be cautious about over-investment in such facilities.
12.4.3 The Case of Tank Irrigation Systems in Tamil Nadu,
India10
Traditional irrigation systems in Tamil Nadu are tank systems, which consist of
a water storage area (a tank), sluices, and canals. This communal infrastructure
has collectively been managed by informal local bodies. Farmers use this irrigation
water mainly for rice (the staple food of the area), as well as for cotton, groundnuts,
sugarcane, and vegetables.
Three factors accelerated the exit of the farmers from tank systems during the early
1990s: (1) migration to urban and foreign non-agricultural sectors, (2) reductions in
electric pump prices and well-digging costs, and (3) a free electricity power policy.
The first factor, migration, started with the country’s rapid industrialization when
the government started its economic liberalization policies in 1991. In addition,
globalizationmade overseasworksmore accessible. An important change underlying
this trend was that water tenders, called Neerkatti in local terms, who were hired
from some specific scheduled caste families under a hereditary system, left water
management for non-agricultural work, seeking higher wages as well as freedom
from the hereditary system (Jegadeesan and Fujita 2011). This is similar to what
happened in Japan in that the scarcity of experiencedwater tenders increasedwith the
rapid industrialization. The second and the third factors caused the massive diffusion
of private wells and pumps (Fig. 12.5). The shift in the relative share in Fig. 12.5
10This section draws heavily on Kajisa (2012) and Kajisa et al. (2007).
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Fig. 12.5 Percentage share of well-irrigated and tank-irrigated area in total irrigated area in Tamil
Nadu from 1960 to 2005. Source Kajisa et al. (2007)
reflects not only a preference for private wells when new systems were installed, but
also the actual replacement of tank systems with well systems (Paramasivam 2009).
This hastened the exit of farmers from the tank irrigation system.
The exit of such farmers eventually resulted in the decline of tank management,
and hence agricultural performance in the tank irrigated area, because of the negative
externality caused by their exit. Then, as a reaction to this change, more farmers
tended to switch to pumps and wells for groundwater irrigation. As such, a vicious
cycle can be observed. From thewelfare point of view, theworst casewas that farmers
suffered from tank deterioration but had no recourse to groundwater. The rice yields
greatly declined in this case. Table 12.2 summarizes the rice yield, household income
per capita, head count poverty ratio, and rice profit by irrigation status, classified by
the condition of tanks (deteriorated or maintained) and by the access to groundwater
(access or no access). The aforementioned worst case corresponds to column (1) in
the table. The table shows not only that this group achieved the lowest rice yield, but
also that the compensation for yield loss through income diversification was difficult
and, thus the farmers in this group obtained the lowest income and tended to fall into
poverty.
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Table 12.2 Comparison of rice yield, income, poverty ratio, and rice profit by irrigation status of
sample farmers, Tamil Nadu, India, in 1999
Irrigation status (1) (2) (3) (4)
Condition of tank Deteriorated Maintained Deteriorated Maintained
Access to wells No-access No-access Access Access
Rice yield (t/ha) 3.2 3.6 4.4 4.1
Household income per capita
(Rs./month)a
262 309 561 589
Head count poverty ratiob 0.67 0.59 0.30 0.24
Rice profit (Rs./ha) −929 4,801 1,897 5,619
Source Kajisa (2012)
Note aThe value is converted into a per capita base using the adult equivalent number of household
members
bThe international poverty line of US$1 per day, adjusted for purchasing power parity, has been
used. Use of the national poverty line of Rs. 324 (equivalent to US$ 36.4 at PPP exchange rate)
monthly per capita for 1993–94 does not change the qualitative results
The story does not end here; some negative effects were also experienced by well
users. As groundwater extraction entails negative externality, as explained earlier,
the likely outcome is the overexploitation of groundwater beyond a socially optimal
level, and thus more costly irrigation.11 Eventually, well users became unable to earn
as much profit for rice as they had previously due to the unsustainable depletion of
the water resource. Table 12.2 shows that among the groundwater users (columns
(3) and (4)), the profit obtained with deteriorated tanks is much lower than in the
other case, regardless of the fact that they did not have to rely overly on deteriorated
tanks. Provided that such tank deterioration occurred in high well density areas, the
most likely reason for the lower profit was the costlier well irrigation due to ground-
water scarcity in the high well density area. In fact, a major reason for lower profit
is increased family labor costs for longer and more careful groundwater irrigation.
Detailed regression analyses support this narrative (Kajisa 2012). In summary, the
exit of farmers from tank irrigation to groundwater irrigation resulted in a double
tragedy: increased poverty among tank users who had no recourse to groundwater
and potentially no long-term profit among groundwater users. Currently, the imple-
mentation of generous social safety net polices, such as a work guarantee program
and food rationing, have masked the complaints from the farmers, but the tragedy in
agriculture has been actually taking place behind the mask.
What should the authority do? First, some policies discouraging investment in
groundwater irrigation are needed. Such policies would not only reduce the overex-
ploitation of groundwater but would also encourage the revitalization of tank irri-
11Under the free electricity policy in Tamil Nadu, an increase in irrigation costs largely derives
from an increase in family labor input. When the groundwater table declines, farmers must spend
a longer time working for the same amount of water and prepare field water channels with greater
care to minimize water loss. Our observations indicate that the activities related to such operations
are carried out mostly by family labor, rather than by hired labor, to avoid shirking and cheating.
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gation management (by increasing the number of farmers remaining in the tank
system). The termination of the free electricity policy sounds reasonable and effec-
tive but could be politically difficult because politicians fear the loss of votes from
rural farmers. As Japan’s experience shows, an overdose of agricultural protection
is one of the most challenging problems in the rapidly growing countries. We must
focus our greatest efforts on finding solutions to this issue.
Second, similar to the cases of Japan and China, support for the substitution of
capital for labor is another possible solution.12 This support is justifiable not only
from the viewpoint of the existence of the first type of externality but also from
that of second type because people started recognizing the amenity benefits of the
tanks.13 Note, however, that concrete canal lining or pipeline installations, as in
Japan, might not be the appropriate means of substitution because water flow and
the location of water intake will be fixed once such facilities are installed. In Tamil
Nadu, farmers cultivate multiple crops over the seasons in a single year, and they
also change cropping patterns over the years. Hence, the water flow structure in the
command area must remain flexible. A possible labor-saving intervention might be
the use of heavy machines for tank cleaning to maintain the supply capacity. Such
substitutions must proceed in a way that suits the local farming systems.
12.5 Concluding Remarks
In all three cases, the fundamental underlying change was the decline in the num-
ber of traditional irrigation system users. Therefore, the most appropriate strategy
reflecting the change in factor endowment is the substitution of capital for labor. Nei-
ther the market nor the community can achieve this substitution properly because of
the increasing externalities and the rapid decline of community mechanisms in the
emerging states. We must understand that the demand for active involvement of the
government increases for these countries and the government should not hesitate to
implement policies supporting labor saving investments in irrigation management.14
It is important to recognize this point because we tend to assume abundant labor
in rural area in LDCs and, thus, try to develop strategies for labor mobilization for
12The tanks larger than 100 ac. are already under the control of public authority (Public Works
Department), meanwhile those smaller than 100 ac are under the control of local communities. Our
implication applies particularly to the latter ones.
13Encroachments of residences in the water catchment area, which reduces the amount of water
stored in the tanks, is a unique problem of tank irrigation system. This is another example of negative
externality which require some interventions.
14Revitalization or restructuring of a community as a new unit with the new linkages among the
members can be an alternative solution to the decline of the traditional community. Japan’s experi-
ence, however, implies that seeking this solution is not easy because the support for group farming
did not work successfully and then the government has eventually shifted toward an individual
support. Nevertheless, we do not deny the potential role of the new community in the aspects other
than irrigation management. One possible benefit may be the provision of informal social safety
net among the newly linked members.
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successful collectivemanagement.With the academic success of Ostrom’s group, the
development society seems to believe the high potential of the community to achieve
successful collective management. In fact, development strategies such as the com-
munity participatory approach and the transfer of management to local institutions
boomed in the 1980s. The community seems to have been used as a convenient insti-
tution for solutions to resource management issues. However, the use of community
is not a panacea, which is particularly so among emerging states.15 The government
can also play an important role.
The role of government is more important among the emerging states because
of two contemporary issues. First, the overexploitation of groundwater is a serious
problem in many LDCs. Since this problem is related with negative externality, we
can find again an important role of the government. Second, not only the groundwa-
ter but also fresh surface water is becoming scarce in the emerging states because
of the increasing demand in industrial and urban sectors. Introduction of volumetric
irrigation water pricing is regarded as one of the solutions for water savings in the
agricultural sector. To make this system work in the emerging states, the moderniza-
tion of irrigation facilities for water control and measurement must come together
with the introduction of a new pricing system. This strengthens our argument on
the necessity for smooth substitution of capital for labor. These two contemporary
issues indicate that the emerging state must deal with resource scarcity issues more
seriously than the time DCs used to do, and the role of the government is becoming
crucially important.
Although we admit an increasing importance in the role of the government,
we also learn from Japan’s experience that we need some mechanism which helps
us circumvent excessive support following the trend for increasing agricultural
protectionism during rapid industrialization. The protection of the agricultural sector
can have a positive role in the economic development under certain contexts. For
example, it can reduce the risk of social unrest in rapidly growing economies where
the agricultural income grows slower than that of the industrial sector. However,
the support provided must be that which can achieve sustainable agricultural
growth thorough the correction of externalities, rather than that which will result in
stagnation under such protection.
In this regard, we cannot be too optimistic about the direction China and India
are moving in. Anderson and Martin (2008) shows the increasing trend of the nomi-
nal rate of assistance, an indicator of agricultural protection, of these two countries.
Although the level of protection was still low (6% for China and 16% for India in
2000–2004, compared with 137% in Korea and 61% in Taiwan), the trend shown
in these countries is the same as the one predicted by Honma’s political economy
framework (see Chap. 10). Moreover, in India, the source of protection largely came
from subsidies for fertilizer and electricity (for irrigation pumps), which are for
farmers’ income support but not for sustainable agricultural growth (Anderson and
15It is not Ostrom who advocated the versatileness of community. Rather, the development society
seemed to overdose such policies. In later year, Ostrom (2007) and Meinzen-Dick (2007) tried to
adjust the trend in their synthesis using a phrase of “beyond panaceas.”
12 Role of Community and Government in Irrigation Management … 291
Martin 2008). Our cases exemplify the difficulties the emerging states would face in
circumventing the trap of agricultural protectionism. However, the government must
clearly understand that maintaining the support and protection without productiv-
ity improvement eventually become a huge financial burden to the state. Choosing
appropriate policies under pressures from different interest groups is a challenging
political economy issue for the emerging states, but they certainly must deal with
it by upgrading their political systems and convince their citizens not to repeat the
same mistake that some DCs had made.
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